area handbook series 

China 

a country study 



China 

a country study 



Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Edited by 
Robert L. Worden, 
Andrea Matles Savada, 
and Ronald E. Dolan 
Research Completed 
July 1987 



On the cover: The artist's pen-and-ink rendering of a cast- 
bronze horse, chariot, and driver of the Eastern Han 
dynasty (A.D. 25-220) reveals the dual sense of vitality 
and passivity often found in Chinese art. 



Fourth Edition, First Printing, 1988. 

Copyright ®1988 United States Government as represented by 
the Secretary of the Army. All rights reserved. 

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data 

China, a country study. 
(DA pam; 550-60) 

"Research completed September 1987." 
Bibliography: p. 637. 
Includes index. 

Supt. of Docs. no. : LC D101 .22:60/987 
1. China. I. Worden, Robert L., 1945- . II. Savada, 
Andrea Matles, 1950- . III. Dolan, Ronald E., 1939- 
IV. Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. V. Series. 

DS706.C489 1988 951 87-600493 



Headquarters, Department of the Army 
DA Pam 550-60 
Supersedes 1981 edition 



I .., Sale by [he Superintenclenl of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 



Foreword 



This volume is one in a continuing series of books now being 
prepared by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Con- 
gress under the Country Studies — Area Handbook Program. The 
last page of this book lists the other published studies. 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, 
describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national 
security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelation- 
ships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural 
factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social 
scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of 
the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static 
portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make 
up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com- 
mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature 
and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their 
attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and 
political order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not 
be construed as an expression of an official United States govern- 
ment position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to 
adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections, 
additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be wel- 
comed for use in future editions. 

The Chief 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, D.C. 20540 



in 



Acknowledgments 



The authors wish to acknowledge their use and adaptation of 
several chapters from the 1981 edition of China: A Country Study, 
edited by Frederica M. Bunge and Rinn-Sup Shinn. In particu- 
lar, substantial parts of the following chapters were incorporated 
by the authors of the new edition: Martin Weil's "Physical Envi- 
ronment and Population," Joel N. Glassman's "Education and 
Culture," Thomas R. Gottschang's "Industry" and "Trade and 
Transportation," Rinn-Sup Shinn's "Party and Government," 
and David G. Barlow and Daniel W. Wagner's "Public Order and 
Internal Security." 

The authors also are indebted to a number of individuals in the 
United States government and in international, diplomatic, and 
private organizations who gave of their time and special knowledge 
on Chinese affairs to provide research data and perspective. Those 
who were particularly helpful were Judith Banister of the United 
States Bureau of the Census; Paul Schroeder of the Map Library, 
Department of State; Edward P. Parris of the Department of 
Defense; Chi Wang of the Asian Division, Library of Congress; 
and Constance A. Johnson of the Far Eastern Law Library, Library 
of Congress. The photographs that illustrate this study were gener- 
ously contributed by a variety of individuals and public and pri- 
vate organizations. All have been credited in the captions. In 
particular, Liu Haiming of the Embassy of the People's Republic 
of China assisted in making available numerous photographs on 
diverse subjects. None of the aforementioned individuals or their 
organizations, however, are responsible for the contents of the book. 

The authors also wish to express their appreciation to members 
of the staff of the Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 
who contributed to the preparation of the book. Foremost among 
these was Barbara L. Dash, who meticulously reviewed the text. 
Without her assistance the entire effort would not have been as 
complete and as finely tuned as it has come to be. Ms. Dash was 
assisted in editing by Glenn E. Curtis and Martha E. Hopkins, 
who also managed production of the book. Mervin J. Shello and 
Ly H. Burnham examined specialized and technical sections of the 
manuscript, and Carolina E. Forrester reviewed textual references 
to China's geography and scrutinized the maps that appear in this 
volume. David P. Cabitto, Sandra K. Cotugno, and Kimberly Lord 
provided copious graphic arts support. Tracy M. Henry assisted 
on numerous phases of the book, including wordprocessing of 



v 



chapter texts, formatting and typing much of the tabular data, and 
proofreading. Alberta Jones King, Barbara Edgerton, and Izella 
Watson diligently provided wordprocessing. Richard F. Nyrop 
reviewed all parts of the book and made valuable suggestions 
throughout its development. 

Others who contributed to this edition were Paulette A. Marshall, 
who designed the cover and chapter illustrations; Teresa E. Kamp, 
who prepared several of the maps; and Margaret Varghese of 
Editorial Experts, who compiled the index. Andrea T. Merrill made 
a very important contribution to the overall consistency and qual- 
ity of the book in performing the final, prepublication review. Also, 
the late John G. Early, head of the Printing and Processing Sec- 
tion, Library of Congress, was instrumental in establishing proce- 
dures for typesetting the final text. Peggy F. Pixley, of the same 
section, directed the actual typesetting, which was accomplished 
by Diann Johnson. 



VI 



Contents 



Page 

Foreword iii 

Acknowledgments v 

Preface xvii 

Country Profile XXI 

Introduction XXXI 

Chapter 1. Historical Setting l 

Rinn-Sup Shinn and Robert L. Worden 

THE ANCIENT DYNASTIES 5 

The Dawn of History 5 

The Zhou Period 6 

The Hundred Schools of Thought 7 

THE IMPERIAL ERA 11 

The First Imperial Period 11 

Era of Disunity 13 

Restoration of Empire 13 

Mongolian Interlude 16 

The Chinese Regain Power 18 

The Rise of the Manchus 18 

EMERGENCE OF MODERN CHINA 21 

The Western Powers Arrive 21 

The Opium War, 1839-42 22 

The Taiping Rebellion, 1851-64 23 

The Self-Strengthening Movement 24 

The Hundred Days' Reform and the Aftermath 28 

The Republican Revolution of 1911 29 

REPUBLICAN CHINA 30 

Nationalism and Communism 31 

Anti-Japanese War 36 

Return to Civil War 38 

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 39 

The Transition to Socialism, 1953-57 41 

The Great Leap Forward, 1958-60 43 

Readjustment and Recovery, 1961-65 46 

The Cultural Revolution Decade, 1966-76 47 

The Post-Mao Period, 1976-78 53 

China and the Four Modernizations, 1979-82 54 



vn 



Chapter 2. Physical Environment and 

Population 59 

Michael L. Waddle 

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT 62 

Boundaries 64 

Terrain and Drainage 65 

Climate 71 

Wildlife 71 

POPULATION 72 

The Data Base 72 

Mortality and Fertility 74 

Population Control Programs 75 

Density and Distribution 78 

Migration 78 

Minority Nationalities 84 

Policy 87 

Labor Force 88 

Health Care 90 

Chapter 3. The Social System 97 

Donald R. DeGlopper 

ETHNIC BOUNDARIES 99 

HAN DIVERSITY AND UNITY 101 

TRADITIONAL SOCIETY AND CULTURE 103 

Diffusion of Values 105 

The Confucian Legacy 105 

Traditional Social Structure 106 

The Examination System 107 

Social Stratification 108 

Stratification and Families 109 

Social Mobility 110 

SOCIAL CHANGE 112 

DIFFERENTIATION 114 

The Work Place 114 

Communist Party Membership 116 

Urban-Rural Distinctions 117 

Regional Distinctions 118 

COMMON PATTERNS 119 

Work Units 120 

Wages and Benefits 121 

Informal Mechanisms of Exchange 122 

RURAL SOCIETY 124 

Collectivization and Class Status 124 

Decollectivization 125 



Vlll 



The Role of the Household 126 

Consequences of Rural Reform 127 

Regulations and Favors 128 

Family and Household 130 

Marriage 132 

Community Structure 133 

URBAN SOCIETY 134 

Distinctive Features 134 

Housing 136 

Families and Marriage 138 

Providing for the Next Generation 139 

Opportunities and Competition 140 

Examinations, Hereditary Transmission of Jobs, 

and Connections 142 

WOMEN 143 

RELIGION 145 

TRENDS AND TENSIONS 147 

Chapter 4. Education and Culture 151 

Andrea Matles Savada and Ronald E. Do lan 

EDUCATION POLICY 154 

THE EDUCATION SYSTEM 156 

New Directions 156 

Compulsory Education Law 157 

Key Schools 159 

PRIMARY EDUCATION 160 

Primary Schools 160 

Preschool Education 162 

Special Education 163 

SECONDARY EDUCATION 163 

Middle Schools 163 

Vocational and Technical Schools 164 

HIGHER EDUCATION 166 

Background 166 

Modernization Goals in the 1980s 168 

Entrance Examinations and Admission Criteria 169 

Changes in Enrollment and Assignment Policies 171 

Scholarship and Loan System 173 

Study Abroad 173 

Educational Investment 174 

TEACHERS 176 

ADULT EDUCATION 177 

Role in Modernization 177 

Alternative Forms 177 

Literacy and Language Reform 179 



IX 



POLICY TOWARD INTELLECTUALS 180 

Background 180 

Post-Mao Development 182 

CULTURE AND THE ARTS 185 

Traditional Literature 185 

Modern Prose 188 

Literature in the Post-Mao Period 189 

Traditional Arts 190 

Contemporary Performing Arts 195 

Publishing 198 

Chapter 5. Economic Context 205 

Thomas R. Gottschang 

GENERAL NATURE OF THE ECONOMY 210 

ECONOMIC POLICIES, 1949-80 213 

Recovery from War, 1949-52 213 

The First Five-Year Plan, 1953-57 215 

The Great Leap Forward, 1958-60 216 

Readjustment and Recovery: "Agriculture First," 

1961-65 218 

Events During the Cultural Revolution, 1966-76 .... 220 

The Post-Mao Interlude, 1976-78 222 

Reform of the Economic System, Beginning in 1979 . . 223 

STRUCTURE AND OPERATION OF 

THE ECONOMY 228 

Roles of the Government and the Party 228 

The Two Major Sectors: Agriculture and Industry ... 231 

Other Important Sectors 236 

Planning 238 

The Budget 242 

The Banking System 243 

Prices 246 

LIVING STANDARDS 250 

Progress since 1949 250 

Food 251 

Clothing 252 

Consumer Goods 254 

Housing 254 

Income Distribution 255 

POTENTIAL FOR ACHIEVING NATIONAL GOALS 260 

Chapter 6. Agriculture 265 

Frederick W. Crook 

RESOURCES ENDOWMENT 268 



x 



AGRICULTURAL POLICIES 271 

The 1950s 271 

Importance of Agriculture Recognized 273 

Recovery 274 

Post-Mao Policies 275 

PLANNING AND ORGANIZATION 278 

OPERATIONAL METHODS AND INPUTS 281 

Cropping Patterns 281 

Fertilizer 281 

Mechanization 282 

Water Conservancy 284 

Pest Control 284 

Seed Varieties 285 

Agricultural Science 285 

PRODUCTION 286 

Crops 286 

Animal Husbandry 291 

Forestry 292 

Fishery 292 

Sideline Production 292 

AGRICULTURAL TRADE 294 

Chapter 7. Industry 299 

Michael L. Waddle 

TRENDS IN INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION 302 

ORGANIZATION 305 

GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRY 305 

LEVEL OF TECHNOLOGY 306 

SUPPLIES OF INDUSTRIAL RESOURCES 308 

Capital 308 

Labor 309 

Raw Materials 309 

Energy 310 

MANUFACTURING 310 

Iron and Steel 310 

Machine Building 313 

Chemicals 317 

Building Materials 318 

Paper 319 

Textiles 320 

Food Processing 321 

Other Consumer Goods 322 

CONSTRUCTION 322 

Housing Construction 322 

Capital Construction 323 



xi 



MINING 324 

Coal 324 

Iron Ore 324 

Other Minerals and Metals 325 

ENERGY 326 

Oil and Natural Gas 326 

Electric and Nuclear Power 328 

RURAL INDUSTRY 331 

DEFENSE INDUSTRY 332 

Chapter 8. Trade and Transportation 335 

Roxane D. V. Sismanidis and Ernestine H. Wang 

INTERNAL TRADE AND DISTRIBUTION 337 

Agriculture 337 

Industry 340 

Lateral Economic Cooperation 342 

Retail Sales 343 

FOREIGN TRADE 344 

History of Chinese Foreign Trade 344 

Trade Policy in the 1980s 347 

Organization of Foreign Trade 349 

Composition of Foreign Trade 352 

Trading Partners 353 

Tourism 354 

TRANSPORTATION 354 

Railroads 357 

Subways 358 

Highways and Roads 360 

Bridges 361 

Inland Waterways 361 

Maritime Shipping 362 

Civil Aviation 363 

POSTAL SERVICES 364 

TELECOMMUNICATIONS 365 

Historical Development 365 

Telecommunication Services 366 

Chapter 9. Science and Technology 371 

Donald R. DeGlopper 

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENCE 

AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY 374 

Pre- 1949 Patterns 374 

Soviet Influence in the 1950s 377 

"Reds" Versus "Experts" in the 1950s and 1960s . . . 379 

Rehabilitation and Rethinking, 1977-84 382 



xii 



SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE 1980s 386 

The Supply of Skilled Manpower 386 

Research Institutes 387 

National Organization and Administration 387 

Integration of Administrative Systems 393 

International Ties 395 

THE REFORM PROGRAM 397 

Shortcomings of the Science and Technology 

System 397 

The Program 398 

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 403 

Policy 403 

Modes of Transfer 403 

Linking Technology and Economics 404 

Chapter 10. Party and Government 407 

Marcia R. Ristaino 

CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY 411 

Party Constitution 411 

National Party Congresses 412 

Central Committee and Political Bureau 413 

Secretariat 415 

Central Military Commission 415 

Other Party Organs 416 

Membership 417 

Mass Organizations 418 

THE GOVERNMENT 421 

Constitutional Framework 421 

The National People's Congress 424 

The State Council 426 

The Judiciary 427 

Local Administration 428 

The Cadre System 434 

THE MEDIA 437 

Chapter 11. The Political Process 443 

Marcia R. Ristaino 

POLITICAL REALIGNMENTS AT THE PARTY 

CENTER 447 

Deng Xiaoping Consolidates Power 447 

Institutionalizing Collective Leadership 450 

A Successor Generation 452 



THE FIRST WAVE OF REFORM, 1979-84 453 

The Opening Up Policy and Reform in the 

Countryside 454 

Rectification and Reform 456 

THE SECOND WAVE OF REFORM, 1984-86 458 

The Repercussions of Urban Reform 458 

The Decentralization of Power 459 

THE THIRD WAVE OF REFORM, BEGINNING IN 

1986 460 

Political Reform 460 

Resistance and the Campaign Against Bourgeois 

Liberalization 461 

THE POLITICS OF MODERNIZATION 462 

The Components of Reform 463 

Competing Bureaucratic Interests 463 

Deng Xiaoping's Seminal Role 465 

MARXISM-LENINISM-MAO ZEDONG THOUGHT 

RE-THOUGHT 465 

The Role of Ideology 466 

Ideology and the Socialist Man 468 

Ideology and Social Change 468 

Chapter 12. Foreign Relations 471 

Elizabeth E. Green 

EVOLUTION OF FOREIGN POLICY 475 

Historical Legacy and Worldview 475 

Nationalism 476 

The Influence of Ideology 478 

Decision Making and Implementation 481 

AN OVERVIEW OF CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS ... 488 

Sino-Soviet Relations 488 

Sino-American Relations 492 

Relations with the Third World 495 

Relations with the Developed World 498 

China's Role in International Organizations 501 

Chapter 13. Criminal Justice and Public 

Security 505 

Ronald E. Dolan 

THE LEGAL SYSTEM 508 

Imperial China 508 

The Republican Period 509 

Developments after 1949 509 

Return to Socialist Legality 517 



xiv 



COURT STRUCTURE AND PROCESS 522 

LAW ENFORCEMENT 525 

Historical Background 525 

Public Security Forces 529 

Grass-Roots Organizations 534 

THE PENAL SYSTEM 537 

Chapter 14. National Defense 541 

Roxane D. V. Sismanidis 

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT, 1927-79 545 

From the Founding of the People's Liberation Army 

to the Korean War 545 

Military Modernization in the 1950s and 1960s 547 

The People's Liberation Army in the Cultural 

Revolution 549 

Military Modernization in the 1970s 551 

MILITARY MODERNIZATION 553 

Civil-Military Relations 555 

Political Role of the People's Liberation Army 555 

Military Organization 557 

Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics 562 

Education and Training 564 

Personnel 565 

Defense Industry and the Economic Role of the 

People's Liberation Army 568 

PERCEPTION OF THREAT 575 

The Soviet Union 576 

Vietnam 577 

India 578 

South China Sea 579 

Taiwan 579 

FOREIGN MILITARY COOPERATION 579 

FORCE STRUCTURE 582 

Ground Forces 582 

Air Force 583 

Navy 585 

Nuclear Forces 587 

Paramilitary Forces 590 

ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND PROSPECTS 593 

Appendix A. Tables 595 

Appendix B. Chronology and Lists 617 

Appendix C. The People's Liberation Army at a 

Glance 633 

XV 



Bibliography 637 

Glossary 699 

Index 709 

List of Figures 

1 China, 1988 xxx 

2 The Chinese Empire, circa 220 B.C., A.D. 700, 1580, and 

1775 12 

3 China-Soviet Union Border Area 66 

4 Topography and Drainage 70 

5 Population Density, 1982 79 

6 Distribution of Major Minority Nationalities 85 

7 Gross National Product and Major Economic Sectors, 

1952-86 212 

8 Agricultural Regions, 1987 269 

9 Per Capita Gross Value of Agricultural Output 

(GVAO) and Crop Production, 1952-83 276 

10 Composition of Agricultural Exports and Imports, 1985 . . . 296 

11 Major Industrial Facilities, 1987 307 

12 Steel Production and Capacity, 1948-86 314 

13 Coal Reserves and Major Mining Areas, 1987 325 

14 Major Oil Basins and Oil Fields, 1987 329 

15 Railroads and Major Air and Sea Ports, 1987 355 

16 Principal Improved Inland Waterways, 1987 363 

17 Organization of the Science and Technology 

Establishment 389 

18 Organization of the Chinese Communist Party, 1987 414 

19 The Structure of the Government, 1987 428 

20 Organization of the People's Courts and People's 

Procuratorates, 1987 524 

21 Organization of the Public Security System, 1987 530 

22 Organization of the Military Establishment, 1987 558 

23 Military Regions and Fleet Commands, 1986 563 



xvi 



Preface 



China in the 1980s was a nation rapidly modernizing as its leader- 
ship implemented sweeping reforms in the economic, social, and 
political sectors and adopted a policy of opening up to the outside 
world. The scale and pace of China's comprehensive moderniza- 
tion program have necessitated this new and updated edition of 
China: A Country Study, which supersedes the third edition published 
in 1981 under the same title. Much of what was reported in 1981 
has been overtaken by events. Sources of information in the new 
edition have included scholarly journals and monographs, official 
reports of governments and international organizations, foreign and 
domestic media reports, numerous periodicals, and, significantly, 
the increasingly available and accurate Chinese government statisti- 
cal reports and analyses. Bibliographic essays calling attention to 
useful sources of further reading appear at the end of each chapter. 

The aim of the authors has been to present an understanding 
of China in a period of transition and modernization against the 
backdrop of both a long and illustrious historical heritage and 
twentieth-century political turmoil. As an aid to readers seeking 
an understanding of the broad framework of China's long history, 
a chronology of dynasties is provided (see table A). Increasingly 
reliable information about all sectors of Chinese society became 
available in the 1980s — emanating from scholars and technical 
experts, both Chinese and foreign — aiding the authors of this 
volume in presenting what is hoped is a clear and thoughtful analy- 
sis. Nevertheless, gaps in data and inconsistent reporting have 
required the authors to make interpretations and conclusions, some 
of which must be regarded as highly tentative. Both old questions 
and new developments need additional investigation by interested 
observers of Chinese affairs. 

With certain minor exceptions, Chinese personal names and 
place-names in this study are represented according to the pinyin 
system of romanization. For those familiar with the Wade-Giles 
system of romanization, once commonly used in Western-language 
publications on Chinese subjects and still used in whole or in part 
by some, conversions are provided for pinyin, Wade-Giles, and 
conventional ("post office") spellings of major place-names (see 
table 2, table 3, Appendix A). The standard spellings provided by 
the United States Board on Geographic Names are used through- 
out the book. Exceptions were made for the names of well-known 
historical figures like Confucius and Sun Yat-sen and certain 



xvn 



place-names, such as Hong Kong and Macao, to coincide with offi- 
cial usage in English-language publications of the government of 
the People's Republic of China. It should be noted too that in the 
text and on maps some generic parts of Chinese geographic names 
have been retained in following Chinese official usage in foreign- 
language publications. Thus jiang and he (river), hai (sea), wan (bay), 
and shan and ling (mountain) have been used, but the English terms 
have been retained for island, plateau, basin, plain, desert, 
province, autonomous region, and special municipality. 

Measurements are given in the metric system; a table is provided 
to assist those readers who wish to convert between metric and non- 
metric systems (see table 1 , Appendix A). A glossary and bibliog- 
raphy also are included at the back of the book. 

Organizational names are spelled out to avoid confusing those 
reading about China for the first time. Thus, there are the National 
Party Congress (of the Chinese Communist Party) and the National 
People's Congress (the legislature), rather than the acronym NPC. 
Some longer or more complicated names appear in acronym form 
after being spelled out in their first use in each chapter. 



xviu 



Table A. Chronology of Chinese Dynasties 



Dates Dynasty 

ca. 21st-16th century B.C Xia 

1700-1027 B.C Shang 

1027-771 B.C Western Zhou 

770-221 B.C Eastern Zhou 

770-476 B.C Spring and Autumn period 

475-221 B.C Warring States period 

221-207 B.C Qin 

206 B.C.rA.D. 9 Western Han 

A.D. 9-24 Xin (Wang Mang interregnum) 

A.D. 25-220 Eastern Han 

A.D. 220-280 Three Kingdoms (San Guo) 

220- 265 Wei 

221- 263 Shu 

229-280 Wu 

A.D. 265-316 Western Jin 

A.D. 317-420 Eastern Jin 

A.D. 420-588 Southern and Northern Dynasties 

420-588 Southern Dynasties 

420-478 Song 

479-501 Qi 

502-556 Liang 

557-588 Chen 

386-588 Northern Dynasties 

386-533 Northern Wei 

534- 549 Eastern Wei 

535- 557 Western Wei 

550-577 Northern Qi 

557-588 Northern Zhou 

A.D. 581-617 Sui 

A.D. 618-907 Tang 

A.D. 907-960 Five Dynasties 

A.D. 907-979 Ten Kingdoms 

916-1125 Liao 



XIX 



Table A. — Cont. 

Dates Dynasty 

960-1279 Song 

960-1127 Northern Song 

1127-1279 Southern Song 

1038-1227 Western Xia 

1115-1234 Jin 

1279-1368 Yuan 

1368-1644 Ming 

1644-1911 Qing 

Source: Based on information from China Handbook Editorial Committee, China Hand- 
book Series: History (trans., Dun J. Li), Beijing, 1982, 188-89; and Shao Chang Lee, 
"China's Cultural Development" (wall chart), East Lansing, 1964. 



XX 



Country Profile 




Country 

Formal Name: People's Republic of China. 

Short Form: China. 

Term for Citizens: Chinese. 

Capital: Beijing. 

Geography 

Size: Area about 9.6 million square kilometers; east to west dis- 
tance about 5,000 kilometers, from the Heilong Jiang (Amur River) 
to Pamir Mountains in Central Asia; north to south distance 
approximately 4,050 kilometers, from Heilongjiang Province to 
Hainan Island in south, and another 1,450 kilometers further south 
to Zengmu Shoal, territorial claim off north coast of Malaysia. 



xxi 



Topography: Main topographic features include Qing-Zang 
(Qinghai-Tibet) Plateau 4,000 meters above sea level and Kunlun, 
Qin Ling, and Greater Hinggan ranges. Longest of country's numer- 
ous rivers, Chang Jiang (Yangtze River) and Huang He (Yellow 
River), extend for some 6,300 and 5,400 kilometers, respectively. 

Climate: Most of country in temperate belt. Complex climatic pat- 
terns ranging from cold-temperate north to tropical south. Precipi- 
tation varies regionally; temperatures range from minus 30°C in 
north in January to 28°C in south in July. Alternating wet mon- 
soon in summer, dry monsoon in winter. 

Society 

Population: 1982 census reported total population of 
1,008,180,738; official estimate at end of 1986 nearly 1.1 billion 
with 1.4 percent annual rate of increase. Urban population offi- 
cially estimated at 382 million by end of 1985, or 37 percent of 
total. About 94 percent of population lives on approximately 36 per- 
cent of land. 

Education: In 1985, about 96 percent of primary-school-age chil- 
dren attended school as compared with about 20 percent before 
1949. About 136 million students enrolled in more than 832,000 
primary schools. Secondary-level middle schools divided into junior 
and senior stages; majority of schools at lower level. About 
48.6 million students attended some 104,800 secondary-level 
institutions. Technical education emphasized. Intense competition 
for admission to more than 1,000 colleges and universities; about 
1.7 million students in various higher educational institutions. Bei- 
jing and Qinghua universities and more than 100 other key univer- 
sities most sought after by college entrants. 

Ethnic Minorities: As of 1987 China recognized 55 minority 
nationalities, numbering about 70 million persons, concentrated 
in northwest and southwest. Not largest, but most important 
politically, Tibetans (Zang nationality) and various Turkic- speaking 
groups constituted majorities in Xizang (Tibet) and Xinjiang-Uygur 
autonomous regions, respectively. 

Health: Level of health and medical care improving. System of 
national, provincial-level, and local facilities in urban and rural 
areas plus network of industrial and state-enterprise hospitals. 
Traditional and Western medicine both practiced. Average life 
expectancy of sixty-nine years in 1985. Many once-widespread epi- 
demic diseases now under control or eradicated. 



xxn 



Economy 



Salient Features: Economic system in transition, cautiously moving 
away from Soviet-style central planning and gradually adopting 
market economy mechanisms and reduced government role. Indus- 
try, largely based on state and collective ownership, marked by 
increasing technological advancements and productivity. China's 
people's communes (see Glossary) largely eliminated by 1984 — after 
more than twenty-five years — and responsibility system (see Glos- 
sary) of production introduced in agricultural sector. Private owner- 
ship of production assets legal, although major nonagricultural and 
industrial facilities still state owned and centrally planned. Restraints 
on foreign trade relaxed and joint ventures encouraged. 

Industry: In 1985 employed about 17 percent of labor force but 
produced more than 43 percent of gross national product (GNP). 
Fastest growing sector; average annual growth of 1 1 percent from 
1952 to 1985. Wide range of technological levels; many small handi- 
craft units; many enterprises using machinery installed or designed 
in 1950s and 1960s; significant number of big, up-to-date plants, 
including textile mills, steel mills, chemical fertilizer plants, and 
petrochemical facilities but also burgeoning light industries produc- 
ing consumer goods. Produced most kinds of products made by 
industrialized nations but limited quantities of high-technology 
items. Technology transfer by importing whole plants, equipment, 
and designs an important means of progress. Major industrial 
centers in Liaoning Province, Beijing-Tianjin-Tangshan area, 
Shanghai, and Wuhan. Mineral resources included huge reserves 
of iron ore; adequate to abundant supplies of nearly all other indus- 
trial minerals. Outdated mining and ore processing technologies 
gradually being replaced with modern techniques. 

Agriculture: In 1985 employed about 63 percent of labor force; 
proportion of GNP about 29 percent. Low worker productivity 
because of scanty supplies of agricultural machinery and other 
modern inputs. Most agricultural processes still performed by hand. 
Very small arable land area (just above 10 percent of total area, 
as compared with 22 percent in United States) in relation to size 
of country and population. Intensive use of land; all fields produce 
at least one crop a year; wherever conditions permit, two or even 
three crops grown annually, especially in south. Grain most impor- 
tant product, including rice, wheat, corn, sorghum, barley, and 
millet. Other important crops include cotton, jute, oilseeds, sugar- 
cane, and sugar beets. Eggs a major product. Pork production has 
increased steadily; poultry and pigs raised on family plots. Other 



xxin 



livestock relatively limited in numbers, except for sheep and goats, 
grazed in large herds on grasslands of Nei Monggol Autonomous 
Region (Inner Mongolia) and northwest. Substantial marine and 
freshwater fishery. Timber resources mainly located in northeast 
and southwest; much of country deforested centuries ago. Wide 
variety of fruits and vegetables grown. 

Energy Sources: Self-sufficient in all energy forms; coal and petro- 
leum exported since early 1970s. Coal reserves among world's larg- 
est; mining technology inadequately developed but improving in 
late 1980s. Petroleum reserves very large but of varying quality 
and in disparate locations. Suspected oil deposits in northwest and 
offshore tracts believed to be among world's largest; exploration 
and extraction limited by scarcity of equipment and trained per- 
sonnel; twenty-seven contracts for joint offshore exploration and 
production by Japanese and Western oil companies signed by 1982, 
but by late 1980s only handful of wells producing. Substantial 
natural gas reserves in north, northwest, and offshore. Hydroelectric 
potential greatest in world, sixth largest in capacity; very large 
hydroelectric projects under construction, others in planning stage. 
Thermal power, mostly coal fired, produced approximately 68 per- 
cent of generating capacity in 1985; expected to increase to 72 per- 
cent by 1990. Emphasis on thermal power in late 1980s seen by 
policy makers as quick, short-term solution to energy needs; hydro- 
electric power seen as long-term solution. Petroleum production 
growth to continue in order to meet needs of nationwide mechani- 
zation and provide important foreign exchange but domestic use 
to be restricted as much as possible. 

Foreign Trade: Small by international standards but growing 
rapidly in size and importance, represented 20 percent of GNP 
in 1985. Trade controlled by Ministry of Foreign Economic Rela- 
tions and Trade and subordinate units and by Bank of China, for- 
eign exchange arm of central bank. Substantial decentralization 
and increased flexibility in foreign trade operations since late 1970s. 
Textiles leading export category. Other important exports included 
petroleum and foodstuffs. Leading imports included machinery, 
transport equipment, manufactured goods, and chemicals. Japan 
dominant trading partner, accounting for 28.9 percent of imports 
and 15.2 percent of exports in 1986. Hong Kong leading market 
for exports (31.6 percent) but source of only 13 percent of imports. 
In 1979 United States became China's second largest source of 
imports and in 1986 was third largest overall trade partner. Western 
Europe, particularly Federal Republic of Germany, also major trad- 
ing partner. Tourism encouraged and growing. 



xxiv 



Transportation and Communications 

Railroads: Basis of transportation system. About 52,000 kilometers 
of track in operation. Only 18 percent double tracked in 1984 and 
some important lines lacking modern equipment. Ninety percent 
of locomotives steam engines in 1979; but by mid-1980s produc- 
tion of diesel and electric models growing rapidly. Freight cars num- 
bered 280,000, passenger cars numbered 20,000 in 1985. Railroads 
efficient within limits of track system. Expansion and improvement 
progressing in 1987. 

Roads: About 962,800 kilometers in 1986; about 80 percent sur- 
faced. Importance of highways and motor vehicles growing but 
bicycles and animal carts still much in evidence throughout country. 

Inland Waterways: About 136,000 kilometers of navigable rivers, 
streams, lakes, and canals carried 44 percent of freight traffic in 
1986, only slightly less than railroads. Rapid growth. Principal sys- 
tem Chang Jiang and its tributaries in central and east China; major 
freight artery. Secondary system Zhu Jiang (Pearl River) and its 
tributaries in south. 

Maritime Shipping: Rapidly growing merchant fleet; 600 vessels 
of various kinds in 1984, total cargo capacity over 16 million tons. 
Major ports include Shanghai, Dalian, Qinhuangdao, Qingdao, 
Tianjin, and Huangpu. Rapid modernization of port facilities. 

Civil Aviation: About 228,000 kilometers of domestic routes; about 
94,000 kilometers of international routes in 1987. State airline 
General Administration of Civil Aviation of China known as 
CAAC. Regional airlines established in mid-1980s. Small but grow- 
ing share of total freight and passenger traffic; important link to 
remote areas and foreign countries. In 1987 fleet included 
American-made Boeing 707, 737, 747, and 767 and McDonnell- 
Douglas MD-82 jetliners as well as other American, British, Soviet, 
West German, and domestic aircraft. Beijing International Air- 
port completed in 1980. 

Telecommunications: Diversified system linked all parts of country 
by telephone, telegraph, radio, and television. Marked improve- 
ments by mid-1980s with influx of foreign technology and increased 
domestic production capabilities. International and long-distance 
telephone links by cable and satellite of high quality. Telegraph, 
facsimile, and telex all in use. International satellite ground sta- 
tions in Beijing and Shanghai; domestic satellite communication 
network operational in 1986. Over 160 radio stations by mid-1980s; 
transistorized radio receivers common. Vast wired broadcasting 



xxv 



system including over 2,600 stations carrying radio transmissions 
into all rural units and many urban areas. Television system grew 
rapidly in 1980s; 90 television stations and 80 million sets. 

Science and Technology: One of Four Modernizations, its high- 
speed development declared essential to all national economic 
development by Deng Xiaoping. Major breakthroughs in nuclear 
weapons, satellite launching and recovery, superconductivity, high- 
yield hybrid rice. Policy formulation at top levels puts emphasis 
on application of science to industry and foreign technology transfer. 

Government and Politics 

Party and Government: A unitary and "socialist state of the dic- 
tatorship of the proletariat," based on Marxism-Leninism-Mao 
Zedong Thought, led by 46-million-member Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP). Political processes guided by party and state consti- 
tutions, both promulgated in 1982; constitutions stress principle 
of democratic centralism (see Glossary), under which representa- 
tive organs of both party and state are elected by lower bodies and 
they in turn elect their administrative arms at corresponding lev- 
els. Within representative and executive bodies minority must abide 
by decisions of majority; lower bodies obey orders of higher level 
organs. In theory, National Party Congress highest organ of power 
of party, but real power lies in Political Bureau of CCP Central 
Committee and, still more, in select Standing Committee of Politi- 
cal Bureau. National People's Congress highest government organ 
of state power; ratifies CCP-approved policies and programs. 
Reforms implemented in early 1980s allowed more serious review 
and deliberations concerning government programs in National 
People's Congress. State Council serves as equivalent of cabinet; 
key members also hold positions in important party organs. 

Administrative Divisions: Divided into three tiers. In 1987 
twenty-nine provincial-level units comprise twenty-one provinces, 
five autonomous regions, and three centrally governed special 
municipalities; middle tier consists of autonomous prefectures, 
counties, autonomous counties, cities, and municipal districts; and 
basic level comprises townships, and villages. 

Judicial System: Four-level court system. Supreme People's Court 
in Beijing; higher people's courts in provinces, autonomous regions, 
and special municipalities; intermediate people's courts at prefec- 
ture level and also in parts of provinces, autonomous regions, and 
special municipalities; basic people's courts in counties, towns, and 



xxvi 



municipal districts. Special courts handle matters affecting mili- 
tary, railroad transportation, water transportation, and forestry. 
Court system paralleled by hierarchy of prosecuting organs called 
people's procuratorates; at apex stands Supreme People's Procura- 
torate. 

Foreign Affairs: As of late 1980s, China pursued independent for- 
eign policy and sought friendly relations and trade with many coun- 
tries despite political differences. China regards itself as developing 
country and member of Third World. China, however, has close 
cooperative relations, including economic, technological, political, 
and limited military cooperation, with United States, Japan, and 
other industrially developed nations. Earlier strains in Chinese 
relations with Soviet Union, long considered by Beijing as main 
threat of war, somewhat ameliorated by late 1980s but still fell short 
of full normalization. 

National Security 

Armed Forces: In 1987 combined strength of combat support units 
of People's Liberation Army (PLA) just under 3 million. Ground 
forces estimated at 2.1 million, world's largest standing army. Air 
Force estimated at 390,000. Navy estimated at 350,000, includ- 
ing those assigned to Naval Air Force, Coastal Defense Forces, and 
Marine Corps. Strategic Missile Force estimated at 100,000. 

Combat Units and Major Equipment: In 1987 ground forces con- 
sisted of 35 main-force armies comprising 118 infantry divisions, 
13 armored divisions, and 33 artillery and antiaircraft divisions; 
73 regional-force divisions, about 70 main- and regional-force 
independent combat and combat support regiments. Major weapons 
systems included Type 34, Type 59, and Type 69 main battle tanks, 
Type 62 and Type 63 light battle tanks; various caliber howitzers 
and guns and antiaircraft artillery. Air Force equipment included 
nearly 5,200 combat aircraft. Navy equipment included 5 nuclear- 
powered submarines (3 attack and 2 ballistic missile launching), 
110 diesel attack submarines, 46 major surface combatants (destroy- 
ers and frigates), 877 fast-attack craft (armed with guns, missiles, 
or torpedoes), nearly 900 other combatant and support ships and 
boats, and 780 Naval Air Force combat aircraft. Strategic Missile 
Force included 50 medium-range ballistic missiles (range of 650 
nautical miles), 60 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (range of 
1 ,620 nautical miles), 4 limited-range intercontinental ballistic mis- 
siles (range of 3,780 nautical miles), and 2 full-range intercontinental 
ballistic missiles (range of 8,100 nautical miles). 



xxvn 



Military Budget: Officially announced for 1987 at ¥20. 4 billion 
(for value of the yuan — see Glossary). Western analysts believe 
defense spending roughly double announced budget, or about 
4 percent of GNP. 

Police Agencies and Paramilitary Forces: Police organized under 
Ministry of Public Security. People's Armed Police Force, primarily 
demobilized PL A troops estimated at 600,000. Supported by grass- 
roots party, government, and neighborhood organizations. Armed 
militia estimated at 4.3 million; ordinary, unarmed militia esti- 
mated at 6 million. 



xxvin 



Introduction 



REFORM— DUBBED CHINA'S "SECOND REVOLU- 
TION" — was one of the most common terms in China's political 
vocabulary in the 1980s. Reform of the Chinese Communist Party 
and its political activities, reform of government organization, 
reform of the economy, military reforms, cultural and artistic 
reforms, indeed, China's post-Mao Zedong leaders called for reform 
of every part of Chinese society. The leaders of the People's Repub- 
lic of China saw reform as the way to realize the broad goal of the 
Four Modernizations (announced by Premier Zhou Enlai in 1975: 
the modernization of industry, agriculture, science and technology, 
and national defense) and to bring China into the community of 
advanced industrial nations by the start of the new millennium. 
The reform movement had antecedents in Chinese history in the 
Han (206 B.C.-A.D. 220), Song (960-1279), and Qing (1644- 
1911) dynasties, when concerted efforts were made to bring about 
fundamental changes in administrative methods while keeping the 
overall institutional framework intact. Thus, the reform movement 
of the 1980s — which has been attributed largely to the insights and 
determination of Deng Xiaoping, the most important figure in the 
post-Mao Zedong leadership — took its place in the broad spectrum 
of Chinese history. As with previous reform movements, history 
will measure this one's success. 

Late twentieth-century Chinese society has developed out of some 
3,300 years of recorded history and, as archaeological finds indi- 
cate, several millennia of prehistoric civilization. For thousands of 
years, the Middle Kingdom (Zhongguo — the Chinese name for 
China) was marked by organizational and cultural continuity, which 
were reaffirmed in a cyclic rise, flourishing, and decline of imperial 
dynasties. Short-lived, vibrant, but often tyrannical dynasties fre- 
quently were followed by long periods of stability and benevolent 
rule that were built on the best features of the preceding era and 
that discarded or modified more authoritarian ideas. An ethical 
system of relations — governed by rules of propriety attributed to 
the School of Literati (also known as the Confucian school) — 
carefully defined each person's place in society. In this system, har- 
mony of social relations rather than the rights of the individual was 
the ideal. The highest social status was held by scholar-officials, 
the literati who provided the interpretations needed for maintain- 
ing harmony in a slowly evolving world. Hard-working farmers, 



xxxi 




XXX 



the providers of sustenance to society, also occupied an important 
place in the societal structure. 

China's development was influenced by the alien peoples on the 
frontiers of Chinese civilization, who were sinicized into the Chinese 
polity (see fig. 1, frontispiece). Occasionally, groups arose among 
alien border peoples that were strong enough to conquer China 
itself. These groups established their own dynasties, only to be 
absorbed into an age-old system of governance. The importation 
of Buddhism, too, in the first century A.D. and its gradual assimi- 
lation had a fundamental impact on China. Early contacts with 
the premodern Western world brought a variety of exchanges. The 
Chinese contributed silk, printing, gunpowder, and porcelain. Sta- 
ple foodstuffs from Africa and the Americas were assimilated by 
China, as was the Western-style chair. In later centuries, Chinese 
scholars studied Western astronomy, mathematics, and other 
branches of science. Westerners arrived in China in the nineteenth 
century, during the decline of the Qing dynasty, in search of trade 
and colonial empires. Through force of arms the Westerners 
imposed unequal treaties compelling China to accept humiliating 
compromises to its traditional system of society and government. 

China reacted to intrusions from the West — and from a newly 
modernized Japan (to which China lost a war in 1895) — in a vari- 
ety of ways, sometimes maintaining the traditional status quo, 
adapting Western functions to Chinese substance, or rejecting 
Chinese tradition in favor of Western substance and form. As the 
Qing dynasty declined, reforms came too late and did too little. 
The unsuccessful reform efforts were followed by revolution. Still 
burdened with the legacy of thousands of years of imperial rule 
and nearly a century of humiliations at foreign hands, China saw 
the establishment of a republic in 1911. But warlord rule and civil 
war continued for nearly forty more years, accompanied in 1937-45 
by war with Japan. 

The Chinese civil war of 1945-49 was won by the Chinese Com- 
munist Party, the current ruling party of China, led by its chair- 
man and chief ideologist, Mao Zedong. The Communists moved 
quickly to consolidate their victory and integrate all Chinese soci- 
ety into a People's Republic. Except for the island of Taiwan (which 
became the home of the exiled Guomindang under Chiang Kai-shek 
and his successors), the new government unified the nation and 
achieved a stability China had not experienced for generations. 
Eagerness on the part of some Communist leaders to achieve even 
faster results engendered the Great Leap Forward (1958-60), a pro- 
gram that attempted rapid economic modernization but proved 
disastrous. Political reaction to the Great Leap Forward brought 



xxxn 



only a temporary respite before a counterreaction occurred in the 
form of the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), a period of radical 
experimentation and political chaos that brought the educational 
system to a halt and severely disrupted attempts at rational eco- 
nomic planning. When Mao Zedong died in 1976, the Cultural 
Revolution era effectively came to an end. 

Eager to make up for lost time and wasted resources, China's 
leaders initiated China's "second revolution" — a comprehensive 
economic modernization and organizational reform program. Deng 
Xiaoping and his associates mobilized the Chinese people in new 
ways to make China a world power. Starting with the Third Plenum 
of the Chinese Communist Party's Eleventh National Party Con- 
gress in December 1978, Deng reaffirmed the aims of the Four 
Modernizations, placing economic progress above the Maoist goals 
of class struggle and permanent revolution. Profit incentives and 
bonuses took the place of ideological slogans and red banners as 
China's leaders experimented with ways to modernize the economy. 
Mao's legendary people's communes were dismantled and replaced 
by a responsibility system, in which peasant households were given 
greater decision-making power over agricultural production and 
distribution. Farm families were allowed to lease land and grow 
crops of their own choosing. In the urban sector, factory managers 
were granted the flexibility to negotiate with both domestic and 
foreign counterparts over matters that previously had been han- 
dled by central planners in Beijing. Exploitation of China's rich 
natural resources advanced significantly in the late 1970s and 
throughout the 1980s. As China's industrial sector advanced, there 
was increasing movement of the population to urban areas. China's 
population itself had surpassed 1 billion people by 1982 and was 
experiencing an annual rate of increase of 1 .4 percent. As in times 
past, foreign specialists were invited to assist in the modernization 
process, and joint ventures with foreign capitalists and multinational 
conglomerates proliferated. Increasing numbers of Chinese students 
went abroad to pursue advanced degrees in a wide range of scien- 
tific and technical fields. 

All this change was not without cost — both political and mone- 
tary. Efforts at fundamental transformation of economic, govern- 
mental, and political organizations caused discontent among some 
people and in some institutions and were resisted by those who clung 
to the "iron rice bowl" of guaranteed lifetime job tenure. Beijing's 
reform leaders made repeated calls for party members and govern- 
ment bureaucrats to reform their "ossified thinking" and to adopt 
modern methods. Older and inappropriately trained bureaucrats 
retired in great numbers as a younger and more technically oriented 



xxxiii 



generation took over. In the ongoing debate between those who 
emphasized ideological correctness and those who stressed the need 
for technical competence — "reds'" versus "experts" — the tech- 
nocrats again emerged predominant. But developing and success- 
fully applying technological expertise — the very essence of the Four 
Modernizations — cost vast sums of money and required special 
effort on the part of the Chinese people. In a rejection of the time- 
honored concept of "self-reliance,' ' China entered into the milieu 
of international bank loans, joint ventures, and a whole panoply 
of once-abhorred capitalist economic practices. 

As politics and the economy continued to respond to and change 
each other, China's reformers had to balance contending forces 
within and against their reform efforts while maintaining the 
momentum of the Four Modernizations program. In doing so. 
Deng Xiaoping and his associates were faced with several unen- 
viable tasks. One was to create unity and support for the scope 
and pace of the reform program among party members. There w as 
also a necessity to deliver material results to the broad masses of 
people amid economic experiments and mounting inflation . Failure 
to achieve these balances and to make mid-course corrections could 
prove disastrous for the reform leadership. 

A sound ideological basis was needed to ensure the support of 
the party for the reform program. Deng's political idioms, such as 
"seeking truth from facts" and "socialism with Chinese characteris- 
tics," were reminiscent of reformist formulations of centuries past 
and had underlying practical ramifications. The supporters of Deng 
held that theory and practice must be fully integrated if success is 
to be hoped for, and they articulated the position that the Marxist- 
Leninist creed is not only valid but is adaptable to China's special — if 
not unique — situation. The ideological conviction that China was 
still in the "initial stage of socialism" — a viewpoint reaffirmed at 
the Thirteenth National Party Congress in October and November 
1987 — provided a still broader ideological basis for continuing the 
development of the Deng's reform program in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. This ideological pronouncement also emphasized 
reformers' fundamental tenet that since the end of the "'period of 
socialist transformation" (turning over private ownership of the 
means of production to the state) in 1956, there had been numer- 
ous "leftist" errors made in the party's ideological line. Mistakes 
such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution had 
produced setbacks in achieving "socialist modernization" and had 
kept China from emerging from the initial stage of socialism. It was, 
perhaps, the very failure of these leftist campaigns that had paved 
the way lor the reforms of the 1980s. 



xxxiv 



Political confrontation over the reforms was pervasive and, to 
many foreign observers, confusing. In simplistic terms, the "con- 
servatives" in the reform debate were members of the post-Mao 
"left," while the "liberals" were the pro-Deng "right. " Being con- 
servative in China in the 1980s variously meant adhering to the 
less radical aspects of Maoi st orthodoxy (not all of which had been 
discredited) or accepting the goals of reform but rejecting the pace, 
scope, or certain methods of the Deng program. Thus, there were 
both conservative opponents to reform and conservative reform- 
ers. While many reform opponents had been swept away into 
"retirement," conservative reformers until the late 1980s served 
as members of China's highest ruling body and locus of power, 
the Standing Committee of the party's Political Bureau. Such lead- 
ers as Standing Committee member Chen Yun, one of the prin- 
cipal architects of economic reform, objected to the "bourgeois 
liberalization" of the modernization process that came with infu- 
sions of foreign, especially Western, culture. In the conservative 
reform view, the application of Chinese values to Western tech- 
nology (reminiscent of the traditional tiyong [substance versus form] 
formulation evoked in the late-nineteenth-century reform period) 
would serve the People's Republic in good stead. 

In the 1980s China's intellectuals and students frequently tested 
the limits of official tolerance in calls for freer artistic and literary 
expression, demands for more democratic processes, and even criti- 
cisms of the party. These confrontations reached their apex in late 
1986, when thousands of students throughout the nation took to 
the streets to make their views known. In the resulting crackdown, 
some prominent intellectuals were demoted or expelled from the 
party. Even its highest official was not invulnerable: General Secre- 
tary Hu Yaobang was demoted in January 1987 for having dealt 
unsuccessfully with public activism and criticism of the party. Hu's 
ouster paved the way for the chief implementer of the Deng reforms, 
Zhao Ziyang, premier of the State Council, to assume command 
of the party and more firmly establish Deng's ideology as the sta- 
tus quo of reform. At the time of the writing of this book, it 
remained to be seen what degree of success the conservative reform 
elements would have in effecting a compromise, having placed their 
own representatives in the Political Bureau Standing Committee 
and the State Council's highest offices in late 1987. 

Self-proclaimed successes of the reforms of the 1980s included 
improvements in both rural and urban life, adjustment of the struc- 
tures of ownership, diversification of methods of operation, and 
introduction of more people into the decision-making process. As 
market mechanisms became an important part of the newly 



xxxv 



reformed planning system, products circulated more freely and the 
commodity market was rapidly improved. The government sought 
to rationalize prices, revamp the wage structure, and reform the 
financial and taxation systems. The policy of opening up to the 
outside world (the Chinese eschew the term open door, with its legacy 
of imperialist impositions) brought a significant expansion of eco- 
nomic, technological, and trade relations with other countries. 
Reforms of the scientific, technological, and educational institu- 
tions rounded out the successes of the Deng-inspired reforms. For 
the first time in modern Chinese history, the reforms also were 
being placed on the firm basis of a rational body of law and a care- 
fully codified judicial system. Although reform and liberalization 
left the once more-strictly regimented society open to abuses, the 
new system of laws and judicial organizations continued to foster 
the stable domestic environment and favorable investment climate 
that China needed to realize its modernization goals. 

Amid these successes, the authorities admitted that there were 
difficulties in attempting simultaneously to change the basic eco- 
nomic structure and to avoid the disruptions and declines in produc- 
tion that had marked the ill-conceived "leftist experiments" of the 
previous thirty years. China's size and increasing economic devel- 
opment rendered central economic planning ineffective, and the 
absence of markets and a modern banking system left the central 
authorities few tools with which to manage the economy. A realis- 
tic pricing system that reflected accurately levels of supply and 
demand and the value of scarce resources had yet to be imple- 
mented. The tremendous pent-up demand for consumer goods and 
the lack of effective controls on investment and capital grants to 
local factories unleashed inflationary pressures that the government 
found difficult to contain. Efforts to transform lethargic state fac- 
tories into efficient enterprises responsible for their own profits and 
losses were hampered by shortages of qualified managers and by 
the lack of both a legal framework for contracts and a consistent 
and predictable taxation system. The goals of economic reform were 
clear, but their implementation was slowed by practical and politi- 
cal obstacles. National leaders responded by reaffirming support 
for reform in general terms and by publicizing the successes of those 
cities that had been permitted to experiment with managerial 
responsibility, markets for raw materials, and fundraising through 
the sale of corporate bonds. 

National security has been a key determinant of Chinese plan- 
ning since 1949. Although national defense has been the lowest 
priority of the Four Modernizations, it has not been neglected. 
China has had a perennial concern with being surrounded by 



xxxvi 



enemies — the Soviets to the north and west, the Vietnamese to the 
south, and the Indians to the southwest — and has sought increas- 
ingly to project itself as a regional power. In response to this con- 
cern and power projection, in the 1980s China moved to augment 
"people's war" tactics with combined-arms tactics; to develop 
intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear submarines, and other 
strategic forces; and to acquire sophisticated foreign technologies 
with military applications. In the international arena, China in the 
1980s increasingly used improved bilateral relations and a variety 
of international forums to project its "independent foreign policy 
of peace" while opening up to the outside world. 

March 8, 1988 



After the manuscript for this book was completed in the sum- 
mer of 1987, several momentous events took place in China. Some 
were alluded to as imminent in the various chapters of the book. 
From October 25 to November 1, 1987, the Chinese Communist 
Party held its Thirteenth National Party Congress. Dozens of vet- 
eran party leaders retired from active front-line positions. Not least 
among the changes was the alteration of the Standing Committee 
of the party Political Bureau — the very apex of power in China — 
both in personnel and in stated purpose. Deng Xiaoping, Chen 
Yun, and Li Xiannian stepped down, and Hu Yaobang's demo- 
tion to mere Political Bureau membership was confirmed. Only 
one incumbent — Zhao Ziyang — was left on the Standing Commit- 
tee. In place of the party elders and Hu Yaobang, a group of mostly 
younger, more technologically oriented individuals were seated. 
The Political Bureau's Standing Committee comprised Deng's pro- 
tege, sixty-eight-year-old Zhao Ziyang (who relinquished his posi- 
tion as head of government to become general secretary of the 
party); Li Peng, a sixty-year-old, Soviet-educated engineer, who 
became acting premier of the State Council in Zhao's place (he 
was confirmed as premier in spring 1988); Qiao Shi, a sixty-four- 
year-old expert in party affairs, government administration, and 
legal matters; Hu Qili, a fifty-eight-year-old party Secretariat mem- 
ber in charge of ideological education, theoretical research, and 
propaganda; and veteran economic planner and conservative reform 
architect Yao Yilin, the new party elder at age seventy-one. In 
regard to function, the Political Bureau no longer was conceived 
of as a group of influential individuals but as a consensual decision- 
making organization. The party constitution was amended to make 



xxxvn 



the party Secretariat a staff arm of the Political Bureau and its 
Standing Committee, rather than the somewhat autonomous body 
it had been since 1982. By mid- 1988 the Chinese Communist Party 
had announced that its increasingly well educated membership had 
risen to 47 million, an all-time high. 

The retirees were not left without a voice. Deng, eighty-three 
and still China's de facto leader, retained his positions as chair- 
man of the party and state Central Military Commissions, the lat- 
ter of which designated him as commander-in-chief of the Chinese 
armed forces. (Zhao Ziyang was appointed first vice chairman of 
the party and state Central Military Commissions, giving him mili- 
tary credentials and paving the way for him to succeed Deng.) 
Eighty-two-year-old Chen Yun gave up his position as first secre- 
tary of the party Central Commission for Discipline Inspection but 
replaced Deng as chairman of the party's Central Advisory Com- 
mission, a significant forum for party elders. Li Xiannian who relin- 
quished his position as head of state, or president, to another party 
elder — eighty-one-year-old Yang Shangkun — to become chairman 
of the Seventh Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference 
in spring 1988, was left without a leading party position. Hu 
Yaobang, far from being totally disgraced after his January 1987 
debacle, retained membership on the Political Bureau and enjoyed 
a fair amount of popular support at the Thirteenth National Party 
Congress and afterward. 

Below the national level, numerous leadership changes also took 
place following the Thirteenth National Party Congress. More than 
600 younger and better educated leaders of provincial-level con- 
gresses and governments had been elected in China's twenty-nine 
provinces, autonomous regions, and special municipalities. 

The Seventh National People's Congress was held from March 
25 to April 13, 1988. This congress, along with the Seventh Chinese 
People's Political Consultative Conference, held from March 24 
to April 10, 1988, was marked by a new openness and tolerance 
of debate and dissent. The opening ceremony of the National Peo- 
ple's Congress was televised live, and meetings and panel discus- 
sions were recorded and broadcast the same day. Chinese and 
foreign journalists were permitted to attend the panel discussions 
and question the deputies in press conferences. Dissenting state- 
ments and dissenting votes were widely publicized in the domestic 
press. A spirit of reform prevailed as laws and constitutional amend- 
ments were ratified to legitimize private business and land sales 
and to encourage foreign investment. The State Council was 
restructured and streamlined. Fourteen ministries and commissions 
were dissolved and ten new ones — the State Planning Commission 



xxxvin 



and ministries of personnel, labor, materials, transportation, 
energy, construction, aeronautics and astronautics industry, water 
resources, and machine building and electronics industry — were 
established. Many of the ministries that were dissolved were con- 
verted into business enterprises responsible for their own profits 
and losses. 

Li Peng was elected premier of the State Council, as expected, 
and Yao Yilin and fifty-nine-year-old financial expert Tian Jiyun 
were re-elected as vice premiers. Sixty-six-year-old former Minister 
of Foreign Affairs Wu Xueqian also was elected vice premier. State 
councillors, all technocrats chosen for their professional expertise, 
were reduced in number from eleven to nine. All state councillors 
except Beijing mayor Chen Xitong and Secretary General of the 
State Council Chen Junsheng served concurrently as heads of 
national-level commissions or ministries. Although seven of the nine 
were new state councillors, only Li Guixian, the newly appointed 
governor of the People's Bank of China, was new to national 
politics. In a move that seemed to bode well for reform efforts, long- 
time Deng ally and political moderate Wan Li was selected to 
replace Peng Zhen as chairman of the Standing Committee of the 
Seventh National People's Congress. The conservative Peng had 
been considered instrumental in blocking or delaying many 
important pieces of reformist legislation. It also was decided at the 
Seventh National People's Congress to elevate Hainan Island, for- 
merly part of Guangdong Province, to provincial status and to desig- 
nate it as a special economic zone. 

In September and October 1987 and again in March 1988, riots 
erupted in the streets of Lhasa, the capital of Xizang Autonomous 
Region (Tibet). Calls for "independence for Tibet" and expres- 
sions of support for the exiled spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, 
were made amid violence that claimed the lives of at least six peo- 
ple in 1987 and at least nine more (including policemen) in 1988. 
Many more were reported to have been badly injured. Although 
Chinese authorities condemned the riots, their initial response was 
restrained in comparison with actions they had taken against earlier 
anti-Chinese demonstrations in Xizang. In addition, the authori- 
ties accompanied their censure of the Lhasa riots with a plethora 
of publicity on advances made by the inhabitants of Xizang in recent 
years and a lifting of travel restrictions on foreign correspondents. 
The March 1988 rioting spread to neighboring Qinghai Province, 
where there is a sizable Tibetan (Zang) minority. This time the 
authorities resorted to sterner measures, such as military force and 
numerous arrests, but only after offering lenient treatment to riot- 
ers who turned themselves in voluntarily. By mid- 1988, it appeared 



xxxix 



that both the Dalai Lama, concerned that violence and bloodshed 
in his homeland was out of control, and the Chinese government, 
worried about instability in a strategic border area, were display- 
ing greater flexibility in their respective positions. 

The January 1988 death of Taiwan's leader, Chiang Ching-kuo, 
brought expressions of sympathy from Zhao Ziyang and other 
Chinese Communist Party leaders and renewed calls for the reuni- 
fication of China under the slogan "one country, two systems." 
Implicit in the mainland's discussion of the transfer of power to 
a new generation of leaders — Taiwan-born Li Teng-hui succeeded 
Chiang — was regret that the opportunity had been lost for reach- 
ing a rapprochement with the last ruling member of the Chiang 
family. Beijing appealed to the patriotism of the people in Taiwan 
and called for unity with the mainland but, at the same time, kept 
a close watch for any sentiments that might lead to independence 
for Taiwan. 

In foreign affairs, Beijing continued to balance its concern for 
security with its desire for an independent foreign policy. China 
reacted cautiously to the signing of a nuclear arms treaty by the 
Soviet Union and the United States and refused to hold its own 
summit with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Despite a lessen- 
ing of tensions between Beijing and Moscow and greatly improved 
Chinese relations with the governments and ruling parties through- 
out Eastern Europe, China continued to insist that the Soviet Union 
would have to end its support for Vietnamese occupation of Cam- 
bodia, withdraw all of its troops from Afghanistan, and significantly 
reduce Soviet forces deployed on the Sino-Soviet border and in the 
Mongolian People's Republic before relations between the Chinese 
and Soviet governments and parties could improve. By mid- 1988 
there were indications that the Soviet Union was taking steps to 
remove these "three obstacles" to improved Sino-Soviet relations. 
As early as the fall of 1986, the Soviet Union announced the pull- 
back of a significant number of troops from Mongolia and the Sino- 
Soviet border. In May 1988 Moscow began withdrawing troops 
from Afghanistan with the goal of evacuating its forces from that 
country by early 1989. But China remained skeptical of Vietnamese 
government announcements that it would withdraw 50,000 troops 
from Cambodia by the end of 1988, and China's leaders continued 
to pressure the Soviet Union to exert more influence on Vietnam 
to secure an early withdrawal of all Vietnamese troops from Cam- 
bodia. Already strained Sino-Vietnamese relations were exacer- 
bated when Chinese and Vietnamese naval forces clashed in March 
1988 over several small islands in the strategically located Nansha 
(Spratly) archipelago. 



xl 



In Sino-American relations, disputes over trade and technology 
transfer in 1987 were further clouded by United States concern 
over reported Chinese Silkworm shore-to-ship missile sales to Iran, 
sales of Dongfeng-3 intermediate-range missiles to Saudi Arabia, 
and disclosures that Israel allegedly assisted China in the develop- 
ment of the missile system later sold to the Saudis. Another con- 
cern was China's protest over an October 1987 United States Senate 
resolution on the "Tibetan question" that focused on alleged human 
rights violations in Xizang. A visit to Washington, by then Minister 
of Foreign Affairs Wu Xueqian in March 1988, however, had salu- 
tary effects on bilateral relations: China made assurances that it 
would cease Silkworm missile sales to Iran and the United States 
pledged to continue to make desired technologies available to China. 
The perennial Taiwan issue and problems in Xizang apparently 
were subsumed by larger national interests. 

In February 1988 Beijing China achieved its long-sought goal 
of establishing diplomatic relations with Uruguay, one of the few 
nations that still had state-to-state ties with Taipei. With this 
accomplishment China increased its diplomatic exchanges to 134 
countries, while Taiwan's official representations were reduced 
to 22. 

The dynamism of China's domestic activities and international 
relations will continue as the new millennium approaches. Develop- 
ments in the all-encompassing reform program and their resulting 
impact on Chinese society, particularly the efforts of China's leaders 
to bring increasing prosperity to the more than 1 billion Chinese 
people, and China's growing participation and influence in the 
international community will remain of interest to observers 
throughout the world. 



July 15, 1988 Robert L. Worden, 

Andrea Matles Savada, 
and Ronald E. Dolan 



xli 



Chapter 1. Historical Setting 




This artist 's conception of a human-shaped bronze wheel pin from the West- 
ern Zhou dynasty (1027-771 B. C.) shows not only the high level of orna- 
mentation common for functional items, but also the style of dress of the 
period. 



THE HISTORY OF CHINA, as documented in ancient writ- 
ings, dates back some 3,300 years. Modern archaeological studies 
provide evidence of still more ancient origins in a culture that 
flourished between 2500 and 2000 B.C. in what is now central 
China and the lower Huang He (Yellow River) Valley of north 
China. Centuries of migration, amalgamation, and development 
brought about a distinctive system of writing, philosophy, art, and 
political organization that came to be recognized as Chinese civili- 
zation. What makes the civilization unique in world history is its 
continuity through over 4,000 years to the present century. 

The Chinese have developed a strong sense of their real and 
mythological origins and have kept voluminous records since very 
early times. It is largely as a result of these records that knowledge 
concerning the ancient past, not only of China but also of its neigh- 
bors, has survived. 

Chinese history, until the twentieth century, was written mostly 
by members of the ruling scholar-official class and was meant to 
provide the ruler with precedents to guide or justify his policies. 
These accounts focused on dynastic politics and colorful court his- 
tories and included developments among the commoners only as 
backdrops. The historians described a Chinese political pattern of 
dynasties, one following another in a cycle of ascent, achievement, 
decay, and rebirth under a new family. 

Of the consistent traits identified by independent historians, a 
salient one has been the capacity of the Chinese to absorb the peo- 
ple of surrounding areas into their own civilization. Their success 
can be attributed to the superiority of their ideographic written lan- 
guage, their technology, and their political institutions; the refine- 
ment of their artistic and intellectual creativity; and the sheer weight 
of their numbers. The process of assimilation continued over the 
centuries through conquest and colonization until what is now 
known as China Proper was -brought under unified rule. The 
Chinese also left an enduring mark on people beyond their bor- 
ders, especially the Koreans, Japanese, and Vietnamese. 

Another recurrent historical theme has been the unceasing strug- 
gle of the sedentary Chinese against the threat posed to their safety 
and way of life by non-Chinese peoples on the margins of their 
territory in the north, northeast, and northwest. In the thirteenth 
century, the Mongols from the northern steppes became the first 
alien people to conquer all China. Although not as culturally 



3 



China: A Country Study 



developed as the Chinese, they left an imprint on Chinese civili- 
zation. They also heightened Chinese perceptions of threat from 
the north. China came under alien rule for the second time in the 
mid-seventeenth century; the conquerors — the Manchus — came 
again from the north and northeast. 

For centuries virtually all the foreigners that Chinese rulers saw 
came from the less developed societies along their land borders. 
This circumstance conditioned the Chinese view of the outside 
world. The Chinese saw their domain as the self-sufficient center 
of the universe and derived from this image the traditional (and 
still used) Chinese name for their country — Zhongguo, literally, 
Middle Kingdom or Central Nation. China saw itself surrounded 
on all sides by so-called barbarian peoples whose cultures were 
demonstrably inferior by Chinese standards. 

This China-centered ("sinocentric") view of the world was still 
undisturbed in the nineteenth century, at the time of the first seri- 
ous confrontation with the West. China had taken it for granted 
that its relations with Europeans would be conducted according 
to the tributary system that had evolved over the centuries between 
the emperor and representatives of the lesser states on China's bor- 
ders as well as between the emperor and some earlier European 
visitors. But by the mid-nineteenth century, humiliated militarily 
by superior Western weaponry and technology and faced with 
imminent territorial dismemberment, China began to reassess its 
position with respect to Western civilization. By 1911 the two- 
millennia-old dynastic system of imperial government was brought 
down by its inability to make this adjustment successfully. 

Because of its length and complexity, the history of the Middle 
Kingdom lends itself to varied interpretation. After the communist 
takeover in 1949, historians in mainland China wrote their own 
version of the past — a history of China built on a Marxist model 
of progression from primitive communism to slavery, feudalism, 
capitalism, and finally socialism. The events of history came to be 
presented as a function of the class struggle. Historiography became 
subordinated to proletarian politics fashioned and directed by the 
Chinese Communist Party. A series of thought-reform and anti- 
rightist campaigns were directed against intellectuals in the arts, 
sciences, and academic community. The Cultural Revolution 
(1966-76) further altered the objectivity of historians. In the years 
after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, however, interest grew 
within the party, and outside it as well, in restoring the integrity 
of historical inquiry. This trend was consistent with the party's com- 
mitment to "seeking truth from facts." As a result, historians and 
social scientists raised probing questions concerning the state of 



4 



Historical Setting 



historiography in China. Their investigations ineluded not only 
historical study of traditional China but penetrating inquiries into 
modern Chinese history and the history of the Chinese Communist 
Party. 

In post-Mao China, the discipline of historiography has not been 
separated from politics, although a much greater range of histori- 
cal topics has been discussed. Figures from Confucius — who was 
bitterly excoriated for his "feudal" outlook by Cultural Revolution- 
era historians — to Mao himself have been evaluated with increasing 
flexibility. Among the criticisms made by Chinese social scientists 
is that Maoist-era historiography distorted Marxist and Leninist 
interpretations. This meant that considerable revision of histori- 
cal texts was in order in the 1980s, although no substantive change 
away from the conventional Marxist approach was likely. Histori- 
cal institutes were restored within the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences, and a growing corps of trained historians, in institutes 
and academia alike, returned to their work with the blessing of the 
Chinese Communist Party. This in itself was a potentially signifi- 
cant development. 

The Ancient Dynasties 

Chinese civilization, as described in mythology, begins with 
Pangu, the creator of the universe, and a succession of legendary 
sage-emperors and culture heroes who taught the ancient Chinese 
to communicate and to find sustenance, clothing, and shelter. The 
first prehistoric dynasty is said to be Xia, from about the twenty- 
first to the sixteenth century B.C. Until scientific excavations were 
made at early bronze-age sites at Anyang, Henan Province, in 1928, 
it was difficult to separate myth from reality in regard to the Xia. 
But since then, and especially in the 1960s and 1970s, archaeolo- 
gists have uncovered urban sites, bronze implements, and tombs 
that point to the existence of Xia civilization in the same locations 
cited in ancient Chinese historical texts. At minimum, the Xia 
period marked an evolutionary stage between the late neolithic cul- 
tures and the Chinese urban civilization typical of the Shang 
dynasty. 

The Dawn of History 

Thousands of archaeological finds in the Huang He Valley — 
the apparent cradle of Chinese civilization — provide evidence about 
the Shang dynasty, which endured roughly from 1700 to 1027 B.C. 
The Shang dynasty (also called the Yin dynasty in its later stages) 
is believed to have been founded by a rebel leader who overthrew 
the last Xia ruler. Its civilization was based on agriculture, 



5 



China: A Country Study 



augmented by hunting and animal husbandry. Two important 
events of the period were the development of a writing system, as 
revealed in archaic Chinese inscriptions found on tortoise shells 
and flat cattle bones (commonly called oracle bones), and the use 
of bronze metallurgy. A number of ceremonial bronze vessels with 
inscriptions date from the Shang period; the workmanship on the 
bronzes attests to a high level of civilization. 

A line of hereditary Shang kings ruled over much of northern 
China, and Shang troops fought frequent wars with neighboring 
settlements and nomadic herdsmen from the inner Asian steppes. 
The capitals, one of which was at the site of the modern city of 
Anyang, were centers of glittering court life. Court rituals to propiti- 
ate spirits and to honor sacred ancestors were highly developed. 
In addition to his secular position, the king was the head of the 
ancestor- and spirit-worship cult. Evidence from the royal tombs 
indicates that royal personages were buried with articles of value, 
presumably for use in the afterlife. Perhaps for the same reason, 
hundreds of commoners, who may have been slaves, were buried 
alive with the royal corpse. 

The Zhou Period 

The last Shang ruler, a despot according to standard Chinese 
accounts, was overthrown by a chieftain of a frontier tribe called 
Zhou, which had settled in the Wei Valley in modern Shaanxi 
Province. The Zhou dynasty had its capital at Hao, near the city 
of Xi'an, or Chang'an, as it was known in its heyday in the imperial 
period. Sharing the language and culture of the Shang, the early 
Zhou rulers, through conquest and colonization, gradually sini- 
cized, that is, extended Shang culture through much of China 
Proper (see Glossary) north of the Chang Jiang (Yangtze River). 
The Zhou dynasty lasted longer than any other, from 1027 to 
221 B.C. It was philosophers of this period who first enunciated 
the doctrine of the "mandate of heaven" {tianming), the notion that 
the ruler (the "son of heaven") governed by divine right but that 
his dethronement would prove that he had lost the mandate. The 
doctrine explained and justified the demise of the two earlier 
dynasties and at the same time supported the legitimacy of present 
and future rulers. 

The term feudal has often been applied to the Zhou period because 
the Zhou's early decentralized rule invites comparison with medieval 
rule in Europe. At most, however, the early Zhou system was proto- 
feudal, being a more sophisticated version of earlier tribal organi- 
zation, in which effective control depended more on familial ties 
than on feudal legal bonds. Whatever feudal elements there may 



6 



Historical Setting 



have been deereased as time went on. The Zhou amalgam of city- 
states became progressively centralized and established increasingly 
impersonal political and economic institutions. These developments, 
which probably occurred in the latter Zhou period, were manifested 
in greater central control over local governments and a more rou- 
tinized agricultural taxation. 

In 771 B.C. the Zhou court was sacked, and its king was killed by 
invading barbarians who were allied with rebel lords. The capital 
was moved eastward to Luoyang in present-day Henan Province. 
Because of this shift, historians divide the Zhou era into Western 
Zhou (1027-771 B.C.) and Eastern Zhou (770-221 B.C.). With 
the royal line broken, the power of the Zhou court gradually 
diminished; the fragmentation of the kingdom accelerated. Eastern 
Zhou divides into two subperiods. The first, from 770 to 476 B.C., 
is called the Spring and Autumn Period, after a famous historical 
chronicle of the time; the second is known as the Warring States 
Period (475-221 B.C.). 

The Hundred Schools of Thought 

The Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, though 
marked by disunity and civil strife, witnessed an unprecedented 
era of cultural prosperity — the "golden age" of China. The atmo- 
sphere of reform and new ideas was attributed to the struggle for 
survival among warring regional lords who competed in building 
strong and loyal armies and in increasing economic production to 
ensure a broader base for tax collection. To effect these economic, 
military, and cultural developments, the regional lords needed ever- 
increasing numbers of skilled, literate officials and teachers, the 
recruitment of whom was based on merit. Also during this time, 
commerce was stimulated through the introduction of coinage and 
technological improvements. Iron came into general use, making 
possible not only the forging of weapons of war but also the 
manufacture of farm implements. Public works on a grand scale — 
such as flood control, irrigation projects, and canal digging — were 
executed. Enormous walls were built around cities and along the 
broad stretches of the northern frontier. 

So many different philosophies developed during the late Spring 
and Autumn and early Warring States periods that the era is often 
known as that of the Hundred Schools of Thought. From the 
Hundred Schools of Thought came many of the great classical writ- 
ings on which Chinese practices were to be based for the next two 
and one-half millennia. Many of the thinkers were itinerant 
intellectuals who, besides teaching their disciples, were employed 



7 



China: A Country Study 



as advisers to one or another of the various state rulers on the 
methods of government, war, and diplomacy. 

The body of thought that had the most enduring effect on sub- 
sequent Chinese life was that of the School of Literati (ru). often 
called the Confucian school in the West. The written legacy of the 
School of Literati is embodied in the Confucian Classics, which 
were to become the basis for the order of traditional society. Con- 
fucius (551-479 B.C.), also called Kong Zi, or Master Kong, looked 
to the early days of Zhou rule for an ideal social and political order. 
He believed that the only way such a system could be made to work 
properly was for each person to act according to prescribed rela- 
tionships. "Let the ruler be a ruler and the subject a subject." he 
said, but he added that to rule properly a king must be virtuous. 
To Confucius, the functions of government and social stratifica- 
tion were facts of life to be sustained by ethical values. His ideal 
was the junzi (ruler's son), which came to mean gentleman in the 
sense of a cultivated or superior man. 

Mencius (372-289 B.C.), or Meng Zi, was a Confucian disci- 
ple who made major contributions to the humanism of Confucian 
thought. Mencius declared that man was by nature good. He 
expostulated the idea that a ruler could not govern without the peo- 
ple's tacit consent and that the penalty for unpopular, despotic rule 
was the loss of the "mandate of heaven." 

The effect of the combined work of Confucius, the codifier and 
interpreter of a system of relationships based on ethical behavior, 
and Mencius, the synthesizer and developer of applied Confucian 
thought, was to provide traditional Chinese society with a com- 
prehensive framework on which to order virtually every aspect of 
life (see Traditional Society and Culture, ch. 3; Culture and the 
Arts, ch. 4). 

There were to be accretions to the corpus of Confucian thought, 
both immediately and over the millennia, and from within and out- 
side the Confucian school. Interpretations made to suit or influence 
contemporary society made Confucianism dynamic while preserving 
a fundamental system of model behavior based on ancient texts. 

Diametrically opposed to Mencius, for example, was the interpre- 
tation of Xun Zi (ca. 300-237 B.C.), another Confucian follower. 
Xun Zi preached that man is innately selfish and evil and that good- 
ness is attainable only through education and conduct befitting one's 
status. He also argued that the best government is one based on 
authoritarian control, not ethical or moral persuasion. 

Xun Zi's unsentimental and authoritarian inclinations were 
developed into the doctrine embodied in the School of Law 
(fa), or Legalism. The doctrine was formulated by Han Fei 



8 



Confucius 

Courtesy Library of Congress 



China: A Country Study 

(d. 233 B.C.) and Li Si (d. 208 B.C.), who maintained that human 
nature was ineorrigibly selfish and therefore the only way to preserve 
the social order was to impose discipline from above and to enforce 
laws strictly. The Legalists exalted the state and sought its prosperity 
and martial prowess above the welfare of the common people. Legal- 
ism became the philosophic basis for the imperial form of govern- 
ment. When the most practical and useful aspects of Confucianism 
and Legalism were synthesized in the Han period (206 B.C.- 
A.D. 220), a system of governance came into existence that was 
to survive largely intact until the late nineteenth century. Taoism 
(or Daoism in pinyin), the second most important stream of Chinese 
thought, also developed during the Zhou period. Its formulation 
is attributed to the legendary sage Lao Zi (Old Master), said to 
predate Confucius, and Zhuang Zi (369-286 B.C.). The focus of 
Taoism is the individual in nature rather than the individual in 
society. It holds that the goal of life for each individual is to find 
one's own personal adjustment to the rhythm of the natural (and 
supernatural) world, to follow the Way (dao) of the universe. In 
many ways the opposite of rigid Confucian moralism, Taoism 
served many of its adherents as a complement to their ordered daily 
lives. A scholar on duty as an official would usually follow Confu- 
cian teachings but at leisure or in retirement might seek harmony 
with nature as a Taoist recluse. 

Another strain of thought dating to the Warring States Period 
is the school of yin-yang and the five elements. The theories of this 
school attempted to explain the universe in terms of basic forces 
in nature, the complementary agents of yin (dark, cold, female, 
negative) and yang (light, hot, male, positive) and the five elements 
(water, fire, wood, metal, and earth). In later periods these theo- 
ries came to have importance both in philosophy and in popular 
belief. 

Still another school of thought was based on the doctrine of Mo 
Zi (470-391 B.C.?), or Mo Di. Mo Zi believed that "all men are 
equal before God" and that mankind should follow heaven by prac- 
ticing universal love. Advocating that all action must be utilitarian, 
Mo Zi condemned the Confucian emphasis on ritual and music. 
He regarded warfare as wasteful and advocated pacificism. Mo Zi 
also believed that unity of thought and action were necessary to 
achieve social goals. He maintained that the people should obey 
their leaders and that the leaders should follow the will of heaven. 
Although Moism failed to establish itself as a major school of 
thought, its views are said to be "strongly echoed" in Legalist 
thought. In general, the teachings of Mo Zi left an indelible 
impression on the Chinese mind. 



10 



Historical Setting 



The Imperial Era 

The First Imperial Period 

Much of what came to constitute China Proper was unified for 
the first time in 221 B.C. (see fig. 2). In that year the western fron- 
tier state of Qin, the most aggressive of the Warring States, sub- 
jugated the last of its rival states. {Qin in Wade-Giles romanization 
is Ch'in, from which the English China probably derived.) Once 
the king of Qin consolidated his power, he took the title Shi Huangdi 
(First Emperor), a formulation previously reserved for deities and 
the mythological sage-emperors, and imposed Qin's centralized, 
nonhereditary bureaucratic system on his new empire. In subjugat- 
ing the six other major states of Eastern Zhou, the Qin kings had 
relied heavily on Legalist scholar- advisers. Centralization, achieved 
by ruthless methods, was focused on standardizing legal codes and 
bureaucratic procedures, the forms of writing and coinage, and 
the pattern of thought and scholarship. To silence criticism of 
imperial rule, the kings banished or put to death many dissenting 
Confucian scholars and confiscated and burned their books. Qin 
aggrandizement was aided by frequent military expeditions push- 
ing forward the frontiers in the north and south. To fend off bar- 
barian intrusion, the fortification walls built by the various warring 
states were connected to make a 5,000-kilometer-long wall. (What 
is commonly referred to as the Great Wall is actually four great 
walls rebuilt or extended during the Western Han, Sui, Jin, and 
Ming periods, rather than a single, continuous wall.) At its extremi- 
ties, the Great Wall reaches from northeastern Heilongjiang 
Province to northwestern Gansu. A number of public works projects 
were also undertaken to consolidate and strengthen imperial rule. 
These activities required enormous levies of manpower and 
resources, not to mention repressive measures. Revolts broke out 
as soon as the first Qin emperor died in 210 B.C. His dynasty was 
extinguished less than twenty years after its triumph. The imperial 
system initiated during the Qin dynasty, however, set a pattern 
that was developed over the next two millennia. 

After a short civil war, a new dynasty, called Han (206 B.C.- 
A.D. 220), emerged with its capital at Chang'an. The new empire 
retained much of the Qin administrative structure but retreated 
a bit from centralized rule by establishing vassal principalities in 
some areas for the sake of political convenience. The Han rulers 
modified some of the harsher aspects of the previous dynasty; Con- 
fucian ideals of government, out of favor during the Qin period, 
were adopted as the creed of the Han empire, and Confucian schol- 
ars gained prominent status as the core of the civil service. A civil 



11 



China: A Country Study 




Source: Bast-don information from Chiao-min Hsich Alias of China, New York, 1973, 
225, 2!58, 247, and 249. 



Figure 2. The Chinese Empire, circa 220 B.C. , A.D. 700, 1580, and 1775 



service examination system also was initiated. Intellectual, liter- 
ary, and artistic endeavors revived and flourished. The Han period 
produced China's most famous historian, Sima Qian (145-87 
B.C.?), whose Shiji (Historical Records) provides a detailed chroni- 
cle from the time of a legendary Xia emperor to that of the Han 
emperor Wu Di (141-87 B.C.). Technological advances also 
marked this period. Two of the great Chinese inventions, paper 
and porcelain, date from Han times. 

The Han dynasty, after which the members of the ethnic majority 
in China, the "people of Han," are named, was notable also for 
its military prowess. The empire expanded westward as far as the 
rim of the Tarim Basin (in modern Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous 
Region), making possible relatively secure caravan traffic across 
Central Asia to Antioch, Baghdad, and Alexandria. The paths of 



12 



Historical Setting 



caravan traffic are often called the "silk route" because the route 
was used to export Chinese silk to the Roman Empire. Chinese 
armies also invaded and annexed parts of northern Vietnam and 
northern Korea toward the end of the second century B.C. Han 
control of peripheral regions was generally insecure, however. To 
ensure peace with non-Chinese local powers, the Han court devel- 
oped a mutually beneficial "tributary system." Non-Chinese states 
were allowed to remain autonomous in exchange for symbolic 
acceptance of Han overlordship. Tributary ties were confirmed and 
strengthened through intermarriages at the ruling level and peri- 
odic exchanges of gifts and goods. 

After 200 years, Han rule was interrupted briefly (in A.D. 9-24 
by Wang Mang, a reformer) and then restored for another 200 
years. The Han rulers, however, were unable to adjust to what 
centralization had wrought: a growing population, increasing wealth 
and resultant financial difficulties and rivalries, and ever-more com- 
plex political institutions. Riddled with the corruption characteristic 
of the dynastic cycle, by A.D. 220 the Han empire collapsed. 

Era of Disunity 

The collapse of the Han dynasty was followed by nearly four 
centuries of rule by warlords. The age of civil wars and disunity 
began with the era of the Three Kingdoms (Wei, Shu, and Wu, 
which had overlapping reigns during the period A.D. 220-80). In 
later times, fiction and drama greatly romanticized the reputed 
chivalry of this period. Unity was restored briefly in the early years 
of the Jin dynasty (A.D. 265-420), but the Jin could not long con- 
tain the invasions of the nomadic peoples. In A.D. 317 the Jin court 
was forced to flee from Luoyang and reestablished itself at Nanjing 
to the south. The transfer of the capital coincided with China's 
political fragmentation into a succession of dynasties that was to 
last from A.D. 304 to 589. During this period the process of siniciza- 
tion accelerated among the non-Chinese arrivals in the north and 
among the aboriginal tribesmen in the south. This process was also 
accompanied by the increasing popularity of Buddhism (introduced 
into China in the first century A.D.) in both north and south China. 
Despite the political disunity of the times, there were notable tech- 
nological advances. The invention of gunpowder (at that time for 
use only in fireworks) and the wheelbarrow is believed to date from 
the sixth or seventh century. Advances in medicine, astronomy, 
and cartography are also noted by historians. 

Restoration of Empire 

China was reunified in A.D. 589 by the short-lived Sui dynasty 
(A.D. 581-617), which has often been compared to the earlier Qin 



13 



China: A Country Study 



dynasty in tenure and the ruthlessness of its accomplishments. The 
Sui dynasty's early demise was attributed to the government's tyran- 
nical demands on the people, who bore the crushing burden of taxes 
and compulsory labor. These resources were overstrained in the 
completion of the Grand Canal — a monumental engineering feat — 
and in the undertaking of other construction projects, including 
the reconstruction of the Great Wall. Weakened by costly and disas- 
trous military campaigns against Korea in the early seventh cen- 
tury, the dynasty disintegrated through a combination of popular 
revolts, disloyalty, and assassination. 

The Tang dynasty (A.D. 618-907), with its capital at Chang'an, 
is regarded by historians as a high point in Chinese civilization — 
equal, or even superior, to the Han period. Its territory, acquired 
through the military exploits of its early rulers, was greater than 
that of the Han. Stimulated by contact with India and the Middle 
East, the empire saw a flowering of creativity in many fields. Bud- 
dhism, originating in India around the time of Confucius, flourished 
during the Tang period, becoming thoroughly sinicized and a per- 
manent part of Chinese traditional culture. Block printing was 
invented, making the written word available to vastly greater audi- 
ences. The Tang period was the golden age of literature and art 
(see Culture and the Arts, ch. 4). A government system supported 
by a large class of Confucian literati selected through civil service 
examinations was perfected under Tang rule. This competitive 
procedure was designed to draw the best talents into government. 
But perhaps an even greater consideration for the Tang rulers, 
aware that imperial dependence on powerful aristocratic families 
and warlords would have destabilizing consequences, was to cre- 
ate a body of career officials having no autonomous territorial or 
functional power base. As it turned out, these scholar-officials 
acquired status in their local communities, family ties, and shared 
values that connected them to the imperial court. From Tang times 
until the closing days of the Qing empire in 1911, scholar-officials 
functioned often as intermediaries between the grass-roots level and 
the government. 

By the middle of the eighth century A.D., Tang power had 
ebbed. Domestic economic instability and military defeat in 751 
by Arabs at Talas, in Central Asia, marked the beginning of five 
centuries of steady military decline for the Chinese empire. Mis- 
rule, court intrigues, economic exploitation, and popular rebellions 
weakened the empire, making it possible for northern invaders to 
terminate the dynasty in 907. The next half-century saw the frag- 
mentation of China into five northern dynasties and ten southern 
kingdoms. But in 960 a new power, Song (960-1279), reunified 



14 



Partially excavated terra-cotta figures 
unearthed during the 1970s at the tomb of China's first emperor, 
Shi Huangdi, near XV an. Chinese archaeologists discovered over 9,000 
warriors, horses, chariots, and associated artifacts in the tomb. 

Courtesy China Pictorial 

most of China Proper. The Song period divides into two phases: North- 
ern Song (960-1 127) and Southern Song (1 127-1279). The division 
was caused by the forced abandonment of north China in 1127 by 
the Song court, which could not push back the nomadic invaders. 

The founders of the Song dynasty built an effective centralized 
bureaucracy staffed with civilian scholar-officials. Regional mili- 
tary governors and their supporters were replaced by centrally 
appointed officials. This system of civilian rule led to a greater con- 
centration of power in the emperor and his palace bureaucracy than 
had been achieved in the previous dynasties. 

The Song dynasty is notable for the development of cities not 
only for administrative purposes but also as centers of trade, indus- 
try, and maritime commerce. The landed scholar-officials, some- 
times collectively referred to as the gentry, lived in the provincial 
centers alongside the shopkeepers, artisans, and merchants. A new 
group of wealthy commoners — the mercantile class — arose as print- 
ing and education spread, private trade grew, and a market econ- 
omy began to link the coastal provinces and the interior. 
Landholding and government employment were no longer the only 
means of gaining wealth and prestige. 



15 



China: A Country Study 



Culturally, the Song refined many of the developments of the 
previous centuries. Included in these refinements were not only 
the Tang ideal of the universal man, who combined the qualities 
of scholar, poet, painter, and statesman, but also historical writ- 
ings, painting, calligraphy, and hard-glazed porcelain. Song intel- 
lectuals sought answers to all philosophical and political questions 
in the Confucian Classics. This renewed interest in the Confucian 
ideals and society of ancient times coincided with the decline of 
Buddhism, which the Chinese regarded as foreign and offering few 
practical guidelines for the solution of political and other mundane 
problems. 

The Song Neo-Confucian philosophers, finding a certain purity 
in the originality of the ancient classical texts, wrote commentaries 
on them. The most influential of these philosophers was Zhu Xi 
(1130-1200), whose synthesis of Confucian thought and Buddhist, 
Taoist, and other ideas became the official imperial ideology from 
late Song times to the late nineteenth century. As incorporated into 
the examination system, Zhu Xi's philosophy evolved into a rigid 
official creed, which stressed the one-sided obligations of obedience 
and compliance of subject to ruler, child to father, wife to husband, 
and younger brother to elder brother. The effect was to inhibit the 
societal development of premodern China, resulting both in many 
generations of political, social, and spiritual stability and in a slow- 
ness of cultural and institutional change up to the nineteenth cen- 
tury (see Traditional Society and Culture, ch. 3). Neo-Confucian 
doctrines also came to play the dominant role in the intellectual 
life of Korea, Vietnam, and Japan. 

Mongolian Interlude 

By the mid-thirteenth century, the Mongols had subjugated north 
China, Korea, and the Muslim kingdoms of Central Asia and had 
twice penetrated Europe. With the resources of his vast empire, 
Kublai Khan (1215-94), a grandson of Genghis Khan (1167P-1227) 
and the supreme leader of all Mongol tribes, began his drive against 
the Southern Song. Even before the extinction of the Song dynasty, 
Kublai Khan had established the first alien dynasty to rule all 
China— the Yuan (1279-1368). 

Although the Mongols sought to govern China through tradi- 
tional institutions, using Chinese (Han) bureaucrats, they were not 
up to the task. The Han were discriminated against socially and 
politically. All important central and regional posts were monopo- 
lized by Mongols, who also preferred employing non-Chinese from 
other parts of the Mongol domain — Central Asia, the Middle East, 
and even Europe — in those positions for which no Mongol could 



16 



Historical Setting 



be found. Chinese were more often employed in non-Chinese 
regions of the empire. 

As in other periods of alien dynastic rule of China, a rich cul- 
tural diversity developed during the Yuan dynasty. The major cul- 
tural achievements were the development of drama and the novel 
and the increased use of the written vernacular. The Mongols' 
extensive West Asian and European contacts produced a fair 
amount of cultural exchange. Western musical instruments were 
introduced to enrich the Chinese performing arts. From this period 
dates the conversion to Islam, by Muslims of Central Asia, of grow- 
ing numbers of Chinese in the northwest and southwest. Nestori- 
anism and Roman Catholicism also enjoyed a period of toleration. 
Lamaism (Tibetan Buddhism) flourished, although native Taoism 
endured Mongol persecutions. Confucian governmental practices 
and examinations based on the Classics, which had fallen into dis- 
use in north China during the period of disunity, were reinstated 
by the Mongols in the hope of maintaining order over Han society. 
Advances were realized in the fields of travel literature, cartogra- 
phy and geography, and scientific education. Certain key Chinese 
innovations, such as printing techniques, porcelain production, 
playing cards, and medical literature, were introduced in Europe, 
while the production of thin glass and cloisonne became popular 
in China. The first records of travel by Westerners date from this 
time. The most famous traveler of the period was the Venetian 
Marco Polo, whose account of his trip to "Cambaluc," the Great 
Khan's capital (now Beijing), and of life there astounded the peo- 
ple of Europe. The Mongols undertook extensive public works. 
Road and water communications were reorganized and improved. 
To provide against possible famines, granaries were ordered built 
throughout the empire. The city of Beijing was rebuilt with new 
palace grounds that included artificial lakes, hills and mountains, 
and parks. During the Yuan period, Beijing became the terminus 
of the Grand Canal, which was completely renovated. These com- 
mercially oriented improvements encouraged overland as well as 
maritime commerce throughout Asia and facilitated the first direct 
Chinese contacts with Europe. Chinese and Mongol travelers to 
the West were able to provide assistance in such areas as hydraulic 
engineering, while bringing back to the Middle Kingdom new scien- 
tific discoveries and architectural innovations. Contacts with the 
West also brought the introduction to China of a major new food 
crop — sorghum — along with other foreign food products and meth- 
ods of preparation. 



17 



China: A Country Study 



The Chinese Regain Power 

Rivalry among the Mongol imperial heirs, natural disasters, and 
numerous peasant uprisings led to the collapse of the Yuan dynasty. 
The Ming dynasty (1368-1644) was founded by a Han Chinese 
peasant and former Buddhist monk turned rebel army leader. Hav- 
ing its capital first at Nanjing (which means Southern Capital) and 
later at Beijing (Northern Capital), the Ming reached the zenith 
of power during the first quarter of the fifteenth century. The 
Chinese armies reconquered Annam, as northern Vietnam was then 
known, in Southeast Asia and kept back the Mongols, while the 
Chinese fleet sailed the China seas and the Indian Ocean, cruis- 
ing as far as the east coast of Africa. The maritime Asian nations 
sent envoys with tribute for the Chinese emperor. Internally, the 
Grand Canal was expanded to its farthest limits and proved to be 
a stimulus to domestic trade. 

The Ming maritime expeditions stopped rather suddenly after 
1433, the date of the last voyage. Historians have given as one of 
the reasons the great expense of large-scale expeditions at a time 
of preoccupation with northern defenses against the Mongols. 
Opposition at court also may have been a contributing factor, as 
conservative officials found the concept of expansion and commer- 
cial ventures alien to Chinese ideas of government. Pressure from 
the powerful Neo-Confucian bureaucracy led to a revival of strict 
agrarian-centered society. The stability of the Ming dynasty, which 
was without major disruptions of the population (then around 100 
million), economy, arts, society, or politics, promoted a belief 
among the Chinese that they had achieved the most satisfactory 
civilization on earth and that nothing foreign was needed or 
welcome. 

Long wars with the Mongols, incursions by the Japanese into 
Korea, and harassment of Chinese coastal cities by the Japanese 
in the sixteenth century weakened Ming rule, which became, as 
earlier Chinese dynasties had, ripe for an alien takeover. In 1644 
the Manchus took Beijing from the north and became masters of 
north China, establishing the last imperial dynasty, the Qing 
(1644-1911). 

The Rise of the Manchus 

Although the Manchus were not Han Chinese and were strongly 
resisted, especially in the south, they had assimilated a great deal 
of Chinese culture before conquering China Proper. Realizing that 
to dominate the empire they would have to do things the Chinese 
way, the Manchus retained many institutions of Ming and earlier 



18 



Ming dynasty stone 
guardians near an inner 
section of the Great Wall 
northwest of Beijing 
Courtesy Robert L. W or den 



The Great Wall at Badaling, 
northwest of Beijing. The 
strategic section of the wall, 
known as the "key to the 
gate to Beijing" was built 
during the Ming dynasty. 
Courtesy Beijing Slide Studio 



China: A Country Study 

Chinese derivation. They eontinued the Confueian court practices 
and temple rituals, over which the emperors had traditionally 
presided. 

The Manchus continued the Confucian civil service system. 
Although Chinese were barred from the highest offices, Chinese 
officials predominated over Manchu officeholders outside the capi- 
tal, except in military positions. The Neo-Confucian philosophy, 
emphasizing the obedience of subject to ruler, was enforced as the 
state creed. The Manchu emperors also supported Chinese liter- 
ary and historical projects of enormous scope; the survival of much 
of China's ancient literature is attributed to these projects. 

Ever suspicious of Han Chinese, the Qing rulers put into effect 
measures aimed at preventing the absorption of the Manchus into 
the dominant Han Chinese population. Han Chinese were pro- 
hibited from migrating into the Manchu homeland, and Manchus 
were forbidden to engage in trade or manual labor. Intermarriage 
between the two groups was forbidden. In many government 
positions a system of dual appointments was used — the Chinese 
appointee was required to do the substantive work and the Manchu 
to ensure Han loyalty to Qing rule. 

The Qing regime was determined to protect itself not only from 
internal rebellion but also from foreign invasion. After China Proper 
had been subdued, the Manchus conquered Outer Mongolia (now 
the Mongolian People's Republic) in the late seventeenth century. 
In the eighteenth century, they gained control of Central Asia as 
far as the Pamir Mountains and established a protectorate over 
the area commonly known in the West as Tibet, but which the 
Chinese call Xizang. The Qing thus became the first dynasty to 
eliminate successfully all danger to China Proper from across its 
land borders. Under Manchu rule the empire grew to include a 
larger area than before or since; Taiwan, the last outpost of anti- 
Manchu resistance, was also incorporated into China for the first 
time. In addition, Qing emperors received tribute from the vari- 
ous border states. 

The chief threat to China's integrity did not come overland, as 
it had so often in the past, but by sea, reaching the southern coastal 
area first. Western traders, missionaries, and soldiers of fortune 
began to arrive in large numbers even before the Qing, in the six- 
teenth century. The empire's inability to evaluate correctly the 
nature of the new challenge or to respond flexibly to it resulted 
in the demise of the Qing and the collapse of the entire millennia- 
old framework of dynastic rule. 



20 



Historical Setting 



Emergence of Modern China 

The success of the Qing dynasty in maintaining the old order 
proved a liability when the empire was confronted with growing 
challenges from seafaring Western powers. The centuries of peace 
and self-satisfaction dating back to Ming times had encouraged little 
change in the attitudes of the ruling elite. The imperial Neo- 
Confucian scholars accepted as axiomatic the cultural superiority 
of Chinese civilization and the position of the empire at the hub 
of their perceived world. To question this assumption, to suggest 
innovation, or to promote the adoption of foreign ideas was viewed 
as tantamount to heresy. Imperial purges dealt severely with those 
who deviated from orthodoxy. 

By the nineteenth century, China was experiencing growing 
internal pressures of economic origin. By the start of the century, 
there were over 300 million Chinese, but there was no industry 
or trade of sufficient scope to absorb the surplus labor. Moreover, 
the scarcity of land led to widespread rural discontent and a break- 
down in law and order. The weakening through corruption of the 
bureaucratic and military systems and mounting urban pauperism 
also contributed to these disturbances. Localized revolts erupted 
in various parts of the empire in the early nineteenth century. Secret 
societies, such as the White Lotus sect in the north and the Triad 
Society in the south, gained ground, combining anti-Manchu sub- 
version with banditry. 

The Western Powers Arrive 

As elsewhere in Asia, in China the Portuguese were the pioneers, 
establishing a foothold at Macao (Aomen in pinyin), from which 
they monopolized foreign trade at the Chinese port of Guangzhou 
(Canton). Soon the Spanish arrived, followed by the British and 
the French. Trade between China and the West was carried on 
in the guise of tribute: foreigners were obliged to follow the elabo- 
rate, centuries-old ritual imposed on envoys from China's tribu- 
tary states. There was no conception at the imperial court that the 
Europeans would expect or deserve to be treated as cultural or 
political equals. The sole exception was Russia, the most powerful 
inland neighbor. 

The Manchus were sensitive to the need for security along the 
northern land frontier and therefore were prepared to be realistic 
in dealing with Russia. The Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689) with the 
Russians, drafted to bring to an end a series of border incidents 
and to establish a border between Siberia and Manchuria (north- 
east China) along the Heilong Jiang (Amur River), was China's 



21 



China: A Country Study 



first bilateral agreement with a European power. In 1727 the Treaty 
of Kiakhta delimited the remainder of the eastern portion of the 
Sino-Russian border. Western diplomatie efforts to expand trade 
on equal terms were rebuffed, the official Chinese assumption being 
that the empire was not in need of foreign — and thus inferior — 
products. Despite this attitude, trade flourished, even though after 
1760 all foreign trade was confined to Guangzhou, where the for- 
eign traders had to limit their dealings to a dozen officially licensed 
Chinese merchant firms. 

Trade was not the sole basis of contact with the West. Since the 
thirteenth century, Roman Catholic missionaries had been attempt- 
ing to establish their church in China. Although by 1800 only a 
few hundred thousand Chinese had been converted, the mission- 
aries — mostly Jesuits — contributed greatly to Chinese knowledge 
in such fields as cannon casting, calendar making, geography, 
mathematics, cartography, music, art, and architecture. The Jesuits 
were especially adept at fitting Christianity into a Chinese frame- 
work and were condemned by a papal decision in 1704 for having 
tolerated the continuance of Confucian ancestor rites among Chris- 
tian converts. The papal decision quickly weakened the Christian 
movement, which it proscribed as heterodox and disloyal. 

The Opium War, 1839-42 

During the eighteenth century, the market in Europe and 
America for tea, a new drink in the West, expanded greatly. 
Additionally, there was a continuing demand for Chinese silk and 
porcelain. But China, still in its preindustrial stage, wanted little 
that the West had to offer, causing the Westerners, mostly Brit- 
ish, to incur an unfavorable balance of trade. To remedy the situa- 
tion, the foreigners developed a third-party trade, exchanging their 
merchandise in India and Southeast Asia for raw materials and 
semiprocessed goods, which found a ready market in Guangzhou. 
By the early nineteenth century, raw cotton and opium from India 
had become the staple British imports into China, in spite of the 
fact that opium was prohibited entry by imperial decree. The opium 
traffic was made possible through the connivance of profit-seeking 
merchants and a corrupt bureaucracy. 

In 1839 the Qing government, after a decade of unsuccessful 
anti-opium campaigns, adopted drastic prohibitory laws against 
the opium trade. The emperor dispatched a commissioner, Lin 
Zexu (1785-1850), to Guangzhou to suppress illicit opium traffic. 
Lin seized illegal stocks of opium owned by Chinese dealers and 
then detained the entire foreign community and confiscated and 
destroyed some 20,000 chests of illicit British opium. The British 



22 



Historical Setting 



retaliated with a punitive expedition, thus initiating the first Anglo- 
Chinese war, better known as the Opium War (1839-42). Unpre- 
pared for war and grossly underestimating the capabilities of the 
enemy, the Chinese were disastrously defeated, and their image 
of their own imperial power was tarnished beyond repair. The 
Treaty of Nanjing (1842), signed on board a British warship by 
two Manchu imperial commissioners and the British plenipoten- 
tiary, was the first of a series of agreements with the Western trading 
nations later called by the Chinese the "unequal treaties." Under 
the Treaty of Nanjing, China ceded the island of Hong Kong 
(Xianggang in pinyin) to the British; abolished the licensed monop- 
oly system of trade; opened 5 ports to British residence and for- 
eign trade; limited the tariff on trade to 5 percent ad valorem; 
granted British nationals extraterritoriality (exemption from Chinese 
laws); and paid a large indemnity. In addition, Britain was to have 
most-favored-nation treatment, that is, it would receive whatever 
trading concessions the Chinese granted other powers then or later. 
The Treaty of Nanjing set the scope and character of an unequal 
relationship for the ensuing century of what the Chinese would call 
"national humiliations." The treaty was followed by other incur- 
sions, wars, and treaties that granted new concessions and added 
new privileges for the foreigners. 

The Taiping Rebellion, 1851-64 

During the mid-nineteenth century, China's problems were com- 
pounded by natural calamities of unprecedented proportions, 
including droughts, famines, and floods. Government neglect of 
public works was in part responsible for this and other disasters, 
and the Qing administration did little to relieve the widespread 
misery caused by them. Economic tensions, military defeats at 
Western hands, and anti-Manchu sentiments all combined to 
produce widespread unrest, especially in the south. South China 
had been the last area to yield to the Qing conquerors and the first 
to be exposed to Western influence. It provided a likely setting for 
the largest uprising in modern Chinese history — the Taiping 
Rebellion. 

The Taiping rebels were led by Hong Xiuquan (1814-64), a vil- 
lage teacher and unsuccessful imperial examination candidate. 
Hong formulated an eclectic ideology combining the ideals of pre- 
Confucian utopianism with Protestant beliefs. He soon had a 
following in the thousands who were heavily anti-Manchu and anti- 
establishment. Hong's followers formed a military organization to 
protect against bandits and recruited troops not only among 
believers but also from among other armed peasant groups and 



23 



China: A Country Study 



secret societies. In 1851 Hong Xiuquan and others launched an 
uprising in Guizhou Province. Hong proclaimed the Heavenly 
Kingdom of Great Peace (Taiping Tianguo, or Taiping for short) 
with himself as king. The new order was to reconstitute a legend- 
ary ancient state in which the peasantry owned and tilled the land 
in common; slavery, concubinage, arranged marriage, opium smok- 
ing, footbinding, judicial torture, and the worship of idols were 
all to be eliminated. The Taiping tolerance of the esoteric rituals 
and quasi-religious societies of south China — themselves a threat 
to Qing stability — and their relentless attacks on Confucianism — still 
widely accepted as the moral foundation of Chinese behavior — 
contributed to the ultimate defeat of the rebellion. Its advocacy of 
radical social reforms alienated the Han Chinese scholar-gentry 
class. The Taiping army, although it had captured Nanjing and 
driven as far north as Tianjin, failed to establish stable base areas. 
The movement's leaders found themselves in a net of internal feuds, 
defections, and corruption. Additionally, British and French forces, 
being more willing to deal with the weak Qing administration than 
contend with the uncertainties of a Taiping regime, came to the 
assistance of the imperial army. Before the Chinese army succeeded 
in crushing the revolt, however, 14 years had passed, and well over 
30 million people were reported killed. 

To defeat the rebellion, the Qing court needed, besides Western 
help, an army stronger and more popular than the demoralized 
imperial forces. In 1860 scholar-official Zeng Guofan (1811-72), 
from Hunan Province, was appointed imperial commissioner and 
governor-general of the Taiping-controlled territories and placed 
in command of the war against the rebels. Zeng's Hunan army, 
created and paid for by local taxes, became a powerful new fight- 
ing force under the command of eminent scholar-generals. Zeng's 
success gave new power to an emerging Han Chinese elite and 
eroded Qing authority. Simultaneous uprisings in north China (the 
Nian Rebellion) and southwest China (the Muslim Rebellion) fur- 
ther demonstrated Qing weakness. 

The Self-Strengthening Movement 

The rude realities of the Opium War, the unequal treaties, and 
the mid-century mass uprisings caused Qing courtiers and officials 
to recognize the need to strengthen China. Chinese scholars and 
officials had been examining and translating "Western learning" 
since the 1840s. Under the direction of modern-thinking Han offi- 
cials, Western science and languages were studied, special schools 
were opened in the larger cities, and arsenals, factories, and ship- 
yards were established according to Western models. Western 



24 



Ceremonial bronze tortoise incense burner known as Pei Xi, 
a mythological river god, Hall of Supreme Harmony, 

Forbidden City, Beijing 
Courtesy Beijing Slide Studio 

diplomatic practices were adopted by the Qing, and students were 
sent abroad by the government and on individual or community 
initiative in the hope that national regeneration could be achieved 
through the application of Western practical methods. 

Amid these activities came an attempt to arrest the dynastic 
decline by restoring the traditional order. The effort was known 
as the Tongzhi Restoration, named for the Tongzhi Emperor 
(1862-74), and was engineered by the young emperor's mother, 
the Empress Dowager Ci Xi (1835-1908). The restoration, 
however, which applied "practical knowledge" while reaffirming 
the old mentality, was not a genuine program of modernization. 

The effort to graft Western technology onto Chinese institutions 
became known as the Self-Strengthening Movement. The move- 
ment was championed by scholar-generals like Li Hongzhang 
(1823-1901) and Zuo Zongtang (1812-85), who had fought with 
the government forces in the Taiping Rebellion. From 1861 to 1894, 
leaders such as these, now turned scholar-administrators, were 
responsible for establishing modern institutions, developing basic 
industries, communications, and transportation, and modernizing 
the military. But despite its leaders' accomplishments, the Self- 
Strengthening Movement did not recognize the significance of the 



25 



China: A Country Study 



political institutions and social theories that had fostered Western 
advances and innovations. This weakness led to the movement's 
failure. Modernization during this period would have been difficult 
under the best of circumstances. The bureaucracy was still deeply 
influenced by Neo-Confucian orthodoxy. Chinese society was still 
reeling from the ravages of the Taiping and other rebellions, and 
foreign encroachments continued to threaten the integrity of China. 

The first step in the foreign powers' effort to carve up the empire 
was taken by Russia, which had been expanding into Central Asia. 
By the 1850s, tsarist troops also had invaded the Heilong Jiang 
watershed of Manchuria, from which their countrymen had been 
ejected under the Treaty of Nerchinsk. The Russians used the 
superior knowledge of China they had acquired through their 
century-long residence in Beijing to further their aggrandizement. 
In 1860 Russian diplomats secured the secession of all of Man- 
churia north of the Heilong Jiang and east of the Wusuli Jiang 
(Ussuri River). Foreign encroachments increased after 1860 by 
means of a series of treaties imposed on China on one pretext or 
another. The foreign stranglehold on the vital sectors of the Chinese 
economy was reinforced through a lengthening list of concessions. 
Foreign settlements in the treaty ports became extraterritorial — 
sovereign pockets of territories over which China had no jurisdic- 
tion. The safety of these foreign settlements was ensured by the 
menacing presence of warships and gunboats. 

At this time the foreign powers also took over the peripheral states 
that had acknowledged Chinese suzerainty and given tribute to the 
emperor. France colonized Cochin China, as southern Vietnam 
was then called, and by 1864 established a protectorate over Cam- 
bodia. Following a victorious war against China in 1884-85, France 
also took Annam. Britain gained control over Burma. Russia 
penetrated into Chinese Turkestan (modern-day Xinjiang-Uygur 
Autonomous Region). Japan, having emerged from its century- 
and-a-half-long seclusion and having gone through its own moder- 
nization movement, defeated China in the war of 1894-95. The 
Treaty of Shimonoseki forced China to cede Taiwan and the Penghu 
Islands to Japan, pay a huge indemnity, permit the establishment 
of Japanese industries in four treaty ports, and recognize Japanese 
hegemony over Korea. In 1898 the British acquired a ninety-nine- 
year lease over the so-called New Territories of Kowloon (Jiulong 
in pinyin), which increased the size of their Hong Kong colony. 
Britain, Japan, Russia, Germany, France, and Belgium each gained 
spheres of influence in China. The United States, which had not 
acquired any territorial cessions, proposed in 1899 that there be 
an "open door" policy in China, whereby all foreign countries 



26 



A Ming dynasty marble 
huabiao or ornamental 
column, just inside the 
Tiananmen Gate in Beijing 
incorporates a dragon in 
half relief and is crested 
with a dragon resting in 
a lotus flower. 
The crosspieces are 
stylized clouds. 
Courtesy Robert L. W or den 



Empress Dowager 
Ci Xi 's throne in the Palace 
of Gathering Excellence, 
Palace Museum, Beijing 
Courtesy Beijing Slide Studio 




27 



China: A Country Study 



would have equal duties and privileges in all treaty ports within 
and outside the various spheres of influence. All but Russia agreed 
to the United States overture. 

The Hundred Days' Reform and the Aftermath 

In the 103 days from June 1 1 to September 21, 1898, the Qing 
emperor, Guangxu (1875-1908), ordered a series of reforms aimed 
at making sweeping social and institutional changes. This effort 
reflected the thinking of a group of progressive scholar-reformers 
who had impressed the court with the urgency of making innova- 
tions for the nation's survival. Influenced by the Japanese success 
with modernization, the reformers declared that China needed more 
than "self-strengthening" and that innovation must be accompa- 
nied by institutional and ideological change. 

The imperial edicts for reform covered a broad range of sub- 
jects, including stamping out corruption and remaking, among 
other things, the academic and civil-service examination systems, 
legal system, governmental structure, defense establishment, and 
postal services. The edicts attempted to modernize agriculture, 
medicine, and mining and to promote practical studies instead of 
Neo-Confucian orthodoxy. The court also planned to send students 
abroad for firsthand observation and technical studies. All these 
changes were to be brought about under a de facto constitutional 
monarchy. 

Opposition to the reform was intense among the conservative 
ruling elite, especially the Manchus, who, in condemning the 
announced reform as too radical, proposed instead a more moder- 
ate and gradualist course of change. Supported by ultraconserva- 
tives and with the tacit support of the political opportunist Yuan 
Shikai (1859-1916), Empress Dowager Ci Xi engineered a coup 
d'etat on September 21, 1898, forcing the young reform-minded 
Guangxu into seclusion. Ci Xi took over the government as regent. 
The Hundred Days' Reform ended with the rescindment of the 
new edicts and the execution of six of the reform's chief advocates. 
The two principal leaders, Kang Youwei (1858-1927) and Liang 
Qichao (1873-1929), fled abroad to found the Baohuang Hui (Pro- 
tect the Emperor Society) and to work, unsuccessfully, for a con- 
stitutional monarchy in China. 

The conservatives then gave clandestine backing to the antiforeign 
and anti-Christian movement of secret societies known as Yihetuan 
(Society of Righteousness and Harmony). The movement has been 
better known in the West as the Boxers (from an earlier name — 
Yihequan, Righteousness and Harmony Boxers). In 1900 Boxer 
bands spread over the north China countryside, burning missionary 



28 



Historical Setting 



facilities and killing Chinese Christians. Finally, in June 1900, the 
Boxers besieged the foreign concessions in Beijing and Tianjin, an 
action that provoked an allied relief expedition by the offended 
nations. The Qing declared war against the invaders, who easily 
crushed their opposition and occupied north China. Under the Pro- 
tocol of 1901, the court was made to consent to the execution of 
ten high officials and the punishment of hundreds of others, expan- 
sion of the Legation Quarter, payment of war reparations, station- 
ing of foreign troops in China, and razing of some Chinese 
fortifications. 

In the decade that followed, the court belatedly put into effect 
some reform measures. These included the abolition of the mori- 
bund Confucian-based examination, educational and military 
modernization patterned after the model of Japan, and an experi- 
ment, if half-hearted, in constitutional and parliamentary govern- 
ment (see The Examination System, ch. 3). The suddenness and 
ambitiousness of the reform effort actually hindered its success. One 
effect, to be felt for decades to come, was the establishment of new 
armies, which, in turn, gave rise to warlordism. 

The Republican Revolution of 1911 

Failure of reform from the top and the fiasco of the Boxer 
Uprising convinced many Chinese that the only real solution lay 
in outright revolution, in sweeping away the old order and erect- 
ing a new one patterned preferably after the example of Japan. 
The revolutionary leader was Sun Yat-sen (Sun Yixian in pinyin, 
1866-1925), a republican and anti-Qmg activist who became 
increasingly popular among the overseas Chinese (see Glossary) 
and Chinese students abroad, especially in Japan. In 1905 Sun 
founded the Tongmeng Hui (United League) in Tokyo with Huang 
Xing (1874-1916), a popular leader of the Chinese revolutionary 
movement in Japan, as his deputy. This movement, generously 
supported by overseas Chinese funds, also gained political support 
with regional military officers and some of the reformers who had 
fled China after the Hundred Days' Reform. Sun's political philoso- 
phy was conceptualized in 1897, first enunciated in Tokyo in 1905, 
and modified through the early 1920s. It centered on the Three 
Principles of the People (san min zhuyi); "nationalism, democracy, 
and people's livelihood." The principle of nationalism called for 
overthrowing the Manchus and ending foreign hegemony over 
China. The second principle, democracy, was used to describe Sun's 
goal of a popularly elected republican form of government. Peo- 
ple's livelihood, often referred to as socialism, was aimed at helping 



29 



China: A Country Study 



the common people through regulation of the ownership of the 
means of production and land. 

The republican revolution broke out on October 10, 1911, in 
Wuchang, the capital of Hubei Province, among discontented mod- 
ernized army units whose anti-Qing plot had been uncovered. It 
had been preceded by numerous abortive uprisings and organized 
protests inside China. The revolt quickly spread to neighboring 
cities, and Tongmeng Hui members throughout the country rose 
in immediate support of the Wuchang revolutionary forces. By late 
November, fifteen of the twenty-four provinces had declared their 
independence of the Qing empire. A month later, Sun Yat-sen 
returned to China from the United States, where he had been rais- 
ing funds among overseas Chinese and American sympathizers. 
On January 1, 1912, Sun was inaugurated in Nanjing as the provi- 
sional president of the new Chinese republic. But power in Beij- 
ing already had passed to the commander-in-chief of the imperial 
army, Yuan Shikai, the strongest regional military leader at the 
time. To prevent civil war and possible foreign intervention from 
undermining the infant republic, Sun agreed to Yuan's demand 
that China be united under a Beijing government headed by Yuan. 
On February 12, 1912, the last Manchu emperor, the child Puyi, 
abdicated. On March 10, in Beijing, Yuan Shikai was sworn in 
as provisional president of the Republic of China. 

Republican China 

The republic that Sun Yat-sen and his associates envisioned 
evolved slowly. The revolutionists lacked an army, and the power 
of Yuan Shikai began to outstrip that of parliament. Yuan revised 
the constitution at will and became dictatorial. In August 1912 a 
new political party was founded by Songjiaoren (1882-1913), one 
of Sun's associates. The party, the Guomindang (Kuomintang or 
KMT — the National People's Party, frequently referred to as the 
Nationalist Party), was an amalgamation of small political groups, 
including Sun's Tongmeng Hui. In the national elections held in 
February 1913 for the new bicameral parliament, Song campaigned 
against the Yuan administration, and his party won a majority of 
seats. Yuan had Song assassinated in March; he had already 
arranged the assassination of several pro-revolutionist generals. Ani- 
mosity toward Yuan grew. In the summer of 1913 seven southern 
provinces rebelled against Yuan. When the rebellion was sup- 
pressed, Sun and other instigators fled to Japan. In October 1913 
an intimidated parliament formally elected Yuan president of the 
Republic of China, and the major powers extended recognition 
to his government. To achieve international recognition, Yuan 



30 



A pavilion at the Yeheyuan (Summer Palace), Beijing 

Courtesy R inn -Sup Shinn 

Shikai had to agree to autonomy for Outer Mongolia and Xizang. 
China was still to be suzerain, but it would have to allow Russia 
a free hand in Outer Mongolia and Britain continuance of its 
influence in Xizang. 

In November Yuan Shikai, legally president, ordered the Guo- 
mindang dissolved and its members removed from parliament. 
Within a few months, he suspended parliament and the provincial 
assemblies and forced the promulgation of a new constitution, 
which, in effect, made him president for life. Yuan's ambitions 
still were not satisfied, and, by the end of 1915, it was announced 
that he would reestablish the monarchy. Widespread rebellions 
ensued, and numerous provinces declared independence. With 
opposition at every quarter and the nation breaking up into warlord 
factions, Yuan Shikai died of natural causes in June 1916, deserted 
by his lieutenants. 

Nationalism and Communism 

After Yuan Shikai 's death, shifting alliances of regional warlords 
fought for control of the Beijing government. The nation also was 
threatened from without by the Japanese. When World War I broke 
out in 1914, Japan fought on the Allied side and seized German 
holdings in Shandong Province. In 1915 the Japanese set before 
the warlord government in Beijing the so-called Twenty-One 



31 



China: A Country Study 



Demands, which would have made China a Japanese protectorate. 
The Beijing government rejected some of these demands but yielded 
to the Japanese insistence on keeping the Shandong territory already 
in its possession. Beijing also recognized Tokyo's authority over 
southern Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia. In 1917, in secret 
communiques, Britain, France, and Italy assented to the Japanese 
claim in exchange for Japan's naval action against Germany. 

In 1917 China declared war on Germany in the hope of recover- 
ing its lost province, then under Japanese control. But in 1918 the 
Beijing government signed a secret deal with Japan accepting the 
latter' s claim to Shandong. When the Paris peace conference of 
1919 confirmed the Japanese claim to Shandong and Beijing's sell- 
out became public, internal reaction was shattering. On May 4, 
1919, there were massive student demonstrations against the Beijing 
government and Japan. The political fervor, student activism, and 
iconoclastic and reformist intellectual currents set in motion by the 
patriotic student protest developed into a national awakening known 
as the May Fourth Movement. The intellectual milieu in which 
the May Fourth Movement developed was known as the New Cul- 
ture Movement and occupied the period from 1917 to 1923. The 
student demonstrations of May 4, 1919 were the high point of the 
New Culture Movement, and the terms are often used synony- 
mously. Students returned from abroad advocating social and 
political theories ranging from complete Westernization of China 
to the socialism that one day would be adopted by China's com- 
munist rulers. 

Opposing the Warlords 

The May Fourth Movement helped to rekindle the then-fading 
cause of republican revolution. In 1917 Sun Yat-sen had become 
commander-in-chief of a rival military government in Guangzhou 
in collaboration with southern warlords. In October 1919 Sun 
reestablished the Guomindang to counter the government in Bei- 
jing. The latter, under a succession of warlords, still maintained 
its facade of legitimacy and its relations with the West. By 1921 
Sun had become president of the southern government. He spent 
his remaining years trying to consolidate his regime and achieve 
unity with the north. His efforts to obtain aid from the Western 
democracies were ignored, however, and in 1921 he turned to the 
Soviet Union, which had recently achieved its own revolution. The 
Soviets sought to befriend the Chinese revolutionists by offering 
scathing attacks on "Western imperialism." But for political 
expediency, the Soviet leadership initiated a dual policy of sup- 
port for both Sun and the newly established Chinese Communist 



32 



Historical Setting 



Party (CCP). The Soviets hoped for consolidation but were pre- 
pared for either side to emerge victorious. In this way the struggle 
for power in China began between the Nationalists and the Com- 
munists. In 1922 the Guomindang-warlord alliance in Guangzhou 
was ruptured, and Sun fled to Shanghai. By then Sun saw the need 
to seek Soviet support for his cause. In 1923 a joint statement by 
Sun and a Soviet representative in Shanghai pledged Soviet assis- 
tance for China's national unification. Soviet advisers — the most 
prominent of whom was an agent of the Comintern (see Glossary), 
Mikhail Borodin — began to arrive in China in 1923 to aid in the 
reorganization and consolidation of the Guomindang along the lines 
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The CCP was under 
Comintern instructions to cooperate with the Guomindang, and 
its members were encouraged to join while maintaining their party 
identities. The CCP was still small at the time, having a member- 
ship of 300 in 1922 and only 1,500 by 1925. The Guomindang in 
1922 already had 150,000 members. 

Soviet advisers also helped the Nationalists set up a political 
institute to train propagandists in mass mobilization techniques and 
in 1923 sent Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi in pinyin), one of Sun's 
lieutenants from Tongmeng Hui days, for several months' mili- 
tary and political study in Moscow. After Chiang's return in late 
1923, he participated in the establishment of the Whampoa 
(Huangpu in pinyin) Military Academy outside Guangzhou, which 
was the seat of government under the Guomindang-CCP alliance. 
In 1924 Chiang became head of the academy and began the rise 
to prominence that would make him Sun's successor as head of 
the Guomindang and the unifier of all China under the right-wing 
nationalist government. 

Sun Yat-sen died of cancer in Beijing in March 1925, but the 
Nationalist movement he had helped to initiate was gaining momen- 
tum. During the summer of 1925, Chiang, as commander-in-chief 
of the National Revolutionary Army, set out on the long-delayed 
Northern Expedition against the northern warlords. Within nine 
months, half of China had been conquered. By 1926, however, 
the Guomindang had divided into left- and right-wing factions, and 
the Communist bloc within it was also growing. In March 1926, 
after thwarting a kidnapping attempt against him, Chiang abruptly 
dismissed his Soviet advisers, imposed restrictions on CCP mem- 
bers' participation in the top leadership, and emerged as the pre- 
eminent Guomindang leader. The Soviet Union, still hoping to 
prevent a split between Chiang and the CCP, ordered Communist 
underground activities to facilitate the Northern Expedition, which 
was finally launched by Chiang from Guangzhou in July 1926. 



33 



China: A Country Study 



In early 1927 the Guomindang-CCP rivalry led to a split in the 
revolutionary ranks. The CCP and the left wing of the Guomin- 
dang had decided to move the seat of the Nationalist government 
from Guangzhou to Wuhan. But Chiang, whose Northern Expe- 
dition was proving successful, set his forces to destroying the Shang- 
hai CCP apparatus and established an anti-Communist government 
at Nanjing in April 1927. There now were three capitals in China: 
the internationally recognized warlord regime in Beijing; the Com- 
munist and left-wing Guomindang regime at Wuhan; and the right- 
wing civilian-military regime at Nanjing, which would remain the 
Nationalist capital for the next decade. 

The Comintern cause appeared bankrupt. A new policy was 
instituted calling on the CCP to foment armed insurrections in both 
urban and rural areas in preparation for an expected rising tide 
of revolution. Unsuccessful attempts were made by Communists 
to take cities such as Nanchang, Changsha, Shantou, and Guang- 
zhou, and an armed rural insurrection, known as the Autumn Har- 
vest Uprising, was staged by peasants in Hunan Province. The 
insurrection was led by Mao Zedong (1893-1976), who would later 
become chairman of the CCP and head of state of the People's 
Republic of China. Mao was of peasant origins and was one of 
the founders of the CCP. 

But in mid-1927 the CCP was at a low ebb. The Communists 
had been expelled from Wuhan by their left-wing Guomindang 
allies, who in turn were toppled by a military regime. By 1928 all 
of China was at least nominally under Chiang's control, and the 
Nanjing government received prompt international recognition as 
the sole legitimate government of China. The Nationalist govern- 
ment announced that in conformity with Sun Yat-sen's formula 
for the three stages of revolution — military unification, political 
tutelage, and constitutional democracy — China had reached the 
end of the first phase and would embark on the second, which would 
be under Guomindang direction. 

Consolidation under the Guomindang 

The decade of 1928-37 was one of consolidation and accomplish- 
ment by the Guomindang. Some of the harsh aspects of foreign 
concessions and privileges in China were moderated through 
diplomacy. The government acted energetically to modernize the 
legal and penal systems, stabilize prices, amortize debts, reform 
the banking and currency systems, build railroads and highways, 
improve public health facilities, legislate against traffic in narcot- 
ics, and augment industrial and agricultural production. Great 
strides also were made in education and, in an effort to help unify 



34 



The mausoleum of Sun Yat-sen in Nanjing 
Courtesy Xinhua News Agency 

Chinese society, in a program to popularize the national language 
and overcome dialectal variations. The widespread establishment 
of communications facilities further encouraged a sense of unity 
and pride among the people. 

Rise of the Communists 

There were forces at work during this period of progress that 
would eventually undermine the Chiang Kai-shek government. The 
first was the gradual rise of the Communists. 

Mao Zedong, who had become a Marxist at the time of the emer- 
gence of the May Fourth Movement (he was working as a librarian 
at Beijing University), had boundless faith in the revolutionary poten- 
tial of the peasantry. He advocated that revolution in China focus 
on them rather than on the urban proletariat, as prescribed by 
orthodox Marxist-Leninist theoreticians. Despite the failure of the 
Autumn Harvest Uprising of 1927, Mao continued to work among 
the peasants of Hunan Province. Without waiting for the sanction 
of the CCP center, then in Shanghai, he began establishing peasant- 
based Soviets (Communist-run local governments) along the border 
between Hunan and Jiangxi provinces. In collaboration with mili- 
tary commander Zhu De (1886-1976), Mao turned the local peasants 
into a politicized guerrilla force. By the winter of 1927-28, the com- 
bined "peasants' and workers' " army had some 10,000 troops. 



35 



China: A Country Study 



Mao's prestige rose steadily alter the failure of the Comintern- 
directed urban insurrections. In late 1931 he was able to proclaim 
the establishment of the Chinese Soviet Republic under his chair- 
manship in Ruijin, Jiangxi Province. The Soviet-oriented CCP 
Political Bureau came to Ruijin at Mao's invitation with the intent 
of dismantling his apparatus. But, although he had yet to gain mem- 
bership in the Political Bureau, Mao dominated the proceedings. 

In the early 1930s, amid continued Political Bureau opposition 
to his military and agrarian policies and the deadly annihilation 
campaigns being waged against the Red Army by Chiang Kai- 
shek's forces, Mao's control of the Chinese Communist movement 
increased. The epic Long March of his Red Army and its support- 
ers, which began in October 1934, would ensure his place in his- 
tory. Forced to evacuate their camps and homes, Communist 
soldiers and government and party leaders and functionaries num- 
bering about 100,000 (including only 35 women, the spouses of 
high leaders) set out on a circuitous retreat of some 12.500 kilo- 
meters through 11 provinces, 18 mountain ranges, and 24 rivers 
in southwest and northwest China. During the Long March, Mao 
finally gained unchallenged command of the CCP, ousting his rivals 
and reasserting guerrilla strategy. As a final destination, he selected 
southern Shaanxi Province, where some 8,000 survivors of the origi- 
nal group from Jiangxi Province (joined by some 22,000 from other 
areas) arrived in October 1935. The Communists set up their head- 
quarters at Yan'an, where the movement would grow rapidly for 
the next ten years. Contributing to this growth would be a combi- 
nation of internal and external circumstances, of which aggression 
by the Japanese was perhaps the most significant. Conflict with 
Japan, which would continue from the 1930s to the end of World 
War II, was the other force (besides the Communists themselves) 
that would undermine the Nationalist government. 

Anti-Japanese War 

Few Chinese had any illusions about Japanese designs on China. 
Hungry for raw materials and pressed by a growing population. 
Japan initiated the seizure of Manchuria in September 1931 and 
established ex-Qing emperor Puyi as head of the puppet regime 
of Manchukuo in 1932. The loss of Manchuria, and its vast poten- 
tial for industrial development and war industries, was a blow to 
the Nationalist economy. The League of Nations, established at 
the end of World War I, was unable to act in the face of the Japanese 
defiance. The Japanese began to push from south of the Great Wall 
into northern China and into the coastal provinces. Chinese fury 
against Japan was predictable, but anger was also directed against 



36 



Historical Setting 



the Guomindang government, which at the time was more pre- 
occupied with anti-Communist extermination campaigns than with 
resisting the Japanese invaders. The importance of "internal unity 
before external danger" was forcefully brought home in Decem- 
ber 1936, when Nationalist troops (who had been ousted from Man- 
churia by the Japanese) mutinied at Xi'an. The mutineers forcibly 
detained Chiang Kai-shek for several days until he agreed to cease 
hostilities against the Communist forces in northwest China and 
to assign Communist units combat duties in designated anti- 
Japanese front areas. 

The Chinese resistance stiffened after July 7, 1937, when a clash 
occurred between Chinese and Japanese troops outside Beijing (then 
renamed Beiping) near the Marco Polo Bridge. This skirmish not 
only marked the beginning of open, though undeclared, war 
between China and Japan but also hastened the formal announce- 
ment of the second Guomindang-CCP united front against Japan. 
The collaboration took place with salutary effects for the beleaguered 
CCP. The distrust between the two parties, however, was scarcely 
veiled. The uneasy alliance began to break down after late 1938, 
despite Japan's steady territorial gains in northern China, the coastal 
regions, and the rich Chang Jiang Valley in central China. After 
1940, conflicts between the Nationalists and Communists became 
more frequent in the areas not under Japanese control. The Com- 
munists expanded their influence wherever opportunities presented 
themselves through mass organizations, administrative reforms, 
and the land- and tax-reform measures favoring the peasants — 
while the Nationalists attempted to neutralize the spread of Com- 
munist influence. 

At Yan'an and elsewhere in the "liberated areas," Mao was able 
to adapt Marxism-Leninism to Chinese conditions. He taught party 
cadres to lead the masses by living and working with them, eating 
their food, and thinking their thoughts. The Red Army fostered 
an image of conducting guerrilla warfare in defense of the people. 
Communist troops adapted to changing wartime conditions and 
became a seasoned fighting force. Mao also began preparing for 
the establishment of a new China. In 1940 he outlined the pro- 
gram of the Chinese Communists for an eventual seizure of power. 
His teachings became the central tenets of the CCP doctrine that 
came to be formalized as Mao Zedong Thought. With skillful 
organizational and propaganda work, the Communists increased 
party membership from 100,000 in 1937 to 1.2 million by 1945. 

In 1945 China emerged from the war nominally a great mili- 
tary power but actually a nation economically prostrate and on the 
verge of all-out civil war. The economy deteriorated, sapped by 



37 



China: A Country Study 

the military demands of foreign war and internal strife, by spiral- 
ing inflation, and by Nationalist profiteering, speculation, and 
hoarding. Starvation came in the wake of the war, and millions 
were rendered homeless by floods and the unsettled conditions in 
many parts of the country. The situation was further complicated 
by an Allied agreement at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 
that brought Soviet troops into Manchuria to hasten the termina- 
tion of war against Japan. Although the Chinese had not been 
present at Yalta, they had been consulted; they had agreed to have 
the Soviets enter the war in the belief that the Soviet Union would 
deal only with the Nationalist government. After the war, the Soviet 
Union, as part of the Yalta agreement, dismantled and removed 
more than half the industrial equipment left there by the Japanese. 
The Soviet presence in northeast China enabled the Communists 
to move in long enough to arm themselves with the equipment sur- 
rendered by the withdrawing Japanese army. The problems of 
rehabilitating the formerly Japanese-occupied areas and of recon- 
structing the nation from the ravages of a protracted war were stag- 
gering, to say the least. 

Return to Civil War 

During World War II, the United States emerged as a major 
actor in Chinese affairs. As an ally it embarked in late 1941 on 
a program of massive military and financial aid to the hard-pressed 
Nationalist government. In January 1943 the United States and 
Britain led the way in revising their treaties with China, bringing 
to an end a century of unequal treaty relations. Within a few 
months, a new agreement was signed between the United States 
and China for the stationing of American troops in China for the 
common war effort against Japan. In December 1943 the Chinese 
exclusion acts of the 1880s and subsequent laws enacted by the 
United States Congress to restrict Chinese immigration into the 
United States were repealed. 

The wartime policy of the United States was initially to help 
China become a strong ally and a stabilizing force in postwar East 
Asia. As the conflict between the Nationalists and the Communists 
intensified, however, the United States sought unsuccessfully to 
reconcile the rival forces for a more effective anti-Japanese war 
effort. Toward the end of the war, United States Marines were 
used to hold Beiping and Tianjin against a possible Soviet incur- 
sion, and logistic support was given to Nationalist forces in north 
and northeast China. 

Through the mediatory influence of the United States a mili- 
tary truce was arranged in January 1946, but battles between 



38 



Historical Setting 



Nationalists and Communists soon resumed. Realizing that Ameri- 
can efforts short of large-scale armed intervention could not stop 
the war, the United States withdrew the American mission, headed 
by General George C. Marshall, in early 1947. The civil war, in 
which the United States aided the Nationalists with massive eco- 
nomic loans but no military support, became more widespread. 
Battles raged not only for territories but also for the allegiance of 
cross sections of the population. 

Belatedly, the Nationalist government sought to enlist popular 
support through internal reforms. The effort was in vain, however, 
because of the rampant corruption in government and the accom- 
panying political and economic chaos. By late 1948 the Nation- 
alist position was bleak. The demoralized and undisciplined 
Nationalist troops proved no match for the People's Liberation 
Army (PLA). The Communists were well established in the north 
and northeast. Although the Nationalists had an advantage in num- 
bers of men and weapons, controlled a much larger territory and 
population than their adversaries, and enjoyed considerable inter- 
national support, they were exhausted by the long war with Japan 
and the attendant internal responsibilities. In January 1949 Bei- 
ping was taken by the Communists without a fight, and its name 
was changed back to Beijing. Between April and November, major 
cities passed from Guomindang to Communist control with minimal 
resistance. In most cases the surrounding countryside and small 
towns had come under Communist influence long before the cities. 
After Chiang Kai-shek and a few hundred thousand Nationalist 
troops fled from the mainland to the island of Taiwan, there 
remained only isolated pockets of resistance. In December 1949 
Chiang proclaimed Taipei, Taiwan, the temporary capital of 
China. 

The People's Republic of China 

On October 1, 1949, the People's Republic of China was for- 
mally established, with its national capital at Beijing. "The Chinese 
people have stood up!" declared Mao as he announced the crea- 
tion of a "people's democratic dictatorship." The people were 
defined as a coalition of four social classes: the workers, the peasants, 
the petite bourgeoisie, and the national-capitalists. The four classes 
were to be led by the CCP, as the vanguard of the working class. 
At that time the CCP claimed a membership of 4.5 million, of which 
members of peasant origin accounted for nearly 90 percent. The 
party was under Mao's chairmanship, and the government was 
headed by Zhou Enlai (1898-1976) as premier of the State Adminis- 
trative Council (the predecessor of the State Council). 



39 



China: A Country Study 



The Soviet Union recognized the People's Republic on Octo- 
ber 2, 1949. Earlier in the year, Mao had proclaimed his policv 
of "leaning to one side" as a commitment to the socialist bloc. 
In February 1950, after months of hard bargaining. China and 
the Soviet Union signed the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and 
Mutual Assistance, valid until 1980. The pact also was intended 
to counter Japan or any power's joining Japan for the purpose of 
aggression. 

For the first time in decades a Chinese government was met with 
peace, instead of massive military opposition, within its territory. 
The new leadership was highly disciplined and. having a decade 
of wartime administrative experience to draw on, was able to 
embark on a program of national integration and reform. In the 
first year of Communist administration, moderate social and eco- 
nomic policies were implemented with skill and effectiveness. The 
leadership realized that the overwhelming and multitudinous task 
of economic reconstruction and achievement of political and social 
stability required the goodwill and cooperation of all classes of peo- 
ple. Results were impressive by any standard, and popular sup- 
port was widespread. 

By 1950 international recognition of the Communist government 
had increased considerably, but it was slowed by China's involve- 
ment in the Korean War. In October 1950, sensing a threat to the 
industrial heartland in northeast China from the advancing United 
Nations (UN) forces in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
(North Korea), units of the PLA — calling themselves the Chinese 
People's Volunteers — crossed the Yalu Jiang River into North 
Korea in response to a North Korean request for aid. Almost simul- 
taneously the PLA forces also marched into Xizang to reassert 
Chinese sovereignty over a region that had been in effect indepen- 
dent of Chinese rule since the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911. 
In 1951 the UN declared China to be an aggressor in Korea and 
sanctioned a global embargo on the shipment of arms and war 
materiel to China. This step foreclosed for the time being any pos- 
sibility that the People's Republic might replace Nationalist China 
(on Taiwan) as a member of the UN and as a veto-holding mem- 
ber of the UN Security Council. 

After China entered the Korean War, the initial moderation in 
Chinese domestic policies gave way to a massive campaign against 
the "enemies of the state," actual and potential. These enemies 
consisted of "war criminals, traitors, bureaucratic capitalists, and 
counterrevolutionaries." The campaign was combined with party- 
sponsored trials attended by huge numbers of people. The major 
targets in this drive were foreigners and Christian missionaries who 



40 



Historical Setting 



were branded as United States agents at these mass trials. The 
1951-52 drive against political enemies was accompanied by land 
reform, which had actually begun under the Agrarian Reform Law 
of June 28, 1950. The redistribution of land was accelerated, and 
a class struggle (see Glossary) against landlords and wealthy peasants 
was launched. An ideological reform campaign requiring self- 
criticisms and public confessions by university faculty members, 
scientists, and other professional workers was given wide publicity. 
Artists and writers were soon the objects of similar treatment for 
failing to heed Mao's dictum that culture and literature must reflect 
the class interest of the working people, led by the CCP. These 
campaigns were accompanied in 1951 and 1952 by the san fan 
("three anti") and wu fan ("five anti") movements. The former 
was directed ostensibly against the evils of "corruption, waste, and 
bureaucratism"; its real aim was to eliminate incompetent and 
politically unreliable public officials and to bring about an efficient, 
disciplined, and responsive bureaucratic system. The wu fan move- 
ment aimed at eliminating recalcitrant and corrupt businessmen 
and industrialists, who were in effect the targets of the CCP's con- 
demnation of "tax evasion, bribery, cheating in government con- 
tracts, thefts of economic intelligence, and stealing of state assets." 
In the course of this campaign the party claimed to have uncovered 
a well-organized attempt by businessmen and industrialists to cor- 
rupt party and government officials. This charge was enlarged into 
an assault on the bourgeoisie as a whole. The number of people 
affected by the various punitive or reform campaigns was estimated 
in the millions. 

The Transition to Socialism, 1953-57 

The period of officially designated "transition to socialism" cor- 
responded to China's First Five-Year Plan (1953-57). The period 
was characterized by efforts to achieve industrialization, collectiviza- 
tion of agriculture, and political centralization. 

The First Five-Year Plan stressed the development of heavy 
industry on the Soviet model. Soviet economic and technical assis- 
tance was expected to play a significant part in the implementa- 
tion of the plan, and technical agreements were signed with the 
Soviets in 1953 and 1954. For the purpose of economic planning, 
the first modern census was taken in 1953; the population of main- 
land China was shown to be 583 million, a figure far greater than 
had been anticipated. 

Among China's most pressing needs in the early 1950s were food 
for its burgeoning population, domestic capital for investment, and 
purchase of Soviet-supplied technology, capital equipment, and 



41 



China: A Country Study 

military hardware. To satisfy these needs, the government began 
to collectivize agriculture. Despite internal disagreement as to the 
speed of collectivization, which at least for the time being was 
resolved in Mao's favor, preliminary collectivization was 90 per- 
cent completed by the end of 1956. In addition, the government 
nationalized banking, industry, and trade. Private enterprise in 
mainland China was virtually abolished. 

Major political developments included the centralization of party 
and government administration. Elections were held in 1953 for 
delegates to the First National People's Congress, China's national 
legislature, which met in 1954. The congress promulgated the state 
constitution of 1954 and formally elected Mao chairman (or presi- 
dent) of the People's Republic; it elected Liu Shaoqi (1898-1969) 
chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Con- 
gress and named Zhou Enlai premier of the new State Council. 

In the midst of these major governmental changes, and helping 
to precipitate them, was a power struggle within the CCP leading 
to the 1954 purge of Political Bureau member Gao Gang and Party 
Organization Department head Rao Shushi, who were accused of 
illicitly trying to seize control of the party. 

The process of national integration also was characterized by 
improvements in party organization under the administrative direc- 
tion of the secretary general of the party, Deng Xiaoping (who 
served concurrently as vice premier of the State Council). There 
was a marked emphasis on recruiting intellectuals, who by 1956 
constituted nearly 12 percent of the party's 10.8 million members. 
Peasant membership had decreased to 69 percent, while there was 
an increasing number of "experts" (see Glossary), who were needed 
for the party and governmental infrastructures, in the party ranks. 

As part of the effort to encourage the participation of intellectuals 
in the new regime, in mid- 1956 there began an official effort to 
liberalize the political climate (see Policy Toward Intellectuals, 
ch. 4). Cultural and intellectual figures were encouraged to speak 
their minds on the state of CCP rule and programs. Mao personally 
took the lead in the movement, which was launched under the clas- 
sical slogan "Let a hundred flowers bloom, let the hundred schools 
of thought contend." At first the party's repeated invitation to air 
constructive views freely and openly was met with caution. By 
mid- 195 7, however, the movement unexpectedly mounted, bringing 
denunciation and criticism against the party in general and the 
excesses of its cadres in particular. Startled and embarrassed, leaders 
turned on the critics as "bourgeois rightists" and launched the Anti- 
Rightist Campaign. The Hundred Flowers Campaign (see Glossary), 



42 



Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, and Mao Zedong in 1957 

Courtesy China Pictorial 

sometimes called the Double Hundred Campaign, apparently had 
a sobering effect on the CCP leadership. 

The Great Leap Forward, 1958-60 

The antirightist drive was followed by a militant approach toward 
economic development. In 1958 the CCP launched the Great Leap 
Forward campaign under the new "General Line for Socialist Con- 
struction." The Great Leap Forward was aimed at accomplishing 
the economic and technical development of the country at a vastly 
faster pace and with greater results. The shift to the left that the 
new "General Line" represented was brought on by a combina- 
tion of domestic and external factors. Although the party leaders 
appeared generally satisfied with the accomplishments of the First 
Five- Year Plan, they — Mao and his fellow radicals in particular — 
believed that more could be achieved in the Second Five-Year Plan 
(1958-62) if the people could be ideologically aroused and if domes- 
tic resources could be utilized more efficiently for the simultaneous 
development of industry and agriculture. These assumptions led 
the party to an intensified mobilization of the peasantry and mass 
organizations, stepped-up ideological guidance and indoctrination 
of technical experts, and efforts to build a more responsive politi- 
cal system. The last of these undertakings was to be accomplished 
through a new xiafang (down to the countryside) movement, under 



43 



China: A Country Study 



which cadres inside and outside the party would be sent to facto- 
ries, communes, mines, and public works projects for manual labor 
and firsthand familiarization with grass-roots conditions. Although 
evidence is sketchy, Mao's decision to embark on the Great Leap 
Forward was based in part on his uncertainty about the Soviet policy 
of economic, financial, and technical assistance to China. That 
policy, in Mao's view, not only fell far short of his expectations 
and needs but also made him wary of the political and economic 
dependence in which China might find itself (see Sino-Soviet 
Relations, ch. 12). 

The Great Leap Forward centered on a new socioeconomic and 
political system created in the countryside and in a few urban 
areas — the people's communes (see Glossary). By the fall of 1958, 
some 750,000 agricultural producers' cooperatives, now designated 
as production brigades, had been amalgamated into about 23,500 
communes, each averaging 5,000 households, or 22,000 people. 
The individual commune was placed in control of all the means 
of production and was to operate as the sole accounting unit; it 
was subdivided into production brigades (generally coterminous 
with traditional villages) and production teams. Each commune 
was planned as a self-supporting community for agriculture, small- 
scale local industry (for example, the famous backyard pig-iron fur- 
naces), schooling, marketing, administration, and local security 
(maintained by militia organizations). Organized along paramili- 
tary and laborsaving lines, the commune had communal kitchens, 
mess halls, and nurseries. In a way, the people's communes con- 
stituted a fundamental attack on the institution of the family, 
especially in a few model areas where radical experiments in com- 
munal living — large dormitories in place of the traditional nuclear- 
family housing — occurred. (These were quickly dropped.) The 
system also was based on the assumption that it would release 
additional manpower for such major projects as irrigation works 
and hydroelectric dams, which were seen as integral parts of the 
plan for the simultaneous development of industry and agriculture 
(see Agricultural Policies, ch. 6). 

The Great Leap Forward was an economic failure. In early 1959, 
amid signs of rising popular restiveness, the CCP admitted that 
the favorable production report for 1958 had been exaggerated. 
Among the Great Leap Forward's economic consequences were 
a shortage of food (in which natural disasters also played a part); 
shortages of raw materials for industry; overproduction of poor- 
quality goods; deterioration of industrial plants through mismanage- 
ment; and exhaustion and demoralization of the peasantry and of 
the intellectuals, not to mention the party and government cadres 



44 



Historical Setting 



at all levels. Throughout 1959 efforts to modify the administra- 
tion of the communes got under way; these were intended partly 
to restore some material incentives to the production brigades and 
teams, partly to decentralize control, and partly to house families 
that had been reunited as household units. 

Political consequences were not inconsiderable. In April 1959 
Mao, who bore the chief responsibility for the Great Leap For- 
ward fiasco, stepped down from his position as chairman of the 
People's Republic. The National People's Congress elected Liu 
Shaoqi as Mao's successor, though Mao remained chairman of the 
CCP. Moreover, Mao's Great Leap Forward policy came under 
open criticism at a party conference at Lushan, Jiangxi Province. 
The attack was led by Minister of National Defense Peng Dehuai, 
who had become troubled by the potentially adverse effect Mao's 
policies would have on the modernization of the armed forces. Peng 
argued that "putting politics in command" was no substitute for 
economic laws and realistic economic policy; unnamed party leaders 
were also admonished for trying to "jump into communism in one 
step." After the Lushan showdown, Peng Dehuai, who allegedly 
had been encouraged by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev to oppose 
Mao, was deposed. Peng was replaced by Lin Biao, a radical and 
opportunist Maoist. The new defense minister initiated a systematic 
purge of Peng's supporters from the military. 

Militancy on the domestic front was echoed in external policies 
(see Evolution of Foreign Policy, ch. 12). The "soft" foreign policy 
based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (see Glossary) 
to which China had subscribed in the mid-1950s gave way to a 
"hard" line in 1958. From August through October of that year, 
the Chinese resumed a massive artillery bombardment of the 
Nationalist-held offshore islands of Jinmen (Chin-men in Wade- 
Giles, but often referred to as Kinmen or Quemoy) and Mazu 
(Ma-tsu in Wade-Giles). This was accompanied by an aggressive 
propaganda assault on the United States and a declaration of intent 
to "liberate" Taiwan. 

Chinese control over Xizang had been reasserted in 1950. The 
socialist revolution that took place thereafter increasingly became 
a process of sinicization for the Tibetans. Tension culminated in 
a revolt in 1958-59 and the flight to India by the Dalai Lama, the 
Tibetans' spiritual and de facto temporal leader. Relations with 
India — where sympathy for the rebels was aroused — deteriorated 
as thousands of Tibetan refugees crossed the Indian border. There 
were several border incidents in 1959, and a brief Sino-Indian 
border war erupted in October 1962 as China laid claim to Aksai 
Chin, nearly 103,600 square kilometers of territory that India 



45 



China: A Country Study 



regarded as its own (see Physical Environment, ch. 2). The Soviet 
Union gave India its moral support in the dispute, thus contribut- 
ing to the growing tension between Beijing and Moscow. 

The Sino-Soviet dispute of the late 1950s was the most impor- 
tant development in Chinese foreign relations. The Soviet Union 
had been China's principal benefactor and ally, but relations 
between the two were cooling. The Soviet agreement in late 1957 
to help China produce its own nuclear weapons and missiles was 
terminated by mid- 1959 (see Defense Industry and the Economic 
Role of the People's Liberation Army, ch. 14). From that point 
until the mid-1960s, the Soviets recalled all of their technicians and 
advisers from China and reduced or canceled economic and tech- 
nical aid to China. The discord was occasioned by several factors. 
The two countries differed in their interpretation of the nature of 
"peaceful coexistence." The Chinese took a more militant and 
unyielding position on the issue of anti-imperialist struggle, but 
the Soviets were unwilling, for example, to give their support on 
the Taiwan question. In addition, the two communist powers dis- 
agreed on doctrinal matters. The Chinese accused the Soviets of 
"revisionism' ' ; the latter countered with charges of "dogmatism / ' 
Rivalry within the international communist movement also exacer- 
bated Sino-Soviet relations. An additional complication was the 
history of suspicion each side had toward the other, especially the 
Chinese, who had lost a substantial part of territory to tsarist Rus- 
sia in the mid-nineteenth century. Whatever the causes of the dis- 
pute, the Soviet suspension of aid was a blow to the Chinese scheme 
for developing industrial and high-level (including nuclear) tech- 
nology. 

Readjustment and Recovery, 1961-65 

In 1961 the political tide at home began to swing to the right, 
as evidenced by the ascendancy of a more moderate leadership. 
In an effort to stabilize the economic front, for example, the party — 
still under Mao's titular leadership but under the dominant 
influence of Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Peng Zhen, 
Bo Yibo, and others — initiated a series of corrective measures. 
Among these measures was the reorganization of the commune sys- 
tem, with the result that production brigades and teams had more 
say in their own administrative and economic planning. To gain 
more effective control from the center, the CCP reestablished its 
six regional bureaus and initiated steps aimed at tightening party 
discipline and encouraging the leading party cadres to develop 
populist-style leadership at all levels. The efforts were prompted 
by the party's realization that the arrogance of party and government 



46 



Historical Setting 



functionaries had engendered only public apathy. On the indus- 
trial front, much emphasis was now placed on realistic and effi- 
cient planning; ideological fervor and mass movements were no 
longer the controlling themes of industrial management. Produc- 
tion authority was restored to factory managers. Another notable 
emphasis after 1961 was the party's greater interest in strengthen- 
ing the defense and internal security establishment. By early 1965 
the country was well on its way to recovery under the direction 
of the party apparatus, or, to be more specific, the Central Com- 
mittee's Secretariat headed by Secretary General Deng Xiaoping. 

The Cultural Revolution Decade, 1966-76 

In the early 1960s, Mao was on the political sidelines and in semi- 
seclusion. By 1962, however, he began an offensive to purify the 
party, having grown increasingly uneasy about what he believed 
were the creeping "capitalist" and antisocialist tendencies in the 
country. As a hardened veteran revolutionary who had overcome 
the severest adversities, Mao continued to believe that the material 
incentives that had been restored to the peasants and others were 
corrupting the masses and were counterrevolutionary. 

To arrest the so-called capitalist trend, Mao launched the Socialist 
Education Movement (1962-65; see Glossary), in which the primary 
emphasis was on restoring ideological purity, reinfusing revolu- 
tionary fervor into the party and government bureaucracies, and 
intensifying class struggle. There were internal disagreements, 
however, not on the aim of the movement but on the methods of 
carrying it out. Opposition came mainly from the moderates 
represented by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, who were unsym- 
pathetic to Mao's policies. The Socialist Education Movement was 
soon paired with another Mao campaign, the theme of which was 
"to learn from the People's Liberation Army." Minister of National 
Defense Lin Biao's rise to the center of power was increasingly con- 
spicuous. It was accompanied by his call on the PLA and the CCP 
to accentuate Maoist thought as the guiding principle for the 
Socialist Education Movement and for all revolutionary undertak- 
ings in China. 

In connection with the Socialist Education Movement, a thorough 
reform of the school system, which had been planned earlier to coin- 
cide with the Great Leap Forward, went into effect. The reform 
was intended as a work-study program — a new xiafang movement — 
in which schooling was slated to accommodate the work schedule 
of communes and factories. It had the dual purpose of providing 
mass education less expensively than previously and of re-educating 
intellectuals and scholars to accept the need for their own 



47 



China: A Country Study 

participation in manual labor. The drafting of intellectuals for 
manual labor was part of the party's rectification campaign, pub- 
licized through the mass media as an effort to remove "bourgeois" 
influences from professional workers — particularly, their tendency 
to have greater regard for their own specialized fields than for the 
goals of the party. Official propaganda accused them of being more 
concerned with having "expertise" than being "red" (see Glos- 
sary). 

The Militant Phase, 1966-68 

By mid- 1965 Mao had gradually but systematically regained con- 
trol of the party with the support of Lin Biao, Jiang Qing (Mao's 
fourth wife), and Chen Boda, a leading theoretician. In late 1965 
a leading member of Mao's "Shanghai Mafia," Yao Wenyuan, 
wrote a thinly veiled attack on the deputy mayor of Beijing, Wu 
Han. In the next six months, under the guise of upholding ideo- 
logical purity, Mao and his supporters purged or attacked a wide 
variety of public figures, including State Chairman Liu Shaoqi and 
other party and state leaders. By mid- 1966 Mao's campaign had 
erupted into what came to be known as the Great Proletarian Cul- 
tural Revolution, the first mass action to have emerged against the 
CCP apparatus itself. 

Considerable intraparty opposition to the Cultural Revolution 
was evident. On the one side was the Mao-Lin Biao group, sup- 
ported by the PL A; on the other side was a faction led by Liu Shaoqi 
and Deng Xiaoping, which had its strength in the regular party 
machine. Premier Zhou Enlai, while remaining personally loyal 
to Mao, tried to mediate or to reconcile the two factions. 

Mao felt that he could no longer depend on the formal party 
organization, convinced that it had been permeated with the 
"capitalist" and bourgeois obstructionists. He turned to Lin Biao 
and the PLA to counteract the influence of those who were allegedly 
" 'left' in form but 'right' in essence." The PLA was widely 
extolled as a "great school" for the training of a new generation 
of revolutionary fighters and leaders. Maoists also turned to middle- 
school students for political demonstrations on their behalf. These 
students, joined also by some university students, came to be known 
as the Red Guards (see Glossary). Millions of Red Guards were 
encouraged by the Cultural Revolution group to become a "shock 
force" and to "bombard" with criticism both the regular party 
headquarters in Beijing and those at the regional and provincial 
levels. Red Guard activities were promoted as a reflection of Mao's 
policy of rekindling revolutionary enthusiasm and destroying "out- 
dated," "counterrevolutionary" symbols and values. Mao's ideas, 



48 



Historical Setting 



popularized in the Quotations from Chairman Mao, became the stan- 
dard by which all revolutionary efforts were to be judged. The "four 
big rights" — speaking out freely, airing views fully, holding great 
debates, and writing big-character posters (see Glossary) — became 
an important factor in encouraging Mao's youthful followers to criti- 
cize his intraparty rivals. The "four big rights" became such a major 
feature during the period that they were later institutionalized in 
the state constitution of 1975 (see Constitutional Framework, ch. 10). 
The result of the unfettered criticism of established organs of con- 
trol by China's exuberant youth was massive civil disorder, punc- 
tuated also by clashes among rival Red Guard gangs and between 
the gangs and local security authorities. The party organization was 
shattered from top to bottom. (The Central Committee's Secretariat 
ceased functioning in late 1966.) The resources of the public secu- 
rity organs were severely strained. Faced with imminent anarchy, 
the PLA — the only organization whose ranks for the most part had 
not been radicalized by Red Guard-style activities — emerged as the 
principal guarantor of law and order and the de facto political 
authority. And, although the PLA was under Mao's rallying call 
to "support the left," PLA regional military commanders ordered 
their forces to restrain the leftist radicals, thus restoring order 
throughout much of China. The PLA also was responsible for the 
appearance in early 1967 of the revolutionary committees, a new 
form of local control that replaced local party committees and admin- 
istrative bodies. The revolutionary committees were staffed with Cul- 
tural Revolution activists, trusted cadres, and military commanders, 
the latter frequently holding the greatest power. 

The radical tide receded somewhat beginning in late 1967, but 
it was not until after mid- 1968 that Mao came to realize the use- 
lessness of further revolutionary violence. Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaop- 
ing, and their fellow "revisionists" and "capitalist roaders" had 
been purged from public life by early 1967, and the Maoist group 
had since been in full command of the political scene. 

Viewed in larger perspective, the need for domestic calm and 
stability was occasioned perhaps even more by pressures emanat- 
ing from outside China. The Chinese were alarmed in 1966-68 
by steady Soviet military buildups along their common border. The 
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 heightened Chinese 
apprehensions. In March 1969 Chinese and Soviet troops clashed 
on Zhenbao Island (known to the Soviets as Damanskiy Island) 
in the disputed Wusuli Jiang (Ussuri River) border area. The ten- 
sion on the border had a sobering effect on the fractious Chinese 
political scene and provided the regime with a new and unifying 
rallying call (see The Soviet Union, ch. 14). 



49 



China: A Country Study 



The Ninth National Party Congress to the Demise of Lin Biao, 
1969-71 

The activist phase of the Cultural Revolution — considered to be 
the first in a series of cultural revolutions — was brought to an end 
in April 1969. This end was formally signaled at the CCP's Ninth 
National Party Congress, which convened under the dominance 
of the Maoist group. Mao was confirmed as the supreme leader. 
Lin Biao was promoted to the post of CCP vice chairman and was 
named as Mao's successor. Others who had risen to power by means 
of Cultural Revolution machinations were rewarded with positions 
on the Political Bureau; a significant number of military com- 
manders were appointed to the Central Committee. The party con- 
gress also marked the rising influence of two opposing forces, Mao's 
wife, Jiang Qing, and Premier Zhou Enlai. 

The general emphasis after 1969 was on reconstruction through 
rebuilding of the party, economic stabilization, and greater sensi- 
tivity to foreign affairs. Pragmatism gained momentum as a cen- 
tral theme of the years following the Ninth National Party Congress, 
but this tendency was paralleled by efforts of the radical group to 
reassert itself. The radical group — Kang Sheng, Xie Fuzhi, Jiang 
Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen — 
no longer had Mao's unqualified support. By 1970 Mao viewed 
his role more as that of the supreme elder statesman than of an 
activist in the policy-making process. This was probably the result 
as much of his declining health as of his view that a stabilizing 
influence should be brought to bear on a divided nation. As Mao 
saw it, China needed both pragmatism and revolutionary enthu- 
siasm, each acting as a check on the other. Factional infighting 
would continue unabated through the mid-1970s, although an 
uneasy coexistence was maintained while Mao was alive. 

The rebuilding of the CCP got under way in 1969. The process 
was difficult, however, given the pervasiveness of factional tensions 
and the discord carried over from the Cultural Revolution years. 
Differences persisted among the military, the party, and left- 
dominated mass organizations over a wide range of policy issues, 
to say nothing of the radical-moderate rivalry. It was not until 
December 1970 that a party committee could be reestablished at 
the provincial level. In political reconstruction two developments 
were noteworthy. As the only institution of power for the most part 
left unscathed by the Cultural Revolution, the PLA was particu- 
larly important in the politics of transition and reconstruction. The 
PLA was, however, not a homogeneous body. In 1970-71 Zhou 
Enlai was able to forge a centrist-rightist alliance with a group of 



50 



Historical Setting 



PLA regional military commanders who had taken exception to 
certain of Lin Biao's policies. This coalition paved the way for a 
more moderate party and government leadership in the late 1970s 
and 1980s (see The First Wave of Reform, 1979-84, ch. 11). 

The PLA was divided largely on policy issues. On one side of 
the infighting was the Lin Biao faction, which continued to exhort 
the need for "politics in command" and for an unremitting strug- 
gle against both the Soviet Union and the United States. On the 
other side was a majority of the regional military commanders, who 
had become concerned about the effect Lin Biao's political ambi- 
tions would have on military modernization and economic develop- 
ment. These commanders' views generally were in tune with the 
positions taken by Zhou Enlai and his moderate associates. Spe- 
cifically, the moderate groups within the civilian bureaucracy and 
the armed forces spoke for more material incentives for the peas- 
antry, efficient economic planning, and a thorough reassessment 
of the Cultural Revolution. They also advocated improved rela- 
tions with the West in general and the United States in particular — if 
for no other reason than to counter the perceived expansionist aims 
of the Soviet Union. Generally, the radicals' objection notwith- 
standing, the Chinese political tide shifted steadily toward the right 
of center. Among the notable achievements of the early 1970s was 
China's decision to seek rapprochement with the United States, 
as dramatized by President Richard M. Nixon's visit in February 
1972. In September 1972 diplomatic relations were established with 
Japan. 

Without question, the turning point in the decade of the Cul- 
tural Revolution was Lin Biao's abortive coup attempt and his sub- 
sequent death in a plane crash as he fled China in September 1971 . 
The immediate consequence was a steady erosion of the fundamen- 
talist influence of the left-wing radicals. Lin Biao's closest supporters 
were purged systematically. Efforts to depoliticize and promote 
professionalism were intensified within the PLA. These were also 
accompanied by the rehabilitation (see Glossary) of those persons 
who had been persecuted or fallen into disgrace in 1966-68. 

End of the Era of Mao Zedong, 1972- 76 

Among the most prominent of those rehabilitated was Deng 
Xiaoping, who was reinstated as a vice premier in April 1973, 
ostensibly under the aegis of Premier Zhou Enlai but certainly with 
the concurrence of Mao Zedong. Together, Zhou Enlai and Deng 
Xiaoping came to exert strong influence. Their moderate line favor- 
ing modernization of all sectors of the economy was formally con- 
firmed at the Tenth National Party Congress in August 1973, at 



51 



China: A Country Study 



which time Deng Xiaoping was made a member of the party's Cen- 
tral Committee (but not yet of the Political Bureau). 

The radical camp fought back by building an armed urban 
militia, but its mass base of support was limited to Shanghai and 
parts of northeastern China — hardly sufficient to arrest what it 
denounced as "revisionist" and "capitalist" tendencies. In Janu- 
ary 1975 Zhou Enlai, speaking before the Fourth National Peo- 
ple's Congress, outlined a program of what has come to be known 
as the Four Modernizations (see Glossary) for the four sectors of 
agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology 
(see Economic Policies, 1949-80, ch. 5). This program would be 
reaffirmed at the Eleventh National Party Congress, which con- 
vened in August 1977. Also in January 1975, Deng Xiaoping's 
position was solidified by his election as a vice chairman of the CCP 
and as a member of the Political Bureau and its Standing Com- 
mittee. Deng also was installed as China's first civilian chief of the 
PLA General Staff Department. 

The year 1976 saw the deaths of the three most senior officials 
in the CCP and the state apparatus: Zhou Enlai in January, Zhu 
De (then chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Peo- 
ple's Congress and de jure head of state) in July, and Mao Zedong 
in September. In April of the same year, masses of demonstrators 
in Tiananmen Square in Beijing memorialized Zhou Enlai and criti- 
cized Mao's closest associates, Zhou's opponents. In June the 
government announced that Mao would no longer receive foreign 
visitors. In July an earthquake devastated the city of Tangshan 
in Hebei Province. These events, added to the deaths of the three 
Communist leaders, contributed to a popular sense that the "man- 
date of heaven" had been withdrawn from the ruling party. At 
best the nation was in a state of serious political uncertainty. 

Deng Xiaoping, the logical successor as premier, received a tem- 
porary setback after Zhou's death, when radicals launched a major 
counterassault against him. In April 1976 Deng was once more 
removed from all his public posts, and a relative political unknown, 
Hua Guofeng, a Political Bureau member, vice premier, and minis- 
ter of public security, was named acting premier and party first 
vice chairman. 

Even though Mao Zedong's role in political life had been sporadic 
and shallow in his later years, it was crucial. Despite Mao's alleged 
lack of mental acuity, his influence in the months before his death 
remained such that his orders to dismiss Deng and appoint Hua 
Guofeng were accepted immediately by the Political Bureau. The 
political system had polarized in the years before Mao's death into 
increasingly bitter and irreconcilable factions. While Mao was 



52 



Historical Setting 



alive — and playing these factions off against each other — the con- 
tending forces were held in check. His death resolved only some 
of the problems inherent in the succession struggle. 

The radical clique most closely associated with Mao and the Cul- 
tural Revolution became vulnerable after Mao died, as Deng had 
been after Zhou Enlai's demise. In October, less than a month after 
Mao's death, Jiang Qing and her three principal associates — 
denounced as the Gang of Four (see Glossary) — were arrested with 
the assistance of two senior Political Bureau members, Minister 
of National Defense Ye Jianying (1897-1986) and Wang Dong- 
xing, commander of the CCP's elite bodyguard. Within days it 
was formally announced that Hua Guofeng had assumed the posi- 
tions of party chairman, chairman of the party's Central Military 
Commission, and premier. 

The Post-Mao Period, 1976-78 

The jubilation following the incarceration of the Gang of Four 
and the popularity of the new ruling triumvirate (Hua Guofeng, 
Ye Jianying, and Li Xiannian, a temporary alliance of necessity) 
were succeeded by calls for the restoration to power of Deng Xiaop- 
ing and the elimination of leftist influence throughout the political 
system. By July 1977, at no small risk to undercutting Hua 
Guofeng' s legitimacy as Mao's successor and seeming to contradict 
Mao's apparent will, the Central Committee exonerated Deng 
Xiaoping from responsibility for the Tiananmen Square incident. 
Deng admitted some shortcomings in the events of 1975, and finally, 
at a party Central Committee session, he resumed all the posts from 
which he had been removed in 1976. 

The post-Mao political order was given its first vote of confi- 
dence at the Eleventh National Party Congress, held August 12-18, 
1977. Hua was confirmed as party chairman, and Ye Jianying, 
Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian, and Wang Dongxing were elected 
vice chairmen. The congress proclaimed the formal end of the Cul- 
tural Revolution, blamed it entirely on the Gang of Four, and reiter- 
ated that "the fundamental task of the party in the new historical 
period is to build China into a modern, powerful socialist country 
by the end of the twentieth century." Many contradictions still 
were apparent, however, in regard to the Maoist legacy and the 
possibility of future cultural revolutions. 

The new balance of power clearly was unsatisfactory to Deng, 
who sought genuine party reform and, soon after the National Party 
Congress, took the initiative to reorganize the bureaucracy and 
redirect policy. His longtime protege Hu Yaobang replaced Hua 
supporter Wang Dongxing as head of the CCP Organization 



53 



China: A Country Study 



Department. Educational reforms were instituted, and Cultural 
Revolution-era verdicts on literature, art, and intellectuals were 
overturned. The year 1978 proved a crucial one for the reformers. 
Differences among the two competing factions — that headed by Hua 
Guofeng (soon to be branded a leftist) and that led by Deng and 
the more moderate figures — became readily apparent by the time 
the Fifth National People's Congress was held in February and 
March 1978. Serious disputes arose over the apparently dispropor- 
tionate development of the national economy, the Hua forces call- 
ing for still more large-scale projects that China could ill afford. 
In the face of substantive losses in leadership positions and policy 
decisions, the leftists sought to counterattack with calls for strict 
adherence to Mao Zedong Thought and the party line of class strug- 
gle. Rehabilitations of Deng's associates and others sympathetic 
to his reform plans were stepped up. Not only were many of those 
purged during the Cultural Revolution returned to power, but 
individuals who had fallen from favor as early as the mid-1950s 
were rehabilitated. It was a time of increased political activism by 
students, whose big-character posters attacking Deng's opponents — 
and even Mao himself — appeared with regularity. 

China and the Four Modernizations, 1979-82 

The culmination of Deng Xiaoping' s re-ascent to power and the 
start in earnest of political, economic, social, and cultural reforms 
were achieved at the Third Plenum of the National Party Con- 
gress's Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978. The Third 
Plenum is considered a major turning point in modern Chinese 
political history. "Left" mistakes committed before and during the 
Cultural Revolution were "corrected," and the "two whatevers" 
policy ("support whatever policy decisions Chairman Mao made 
and follow whatever instructions Chairman Mao gave") was repudi- 
ated. The classic party line calling for protracted class struggle was 
officially exchanged for one promoting the Four Modernizations. 
In the future, the attainment of economic goals would be the mea- 
sure of the success or failure of policies and individual leadership; 
in other words, economics, not politics, was in command. To effect 
such a broad policy redirection, Deng placed key allies on the 
Political Bureau (including Chen Yun as an additional vice chair- 
man and Hu Yaobang as a member) while positioning Hu Yao- 
bang as secretary general of the CCP and head of the party's 
Propaganda Department. Although assessments of the Cultural 
Revolution and Mao were deferred, a decision was announced on 
"historical questions left over from an earlier period." The 1976 
Tiananmen Square incident, the 1959 removal of Peng Dehuai, 



54 



Historical Setting 



and other now infamous political machinations were reversed in 
favor of the new leadership. New agricultural policies intended to 
loosen political restrictions on peasants and allow them to produce 
more on their own initiative were approved. 

Rapid change occurred in the subsequent months and years. The 
year 1979 witnessed the formal exchange of diplomatic recogni- 
tion between the People's Republic and the United States, a border 
war between China and Vietnam, the fledgling "democracy move- 
ment" (which had begun in earnest in November 1978), and the 
determination not to extend the thirty-year-old Treaty of Friend- 
ship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union. All 
these events led to some criticism of Deng Xiaoping, who had to 
alter his strategy temporarily while directing his own political 
warfare against Hua Guofeng and the leftist elements in the party 
and government. As part of this campaign, a major document was 
presented at the September 1979 Fourth Plenum of the Eleventh 
Central Committee, giving a "preliminary assessment" of the entire 
thirty-year period of Communist rule. At the plenum, party Vice 
Chairman Ye Jianying pointed out the achievements of the CCP 
while admitting that the leadership had made serious political errors 
affecting the people. Furthermore, Ye declared the Cultural Revo- 
lution "an appalling catastrophe" and "the most severe setback 
to [the] socialist cause since [1949]." Although Mao was not spe- 
cifically blamed, there was no doubt about his share of responsi- 
bility. The plenum also marked official acceptance of a new 
ideological line that called for "seeking truth from facts" and of 
other elements of Deng Xiaoping' s thinking. A further setback for 
Hua was the approval of the resignations of other leftists from lead- 
ing party and state posts. In the months following the plenum, a 
party rectification campaign ensued, replete with a purge of party 
members whose political credentials were largely achieved as a result 
of the Cultural Revolution. The campaign went beyond the civilian 
ranks of the CCP, extending to party members in the PLA as well. 

Economic advances and political achievements had strengthened 
the position of the Deng reformists enough that by February 1980 
they were able to call the Fifth Plenum of the Eleventh Central 
Committee. One major effect of the plenum was the resignation 
of the members of the "Little Gang of Four" (an allusion to the 
original Gang of Four, Mao's allies) — Hua's closest collaborators 
and the backbone of opposition to Deng. Wang Dongxing, Wu 
De, Ji Dengkui, and Chen Xilian were charged with "grave [but 
unspecified] errors" in the struggle against the Gang of Four and 
demoted from the Political Bureau to mere Central Committee 
membership. In turn, the Central Committee elevated Deng's 



55 



China: A Country Study 

proteges Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang to the Standing Commit- 
tee of the Political Bureau and the newly restored party Secretariat. 
Under the title of secretary general, Hu Yaobang took over day- 
to-day running of the party (see The First Wave of Reform, 1979— 
84, ch. 11). Especially poignant was the posthumous rehabilita- 
tion of the late president and one-time successor to Mao, Liu 
Shaoqi, at the Fifth Plenum. Finally, at the Fifth National Peo- 
ple's Congress session in August and September that year, Deng's 
preeminence in government was consolidated when he gave up his 
vice premiership and Hua Guofeng resigned as premier in favor 
of Zhao Ziyang. 

One of the more spectacular political events of modern Chinese 
history was the month-long trial of the Gang of Four and six of 
Lin Biao's closest associates. A 35-judge special court was convened 
in November 1980 and issued a 20,000-word indictment against 
the defendants. The indictment came more than four years after 
the arrest of Jiang Qing and her associates and more than nine 
years after the arrests of the Lin Biao group. Beyond the trial of 
ten political pariahs, it appeared that the intimate involvement of 
Mao Zedong, current party chairman Hua Guofeng, and the CCP 
itself were on trial. The prosecution wisely separated political errors 
from actual crimes. Among the latter were the usurpation of state 
power and party leadership; the persecution of some 750,000 peo- 
ple, 34,375 of whom died during the period 1966-76; and, in the 
case of the Lin Biao defendants, the plotting of the assassination 
of Mao. In January 1981 the court rendered guilty verdicts against 
the ten. Jiang Qing, despite her spirited self-vindication and defense 
of her late husband, received a death sentence with a two-year sus- 
pension; later, Jiang Qing's death sentence was commuted to life 
imprisonment. So enduring was Mao's legacy that Jiang Qing 
appeared to be protected by it from execution. The same sentence 
was given to Zhang Chunqiao, while Wang Hongwen was given 
life and Yao Wenyuan twenty years. Chen Boda and the other Lin 
Biao faction members were given sentences of between sixteen and 
eighteen years. The net effect of the trial was a further erosion of 
Mao's prestige and the system he created. In pre-trial meetings, 
the party Central Committee posthumously expelled CCP vice 
chairman Kang Sheng and Political Bureau member Xie Fuzhi 
from the party because of their participation in the "counterrevolu- 
tionary plots" of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing. The memorial speeches 
delivered at their funerals were also rescinded. There was enough 
adverse pre-trial testimony that Hua Guofeng reportedly offered 
to resign the chairmanship before the trial started. 



56 



Historical Setting 



In June 1981 the Sixth Plenum of the Eleventh Central Commit- 
tee marked a major milestone in the passing of the Maoist era. 
The Central Committee accepted Hua's resignation from the chair- 
manship and granted him the face-saving position of vice chair- 
man. In his place, CCP secretary general Hu Yaobang became 
chairman. Hua also gave up his position as chairman of the party's 
Central Military Commission in favor of Deng Xiaoping. The ple- 
num adopted the 35,000-word "Resolution on Certain Questions 
in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's 
Republic of China." The resolution reviewed the sixty years since 
the founding of the CCP, emphasizing party activities since 1949. 
A major part of the document condemned the ten-year Cultural 
Revolution and assessed Mao Zedong's role in it. "Chief respon- 
sibility for the grave 'Left' error of the 'cultural revolution,' an 
error comprehensive in magnitude and protracted in duration, does 
indeed lie with Comrade Mao Zedong. . . . [and] far from mak- 
ing a correct analysis of many problems, he confused right and 
wrong and the people with the enemy. . . . Herein lies his 
tragedy." At the same time, Mao was praised for seeking to cor- 
rect personal and party shortcomings throughout his life, for lead- 
ing the effort that brought the demise of Lin Biao, and for having 
criticized Jiang Qing and her cohort. Hua too was recognized for 
his contributions in defeating the Gang of Four but was branded 
a "whateverist." Hua also was criticized for his anti-Deng Xiaoping 
posture in the period 1976-77. 

Several days after the closing of the plenum, on the occasion of 
the sixtieth anniversary of the founding of the CCP, new party 
chairman Hu Yaobang declared that "although Comrade Mao 
Zedong made grave mistakes in his later years, it is clear that if 
we consider his life work, his contributions to the Chinese revolu- 
tion far outweigh his errors. . . . His immense contributions are 
immortal." These remarks may have been offered in an effort to 
repair the extensive damage done to the Maoist legacy and by 
extension to the party itself. Hu went on, however, to praise the 
contributions of Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, 
and a score of other erstwhile enemies of the late chairman. Thus 
the new party hierarchy sought to assess, and thus close the books 
on, the Maoist era and move on to the era of the Four Moderniza- 
tions. The culmination of Deng's drive to consolidate his power 
and ensure the continuity of his reformist policies among his suc- 
cessors was the calling of the Twelfth National Party Congress in 
September 1982 and the Fifth Session of the Fifth National 



57 



China: A Country Study 



People's Congress in December 1982 (see The First Wave of 
Reform, 1979-84, ch. 11). 

* * * 

Chinese history is a vast field of intellectual inquiry. Advances 
in archaeology and documentary research constantly produce new 
results and numerous new publications. An excellent and concise 
survey of the entire course of Chinese history up to the 1970s is 
China: Tradition and Transformation by John K. Fairbank and Edwin 
O. Reischauer. For a more in-depth review of modern Chinese 
history (beginning of the Qing dynasty to the early 1980s), 
Immanuel C.Y. Hsu's The Rise of Modern China should be consulted. 
Hsu's book is particularly useful for its chapter-by-chapter bibliog- 
raphy. Maurice Meisner's Mao's China and After: A History of the 
People's Republic presents a comprehensive historical analysis of 
post- 1949 China and provides a selected bibliography. 

There are a number of excellent serial publications covering 
Chinese history topics. These include China Quarterly, Chinese Studies 
in History, and Journal of Asian Studies. The Association for Asian 
Studies' annual Bibliography of Asian Studies provides the most com- 
prehensive list of monographs, collections of documents, and arti- 
cles on Chinese history. (For further information and complete 
citations, see Bibliography.) 



58 



Chapter 2. Physical Environment and Population 




A fierce white tiger graces this Han dynasty (206 B. C. -A.D. 220) decora- 
tive, circular facade tile. 



REMARKABLY VARIED LANDSCAPES suggest the disparate 
climate and broad reach of China, the third largest country in the 
world in terms of area. China's climate ranges from subarctic to 
tropical. Its topography includes the world's highest peaks, tortu- 
ous but picturesque river valleys, and vast plains subject to life- 
threatening but soil-enriching flooding. These characteristics have 
dictated where the Chinese people live and how they make their 
livelihood. 

The majority of China's people live in the eastern segment of 
the country, the traditional China Proper. Most are peasants liv- 
ing, as did their forebears, in the low-lying hills and central plains 
that stretch from the highlands eastward and southward to the sea. 
Agriculture predominates in this vast area, generally favored by 
a temperate or subtropical climate. The meticulously tilled fields 
are evidence in part of the government's continuing concern over 
farm output and the food supply. 

Although migration to urban areas has been restricted since the 
late 1950s, as of the end of 1985 about 37 percent of the popula- 
tion was urban. An urban and industrial corridor formed a broad 
arc stretching from Harbin in the northeast through the Beijing 
area and south to China's largest city, the huge industrial metropoli- 
tan complex of Shanghai. 

The uneven pattern of internal development, so strongly weighted 
toward the eastern part of the country, doubtless will change little 
even with developing interest in exploiting the mineral-rich and 
agriculturally productive portions of the vast northwest and south- 
west regions. The adverse terrain and climate of most of those 
regions have discouraged dense population. For the most part, only 
ethnic minority groups have settled there. 

The "minority nationalities" are an important element of 
Chinese society. In 1987 there were 55 recognized minority groups, 
comprising nearly 7 percent of the total population. Because some 
of the groups were located in militarily sensitive border areas and 
in regions with strategic minerals, the government tried to main- 
tain benevolent relations with the minorities. But the minorities 
played only a superficial role in the major affairs of the nation. 

China's ethnically diverse population is the largest in the world, 
and the Chinese Communist Party and the government work 
strenuously to count, control, and care for their people. In 1982 
China conducted its first population census since 1964. It was by 



61 



China: A Country Study 



far the most thorough and accurate census taken under Communist 
rule and confirmed that China was a nation of more than 1 billion 
people, or about one-fifth of the world's population. The census 
provided demographers with a wealth of accurate data on China's 
age-sex structure, fertility and mortality rates, and population den- 
sity and distribution. Useful information also was gathered on 
minority ethnic groups, urban population, and marital status. For 
the first time since the People's Republic of China was founded, 
demographers had reliable information on the size and composi- 
tion of the Chinese work force. 

Beginning in the mid-1950s, the Chinese government introduced, 
with varying degrees of enthusiasm and success, a number of family 
planning, or population control, campaigns and programs. The 
most radical and controversial was the one-child policy publicly 
announced in 1979. Under this policy, which had different guide- 
lines for national minorities, married couples were officially per- 
mitted only one child. Enforcement of the program, however, varied 
considerably from place to place, depending on the vigilance of 
local population control workers. 

Health care has improved dramatically in China since 1949. 
Major diseases such as cholera, typhoid, and scarlet fever have been 
brought under control. Life expectancy has more than doubled, 
and infant mortality has dropped significantly. On the negative 
side, the incidence of cancer, cerebrovascular disease, and heart 
disease has increased to the extent that these have become the lead- 
ing causes of death. Economic reforms initiated in the late 1970s 
fundamentally altered methods of providing health care; the col- 
lective medical care system was gradually replaced by a more 
individual-oriented approach. 

More liberalized emigration policies enacted in the 1980s facili- 
tated the legal departure of increasing numbers of Chinese who 
joined their overseas Chinese relatives and friends. The Four 
Modernizations program (see Glossary), which required access of 
Chinese students and scholars, particularly scientists, to foreign 
education and research institutions, brought about increased con- 
tact with the outside world, particularly the industrialized nations. 
Thus, as China moved toward the twenty-first century, the diverse 
resources and immense population that it had committed to a com- 
prehensive process of modernization became ever more important 
in the interdependent world. 

Physical Environment 

China stretches some 5,000 kilometers across the East Asian land- 
mass in an erratically changing configuration of broad plains, 



62 




Karst formations on the 
Li Jiang near Guilin 
Courtesy 
Douglass M. Do lan 



Overlooking Pagoda of the 
Six Harmonies on the 
Qiantang Jiang, Hangzhou 
Courtesy 
Zhejiang Slide Studio 




63 



China: A Country Study 

expansive deserts, and lofty mountain ranges, including vast areas 
of inhospitable terrain. The eastern half of the country, its seacoast 
fringed with offshore islands, is a region of fertile lowlands, foothills 
and mountains, and subtropical areas. The western half of China 
is a region of sunken basins, rolling plateaus, and towering massifs, 
including a portion of the highest tableland on earth. The vast- 
ness of the country and the barrenness of the western hinterland 
have important implications for defense strategy (see Doctrine, 
Strategy, and Tactics, ch. 14). In spite of many good harbors along 
the approximately 18,000-kilometer coastline, the nation has tradi- 
tionally oriented itself not toward the sea but inland, developing 
as an imperial power whose center lay in the middle and lower 
reaches of the Huang He (Yellow River) on the northern plains. 

Figures for the size of China differ slightly depending on where 
one draws a number of ill-defined boundaries. The official Chinese 
figure is 9.6 million square kilometers, making the country sub- 
stantially smaller than the Soviet Union, slightly smaller than 
Canada, and somewhat larger than the United States. China's con- 
tour is reasonably comparable to that of the United States and lies 
largely at the same latitudes. 

Boundaries 

In 1987 China's borders, more than 20,000 kilometers of land 
frontier shared with nearly all the nations of mainland East Asia, 
were disputed at a number of points. In the western sector, China 
claimed portions of the 41 ,000-square-kilometer Pamir Mountains 
area, a region of soaring mountain peaks and glacial valleys where 
the borders of Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Soviet Union, and China 
meet in Central Asia. North and east of this region, some sections 
of the border remained undemarcated in 1987. The 6,542-kilometer 
frontier with the Soviet Union has been a source of continual fric- 
tion. In 1954 China published maps showing substantial portions 
of Soviet Siberian territory as its own. In the northeast, border fric- 
tion with the Soviet Union produced a tense situation in remote 
regions of Nei Monggol Autonomous Region (Inner Mongolia) 
and Heilongjiang Province along segments of the Ergun He (Argun 
River), Heilongjiang (Amur River), and Wusuli Jiang (Ussuri 
River) (see fig. 3). Each side had massed troops and had exchanged 
charges of border provocation in this area. In a September 1986 
speech in Vladivostok, Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev offered 
the Chinese a more conciliatory position on Sino-Soviet border 
rivers. In 1987 the two sides resumed border talks that had been 
broken off after the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (see 



64 



Physical Environment and Population 

Sino-Soviet Relations, ch. 12; The Soviet Union, ch. 14). Although 
the border issue remained unresolved as of late 1987, China and 
the Soviet Union agreed to consider the northeastern sector first. 

A major dispute between China and India focuses on the north- 
ern edge of their shared border, where the Aksai Chin area of north- 
eastern Jammu and Kashmir is under Chinese control but claimed 
by India. Eastward from Bhutan and north of the Brahmaputra 
River (Yarlung Zangbo Jiang) lies a large area controlled and 
administered by India but claimed by the Chinese in the aftermath 
of the 1959 Tibetan revolt. The area was demarcated by the Brit- 
ish McMahon Line, drawn along the Himalayas in 1914 as the 
Sino-Indian border; India accepts and China rejects this bound- 
ary. In June 1980 China made its first move in twenty years to 
settle the border disputes with India, proposing that India cede the 
Aksai Chin area in Jammu and Kashmir to China in return for 
China's recognition of the McMahon Line; India did not accept 
the offer, however, preferring a sector-by-sector approach to the 
problem. In July 1986 China and India held their seventh round 
of border talks, but they made little headway toward resolving the 
dispute. Each side, but primarily India, continued to make alle- 
gations of incursions into its territory by the other. 

China, Taiwan, and Vietnam all claim sovereignty over both 
the Xisha (Paracel) and the Nansha (Spratly) islands, but the major 
islands of the Xishas are occupied by China. The Philippines claims 
an area known as Kalayaan (Freedom Land), which excludes the 
Nansha in the west and some reefs in the south. Malaysia claims 
the islands and reefs in the southernmost area, and there also is 
a potential for dispute over the islands with Brunei. 

The China-Burma border issue was settled October 1, 1960, by 
the signing of the Sino-Burmese Boundary Treaty. The first joint 
inspection of the border was completed successfully in June 1986. 
In 1987 the island province of Taiwan continued to be under the 
control of the Guomindang authorities (see Sino-United States 
Relations, ch. 12). 

Terrain and Drainage 

Terrain and vegetation vary greatly in China. Mountains, hills, 
and highlands cover about 66 percent of the nation's territory, 
impeding communication and leaving limited level land for agricul- 
ture. Most ranges, including all the major ones, trend east-west. 
In the southwest, the Himalayas and the Kunlun Mountains enclose 
the Qing Zang Plateau, which encompasses most of Xizang 
Autonomous Region (also known as Tibet) and part of Qinghai 
Province. It is the most extensive plateau in the world, where 



65 



China: A Country Study 



Western Sector 




AFGHANISTAN 



X I Z A N G 

V.« Karat or am ^ 



Chinese //ne^ 

J»of confro/f / 

^ a. 



^ AKSAI 
v { CHIN 



In dispute. Based on 1895 Anglo-Russian 
^ rea,y * DOUn dary not recognized by China 



Figure 3. China-Soviet Union Border Area 



elevations average more than 4,000 meters above sea level and the 
loftiest summits rise to more than 7,200 meters. 

From the Qing Zang Plateau, other less-elevated highlands, 
rugged east-west trending mountains, and plateaus interrupted by 
deep depressions fan out to the north and east. A continental scarp 
marks the eastern margin of this territory extending from the 
Greater Hinggan Range in northeastern China, through the Tai- 
hang Shan (a range of mountains overlooking the North China 
Plain) to the eastern edge of the Yunnan-Guizhou Plateau in the 
south (see fig. 4). Virtually all of the low-lying areas of China — 
the regions of dense population and intensive cultivation — are found 
east of this scarp line. 

East- west ranges include some of Asia's greatest mountains. In 
addition to the Himalayas and the Kunlun Mountains, there are 



66 



Physical Environment and Population 



Eastern Sector 




Argun R 



Manzhouli 
Soviet maps stiow bourn 

according to 1911 Treaty of Tsitsiho, > Treats f Beij.ne 

Chinese maps show boundary Ussuri-~f lSfiO 
according to 1727 Treaty of Kiakhta River f , nn '„ , 

/ 400.000 sq. km 
Territorial difference is about 900 sq.km^C yielded to Russia 
Boundary west of Ussuri headwaters\_. T ' hniinr)qrv 
was demarcated in 1861 and V 1 reat > boundary 

redemarcated in 1886. -A^V/odivosfolc 



International boundary 

* International boundary in dispute 

Other line of separation 

. Provincial-level boundary 

50 100 150 200 250 Kilometers 



50 100 150 200 250 Miles 



Figure 3. (continued) 



the Gangdise Shan (Kailas) and the Tian Shan ranges. The latter 
stands between two great basins, the massive Tarim Basin to the 
south and the Junggar Basin to the north. Rich deposits of coal, 
oil, and metallic ores lie in the Tian Shan area. The largest inland 
basin in China, the Tarim Basin measures 1,500 kilometers from 
east to west and 600 kilometers from north to south at its widest 
parts. 

The Himalayas form a natural boundary on the southwest as 
the Altai Mountains do on the northwest. Lesser ranges branch 
out, some at sharp angles from the major ranges. The mountains 
give rise to all the principal rivers. 

The spine of the Kunlun Mountains separates into several 
branches as it runs eastward from the Pamir Mountains. The north- 
ernmost branches, the Altun Shan and the Qilian Shan, rim the 



67 



China: A Country Study 

Qing Zang Plateau in west-central China and overlook the Qaidam 
Basin, a sandy and swampy region containing many salt lakes. A 
southern branch of the Kunlun Mountains divides the watersheds 
of the Huang He and the Chang Jiang (Yangtze River). The Gansu 
Corridor, west of the great bend in the Huang He, was tradition- 
ally an important communications link with Central Asia. 

North of the 3,300-kilometer-long Great Wall, between Gansu 
Province on the west and the Greater Hinggan Range on the east, 
lies the Nei Monggol Plateau, at an average elevation of 1,000 
meters above sea level. The Yin Shan, a system of mountains with 
average elevations of 1,400 meters, extends east- west through the 
center of this vast desert or steppe peneplain. To the south is the 
largest loess plateau in the world, covering 600,000 square kilo- 
meters in Shaanxi Province, parts of Gansu and Shanxi provinces, 
and some of Ningxia-Hui Autonomous Region. Loess is a yellow- 
ish soil blown in from the Nei Monggol deserts. The loose, loamy 
material travels easily in the wind, and through the centuries it 
has veneered the plateau and choked the Huang He with silt. 

Because the river level drops precipitously toward the North 
China Plain, where it continues a sluggish course across the delta, 
it transports a heavy load of sand and mud from the upper reaches, 
much of which is deposited on the flat plain. The flow is channeled 
mainly by constantly repaired manmade embankments; as a result 
the river flows on a raised ridge several meters — in some places 
more than ten meters — above the plain, and waterlogging, floods, 
and course changes have recurred over the centuries. Traditionally, 
rulers were judged by their concern for or indifference to preser- 
vation of the embankments. In the modern era, the new leader- 
ship has been deeply committed to dealing with the problem and 
has undertaken extensive flood control and conservation measures. 

Flowing from its source in the Qing Zang highlands, the Huang 
He courses toward the sea through the North China Plain, the 
historic center of Chinese expansion and influence. Han (see Glos- 
sary) people have farmed the rich alluvial soils of the plain since 
ancient times, constructing the Grand Canal for north-south trans- 
port (see The Imperial Period, ch. 1). The plain itself is actually 
a continuation of the Dongbei (Manchurian) Plain to the north- 
east but is separated from it by the Bo Hai Gulf, an extension of 
the Huang Hai (Yellow Sea). 

Like other densely populated areas of China, the plain is sub- 
ject not only to floods but to earthquakes. For example, the min- 
ing and industrial center of Tangshan, about 165 kilometers east 
of Beijing, was leveled by an earthquake in July 1976 that report- 
edly also killed 242,000 people and injured 164,000. 



68 



Physical Environment and Population 

The Yellow, East China, and South China seas, too, are marginal 
seas of the Pacific Ocean. More than half the coastline (predomi- 
nantly in the south) is rocky; most of the remainder is sandy. The 
Bay of Hangzhou roughly divides the two kinds of shoreline. 

Climate 

Monsoon winds, caused by differences in the heat-absorbing 
capacity of the continent and the ocean, dominate the climate. 
Alternating seasonal air-mass movements and accompanying winds 
are moist in summer and dry in winter. The advance and retreat 
of the monsoons account in large degree for the timing of the rainy 
season and the amount of rainfall throughout the country. Tremen- 
dous differences in latitude, longitude, and altitude give rise to sharp 
variations in precipitation and temperature within China. Although 
most of the country lies in the temperate belt, its climatic patterns 
are complex. 

China's northernmost point lies along the Heilong Jiang in 
Heilongjiang Province in the cold-temperate zone; its southern- 
most point, Hainan Island, has a tropical climate (see table 4, 
Appendix A). Temperature differences in winter are great, but in 
summer the diversity is considerably less. For example, the north- 
ern portions of Heilongjiang Province experience an average Janu- 
ary mean temperature of below 0°C, and the reading may drop 
to minus 30°C; the average July mean in the same area may exceed 
20°C. By contrast, the central and southern parts of Guangdong 
Province experience an average January temperature of above 
10°C, while the July mean is about 28°C. 

Precipitation varies regionally even more than temperature. 
China south of the Qin Ling experiences abundant rainfall, most 
of it coming with the summer monsoons. To the north and west 
of the range, however, rainfall is uncertain. The farther north and 
west one moves, the scantier and more uncertain it becomes. The 
northwest has the lowest annual rainfall in the country and no 
precipitation at all in its desert areas. 

Wildlife 

China lies in two of the world's major zoogeographic regions, 
the Palearctic and the Oriental. The Qing Zang Plateau, Xinjiang 
and Nei Monggol autonomous regions, northeastern China, and 
all areas north of the Huang He are in the Palearctic region. Cen- 
tral, southern, and southwest China lie in the Oriental region. In 
the Palearctic zone are found such important mammals as the river 
fox, horse, camel, tapir, mouse hare, hamster, and jerboa. Among 
the species found in the Oriental region are the civet cat, Chinese 



71 



China: A Country Study 

pangolin, bamboo rat, tree shrew, and also gibbon and various 
other species of monkeys and apes. Some overlap exists between 
the two regions because of natural dispersal and migration, and 
deer or antelope, bears, wolves, pigs, and rodents are found in all 
of the diverse climatic and geological environments. The famous 
giant panda is found only in a limited area along the Chang Jiang. 

Population 
The Data Base 

The People's Republic conducted censuses in 1953, 1964, and 
1982. In 1987 the government announced that the fourth national 
census would take place in 1990 and that there would be one every 
ten years thereafter. The 1982 census, which reported a total popu- 
lation of 1,008,180,738, is generally accepted as significantly more 
reliable, accurate, and thorough than the previous two. Various 
international organizations eagerly assisted the Chinese in conduct- 
ing the 1982 census, including the United Nations Fund for Popu- 
lation Activities which donated US$15.6 million for the preparation 
and execution of the census. 

The nation began preparing for the 1982 census in late 1976. 
Chinese census workers were sent to the United States and Japan 
to study modern census-taking techniques and automation. Com- 
puters were installed in every provincial-level unit except Xizang 
and were connected to a central processing system in the Beijing 
headquarters of the State Statistical Bureau. Pretests and small- 
scale trial runs were conducted and checked for accuracy between 
1980 and 1981 in twenty-four provincial-level units. Census sta- 
tions were opened in rural production brigades (see Glossary) and 
urban neighborhoods. Beginning July 1, 1982, each household sent 
a representative to a census station to be enumerated. The census 
required about a month to complete and employed approximately 
5 million census takers. 

The 1982 census collected data in nineteen demographic cate- 
gories relating to individuals and households. The thirteen areas 
concerning individuals were name, relationship to head of house- 
hold, sex, age, nationality, registration status, educational level, 
profession, occupation, status of nonworking persons, marital status, 
number of children born and still living, and number of births in 
1981 . The six items pertaining to households were type (domestic 
or collective), serial number, number of persons, number of births 
in 1981, number of deaths in 1981, and number of registered per- 
sons absent for more than one year. Information was gathered in 
a number of important areas for which previous data were either 



72 



Landscape on the Grand Canal 
Courtesy Xinhua News Agency 



extremely inaccurate or simply nonexistent, including fertility, mari- 
tal status, urban population, minority ethnic groups, sex compo- 
sition, age distribution, and employment and unemployment (see 
table 5, Appendix A). 

A fundamental anomaly in the 1982 statistics was noted by some 
Western analysts. They pointed out that although the birth and 
death rates recorded by the census and those recorded through the 
household registration system were different, the two systems 
arrived at similar population totals (see Differentiation, ch. 3). The 
discrepancies in the vital rates were the result of the under-reporting 
of both births and deaths to the authorities under the registration 
system; families would not report some births because of the one- 
child policy and would not report some deaths so as to hold on to 
the rations of the deceased. Nevertheless, the 1982 census was a 
watershed for both Chinese and world demographics. After an 
eighteen-year gap, population specialists were given a wealth of 
reliable, up-to-date figures on which to reconstruct past demo- 
graphic patterns, measure current population conditions, and 
predict future population trends. For example, Chinese and for- 
eign demographers used the 1982 census age-sex structure as the 
base population for forecasting and making assumptions about 
future fertility trends. The data on age-specific fertility and mor- 
tality rates provided the necessary base-line information for making 



73 



China: A Country Study 



pangolin, bamboo rat, tree shrew, and also gibbon and various 
other species of monkeys and apes. Some overlap exists between 
the two regions because of natural dispersal and migration, and 
deer or antelope, bears, wolves, pigs, and rodents are found in all 
of the diverse climatic and geological environments. The famous 
giant panda is found only in a limited area along the Chang Jiang. 

Population 
The Data Base 

The People's Republic conducted censuses in 1953, 1964, and 
1982. In 1987 the government announced that the fourth national 
census would take place in 1990 and that there would be one every 
ten years thereafter. The 1982 census, which reported a total popu- 
lation of 1,008,180,738, is generally accepted as significantly more 
reliable, accurate, and thorough than the previous two. Various 
international organizations eagerly assisted the Chinese in conduct- 
ing the 1982 census, including the United Nations Fund for Popu- 
lation Activities which donated US$15.6 million for the preparation 
and execution of the census. 

The nation began preparing for the 1982 census in late 1976. 
Chinese census workers were sent to the United States and Japan 
to study modern census-taking techniques and automation. Com- 
puters were installed in every provincial-level unit except Xizang 
and were connected to a central processing system in the Beijing 
headquarters of the State Statistical Bureau. Pretests and small- 
scale trial runs were conducted and checked for accuracy between 
1980 and 1981 in twenty-four provincial-level units. Census sta- 
tions were opened in rural production brigades (see Glossary) and 
urban neighborhoods. Beginning July 1, 1982, each household sent 
a representative to a census station to be enumerated. The census 
required about a month to complete and employed approximately 
5 million census takers. 

The 1982 census collected data in nineteen demographic cate- 
gories relating to individuals and households. The thirteen areas 
concerning individuals were name, relationship to head of house- 
hold, sex, age, nationality, registration status, educational level, 
profession, occupation, status of nonworking persons, marital status, 
number of children born and still living, and number of births in 
1981. The six items pertaining to households were type (domestic 
or collective), serial number, number of persons, number of births 
in 1981 , number of deaths in 1981 , and number of registered per- 
sons absent for more than one year. Information was gathered in 
a number of important areas for which previous data were either 



72 



Landscape on the Grand Canal 
Courtesy Xinhua News Agency 



extremely inaccurate or simply nonexistent, including fertility, mari- 
tal status, urban population, minority ethnic groups, sex compo- 
sition, age distribution, and employment and unemployment (see 
table 5, Appendix A). 

A fundamental anomaly in the 1982 statistics was noted by some 
Western analysts. They pointed out that although the birth and 
death rates recorded by the census and those recorded through the 
household registration system were different, the two systems 
arrived at similar population totals (see Differentiation, ch. 3). The 
discrepancies in the vital rates were the result of the under-reporting 
of both births and deaths to the authorities under the registration 
system; families would not report some births because of the one- 
child policy and would not report some deaths so as to hold on to 
the rations of the deceased. Nevertheless, the 1982 census was a 
watershed for both Chinese and world demographics. After an 
eighteen-year gap, population specialists were given a wealth of 
reliable, up-to-date figures on which to reconstruct past demo- 
graphic patterns, measure current population conditions, and 
predict future population trends. For example, Chinese and for- 
eign demographers used the 1982 census age-sex structure as the 
base population for forecasting and making assumptions about 
future fertility trends. The data on age-specific fertility and mor- 
tality rates provided the necessary base-line information for making 



73 



China: A Country Study 



population projections. The census data also were useful for esti- 
mating future manpower potential, consumer needs, and utility, 
energy, and health-service requirements. The sudden abundance 
of demographic data helped population specialists immeasurably 
in their efforts to estimate world population. Previously, there had 
been no accurate information on these 21 percent of the earth's 
inhabitants. Demographers who had been conducting research on 
global population without accurate data on the Chinese fifth of the 
world's population were particularly thankful for the 1982 census. 

Mortality and Fertility 

In 1949 crude death rates were probably higher than 30 per 1 ,000, 
and the average life expectancy was only 32 years. Beginning in 
the early 1950s, mortality steadily declined; it continued to decline 
through 1978 and remained relatively constant through 1987. One 
major fluctuation was reported in a computer reconstruction of 
China's population trends from 1953 to 1987 produced by the 
United States Bureau of the Census (see table 6, Appendix A; data 
in this table may vary from officially reported statistics). The com- 
puter model showed that the crude death rate increased dramati- 
cally during the famine years associated with the Great Leap 
Forward (1958-60, see Glossary), resulting in approximately 30 
million deaths above the expected level. 

According to Chinese government statistics, the crude birth rate 
followed five distinct patterns from 1949 to 1982. It remained sta- 
ble from 1949 to 1954, varied widely from 1955 to 1965, experienced 
fluctuations between 1966 and 1969, dropped sharply in the late 
1970s, and increased from 1980 to 1981. Between 1970 and 1980, 
the crude birth rate dropped from 36.9 per 1,000 to 17.6 per 1,000. 
The government attributed this dramatic decline in fertility to the 
wan xi shao (later marriages, longer intervals between births, and 
fewer children) birth control campaign. However, elements of 
socioeconomic change, such as increased employment of women 
in both urban and rural areas and reduced infant mortality (a 
greater percentage of surviving children would tend to reduce 
demand for additional children), may have played some role (see 
Labor Force, this ch.). To the dismay of authorities, the birth rate 
increased in both 1981 and 1982 to a level of 21 per 1,000, primarily 
as a result of a marked rise in marriages and first births. The rise 
was an indication of problems with the one-child policy of 1979 
(see Population Control Programs, this ch.). Chinese sources, 
however, indicated that the birth rate decreased to 17.8 in 1985 
and remained relatively constant thereafter. 

In urban areas, the housing shortage may have been at least 



74 



Physical Environment and Population 

partly responsible for the decreased birth rate. Also, the policy in 
force during most of the 1960s and the early 1970s of sending large 
numbers of high school graduates to the countryside deprived cities 
of a significant proportion of persons of childbearing age and 
undoubtedly had some effect on birth rates (see The Cultural Revo- 
lution Decade, 1966-76, ch. 1). 

Primarily for economic reasons, rural birth rates tended to decline 
less than urban rates. The right to grow and sell agricultural 
products for personal profit and the lack of an old-age welfare sys- 
tem were incentives for rural people to produce many children, 
especially sons, for help in the fields and for support in old age. 
Because of these conditions, it is unclear to what degree propaganda 
and education improvements had been able to erode traditional 
values favoring large families. 

Population Control Programs 

Initially, China's post-1949 leaders were ideologically disposed 
to view a large population as an asset. But the liabilities of a large, 
rapidly growing population soon became apparent. For one year, 
starting in August 1956, vigorous propaganda support was given 
to the Ministry of Public Health's mass birth control efforts. These 
efforts, however, had little impact on fertility. After the interval 
of the Great Leap Forward, Chinese leaders again saw rapid popu- 
lation growth as an obstacle to development, and their interest in 
birth control revived. 

In the early 1960s, propaganda, somewhat more muted than dur- 
ing the first campaign, emphasized the virtues of late marriage. 
Birth control offices were set up in the central government and some 
provincial-level governments in 1964. The second campaign was 
particularly successful in the cities, where the birth rate was cut 
in half during the 1963-66 period. The chaos of the Cultural Revo- 
lution brought the program to a halt, however. 

In 1972 and 1973 the party mobilized its resources for a nation- 
wide birth control campaign administered by a group in the State 
Council (see The State Council, ch. 10). Committees to oversee 
birth control activities were established at all administrative levels 
and in various collective enterprises. This extensive and seemingly 
effective network covered both the rural and the urban population. 
In urban areas public security headquarters included population 
control sections. In rural areas the country's "barefoot doctors" 
(see Glossary) distributed information and contraceptives to peo- 
ple's commune (see Glossary) members. By 1973 Mao Zedong was 
personally identified with the family planning movement, signify- 
ing a greater leadership commitment to controlled population 



75 



China: A Country Study 



growth than ever before. Yet until several years after Mao's death 
in 1976, the leadership was reluctant to put forth directly the 
rationale that population control was necessary for economic growth 
and improved living standards. 

Population growth targets were set for both administrative units 
and individual families. In the mid-1970s the maximum recom- 
mended family size was two children in cities and three or four 
in the country. Since 1979 the government has advocated a one- 
child limit for both rural and urban areas and has generally set 
a maximum of two children in special circumstances. As of 1986 
the policy for minority nationalities was two children per couple, 
three in special circumstances, and no limit for ethnic groups with 
very small populations. The overall goal of the one-child policy 
was to keep the total population within 1.2 billion through the year 
2000, on the premise that the Four Modernizations (see Glossary) 
program would be of little value if population growth was not 
brought under control. 

The one-child policy was a highly ambitious population control 
program. Like previous programs of the 1960s and 1970s, the one- 
child policy employed a combination of propaganda, social pres- 
sure, and in some cases coercion. The one-child policy was unique, 
however, in that it linked reproduction with economic cost or 
benefit. 

Under the one-child program, a sophisticated system rewarded 
those who observed the policy and penalized those who did not. 
Couples with only one child were given a "one-child certificate" 
entitling them to such benefits as cash bonuses, longer maternity 
leave, better child care, and preferential housing assignments. In 
return, they were required to pledge that they would not have more 
children. In the countryside, there was great pressure to adhere 
to the one-child limit. Because the rural population accounted for 
approximately 60 percent of the total, the effectiveness of the one- 
child policy in rural areas was considered the key to the success 
or failure of the program as a whole. 

In rural areas the day-to-day work of family planning was done 
by cadres at the team and brigade levels \who were responsible for 
women's affairs and by health workers. The women's team leader 
made regular household visits to keep track of the status of each 
family under her jurisdiction and collected information on which 
women were using contraceptives, the methods used, and which 
had become pregnant. She then reported to the brigade women's 
leader, who documented the information and took it to a monthly 
meeting of the commune birth-planning committee. According to 
reports, ceilings or quotas had to be adhered to; to satisfy these 



76 



Physical Environment and Population 

cutoffs, unmarried young people were persuaded to postpone mar- 
riage, couples without children were advised to ' 'wait their turn, ' ' 
women with unauthorized pregnancies were pressured to have abor- 
tions, and those who already had children were urged to use con- 
traception or undergo sterilization. Couples with more than one 
child were exhorted to be sterilized. 

The one-child policy enjoyed much greater success in urban than 
in rural areas. Even without state intervention, there were com- 
pelling reasons for urban couples to limit the family to a single child. 
Raising a child required a significant portion of family income, 
and in the cities a child did not become an economic asset until 
he or she entered the work force at age sixteen. Couples with only 
one child were given preferential treatment in housing allocation. 
In addition, because city dwellers who were employed in state 
enterprises received pensions after retirement, the sex of their first 
child was less important to them than it was to those in rural areas 
(see Urban Society, ch. 3). 

Numerous reports surfaced of coercive measures used to achieve 
the desired results of the one-child policy. The alleged methods 
ranged from intense psychological pressure to the use of physical 
force, including some grisly accounts of forced abortions and 
infanticide. Chinese officials admitted that isolated, uncondoned 
abuses of the program occurred and that they condemned such acts, 
but they insisted that the family planning program was administered 
on a voluntary basis using persuasion and economic measures only. 
International reaction to the allegations were mixed. The UN Fund 
for Population Activities and the International Planned Parenthood 
Association were generally supportive of China's family planning 
program. The United States Agency for International Development, 
however, withdrew US$10 million from the Fund in March 1985 
based on allegations that coercion had been used. 

Observers suggested that an accurate assessment of the one-child 
program would not be possible until all women who came of child- 
bearing age in the early 1980s passed their fertile years. As of 1987 
the one-child program had achieved mixed results. In general, it 
was very successful in almost all urban areas but less successful in 
rural areas. The Chinese authorities must have been disturbed by 
the increase in the officially reported annual population growth rate 
(birth rate minus death rate): from 12 per 1,000, or 1.2 percent in 
1980 to 14.1 per 1,000, or 1.4 percent in 1986. If the 1986 rate is 
maintained to the year 2000, the population will exceed 1.2 billion. 

Rapid fertility reduction associated with the one-child policy has 
potentially negative results. For instance, in the future the elderly 
might not be able to rely on their children to care for them as they 



77 



China: A Country Study 

have in the past, leaving the state to assume the expense, which 
could be considerable. Based on United Nations statistics and data 
provided by the Chinese government, it was estimated in 1987 that 
by the year 2000 the population 60 years and older (the retirement 
age is 60 in urban areas) would number 127 million, or 10.1 per- 
cent of the total population; the projection for 2025 was 234 mil- 
lion elderly, or 16.4 percent. According to one Western analyst, 
projections based on the 1982 census show that if the one-child policy 
were maintained to the year 2000, 25 percent of China's popula- 
tion would be age 65 or older by the year 2040. 

Density and Distribution 

Overall population density in 1986 was about 109 people per 
square kilometer. Density was only about one-third that of Japan 
and less than that of many other countries in Asia and in Europe. 
The overall figure, however, concealed major regional variations 
and the high person-land ratio in densely populated areas. In the 
11 provinces, special municipalities, and autonomous regions along 
the southeast coast, population density was 320.6 people per square 
kilometer (see fig. 5). 

In 1986 about 94 percent of the population lived on approxi- 
mately 36 percent of the land. Broadly speaking, the population 
was concentrated in China Proper, east of the mountains and south 
of the Great Wall. The most densely populated areas included the 
Chang Jiang Valley (of which the delta region was the most 
populous), Sichuan Basin, North China Plain, Zhu Jiang Delta, 
and the industrial area around the city of Shenyang in the northeast. 

Population is most sparse in the mountainous, desert, and grass- 
land regions of the northwest and southwest. In Nei Monggol 
Autonomous Region, portions are completely uninhabited, and only 
a few sections have populations more dense than ten people per 
square kilometer. The Nei Monggol, Xinjiang, and Xizang autono- 
mous regions and Gansu and Qinghai provinces comprise 55 per- 
cent of the country's land area but in 1985 contained only 5.7 
percent of its population (see table 7, Appendix A). 

Migration 

Internal 

China has restricted internal movement in various ways. Offi- 
cial efforts to limit free migration between villages and cities began 
as early as 1952 with a series of measures designed to prevent 
individuals without special permission from moving to cities to take 
advantage of the generally higher living standards there. 



78 



Physical Environment and Population 




Source: Based on Zhongguo 1982 Man Renkou Pucha Ziliao (1982 Population Census 
of China), Beijing, March 1985. 

Figure 5. Population Density, 1982 



The party decreased migration to cities during the 1960s and 1970s 
for economic and political reasons (see The Politics of Modernization, 
ch. 11). In the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, large num- 
bers of urban youths were "sent down" to the countryside for 
political and ideological reasons. Many relocated youths were even- 
tually permitted to return to the cities, and by the mid-1980s most 
had done so (see The Cultural Revolution Decade, 1966-76, ch. 1). 

The success of the agricultural reforms under Deng Xiaoping 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s dramatically increased the food 
supply in China's cities, making it possible for more people to come 
in from rural areas and survive without food ration cards. Because 



79 



China: A Country Study 



of the increased food supply, the authorities temporarily relaxed 
the enforcement of migration restrictions. This relaxation, however, 
was short-lived, and in May 1984 new measures strengthened resi- 
dence regulations and reinstated official control over internal migra- 
tion. Additionally, in March 1986 a draft revision of the 1957 
migration regulations was presented to the Standing Committee 
of the Sixth National People's Congress calling for stricter popu- 
lation control policies. 

Nonetheless, migration from rural areas to urban centers contin- 
ued. The problem of too-rapid urbanization was exacerbated by the 
agricultural responsibility system (see Glossary), which forced a real- 
location of labor and left many agricultural workers unemployed. 

The central government attempted to control movement through 
the household registration system and promote development of small 
cities and towns, but within this system many people were still able 
to migrate primarily for employment or educational purposes (see 
Differentiation, ch. 3). Leaving their place of official registration 
for days, months, or even years, unemployed agricultural workers 
found jobs in construction, housekeeping, or commune-run shops 
or restaurants. This temporary mobility was permitted by authori- 
ties because it simultaneously absorbed a large amount of surplus 
rural labor, improved the economies of rural areas, and satisfied 
urban requirements for service and other workers. The most sig- 
nificant aspect of the temporary migration, however, was that it 
was viewed as a possible initial step toward the development of 
small, rural-oriented urban centers that could bring employment 
and urban amenities to rural areas. 

Although the temporary migration into the cities was seen as 
beneficial, controlling it was a serious concern of the central govern- 
ment. An April 1985 survey showed that the "floating" or non- 
resident population in eight selected areas of Beijing was 662,000, 
or 12.5 percent of the total population. The survey also showed 
that people entered or left Beijing 880,000 times a day. In an effort 
to control this activity, neighborhood committees and work units 
(danwei — see Glossary) were required to comply with municipal 
regulations issued in January 1986. These regulations stipulated 
that communities and work units keep records on visitors, that those 
staying in Beijing for up to three days must be registered, and that 
those planning to stay longer must obtain temporary residence per- 
mits from local police stations. 

Although some cities were crowded, other areas of China were 
underpopulated. For example, China had little success populat- 
ing the frontier regions. As early as the 1950s, the government 
began to organize and fund migration for land reclamation, 



80 



Physical Environment and Population 

industrialization, and construction in the interior and frontier 
regions. Land reclamation was carried out by state farms located 
largely in Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region and Heilongjiang 
Province. Large numbers of migrants were sent to such outlying 
regions as Nei Monggol Autonomous Region and Qinghai Province 
to work in factories and mines and to Xinjiang-Uygur Autono- 
mous Region to develop agriculture and industry. In the late 1950s, 
and especially in the 1960s, during the Cultural Revolution, many 
city youths were sent to the frontier areas. Much of the resettled 
population returned home, however, because of insufficient govern- 
ment support, harsh climate, and a general inability to adjust to 
life in the outlying regions. China's regional population distribu- 
tion was consequently as unbalanced in 1986 as it had been in 1953. 
Nevertheless, efforts were still underway in 1987 to encourage 
migration to the frontier regions. 

Urbanization 

In 1987 China had a total of twenty-nine provincial-level admin- 
istrative units directly under the central government in Beijing. In 
addition to the twenty-one provinces (sheng), there were five autono- 
mous regions (zizhiqu) for minority nationalities, and three special 
municipalities (shi) — the three largest cities, Shanghai, Beijing, and 
Tianjin. (The establishment of Hainan Island as a provincial-level 
unit separate from Guangdong Province was scheduled to take place 
in 1988.) A 1979 change in provincial-level administrative bound- 
aries in the northeast region restored Nei Monggol Autonomous 
Region to its original size (it had been reduced by a third in 1969) 
at the expense of Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning provinces. Urban 
areas were further subdivided into lower-level administrative units 
beginning with municipalities and extending down to the neighbor- 
hood level (see Local Administration, ch. 10). 

The pace of urbanization in China from 1949 to 1982 was rela- 
tively slow because of both rapid growth of the rural population 
and tight restrictions on rural-urban migration for most of that 
period. According to the 1953 and 1982 censuses, the urban popu- 
lation as a percentage of total population increased from 13.3 to 
20.6 percent during that period. From 1982 to 1986, however, the 
urban population increased dramatically to 37 percent of the total 
population. This large jump resulted from a combination of fac- 
tors. One was the migration of large numbers of surplus agricul- 
tural workers, displaced by the agricultural responsibility system, 
from rural to urban areas (see Agricultural Policies, ch. 6). Another 
was a 1984 decision to broaden the criteria for classifying an area 
as a city or town. During 1984 the number of towns meeting the 



81 



China: A Country Study 

new urban criteria increased more than twofold, and the urban 
town population doubled. In the mid-1980s demographers expected 
the proportion of the population living in cities and towns to be 
around 50 percent by the turn of the century. This urban growth 
was expected to result primarily from the increase in the number 
of small- and medium-sized cities and towns rather than from an 
expansion of existing large cities. 

China's statistics regarding urban population sometimes can be 
misleading because of the various criteria used to calculate urban 
population. In the 1953 census, urban essentially referred to settle- 
ments with populations of more than 2,500, in which more than 
50 percent of the labor force were involved in nonagricultural pur- 
suits. The 1964 census raised the cut-off to 3,000 and the require- 
ment for nonagricultural labor to 70 percent. The 1982 census used 
the 3,000/70 percent minimum but introduced criteria of 2,500 to 
3,000 and 85 percent as well. Also, in calculating urban popula- 
tion, the 1982 census made a radical change by including the agricul- 
tural population residing within the city boundaries. This explains 
the dramatic jump in urban population from the 138.7 million 
reported for year-end 1981 to the 206.6 million counted by the 1982 
census. In 1984 the urban guidelines were further loosened, allow- 
ing for lower minimum population totals and nonagricultural per- 
centages. The criteria varied among provincial-level units. 

Although China's urban population — 382 million, or 37 percent 
of the total population, in the mid-1980s — was relatively low by 
comparison with developed nations, the number of people living 
in urban areas in China was greater than the total population of 
any country in the world except India and the Soviet Union. The 
four Chinese cities with the largest populations in 1985 were Shang- 
hai, with 7 million; Beijing, with 5.9 million; Tianjin, with 
5.4 million; and Shenyang, with 4.2 million. The disproportion- 
ate distribution of population in large cities occurred as a result 
of the government's emphasis after 1949 on the development of 
large cities over smaller urban areas. In 1985 the 22 most populous 
cities in China had a total population of 47.5 million, or about 12 
percent of China's total urban population. The number of cities 
with populations of at least 100,000 increased from 200 in 1976 
to 342 in 1986 (see table 8, Appendix A). 

In 1987 China was committed to a three-part strategy to control 
urban growth: strictly limiting the size of big cities (those of 500,000 
or more people); developing medium-sized cities (200,000 to 
500,000); and encouraging the growth of small cities (100,000 to 
200,000). The government also encouraged the development of small 
market and commune centers that were not then officially designated 



82 



Physical Environment and Population 

as urban places, hoping that they eventually would be transformed 
into towns and small cities. The big and medium-sized cities were 
viewed as centers of heavy and light industry, and small cities and 
towns were looked on as possible locations for handicraft and work- 
shop activities, using labor provided mainly from rural overflow. 

Emigration and Immigration 

Through most of China's history, strict controls prevented large 
numbers of people from leaving the country. In modern times, 
however, periodically some have been allowed to leave for various 
reasons. For example, in the early 1960s, about 100,000 people 
were allowed to enter Hong Kong. In the late 1970s, vigilance 
against illegal migration to Hong Kong was again relaxed some- 
what. Perhaps as many as 200,000 reached Hong Kong in 1979, 
but in 1980 authorities on both sides resumed concerted efforts to 
reduce the flow. 

In 1983 emigration restrictions were eased as a result in part 
of the economic open-door policy. In 1984 more than 11,500 busi- 
ness visas were issued to Chinese citizens, and in 1985 approxi- 
mately 15,000 Chinese scholars and students were in the United 
States alone. Any student who had the economic resources, from 
whatever source, could apply for permission to study abroad. United 
States consular offices issued more than 12,500 immigrant visas 
in 1984, and there were 60,000 Chinese with approved visa peti- 
tions in the immigration queue. 

Export of labor to foreign countries also increased. The Soviet 
Union, Iraq, and the Federal Republic of Germany requested 
500,000 workers, and as of 1986 China had sent 50,000. The signing 
of the United States-China Consular Convention in 1983 demon- 
strated the commitment to more liberal emigration policies. The 
two sides agreed to permit travel for the purpose of family reunifi- 
cation and to facilitate travel for individuals who claim both Chinese 
and United States citizenship. Emigrating from China remained 
a complicated and lengthy process, however, mainly because many 
countries were unwilling or unable to accept the large numbers of 
people who wished to emigrate. Other difficulties included bureau- 
cratic delays and in some cases a reluctance on the part of Chinese 
authorities to issue passports and exit permits to individuals mak- 
ing notable contributions to the modernization effort. 

The only significant immigration to China has been by the over- 
seas Chinese (see Glossary), who in the years since 1949 have been 
offered various enticements to return to their homeland. Several 
million may have done so since 1949. The largest influx came in 
1978-79, when about 160,000 to 250,000 ethnic Chinese fled 



83 



China: A Country Study 



Vietnam for southern China as relations between the two coun- 
tries worsened. Many of these refugees were reportedly settled in 
state farms on Hainan Island in the South China Sea. 

Minority Nationalities 

Demographic Overview 

Approximately 93 percent of China's population is considered 
Han. Sharp regional and cultural differences, including major varia- 
tions in spoken Chinese, exist among the Han, who are a min- 
gling of many peoples. All the Han nonetheless use a common 
written form of Chinese and share the social organization, values, 
and cultural characteristics universally recognized as Chinese (see 
Han Diversity and Unity, ch. 3). 

Officially, China has fifty-six "nationality" groups, including the 
Han. The Chinese define a nationality as a group of people of com- 
mon origin living in a common area, using a common language, 
and having a sense of group identity in economic and social organi- 
zation and behavior. Altogether, China has fifteen major linguistic 
regions generally coinciding with the geographic distribution of the 
major minority nationalities (see fig. 6). Members of non-Han 
groups, referred to as the "minority nationalities," constitute only 
about 7 percent of the total population but number more than 70 
million people and are distributed over 60 percent of the land. 

Some minority nationalities can be found only in a single region; 
others may have settlements in two or more. In general, however, 
the minorities are concentrated in the provinces and autonomous 
regions of the northwest and the southwest. In Xizang, Xinjiang, 
and Nei Monggol autonomous regions, minorities occupy large 
frontier areas; many are traditionally nomadic and engage primarily 
in pastoral pursuits. Minority groups in Yunnan and Guizhou 
provinces and in the Guangxi-Zhuang Autonomous Region are 
more fragmented and inhabit smaller areas. 

According to the 1982 census, approximately 95 percent of 
Xizang' s civilian population of 1.9 million are Tibetan (Zang 
nationality). An internally cohesive group, the Tibetans have proven 
the most resistant of the minority groups to the government's 
integration efforts. Xinjiang, which is as vast and distant from Bei- 
jing as Xizang, is the minority area next in demographic and politi- 
cal significance. Despite a large-scale immigration of Han since 
the 1950s, in 1985 around 60 percent of Xinjiang's 13.4 million 
population belonged to minority nationalities. Of these, the most 
important were 6. 1 million Uygurs and more than 900,000 Kazaks, 
both Turkic-speaking Central Asian peoples (see table 9, Appen- 
dix A). 



84 



Physical Environment and Population 




Figure 6. Distribution of Major Minority Nationalities 



Provinces with large concentrations of minorities include Yun- 
nan, where the Yi and other minority groups comprised an esti- 
mated 32 percent of the population in 1985; Guizhou, home of more 
than half of the approximately 4 million Miao; and sparsely popu- 
lated Qinghai, which except for the area around the provincial capi- 
tal of Xining is inhabited primarily by Tibetans and other minority 
nationality members, amounting in 1986 to approximately 37 per- 
cent of the total provincial population. Additionally, in 1986 minor- 
ity nationalities constituted approximately 16 percent of the 
population of Nei Monggol Autonomous Region. The Guangxi- 
Zhuang Autonomous Region contains almost all of the approxi- 
mately 13.5 million members of what is China's largest minority 
nationality, the Zhuang; most of them, however, are highly 
assimilated. 



85 



China: A Country Study 



Because many of the minority nationalities are located in politi- 
cally sensitive frontier areas, they have acquired an importance 
greater than their numbers. Some groups have common ancestry 
with peoples in neighboring countries. For example, members of 
the Shan, Korean, Mongol, Uygur and Kazak, and Yao nationali- 
ties are found not only in China but also in Burma, Korea, the 
Mongolian People's Republic, the Soviet Union, and Thailand, 
respectively. If the central government failed to maintain good 
relations with these groups, China's border security could be 
jeopardized (see Threat Perception, ch. 14). Since 1949 Chinese offi- 
cials have declared that the minorities are politically equal to the 
Han majority and in fact should be accorded preferential treatment 
because of their small numbers and poor economic circumstances. 
The government has tried to ensure that the minorities are well 
represented at national conferences and has relaxed certain policies 
that might have impeded their socioeconomic development. 

The minority areas are economically as well as politically 
important. China's leaders have suggested that by the turn of the 
century the focus of economic development should shift to the north- 
west. The area is rich in natural resources, with uranium deposits 
and abundant oil reserves in Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region. 
Much of China's forestland is located in the border regions of the 
northeast and southwest, and large numbers of livestock are raised 
in the arid and semiarid northwest. Also, the vast amount of virgin 
land in minority areas can be used for resettlement to relieve popu- 
lation pressures in the densely populated regions of the country. 

In the early 1980s, the central government adopted various meas- 
ures to provide financial and economic assistance to the minority 
areas. The government allotted subsidies totaling approximately 
¥6,000 million (for value of the yuan, see Glossary) in 1984 to 
balance any deficits experienced in autonomous areas inhabited 
by minority nationalities. After 1980 the autonomous regions of 
Nei Monggol, Xinjiang, Xizang, Guangxi, and Ningxia and the 
provinces of Yunnan, Guizhou, and Qinghai were permitted to 
keep all revenues for themselves. The draft state budget written 
in April 1986 allocated a special grant of ¥800 million to the 
underdeveloped minority nationality areas over and above the regu- 
lar state subsidies. The standard of living in the minority areas 
improved dramatically from the early to the mid-1980s. In Xizang 
Autonomous Region, annual per capita income increased from 
¥216 in 1983 to¥317 in 1984 (national per capita income was ¥663 
in 1983 and ¥721 in 1984). The per capita net income of the 
minority areas in Yunnan Province increased from ¥118 in 1980 
to¥263 in 1984, for an increase of 81.3 percent. Overall, however, 
the minority areas remained relatively undeveloped in 1986. 



86 



Physical Environment and Population 

Policy 

Since 1949 government policy toward minorities has been based 
on the somewhat contradictory goals of national unity and the pro- 
tection of minority equality and identity. The state constitution 
of 1954 declared the country to be a "unified, multinational state" 
and prohibited "discrimination against or oppression of any nation- 
ality and acts which undermine the unity of the nationalities." All 
nationalities were granted equal rights and duties. Policy toward 
the ethnic minorities in the 1950s was based on the assumption 
that they could and should be integrated into the Han polity by 
gradual assimilation, while permitted initially to retain their own 
cultural identity and to enjoy a modicum of self-rule. Accordingly, 
autonomous regions were established in which minority languages 
were recognized, special efforts were mandated to recruit a cer- 
tain percentage of minority cadres, and minority culture and 
religion were ostensibly protected. The minority areas also benefited 
from substantial government investment. 

Yet the attention to minority rights took place within the larger 
framework of strong central control. Minority nationalities, many 
with strong historical and recent separatist or anti-Han tendencies, 
were given no rights of self-determination. With the special excep- 
tion of Xizang in the 1950s, Beijing administered minority regions 
as vigorously as Han areas, and Han cadres filled the most impor- 
tant leadership positions. Minority nationalities were integrated 
into the national political and economic institutions and structures. 
Party statements hammered home the idea of the unity of all the 
rationalities and downplayed any part of minority history that iden- 
tified insufficiently with China Proper. Relations with the minori- 
ties were strained because of traditional Han attitudes of cultural 
superiority. Central authorities criticized this "Han chauvinism" 
but found its influence difficult to eradicate. 

Pressure on the minority peoples to conform were stepped up 
in the late 1950s and subsequently during the Cultural Revolu- 
tion. Ultraleftist ideology maintained that minority distinctness was 
an inherently reactionary barrier to socialist progress. Although 
in theory the commitment to minority rights remained, repressive 
assimilationist policies were pursued. Minority languages were 
looked down upon by the central authorities, and cultural and 
religious freedom was severely curtailed or abolished. Minority 
group members were forced to give up animal husbandry in order 
to grow crops that in some cases were unfamiliar. State subsidies 
were reduced, and some autonomous areas were abolished. These 
policies caused a great deal of resentment, resulting in a major 



87 



China: A Country Study 

rebellion in Xizang in 1959 and a smaller one in Xinjiang in 1962, 
the latter bringing about the flight of some 60,000 Kazak herders 
across the border to the Soviet Union. Scattered reports of vio- 
lence in minority areas in the 1966-76 decade suggest that discon- 
tent was high at that time also. 

After the arrest of the Gang of Four (see Glossary) in 1976, poli- 
cies toward the ethnic minorities were moderated regarding lan- 
guage, religion and culture, and land-use patterns, with the 
admission that the assimilationist policies had caused considera- 
ble alienation. The new leadership pledged to implement a bona 
fide system of autonomy for the ethnic minorities and placed great 
emphasis on the need to recruit minority cadres. 

Although the minorities accounted for only about 7 percent of 
China's population, the minority deputies to the National People's 
Congress made up 13.5 percent of all representatives to the con- 
gress in 1985, and 5 of the 22 vice chairmen of its Standing Com- 
mittee (23 percent) in 1983 were minority nationals. A Mongol, 
Ulanhu, was elected vice president of China in June 1983. 
Nevertheless, political administration of the minority areas was the 
same as that in Han regions, and the minority nationalities were 
subject to the dictates of the Chinese Communist Party. Despite 
the avowed desire to integrate the minorities into the political main- 
stream, the party was not willing to share key decision-making pow- 
ers with the ethnic minorities. As of the late 1970s, the minority 
nationality cadres accounted for only 3 to 5 percent of all cadres. 

Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese government 
in the mid-1980s was pursuing a liberal policy toward the national 
minorities. Full autonomy became a constitutional right, and policy 
stipulated that Han cadres working in the minority areas learn the 
local spoken and written languages. Significant concessions were 
made to Xizang, historically the most nationalistic of the minority 
areas. The number of Tibetan cadres as a percentage of all cadres 
in Xizang increased from 50 percent in 1979 to 62 percent in 1985. 
In Zhejiang Province the government formally decided to assign only 
cadres familiar with nationality policy and sympathetic to minori- 
ties to cities, prefectures, and counties with large numbers of minority 
people. In Xinjiang the leaders of the region's fourteen prefectural 
and city governments and seventy-seven of all eighty-six rural and 
urban leaders were of minority nationality. 

Labor Force 

A 10-percent sample tabulation of census questionnaires from 
the 1982 census provided badly needed statistical data on China's 
working population and allowed the first reliable estimates of the 



88 



Jinuo musicians, Yunnan Province 
Courtesy China Pictorial 
Va dancer, southwest China 
Courtesy Xinhua News Agency 



89 



China: A Country Study 



labor force's size and characteristics. The quality of the data was 
considered to be quite high, although a 40-million-person discrep- 
ancy existed between the 10-percent sample and the regular 
employment statistics. This discrepancy can be explained by the com- 
bination of inaccurate employment statistics and varying methods 
of calculation and scope of coverage. The estimated mid- 1982 labor 
force was 546 million, or approximately 54 percent of the total popu- 
lation. Males accounted for slightly more than half of the estimated 
labor force, and the labor force participation rates for persons age 
fifteen years and older were among the highest in the world. 

The 10-percent sample showed that approximately three-fourths 
of the labor force worked in the agricultural sector. According to 
the State Statistical Bureau, in the mid-1980s more than 120 mil- 
lion people worked in the nonagricultural sector. The sample 
revealed that men occupied the great majority of leadership posi- 
tions. The average worker was a youthful thirty-three years old, 
and three out of every four workers were under forty-five years 
of age. The working population had a low education level. Less 
than 40 percent of the labor force had more than a primary school 
education, and 30 percent were illiterate or semiliterate. 

In mid- 1982 the overall unemployment rate was estimated to 
be about 5 percent. Of the approximately 25 million unemployed, 
12 million were men and 13 million were women. The unemploy- 
ment rate was highest in the northeast and lowest in the south. The 
unemployment rates were higher than those of East Asian, 
Southeast Asian, and Pacific island countries for which data were 
available but were lower than the rates found in North America 
and Europe. Virtually all of the unemployed persons in cities and 
towns were under twenty years of age. 

Health Care 

Since the founding of the People's Republic, the goal of health 
programs has been to provide care to every member of the popu- 
lation and to make maximum use of limited health-care person- 
nel, equipment, and financial resources. The emphasis has been 
on preventive rather than on curative medicine on the premise that 
preventive medicine is "active" while curative medicine is "pas- 
sive." The health-care system has dramatically improved the health 
of the people, as reflected by the remarkable increase in average 
life expectancy from about thirty-two years in 1950 to sixty-nine 
years in 1985. 

After 1949 the Ministry of Public Health was responsible for all 
health-care activities and established and supervised all facets of 
health policy. Along with a system of national, provincial-level, 



90 



Physical Environment and Population 

and local facilities, the ministry regulated a network of industrial 
and state enterprise hospitals and other facilities covering the health 
needs of workers of those enterprises. In 1981 this additional net- 
work provided approximately 25 percent of the country's total health 
services. Health care was provided in both rural and urban areas 
through a three-tiered system. In rural areas the first tier was made 
up of barefoot doctors working out of village medical centers. They 
provided preventive and primary-care services, with an average 
of two doctors per 1,000 people. At the next level were the town- 
ship health centers, which functioned primarily as out-patient clinics 
for about 10,000 to 30,000 people each. These centers had about 
ten to thirty beds each, and the most qualified members of the staff 
were assistant doctors. The two lower-level tiers made up the "rural 
collective health system" that provided most of the country's medi- 
cal care. Only the most seriously ill patients were referred to the 
third and final tier, the county hospitals, which served 200,000 to 
600,000 people each and were staffed by senior doctors who held 
degrees from 5-year medical schools. Health care in urban areas 
was provided by paramedical personnel assigned to factories and 
neighborhood health stations. If more professional care was neces- 
sary the patient was sent to a district hospital, and the most seri- 
ous cases were handled by municipal hospitals. To ensure a higher 
level of care, a number of state enterprises and government agen- 
cies sent their employees directly to district or municipal hospi- 
tals, circumventing the paramedical, or barefoot doctor, stage. 

An emphasis on public health and preventive treatment charac- 
terized health policy from the beginning of the 1950s. At that time 
the party began to mobilize the population to engage in mass "patri- 
otic health campaigns" aimed at improving the low level of 
environmental sanitation and hygiene and attacking certain diseases. 
One of the best examples of this approach was the mass assaults 
on the "four pests" — rats, sparrows, flies, and mosquitoes — and 
on schistosoma-carrying snails. Particular efforts were devoted in 
the health campaigns to improving water quality through such mea- 
sures as deep-well construction and human- waste treatment. Only 
in the larger cities had human waste been centrally disposed. In the 
countryside, where "night soil" has always been collected and applied 
to the fields as fertilizer, it was a major source of disease. Since the 
1950s, rudimentary treatments such as storage in pits, composting, 
and mixture with chemicals have been implemented. 

As a result of preventive efforts, such epidemic diseases as cholera, 
plague, typhoid, and scarlet fever have almost been eradicated. The 
mass mobilization approach proved particularly successful in the 
fight against syphilis, which was reportedly eliminated by the 1960s. 



91 



China: A Country Study 

The incidence of other infectious and parasitic diseases was reduced 
and controlled. Relaxation of certain sanitation and antiepidemic 
programs since the 1960s, however, may have resulted in some 
increased incidence of disease. In the early 1980s, continuing defi- 
ciencies in human-waste treatment were indicated by the persis- 
tence of such diseases as hookworm and schistosomiasis. 
Tuberculosis, a major health hazard in 1949, remained a problem 
to some extent in the 1980s, as did hepatitis, malaria, and dysen- 
tery. In the late 1980s, the need for health education and improved 
sanitation was still apparent, but it was more difficult to carry out 
the health-care campaigns because of the breakdown of the brigade 
system. By the mid-1980s China recognized the acquired immune 
deficiency syndrome (AIDS) virus as a serious health threat but 
remained relatively unaffected by the deadly disease. As of mid- 1987 
there was confirmation of only two deaths of Chinese citizens from 
AIDS, and monitoring of foreigners had begun. Following a 1987 
regional World Health Organization meeting, the Chinese govern- 
ment announced it would join the global fight against AIDS, which 
would involve quarantine inspection of people entering China from 
abroad, medical supervision of people vulnerable to AIDS, and 
establishment of AIDS laboratories in coastal cities. Additionally, 
it was announced that China was experimenting with the use of 
traditional medicine to treat AIDS. 

In the mid-1980s the leading causes of death in China were simi- 
lar to those in the industrialized world: cancer, cerebrovascular dis- 
ease, and heart disease. Some of the more prevalent forms of fatal 
cancers included cancer of the stomach, esophagus, liver, lung, and 
colon-rectum. The frequency of these diseases was greater for men 
than for women, and lung cancer mortality was much greater in 
higher income areas. The degree of risk for the different kinds of 
cancers varied widely by region. For example, nasopharyngeal 
cancer was found primarily in south China, while the incidence 
of esophageal cancer was higher in the north. 

To address concerns over health, the Chinese greatly increased 
the number and quality of health-care personnel, although in 1986 
serious shortages still existed. In 1949 only 33,000 nurses and 363,000 
physicians were practicing; by 1985 the numbers had risen dramati- 
cally to 637,000 nurses and 1.4 million physicians. Some 436,000 
physicians' assistants were trained in Western medicine and had 
2 years of medical education after junior high school. Official Chinese 
statistics also reported that the number of paramedics increased from 
about 485,400 in 1975 to more than 853,400 in 1982. The number 
of students in medical and pharmaceutical colleges in China rose 
from about 100,000 in 1975 to approximately 160,000 in 1982. 



92 




93 



China: A Country Study 

Efforts were made to improve and expand medical facilities. The 
number of hospital beds increased from 1.7 million in 1976 to 
2.2 million in 1984, or to 2 beds per 1,000 compared with 4.5 beds 
per 1,000 in 1981 in the United States. The number of hospitals 
increased from 63,000 in 1976 to 67,000 in 1984, and the number 
of specialized hospitals and scientific research institutions doubled 
during the same period. 

The availability and quality of health care varied widely from 
city to countryside. According to 1982 census data, in rural areas 
the crude death rate was 1.6 per 1 ,000 higher than in urban areas, 
and life expectancy was about 4 years lower. The number of senior 
physicians per 1 ,000 population was about 10 times greater in urban 
areas than in rural ones; state expenditure on medical care was 
more than¥26 per capita in urban areas and less than¥3 per cap- 
ita in rural areas. There were also about twice as many hospital 
beds in urban areas as in rural areas. These are aggregate figures, 
however, and certain rural areas had much better medical care and 
nutritional levels than others. 

In 1987 economic reforms were causing a fundamental trans- 
formation of the rural health-care system. The decollectivization 
of agriculture resulted in a decreased desire on the part of the rural 
populations to support the collective welfare system, of which health 
care was a part. In 1984 surveys showed that only 40 to 45 percent 
of the rural population was covered by an organized cooperative 
medical system, as compared with 80 to 90 percent in 1979. 

This shift entailed a number of important consequences for rural 
health care. The lack of financial resources for the cooperatives 
resulted in a decrease in the number of barefoot doctors, which 
meant that health education and primary and home care suffered 
and that in some villages sanitation and water supplies were checked 
less frequently. Also, the failure of the cooperative health-care sys- 
tem limited the funds available for continuing education for barefoot 
doctors, thereby hindering their ability to provide adequate preven- 
tive and curative services. The costs of medical treatment increased, 
deterring some patients from obtaining necessary medical atten- 
tion. If the patients could not pay for services received, then the 
financial responsibility fell on the hospitals and commune health 
centers, in some cases creating large debts. 

Consequently, in the post-Mao era of modernization, the rural 
areas were forced to adapt to a changing health-care environment. 
Many barefoot doctors went into private practice, operating on a 
fee-for-service basis and charging for medication. But soon farm- 
ers demanded better medical services as their incomes increased, 
bypassing the barefoot doctors and going straight to the commune 



94 



Physical Environment and Population 



health centers or county hospitals. A number of barefoot doctors 
left the medical profession after discovering that they could earn 
a better living from farming, and their services were not replaced. 
The leaders of brigades, through which local health care was 
administered, also found farming to be more lucrative than their 
salaried positions, and many of them left their jobs. Many of the 
cooperative medical programs collapsed. Farmers in some brigades 
established voluntary health-insurance programs but had difficulty 
organizing and administering them. 

Although the practice of traditional Chinese medicine was 
strongly promoted by the Chinese leadership and remained a major 
component of health care, Western medicine was gaining increas- 
ing acceptance in the 1970s and 1980s. For example, the number 
of physicians and pharmacists trained in Western medicine report- 
edly increased by 225,000 from 1976 to 1981, and the number of 
physicians' assistants trained in Western medicine increased by 
about 50,000. In 1981 there were reportedly 516,000 senior phy- 
sicians trained in Western medicine and 290,000 senior physicians 
trained in traditional Chinese medicine. The goal of China's medi- 
cal professionals is to synthesize the best elements of traditional 
and Western approaches. 

In practice, however, this combination has not always worked 
smoothly. In many respects, physicians trained in traditional medi- 
cine and those trained in Western medicine constitute separate groups 
with different interests. For instance, physicians trained in Western 
medicine have been somewhat reluctant to accept "unscientific" 
traditional practices, and traditional practitioners have sought to 
preserve authority in their own sphere. Although Chinese medical 
schools that provided training in Western medicine also provided 
some instruction in traditional medicine, relatively few physicians 
were regarded as competent in both areas in the mid-1980s. 

The extent to which traditional and Western treatment methods 
were combined and integrated in the major hospitals varied greatly. 
Some hospitals and medical schools of purely traditional medicine 
were established. In most urban hospitals, the pattern seemed to 
be to establish separate departments for traditional and Western 
treatment. In the county hospitals, however, traditional medicine 
received greater emphasis. 

Traditional medicine depends on herbal treatments, acupunc- 
ture, acupressure, moxibustion (the burning of herbs over acupunc- 
ture points), and "cupping" of skin with heated bamboo. Such 
approaches are believed to be most effective in treating minor and 
chronic diseases, in part because of milder side effects. Traditional 
treatments may be used for more serious conditions as well, 



95 



China: A Country Study 



particularly for such acute abdominal conditions as appendicitis, 
pancreatitis, and gallstones; sometimes traditional treatments are 
used in combination with Western treatments. A traditional method 
of orthopedic treatment, involving less immobilization than Western 
methods, continued to be widely used in the 1980s. 

Although health care in China developed in very positive ways 
by the mid-1980s, it exacerbated the problem of overpopulation. 
In 1987 China was faced with a population four times that of the 
United States and over three times that of the Soviet Union. Efforts 
to distribute the population over a larger portion of the country 
had failed: only the minority nationalities seemed able to thrive 
in the mountainous or desert-covered frontiers. Birth control pro- 
grams implemented in the 1970s succeeded in reducing the birth 
rate, but estimates in the mid-1980s projected that China's popu- 
lation will surpass the 1 .2 billion mark by the turn of the century, 
putting still greater pressure on the land and resources of the nation. 

A thorough, scholarly study of China's geography is Zhao Song- 
qiao's Physical Geography of China, which contains a number of 
detailed maps and charts, as well as interesting photographs and 
Landsat images. The China Handbook Editorial Committee's China 
Handbook Series: Geography provides a less technical overview of the 
physical environment and includes brief summaries of the topog- 
raphy, climate, and administrative divisions of China's provinces, 
autonomous regions, and special municipalities. 

A good overview of China's population is provided in a series 
of articles found in China's Economy Looks Toward the Year 2000, 
Volume 1: The Four Modernizations , a collection of papers published 
by the United States Congress Joint Economic Committee. It opens 
with a general assessment of population policies and problems and 
continues with articles on the 1982 census results, family planning, 
the labor force, and material poverty. An article written by H. Yuan 
Tien, entitled "China: Demographic Billionaire," in Population 
Bulletin also provides a good demographic overview. 

China's One-Child Family Policy, edited by Elisabeth Croll, Delia 
Davin, and Penny Kane, is an excellent analysis of the radical policy 
first announced in 1979. The work discusses the origins, problems, 
and prospects of the one-child policy. Tien's "Redirection of the 
Chinese Family" provides a concise overview of the one-child policy 
and its implications. (For further information and complete cita- 
tions, see Bibliography.) 



96 



Chapter 3. The Social System 



A Tang dynasty (A.D. 618-906) female dancer 



China, the world's largest society, is united b y 

a set of values and institutions that cut across extensive linguistic, 
environmental, and subcultural differences. Residents of the south- 
ern and northern regions of the country might not understand each 
other's speech, enjoy each other's favorite foods, or make a living 
from each other's land, and they might describe each other with 
derogatory stereotypes. Nonetheless, they would regard each other 
as fellow Chinese, members of the same society, and different from 
the Vietnamese or Koreans, with whom some Chinese might seem 
to have more in common. 

Chinese society, since the second decade of the twentieth century, 
has been the object of a revolution intended to change it in fun- 
damental ways. In its more radical phases, such as the Great Leap 
Forward (1958-60) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), the 
revolution aimed at nothing less than the complete transformation 
of everything from the practice of medicine, to higher education, 
to family life. In the 1980s China's leaders and intellectuals consid- 
ered the revolution far from completed, and they intended further 
social change to make China a fully modernized country. It had 
become increasingly clear that although many aspects of Chinese 
social life had indeed undergone fundamental changes as a result 
of both political movements and economic development, the trans- 
formation was less than total. Much of the past either lived on in 
modified form or served to shape revolutionary initiatives and to 
limit the choices open to even the most radical of revolutionaries. 

Ethnic Boundaries 

China is, like all large states, multiethnic; but one ethnic group — 
the Han Chinese (see Glossary) — dominates the politics, govern- 
ment, and economy. This account focuses on the Han, and it con- 
siders the minority peoples only in relation to the Han ethnic group 
(see Minority Nationalities, ch. 2). 

Over the centuries a great many peoples who were originally 
not Chinese have been assimilated into Chinese society. Entry into 
Han society has not demanded religious conversion or formal 
initiation. It has depended on command of the Chinese written lan- 
guage and evidence of adherence to Chinese values and customs. 
For the most part, what has distinguished those groups that have 
been assimilated from those that have not has been the suitability 
of their environment for Han agriculture. People living in areas 



99 



China: A Country Study 



where Chinese-style agriculture is feasible have either been displaced 
or assimilated. The consequence is that most of China's minori- 
ties inhabit extensive tracts of land unsuited for Han-style agricul- 
ture; they are not usually found as long-term inhabitants of Chinese 
cities or in close proximity to most Han villages. Those living on 
steppes, near desert oases, or in high mountains, and dependent 
on pastoral nomadism or shifting cultivation, have retained their 
ethnic distinctiveness outside Han society. The sharpest ethnic 
boundary has been between the Han and the steppe pastoralists, 
a boundary sharpened by centuries of conflict and cycles of con- 
quest and subjugation. Reminders of these differences are the 
absence of dairy products from the otherwise extensive repertoire 
of Han cuisine and the distaste most Chinese feel for such typical 
steppe specialties as tea laced with butter. 

Official policy recognizes the multiethnic nature of the Chinese 
state, within which all "nationalities" are formally equal. On the 
one hand, it is not state policy to force the assimilation of minority 
nationalities, and such nonpolitical expressions of ethnicity as native 
costumes and folk dances are encouraged. On the other hand, 
China's government is a highly centralized one that recognizes no 
legitimate limits to its authority, and minority peoples in far western 
Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region, for example, are considered 
Chinese citizens just as much as Han farmers on the outskirts of 
Beijing. 

Official attitudes toward minority peoples are inconsistent, if not 
contradictory. Since 1949 policies toward minorities have fluctu- 
ated between tolerance and coercive attempts to impose Han stan- 
dards. Tolerant periods have been marked by subsidized material 
benefits intended to win loyalty, while coercive periods such as the 
Cultural Revolution have attempted to eradicate "superstition" 
and to overthrow insufficiently radical or insufficiently nationalis- 
tic local leaders. 

What has not varied has been the assumption that it is the cen- 
tral government that decides what is best for minority peoples and 
that national citizenship takes precedence over ethnic identity. In 
fact, minority nationality is a legal status in China. The govern- 
ment reserves for itself the right to determine whether or not a group 
is a minority nationality, and the list has been revised several times 
since the 1950s. In the mid-1980s the state recognized 55 minority 
nationalities, some with as few as 1,100 members. Minority nation- 
alities are guaranteed special representation in the National Peo- 
ple's Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative 
Conference (see Glossary). Areas where minorities form the major- 
ity of the population may be designated "autonomous" counties, 



100 



The Social System 



prefectures, or regions, subject to the authority of the central govern- 
ment in Beijing rather than to provincial or subprovincial adminis- 
trations. It is expected that local administrations in such regions 
will be staffed at least in part by minority nationals and that appli- 
cation of national policies will take into account local circumstances 
and special needs. In the early 1980s, for example, minority peo- 
ples were exempted from the strict limitations on the number of 
children per family dictated to the Han population. 

Most Han Chinese have no contact with members of minority 
groups. But in areas such as the Xizang (also known as Tibet) or 
Xinjiang autonomous regions, where large numbers of Han have 
settled since the assertion of Chinese central government authority 
over them in the 1950s, there is clearly some ethnic tension (see 
Minority Nationalities, ch. 2). The tension stems from Han 
dominance over such previously independent or semi-autonomous 
peoples as the Tibetans and Uygurs, from Cultural Revolution 
attacks on religious observances, and from Han disdain for and 
lack of sensitivity to minority cultures. In the autonomous areas 
the ethnic groups appear to lead largely separate lives, and most 
Han in those areas either work as urban-based administrators and 
professionals or serve in military installations or on state farms. 
Since the late 1970s, the central authorities have made efforts to 
conciliate major ethnic minorities by sponsoring the revival of 
religious festivals and by increasing the level of subsidies to the 
poorest minority regions. Because of these efforts, other moderate 
government policies, and the geographic distribution and relatively 
small size of minority groups in China, the country has not suffered 
widespread or severe ethnic conflict. 

Han Diversity and Unity 

The differences among regional and linguistic subgroups of Han 
Chinese are at least as great as those among many European 
nationalities. Han Chinese speak seven or eight mutually unintel- 
ligible dialects, each of which has many local subdialects. Cultural 
differences (cuisine, costume, and custom) are equally great. 
Modern Chinese history provides many examples of conflict, up 
to the level of small-scale regional wars, between linguistic and 
regional groups. 

Such diversities, however, have not generated exclusive loyal- 
ties, and distinctions in religion or political affiliation have not rein- 
forced regional differences. Rather, there has been a consistent 
tendency in Chinese thought and practice to downplay intra-Han 
distinctions, which are regarded as minor and superficial. What 
all Han share is more significant than the ways in which they differ. 



101 



China: A Country Study 



In conceptual terms, the boundary between Han and non-Han is 
absolute and sharp, while boundaries between subsets of Han are 
subject to continual shifts, are dictated by local conditions, and do 
not produce the isolation inherent in relations between Han and 
minority groups. 

Han ethnic unity is the result of two ancient and culturally cen- 
tral Chinese institutions, one of which is the written language. 
Chinese is written with ideographs (sometimes called characters) 
that represent meanings rather than sounds, and so written Chinese 
does not reflect the speech of its author. The disjunction between 
written and spoken Chinese means that a newspaper published in 
Beijing can be read in Shanghai or Guangzhou, although the resi- 
dents of the three cities would not understand each other's speech. 
It also means that there can be no specifically Cantonese (Guang- 
zhou dialect) or Hunanese literature because the local speech of 
a region cannot be directly or easily represented in writing. (It is 
possible to add local color to fiction, cite colloquialisms, or tran- 
scribe folk songs.) Therefore, local languages have not become a 
focus for regional self-consciousness or nationalism. Educated 
Chinese tend to regard the written ideographs as primary, and they 
regard the seven or eight spoken Han Chinese dialects as simply 
variant ways of pronouncing the same ideographs. This is linguisti- 
cally inaccurate, but the attitude has significant political and social 
consequences. The uniform written language in 1987 continued 
to be a powerful force for Han unity. 

The other major force contributing to Han ethnic unity has been 
the centralized imperial state. The ethnic group takes its name from 
the Han dynasty (206 B.C.-A.D. 220; see The Imperial Era, ch. 1). 
Although the imperial government never directly controlled the vil- 
lages, it did have a strong influence on popular values and cul- 
ture. The average peasant could not read and was not familiar with 
the details of state administration or national geography, but he 
was aware of belonging to a group of subcontinental scope. Being 
Han, even for illiterate peasants, has meant conscious identifica- 
tion with a glorious history and a state of immense proportions. 
Peasant folklore and folk religion assumed that the imperial state, 
with an emperor and an administrative bureaucracy, was the nor- 
mal order of society. In the imperial period, the highest prestige 
went to scholar-officials, and every schoolboy had the possibility, 
at least theoretically, of passing the civil service examinations and 
becoming an official. 

The prestige of the state and its popular identification with the 
highest values of Chinese civilization were not accidents; they were 
the final result of a centuries-long program of indoctrination and 



102 



Confucius observing the practice of rules oj 
conduct among the members of society. Woodcuc. 

Courtesy Library of Congress 

education directed by the Confucian scholar-officials. Traditional 
Chinese society can be distinguished from other premodern civili 
zations to the extent that the state, rather than organized religious 
groups or ethnic segments of society, was able to appropriate the 
symbols of wisdom, morality, and the common good. The legacy 
for modern Chinese society has been a strong centralized govern- 
ment that has the right to impose its values on the population and 
against which there is no legitimate right of dissent or secession. 

Traditional Society and Culture 

The leaders who directed the efforts to change Chinese society 
after the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949 
were raised in the old society and had been marked with its values. 
Although they were conscious revolutionaries, they could not wholly 
escape the culture into which they had been born. Nationalists as 
well as revolutionaries, they had no intention of transforming China 
into a replica of any foreign country. They had an ambivalent 
attitude toward their country's past and its traditional society, con- 
demning some aspects and praising others. Furthermore, as prac- 
tical administrators, China's post- 1949 leaders devoted energy and 
attention to changing some aspects of traditional society, such as 
rural land tenure and the content of education, while leaving other 



103 



China: A Country Study 



aspects, such as family structure, largely untouched. Change in 
Chinese society, therefore, has been less than total and less consis- 
tent than has often been claimed by official spokesmen. To under- 
stand contemporary society, it is necessary to be familiar with past 
legacies, particularly in the realm of values and in areas of social 
life, such as family organization, where transformation has not been 
a high-priority political goal. 

China's traditional values were contained in the orthodox ver- 
sion of Confucianism, which was taught in the academies and tested 
in the imperial civil service examinations. These values are dis- 
tinctive for their this-worldly emphasis on society and public admin- 
istration and for their wide diffusion throughout Chinese society. 
Confucianism, never a religion in any accepted sense, is primarily 
concerned with social order. Social harmony is to be achieved within 
the state, whose administrators consciously select the proper poli- 
cies and act to educate both the rulers and the subject masses. Con- 
fucianism originated and developed as the ideology of professional 
administrators and continued to bear the impress of its origins (see 
The Ancient Dynasties; The Imperial Era, ch. 1). 

Imperial-era Confucianists concentrated on this world and had 
an agnostic attitude toward the supernatural. They approved of 
ritual and ceremony, but primarily for their supposed educational 
and psychological effects on those participating. Confucianists 
tended to regard religious specialists (who historically were often 
rivals for authority or imperial favor) as either misguided or intent 
on squeezing money from the credulous masses. The major meta- 
physical element in Confucian thought was the belief in an imper- 
sonal ultimate natural order that included the social order. 
Confucianists asserted that they understood the inherent pattern 
for social and political organization and therefore had the authority 
to run society and the state. 

The Confucianists claimed authority based on their knowledge, 
which came from direct mastery of a set of books. These books, 
the Confucian Classics, were thought to contain the distilled wis- 
dom of the past and to apply to all human beings everywhere at 
all times (see Culture and the Arts, ch. 4). The mastery of the Clas- 
sics was the highest form of education and the best possible qualifi- 
cation for holding public office. The way to achieve the ideal society 
was to teach the entire people as much of the content of the Clas- 
sics as possible. It was assumed that everyone was educable and 
that everyone needed educating. The social order may have been 
natural, but it was not assumed to be instinctive. Confucianism 
put great stress on learning, study, and all aspects of socialization. 
Confucianists preferred internalized moral guidance to the external 



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The Social System 



force of law, which they regarded as a punitive force applied to 
those unable to learn morality. Confucianists saw the ideal society 
as a hierarchy, in which everyone knew his or her proper place 
and duties. The existence of a ruler and of a state were taken for 
granted, but Confucianists held that rulers had to demonstrate their 
fitness to rule by their "merit." The essential point was that heredity 
was an insufficient qualification for legitimate authority. As prac- 
tical administrators, Confucianists came to terms with hereditary 
kings and emperors but insisted on their right to educate rulers 
in the principles of Confucian thought. Traditional Chinese thought 
thus combined an ideally rigid and hierarchical social order with 
an appreciation for education, individual achievement, and mobility 
within the rigid structure. 

Diffusion of Values 

While ideally everyone would benefit from direct study of the 
Classics, this was not a realistic goal in a society composed largely 
of illiterate peasants. But Confucianists had a keen appreciation 
for the influence of social models and for the socializing and teaching 
functions of public rituals and ceremonies. The common people 
were thought to be influenced by the examples of their rulers and 
officials, as well as by public events. Vehicles of cultural transmis- 
sion, such as folk songs, popular drama, and literature and the arts, 
were the objects of government and scholarly attention. Many schol- 
ars, even if they did not hold public office, put a great deal of effort 
into popularizing Confucian values by lecturing on morality, pub- 
licly praising local examples of proper conduct, and "reforming" 
local customs, such as bawdy harvest festivals. In this manner, over 
hundreds of years, the values of Confucianism were diffused across 
China and into scattered peasant villages and rural culture. 

The Confucian Legacy 

Traditional values have clearly shaped much of contemporary 
Chinese life. The belief in rule by an educated and functionally 
unspecialized elite, the value placed on learning and propagating 
an orthodox ideology that focuses on society and government, and 
the stress on hierarchy and the preeminent role of the state were 
all carried over from traditional society. Some of the more radical 
and extreme policies of the 1950s and 1960s, such as attacks on 
intellectuals and compulsory manual labor for bureaucrats, can only 
be understood as responses to deep-rooted traditional attitudes. The 
role of model workers and soldiers, as well as official concern for 
the content and form of popular literature and the arts, also reflects 
characteristically Chinese themes. In the mid-1980s a number of 



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China: A Country Study 



Chinese writers and political leaders identified the lingering hold 
of "feudal" attitudes, even within the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP), as a major obstacle to modernization. They identified such 
phenomena as authoritarianism, unthinking obedience to leaders, 
deprecation of expert knowledge, lack of appreciation for law, and 
the failure to apply laws to leaders as "feudal" legacies that were 
not addressed in the early years of China's revolution. 

Traditional Social Structure 

Throughout the centuries some 80 to 90 percent of the Chinese 
population have been farmers. The farmers supported a small num- 
ber of specialized craftsmen and traders and also an even smaller 
number of land- and office-holding elite families who ran the soci- 
ety. Although the peasant farmers and their families resembled 
counterparts in other societies, the traditional Chinese elite, often 
referred to in English as the gentry, had no peers in other societ- 
ies. The national elite, who comprised perhaps 1 percent of China's 
population, had a number of distinctive features. They were dis- 
persed across the country and often lived in rural areas, where they 
were the dominant figures on the local scene. Although they held 
land, which they rented to tenant farmers, they neither possessed 
large estates like European nobles nor held hereditary titles. They 
achieved their highest and most prestigious titles by their perfor- 
mance on the central government's triennial civil service exami- 
nations. These titles had to be earned by each generation, and since 
the examinations had strict numerical quotas, competition was 
fierce. Government officials were selected from those who passed 
the examinations, which tested for mastery of the Confucian Clas- 
sics. Elite families, like everyone else in China, practiced partible 
inheritance, dividing the estate equally among all sons. The com- 
bination of partible inheritance and the competition for success in 
the examinations meant that rates of mobility into and out of the 
elite were relatively high for a traditional agrarian society. 

The imperial state was staffed by a small civil bureaucracy. Civil 
officials were directly appointed and paid by the emperor and had 
to have passed the civil service examinations. Officials, who were 
supposed to owe their primary loyalty to the emperor, did not serve 
in their home provinces and were generally assigned to different 
places for each tour of duty. Although the salary of central offi- 
cials was low, the positions offered great opportunities for personal 
enrichment, which was one reason that families competed so fiercely 
to pass the examinations and then obtain an appointment. For most 
officials, officeholding was not a lifetime career. They served one 
or a few tours and then returned to their home districts and families, 



106 



Musicians with a variety of 
instruments important to Confucian rituals 
Courtesy Library of Congress 

where their wealth, prestige, and network of official contacts made 
them dominant figures on the local scene. 

The Examination System 

In late imperial China the status of local-level elites was ratified 
by contact with the central government, which maintained a 
monopoly on society's most prestigious titles. The examination sys- 
tem and associated methods of recruitment to the central bureau- 
cracy were major mechanisms by which the central government 
captured and held the loyalty of local-level elites. Their loyalty, 
in turn, ensured the integration of the Chinese state and countered 
tendencies toward regional autonomy and the breakup of the cen- 
tralized system. The examination system distributed its prizes 
according to provincial and prefectural quotas, which meant that 
imperial officials were recruited from the whole country, in num- 
bers roughly proportional to a province's population. Elites all over 
China, even in the disadvantaged peripheral regions, had a chance 
at succeeding in the examinations and achieving the rewards of 
officeholding. 

The examination system also served to maintain cultural unity 
and consensus on basic values. The uniformity of the content of 
the examinations meant that the local elite and ambitious would-be 



107 



China: A Country Study 

elite all across China were being indoctrinated with the same values. 
Even though only a small fraction (about 5 percent) of those who 
attempted the examinations passed them and received titles, the 
study, self-indoctrination, and hope of eventual success on a sub- 
sequent examination served to sustain the interest of those who took 
them. Those who failed to pass (most of the candidates at any sin- 
gle examination) did not lose wealth or local social standing; as 
dedicated believers in Confucian orthodoxy, they served, without 
the benefit of state appointments, as teachers, patrons of the arts, 
and managers of local projects, such as irrigation works, schools, 
or charitable foundations. 

In late traditional China, then, education was valued in part 
because of its possible payoff in the examination system. The overall 
result of the examination system and its associated study was cul- 
tural uniformity — identification of the educated with national rather 
than regional goals and values. This self-conscious national iden- 
tity underlies the nationalism so important in China's politics in 
the twentieth century (see Republican China, ch. 1). 

Social Stratification 

Traditional thought accepted social stratification as natural and 
considered most social groups to be organized on hierarchical prin- 
ciples. In the ideal Confucian scheme of social stratification, schol- 
ars were at the highest level of society, followed by farmers, then 
by artisans, with merchants and soldiers in last place. 

In society at large, the highest and most prestigious positions 
were those of political generalists, such as members of the emperor's 
council or provincial governors. Experts, such as tax specialists or 
physicians, ranked below the ruling political generalists. Although 
commerce has been a major element of Chinese life since the early 
imperial period, and wealthy merchants have been major figures 
in Chinese cities, Confucianists disparaged merchants. Commer- 
cial success never won respect, and wealth based on commerce was 
subject to official taxes, fees, and even confiscation. Upward mobil- 
ity by merchants was achieved by cultivating good relations with 
powerful officials and educating their sons in the hope they might 
become officials. Although dynasties were founded by military con- 
quest, Confucian ideology derogated military skill. Common sol- 
diers occupied a low position in society and were recruited from 
its lowest ranks. Chinese civilization, however, includes a signifi- 
cant military tradition, and generals and strategists usually were 
held in high esteem. 

Most of China's population was composed of peasant farmers, 
whose basic role in supporting the rulers and the rest of society 



108 



The Social System 



was recognized as a positive one in Confucian ideology. In practi- 
cal terms, farming was considered a hard and insecure life and one 
that was best left if an opportunity was available. 

In Chinese communities the factors generating prestige were edu- 
cation, abstention from manual labor, wealth expended on the arts 
and education, a large family with many sons, and community ser- 
vice and acts of charity. Another asset was an extensive personal 
network that permitted one to grant favors and make introductions 
and recommendations. There was no sharp line dividing the elite 
from the masses, and social mobility was possible and common. 

Stratification and Families 

Before 1950 the basic units of social stratification and social 
mobility were families. Although wealthy families were often quite 
large, with as many as thirty people in three or four generations 
living together on a common budget, most families contained five 
or six people. In socioeconomic terms, late traditional China was 
composed of a large number of small enterprises, perhaps as many 
as 100 million farms and small businesses. Each was operated by 
a family, which acted not only as a household but also as a com- 
mercial enterprise. The family head also was the trustee of the estate 
and manager of the family business. Families could own property, 
such as land or shops, and pass it on to the next generation. 

About 80 percent of the population were peasant farmers, and 
land was the fundamental form of property. Although many peasant 
families owned no land, large estates were rare by the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. Peasant families might own all of the land 
they worked, or own some and rent some from a landowner, or 
rent all their land. Regardless of the form of tenure, the farm was 
managed as a unit, and the head of household was free to decide 
what to plant and how to use the labor of family members. Land 
could be bought and sold in small parcels, as well as mortgaged 
and rented in various forms of short-term and long-term contracts. 
The consequence was that in most villages peasant families occupied 
different steps on the ladder of stratification; they did not form a 
uniformly impoverished mass. At any time, peasant families were 
distinguished by the amount of land that they owned and worked 
compared with the percentage of their income they paid in rent. 
Over time, peasant families rose or fell in small steps as they bought 
land or were forced to sell it. 

Most non-farm enterprises, commercial or craft, were similarly 
small businesses run by families. The basic units were owned by 
families, which took a long-term view of their prospects and 
attempted to shift resources and family personnel from occupation 



109 



China: A Country Study 



to occupation to adapt to economic circumstances. In all cases, the 
long-term goal of the head of the family was to ensure the survival 
and prosperity of the family and to pass the estate along to the next 
generation. The most common family strategy was to diversify the 
family's economic activities. Such strategies lay behind the large 
number of small-scale enterprises that characterized Chinese soci- 
ety before 1950. Farming and landowning were secure but not very 
profitable. Commerce and money-lending brought in greater 
returns but also carried greater risks. A successful farm family might 
invest in a shop or a food-processing business, while a successful 
restaurant owner might buy farmland, worked by a sharecropping 
peasant family, as a secure investment. All well-to-do families 
invested in the education of sons, with the hope of getting at least 
one son into a government job. The consequence was that it was 
difficult to draw a class line dividing landlords, merchants, and 
government workers or officials. 

Social Mobility 

Formal education provided the best and most respected avenue 
of upward mobility, and by the nineteenth century literacy rates 
in China were high for a traditional peasant society. Chances of 
receiving a good education were highest for the upper classes in 
and around coastal cities and lowest for the farmers of the interior. 
If schooling was not available, there were other avenues of mobility. 
Rural people could move to cities to seek their fortunes (and in 
some cases the cities were in Southeast Asia or the Americas). People 
could go into business, gamble on the market for perishable cash 
crops, try money-lending on a small scale or, as a long shot, join 
the army or a bandit group. Late traditional society offered alter- 
nate routes to worldly success and a number of ways to change 
one's position in society; but in all routes except education the 
chances of failure outweighed those of success. 

In many cases, whether in business or banditry, success or failure 
depended to a great degree on luck. The combination of popula- 
tion pressure, the low rate of economic growth, natural disasters, 
and endemic war that afflicted the Chinese population in the first 
half of the twentieth century meant that many families lost their 
property, some starved, and almost all faced the probability of mis- 
fortune (see Republican China, ch. 1). From the perspective of 
individuals and individual families, it is likely that from 1850 to 
1950 the chances of downward mobility increased and the ability 
to plan ahead with confidence decreased. 



110 




Open-air shop, Yangzhou, 
Jiangsu 
Province 
Courtesy 
Stephanie Marcus 




111 



China: A Country Study 



Social Change 

After the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949, the 
uncertainty and risks facing small-scale socioeconomic units were 
replaced by an increase in the scale of organization and bureaucrati- 
zation, with a consequent increase in predictability and personal 
security. The tens of millions of small enterprises were replaced 
by a much smaller number of larger enterprises, which were 
organized in a bureaucratic and hierarchical manner. Collectivi- 
zation of land and nationalization of most private businesses meant 
that families no longer had estates to pass along. Long-term interests 
for families resided primarily with the work unit (collective farm, 
office, or factory) to which they belonged. 

Mobility in most cases consisted of gaining administrative pro- 
motions within such work units. Many of the alternate routes to 
social mobility were closed off, and formal education continued to 
be the primary avenue of upward mobility. In villages the army 
offered the only reasonable alternative to a lifetime spent in the 
fields, and demobilized soldiers staffed much of the local adminis- 
trative structure in rural areas. For the first time in Chinese history, 
the peasant masses were brought into direct contact with the national 
government and the ruling party, and national-level politics came 
to have a direct impact on the lives of ordinary people. The for- 
merly local, small-scale, and fragmented power structure was 
replaced by a national and well-integrated structure, operating by 
bureaucratic norms. The unpredictable consequences of market 
forces were replaced by administrative allocation and changing eco- 
nomic policies enforced by the government bureaucracy. 

The principal transformation of society took place during the 
1950s in a series of major campaigns carried out by the party. In 
the countryside, an initial land reform redistributed some land from 
those families with an excess to those with none. This was quickly 
followed by a series of reforms that increased the scale of organi- 
zation, from seasonal mutual aid teams (groups of joint-support 
laborers from individual farming households), to permanent mutual 
aid teams, to voluntary agricultural cooperatives, to compulsory 
agricultural cooperatives, and finally to large people's communes 
(see Glossary). In each step, which came at roughly two-year 
intervals, the size of the unit was increased, and the role of inherited 
land or private ownership was decreased. By the early 1960s, an 
estimated 90 million family farms had been replaced by about 
74,000 communes. During the same period, local governments took 
over commerce, and private traders, shops, and markets were 
replaced by supply and marketing cooperatives and the commercial 



112 




113 



China: A Country Study 

bureaus of local government. In the cities, large industries were 
nationalized and craft enterprises were organized into large-scale 
cooperatives that became branches of local government. Many small 
shops and restaurants were closed down, and those that remained 
were under municipal management. 

In both city and countryside, the 1950s saw a major expansion 
of the party and state bureaucracies, and many young people with 
relatively scarce secondary or college educations found secure white- 
collar jobs in the new organizations. The old society's set of for- 
mal associations — everything from lineages (clans), to irrigation 
cooperatives, to urban guilds and associations of persons from the 
same place of origin, all of which were private, small-scale, and 
usually devoted to a single purpose — were closed down. They were 
replaced by government bureaus or state-sponsored mass associa- 
tions, and their parochial leaders were replaced by party members. 
The new institutions were run by party members and served as 
channels of information, communication, and political influence. 

The basic pattern of contemporary society was established by 
1960, and all changes since then, including the reforms of the early 
and mid-1980s, have represented only modifications and adjust- 
ments to the pattern. The pattern is cellular; most people belong 
to one large, all-embracing unit, such as a factory, government 
office, or village. The unit is run by a party branch, operates (or 
should operate) under common administrative rules and procedures, 
and reflects the current policies of the party. The consequence has 
been that most aspects of social differentiation, stratification, 
mobility, and tensions are now played out within an institutional 
framework. Most of the questions about any individual's life and 
prospects can be answered by specifying the unit — the social cell — 
with which that individual is associated. 

Differentiation 

Although much of the social structure of modern China can be 
interpreted as reflecting basic drives for security and equality, quali- 
ties in short supply before 1950, not all organizations and units 
are alike or equal. There are four major axes of social differentia- 
tion in modern China. To some extent they overlap and reinforce 
each other, but each rests on distinct and separate grounds. 

The Work Place 

Work units (danwei) belong to the state or to collectives. State- 
owned units, typically administrative offices, research institutes, 
and large factories, offer lifetime security, stable salaries, and 
benefits that include pensions and free health care. Collectives 



114 



The Social System 



include the entire agricultural sector and many small-scale factories, 
repair shops, and village- or township-run factories, workshops, 
or service enterprises. Employees on the state payroll enjoy the best 
benefits modern China has to offer. The incomes of those in the 
collective sector are usually lower and depend on the performance 
of the enterprise. They generally lack health benefits or pensions, 
and the collective units usually do not provide housing or child- 
care facilities. In 1981 collective enterprises employed about 40 per- 
cent of the nonagricultural labor force, and most of the growth of 
employment since 1980 has come in this sector. Even though the 
growth since 1980 of individual businesses and small private 
enterprises, such as restaurants and repair services, has provided 
some individuals with substantial cash incomes, employment in 
the state sector remains most people's first choice. This reflects the 
public's recognition of that sector's superior material benefits as 
well as the traditional high prestige of government service. 

"Security and equality" have been high priorities in modern 
China and have usually been offered within single work units. 
Because there is no nationwide insurance or social security system 
and because the income of work units varies, the actual level of 
benefits and the degree of equality (of incomes, housing, or 
opportunities for advancement) depend on the particular work unit 
with which individuals are affiliated. Work units are responsible 
for chronic invalids or old people without families, as well as for 
families confronted with the severe illness or injury of the bread- 
winner. Equality has always been sought within work units (so that 
all factory workers, for example, received the same basic wage, 
or members of a collective farm the same share of the harvest), 
and distinctions among units have not been publicly acknowledged. 
During the Cultural Revolution, however, great stress was placed 
on equality in an abstract or general sense and on its symbolic act- 
ing out. Administrators and intellectuals were compelled to do 
manual labor, and the uneducated and unskilled were held up as 
examples of revolutionary virtue. 

In the mid-1980s many people on the lower fringes of adminis- 
tration were not on the state payroll, and it was at this broad, lower 
level that the distinction between government employees and non- 
government workers assumed the greatest importance. In the coun- 
tryside, village heads were collective-sector workers, as were the 
teachers in village primary schools, while workers for township 
governments (and for all levels above them) and teachers in mid- 
dle schools and universities were state employees. In the armed 
forces, the rank and file who served a three- to five-year enlistment 
at very low pay were considered citizens serving their military 



115 



China: A Country Study 



obligation rather than state employees. Officers, however, were state 
employees, and that distinction was far more significant than their 
rank. The distinction between state and collective-sector employ- 
ment was one of the first things considered when people tried to 
find jobs for their children or a suitable marriage partner. 

Communist Party Membership 

Every unit in China, from the villages through the armed forces, 
is run by the party, which has a monopoly on political power (see 
Membership, ch. 10). Party members are in a sense the heirs of 
the traditional gentry. They are a power-holding elite, dispersed 
over the whole country, and serve as intermediaries between their 
own communities or units and the nation. They are recruited from 
the population at large on universalistic grounds of "merit," and 
they claim authority by their mastery of an ideology that focuses 
on government and public order. The ideology is contained in 
books, and party members are expected to be familiar with the basic 
texts, to continue studying them throughout their careers, and to 
apply them in concrete situations. 

The differences between the traditional elite and the party are 
obvious. Party members are supposed to be revolutionaries, be 
devoted to changing society rather than restoring it, come from 
and represent the peasants and workers, and be willing to submit 
themselves totally and unreservedly to the party. On the whole, 
party members are distinctly less bookish and more military- 
oriented and outwardly egalitarian than traditional elites. Party 
members have been preferentially recruited from the poor peasantry 
of the interior, from the army, and from the ranks of industrial 
workers; intellectuals have usually found it difficult to enter the 
party. The party is represented in every village and every large 
or medium-sized enterprise in the country. The scope of its actions 
and concerns is much greater than that of its traditional prede- 
cessors. 

Relatively speaking, there are more party members than there 
were traditional gentry. In 1986 the Chinese Communist Party had 
44 million members in 2.6 million local party branches. This meant 
that about 8 percent of China's adult population belonged to the 
party. Not all party members hold state jobs: some hold village 
and township-level positions, and many armed forces enlisted per- 
sonnel join the party during their service. (Indeed, a chance to join 
the party has been one of the major attractions of military service 
for peasant youth.) 

Party members direct all enterprises and institutions and 
dominate public life and discussion. Anyone with ambitions to do 



116 



The Social System 



more than his or her daily job or work in a narrow professional 
specialty must join the party. Membership is selective, and candi- 
dates must demonstrate their zeal, devotion to party principles, 
and willingness to make a total commitment to the party. Ideally, 
membership is a complete way of life, not a job, and selection for 
membership depends more on assessment of an individual's total 
personality and "moral" character than on specific qualifications 
or technical skills. While this could probably be said of all com- 
munist parties, Chinese Communist Party members certainly mir- 
ror China's traditional mandarins, who were political generalists 
rather than technical specialists. Party members are the intermedi- 
aries who link enterprises and communities with high-level struc- 
tures, and they can belong to more than one organization, such 
as a factory and a municipal party body. Party membership is vir- 
tually a requirement for upward mobility or for opportunities to 
leave one's original work unit. 

Urban-Rural Distinctions 

In modern China, legal distinction is made between urban and 
rural dwellers, and movement from rural to urban status is difficult. 
Urban life is felt to be far preferable, and living standards and 
opportunities for such advantages as education are much better 
in the cities. This firm and absolute distinction, which had no prece- 
dent in traditional society, is the result of a set of administrative 
decisions and policies that have had major, if unintended, conse- 
quences for social organization. Modern Chinese society has been 
marked by an extraordinary degree of residential immobility, and 
internal migration and population movement have been limited 
by state control. For most of the period since 1958, there has been 
no legal way to move out of villages or from small cities to large 
cities. Although people have not inherited estates and private 
property, they have inherited rural or urban status, which has been 
a major determinant of living standards and life chances. 

China's cities grew rapidly in the early and mid-1950s as rural 
people moved in to take advantage of the employment opportuni- 
ties generated by economic growth and the expansion of heavy 
industry. The authorities became alarmed at this influx, both 
because of the cost of providing urban services (food supply, waste 
disposal) and because of the potential problems of unemployed or 
semi-employed migrants creating squatter settlements. Addition- 
ally, Chinese leaders held a certain anti-urban bias and tended to 
regard China's cities as unproductive. They accused city residents 
of living off the countryside and indulging in luxury consumption. 
Extolling large, smoking factories, they sought to engage the 



117 



China: A Country Study 



population in the manufacture of utilitarian commodities, like steel 
or trucks. The authorities demonstrated their bias against com- 
merce and service trades by closing down many shops and mar- 
kets. Since 1958 they have employed household registration and 
food rationing systems to control urban growth and general migra- 
tion (see Migration, ch. 2). 

In the 1980s the distinction between urban and rural status grew 
mainly out of the food distribution and rationing system. Rural 
registrants were/assumed to be growing their own staple foods, and 
there was no provision for state allocation of grain to them. The 
state monopolized the trade in grain; it collected grain in the coun- 
tryside as a tax or as compulsory purchase and used it to supply 
its functionaries and the urban population (see Internal Trade and 
Distribution, ch. 8). Urban status entitled one to purchase an 
allotment of grain, oil, and various other staple items. These were 
rationed, and a ration coupon as well as money was necessary to 
obtain grain legally. Ration coupons were good only in their own 
localities. The rationing system served several purposes. They 
included the fair distribution of scarce goods, prevention of pri- 
vate speculation in staple foods, and residence control. In addi- 
tion, the police in cities kept household registration records and 
could make unannounced inspections, usually at night, looking for 
people who did not have legal permission to reside in a city. The 
controls have not been foolproof and have worked more effectively 
in times of shortages and strict political control. 

In the 1980s the reasons for the administrative barriers around 
cities were fairly straightforward. Incomes and living standards in 
China's cities are two to three times higher than in the country- 
side. In addition, more urban dwellers have secure state jobs with 
their associated benefits. State investment has been concentrated 
in heavy industry, mostly urban, and agriculture and the rural sec- 
tor have been left to their own devices, after meeting their tax 
obligations. The ironic consequence of a rural and peasant-based 
revolution has been a system that has acted, intentionally or not, 
to increase the social and economic gap between country and city. 

Regional Distinctions 

Regional distinctions in ways of life and standards of living were 
marked in traditional China and continue to have a strong influence 
on contemporary Chinese society. China's size, poorly developed 
transportation system, and state controls on migration mean that 
regional differences in income and in life chances remain large. 
Contemporary Chinese commentary, while certainly explicit on 
the role of class, has tended to ignore regional variation. This may 



118 



The Social System 



reflect the characteristic emphasis on Chinese unity and uniformity, 
as well as the difficulty of fitting regional analysis into a Marxist 
framework. Nevertheless, both geographical position and a com- 
munity's position in administrative and regional hierarchies act 
to limit income from sideline occupations, cash crops, village 
industries, and even such matters as marriage choices. 

Incomes and educational standards in the 1980s were highest 
in the productive lower Chang Jiang (Yangtze River) Valley and 
central Guangdong Province regions and lowest in the semi-arid 
highlands of the northwest and the Yunnan-Guizhou Plateau, as 
they had been since the late nineteenth century. The lowest incomes 
and living standards were in the peripheral areas inhabited by 
minority nationalities. Within all regions, there were distinctions 
between urban cores, intermediate areas, and peripheries. Villages 
on the outskirts of major cities had more opportunities for produc- 
tion of cash crops such as vegetables, more opportunities in side- 
line occupations or subcontracting for urban factories, and easier 
access to urban services and amenities. Higher village incomes were 
reflected in better housing, higher school attendance, well-appointed 
village meeting halls, and a high level of farm and domestic mecha- 
nization. For settlements on the periphery, however, even if only 
a short distance from urban centers, transportation was difficult. 
Such settlements had changed little in appearance since the 1950s 
and devoted most of their land and work force to growing staple 
grains. Many children in these villages dropped out of school before 
completing primary education, as physical strength and endurance 
were more highly regarded than book learning. 

There is clearly a degree of overlap in the four fields of social 
differentiation (work units, party membership, urban-rural distinc- 
tions, and regional distinctions). The top of the hierarchy is occupied 
by those who work in state organizations, belong to the party, live 
in a major city, and inhabit a prosperous region. Correspondingly, 
the least favored inhabitants are peasants whose villages are located 
in the remote parts of poor regions. What is most impressive about 
social differentiation in modern China is the extent to which key 
variables such as region and rural or urban status are ascribed, 
and not easily changed by individual effort. This is the negative 
side of the security and stability that attracted China's populace 
to the party and its programs. 

Common Patterns 

The cellular structure of contemporary Chinese society and the 
Chinese Communist Party's single-party rule mean that almost all 
social organizations share common characteristics (see Social 



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China: A Country Study 



Change, this ch.). The same general description (an all-embracing 
social unit, whose members are assigned to it for life and which 
is organized on bureaucratic principles, subordinate to higher 
administrative levels, and managed by a branch of the party) applies 
to villages, schools, administrative offices, factories, or army units. 
All of these are work units. 

Work Units 

In some ways, Chinese work units {danwei) resemble the large- 
scale bureaucratic organizations that employ most people in eco- 
nomically developed societies. The unit is functionally specialized, 
producing a single product or service, and is internally organized 
into functional departments, with employees classified and rewarded 
according to their work skills. Professional managers run the organi- 
zation, enforce internal regulations and work rules, and negotiate 
with other work units and administrative superiors. 

Chinese work units, however, have many distinctive qualities. 
Workers usually belong to the same unit for their entire working 
life. The degree of commitment to the unit and the extent to which 
the unit affects many aspects of the individual worker's life have 
no parallel in other societies. Chinese work units are highly cor- 
porate, closed, permanent, and all-embracing groups. In most cases, 
people are either born into their units (villages count as units) or 
are assigned to them when they enter the work force. 

Units supply their members with much more than a wage. Hous- 
ing in the cities is usually controlled and assigned by work units. 
Consequently, one's neighbors are often one's workmates. If child- 
care facilities are available, they will most often be provided by 
the work unit. Recreation facilities will be provided by the work 
unit. Political study is carried out with one's workmates. In the 
cities many people meet prospective spouses either at work or 
through the introduction of fellow workers. For most people, social 
mobility takes the form of working their way up within the organi- 
zation. 

If goods are in short supply, they will be rationed through work 
units. This was the case with bicycles and sewing machines in the 
1970s. The same can apply to babies. As part of China's planned 
birth policy, unit supervisors monitor the fertility of married women 
and may decide whose turn it is to have a baby (see Population 
Control Programs, ch. 2). At the other end of the life cycle, pen- 
sions and funeral expenses are provided by work units. Travel to 
another city usually requires the written permission of one's work 
unit before a ticket can be purchased or food coupons for one's 
destination issued. Every unit is managed by party members, who 



120 



The Social System 



are responsible for personnel matters. Outside the farm sector, a 
written dossier is kept for every member of a unit. Units are often 
physically distinct, occupying walled compounds whose exits are 
monitored by gatekeepers. The unit is thus a total community, if 
not a total institution, and unit membership is the single most sig- 
nificant aspect of individual identity in contemporary China. 

Since the 1950s the individual's political life too has been cen- 
tered in the work unit. Political campaigns have meant endless meet- 
ings and rallies within the unit, and when individuals were to be 
criticized or condemned for political deviation or bad class origins, 
it was done within the work unit, by fellow workers. In the post- 
Mao Zedong era, many people were working side by side with others 
whom they had publicly condemned, humiliated, or physically beaten 
fifteen or twenty years before. Much of the quality of life within 
a unit derives from the long-term nature of membership and human 
relations and from the impossibility of leaving. Members seem most 
often to aim for affable but somewhat distant ties of "comradeship" 
with each other, reserving intimate friendships for a few whom they 
have known since childhood or schooldays. 

The work-unit system, with its lifetime membership — sometimes 
referred to as the "iron rice bowl" (see Glossary) — and lack of job 
mobility, is unique to contemporary China. It was developed dur- 
ing the 1950s and early 1960s with little discussion or publicity. 
Its origins are obscure; it most likely arose through the efforts of 
party cadres whose background was rural and whose experience 
was largely in the army and in the disciplined and all-embracing 
life of party branches. 

The special characteristics of the Chinese work unit — such as 
its control over the work and lives of its members and its strict subor- 
dination to administrative superiors who control the resources neces- 
sary to its operation — make the unit an insular, closed entity. Units 
are subject to various administrative hierarchies; reports go up and 
orders come down. The Chinese Communist Party, as a nation- 
wide body, links all units and, in theory, monopolizes channels 
of communication and command (see Chinese Communist Party, 
ch. 10). Vertical, command relations seem to work quite effectively, 
and the degree of local compliance with the orders of superior bodies 
is impressive. Conversely, horizontal relations with other units are 
often weak and tenuous, presenting a problem especially for the 
economy. 

Wages and Benefits 

Much of any worker's total compensation (wages, benefits, and 
official and unofficial perquisites) is determined by membership 



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China: A Country Study 



in a particular work unit. There is considerable variation in the 
benefits associated with different work units. Although the wage 
structure is quite egalitarian when compared with those of other 
countries, wages are only part of the picture (see Income Distri- 
bution, ch. 5). Many of the limited goods available in China can- 
not be bought for money (see Retail Sales, ch. 8). Rather, they 
are available only to certain favored work units. Housing is an 
obvious example. Many collective enterprises may have no hous- 
ing at all or offer only rudimentary dormitories for young, unmar- 
ried workers. 

High-level administrative cadres and military officers may earn 
three or four times more than ordinary workers; in addition, the 
government often grants them superior housing, the unlimited use 
of official automobiles and drivers, access to the best medical care 
in the country, opportunities for travel and vacations, and the right 
to purchase rare consumer goods either at elite shops or through 
special channels. Although China is a socialist state, it is not exactly 
a welfare state. Pensions, medical benefits, and survivors' benefits 
are provided through work units and come out of the unit's budget. 
The amount and nature of benefits may vary from unit to unit. 
The state, through local government bodies, does provide some 
minimal welfare benefits, but only to those with no unit benefits 
or family members able to support them. 

Retirees who have put in twenty-five or thirty years in a state- 
run factory or a central government office can expect a steady 
pension, most often at about 70 percent of their salary, and often 
continue to live in unit housing, especially if they have no grown 
children with whom they can live. In many cases, workers have 
been able to retire and have their children replace them. In other 
cases, some large state enterprises have started smaller sideline or 
subcontracting enterprises specifically to provide employment for 
the grown children of their workers. In contrast, peasants and those 
employed in collective enterprises generally receive no pensions and 
must depend on family members for support. 

Informal Mechanisms of Exchange 

In China formal exchanges of everything from goods and ser- 
vices to information are expected to go through official channels, 
under the supervision of bureaucrats. Administrative channels, 
however, are widely acknowledged to be inadequate and subject 
to inordinate delays. People respond by using and developing 
informal mechanisms of exchange and coordination. The most 
general term for such informal relations is guanxi (personal con- 
nections). Such ties are the affair of individuals rather than 



122 



Construction workers near the Beijing International Airport 

Courtesy R inn -Sup Shinn 
Factory workers pose for picture, Beijing 
Courtesy R inn-Sup Shinn 



123 



China: A Country Study 



institutions and depend on the mutually beneficial exchange of 
favors, services, introductions, and so on. In China such ties are 
created or cultivated through invitations to meals and presenta- 
tion of gifts. 

Personal relations are morally and legally ambiguous, existing 
in a gray and ill-defined zone. In some cases, personal connections 
involve corruption and favoritism, as when powerful cadres "enter 
through the back door" to win admission to college or university 
for their children or to place their relatives or clients in secure, state- 
sector jobs. In other cases, though, the use of such contacts is 
absolutely necessary for the survival of enterprises. Most Chinese 
factories, for example, employ full-time "purchasing agents," 
whose task is to procure essential supplies that are not available 
through the cumbersome state allocation system. As the economic 
reforms of the early 1980s have expanded the scope of market 
exchanges and the ability of enterprises to make their own deci- 
sions on what to produce, the role of brokers and agents of all sorts 
has expanded. In the countryside, village and township cadres often 
act as brokers, finding markets for the commodities produced by 
specialized farming households and tracking down scarce inputs, 
such as fertilizer or fuel or spare parts for agricultural machinery. 

Although the form and operation of guanxi networks clearly has 
traditional roots, as well as parallels in overseas Chinese (see Glos- 
sary) societies and in Hong Kong and Taiwan, they are not sim- 
ply inheritances or holdovers from the traditional past. Personal 
connections and informal exchanges are a basic part of modern 
Chinese society, are essential to its regular functioning, and are 
in many ways a response to the specific political and economic struc- 
tures of that society. They thrive in the absence of formal, public, 
and overt means of exchange and may be considered a response 
to scarcity and to blocked official channels of communication. 
In modern China, those with the most extensive networks of per- 
sonal connections are cadres and party members, who have both 
the opportunity to meet people outside their work units and the 
power to do favors. 

Rural Society 

Collectivization and Class Status 

The first major action to alter village society was the land reform 
of the late 1940s and early 1950s, in which the party sent work 
teams to every village to carry out its land reform policy. This in 
itself was an unprecedented display of administrative and political 
power. The land reform had several related goals. The work teams 



124 



The Social System 



were to redistribute some (though not all) land from the wealthier 
families or land-owning trusts to the poorest segments of the popu- 
lation and so to effect a more equitable distribution of the basic 
means of production; to overthrow the village elites, who might 
be expected to oppose the party and its programs; to recruit new 
village leaders from among those who demonstrated the most com- 
mitment to the party's goals; and to teach everyone to think in 
terms of class status rather than kinship group or patron-client ties. 
In pursuit of the last goal, the party work teams convened exten- 
sive series of meetings, and they classified all the village families 
either as landlords, rich peasants, middle peasants, or poor peasants. 
These labels, based on family landholdings and overall economic 
position roughly between 1945 and 1950, became a permanent and 
hereditary part of every family's identity and, as late as 1980, still 
affected, for example, such things as chances for admission to the 
armed forces, colleges, universities, and local administrative posts 
and even marriage prospects. 

The collectivization of agriculture was essentially completed with 
the establishment of the people's communes in 1958. Communes 
were large, embracing scores of villages. They were intended to 
be multipurpose organizations, combining economic and local 
administrative functions (see Agricultural Policies, ch. 6). Under 
the commune system the household remained the basic unit of con- 
sumption, and some differences in standards of living remained, 
although they were not as marked as they had been before land 
reform. Under such a system, however, upward mobility required 
becoming a team or commune cadre or obtaining a scarce techni- 
cal position such as a truck driver's. 

Decollectivization 

Under the collectivized system, grain production kept up with 
population growth (China's population nearly doubled from 1950 
to 1980), and the rural population was guaranteed a secure but 
low level of subsistence (see Population, ch. 2). But the collectivized 
system seemed to offer few possibilities for rapid economic growth. 
There was some discontent with a system that relied so heavily on 
orders from above and made so little allowance for local conditions 
or local initiative. In the late 1970s, administrators in provincial- 
level units with extensive regions of low yields and consequent low 
standards of living began experimenting with new forms of tenure 
and production. In most cases, these took the form of breaking up 
the collective production team (see Glossary), contracting with 
individual households to work assigned portions of collective land, 
and expanding the variety of crops or livestock that could be 



125 



China: A Country Study 



produced. The experiments were deemed successful and popular, 
and they soon spread to all districts. By the winter of 1982-83, the 
people's communes were abolished; they were replaced by adminis- 
trative townships and a number of specialized teams or businesses 
that often leased such collective assets as tractors and provided ser- 
vices for money. 

The agricultural reforms of the early 1980s led to a confusingly 
large number of new production arrangements and contracts. 
Underlying the variability of administrative and contractual forms 
were several basic principles and trends. In the first place, land, 
the fundamental means of production, remained collective property. 
It was leased, allocated, or contracted to individual households, 
but the households did not own the land and could not transfer 
it to other households. The household became, in most cases, the 
basic economic unit and was responsible for its own production 
and losses. Most economic activity was arranged through contracts, 
which typically secured promises to provide a certain amount of 
a commodity or sum of money to the township government in return 
for the use of land, or workshops, or tractors. 

The goal of the contracting system was to increase efficiency in 
the use of resources and to tap peasant initiative. The rigid require- 
ment that all villages produce grain was replaced by recognition 
of the advantages of specialization and exchange, as well as a much 
greater role for markets. Some "specialized households" devoted 
themselves entirely to production of cash crops or provision of ser- 
vices and reaped large rewards. The overall picture was one of 
increasing specialization, differentiation, and exchange in the rural 
economy and in society in general. Rural incomes increased rapidly, 
in part because the state substantially increased the prices it paid 
for staple crops and in part because of economic growth stimulated 
by the expansion of markets and the rediscovery of comparative 
advantage. 

The Role of the Household 

Decollectivization increased the options available to individual 
households and made household heads increasingly responsible for 
the economic success of their households. In 1987, for example, 
it was legally possible to leave the village and move into a nearby 
town to work in a small factory, open a noodle stand, or set up 
a machine repair business. Farmers, however, still could not legally 
move into medium-sized or large cities. The Chinese press reported 
an increased appreciation in the countryside for education and an 
increased desire for agriculturally oriented newspapers and jour- 
nals, as well as clearly written manuals on such profitable trades 



126 



The Social System 



as rabbit-raising and beekeeping. As specialization and division 
of labor increased, along with increasingly visible differences in 
income and living standards, it became more difficult to encom- 
pass most of the rural population in a few large categories. During 
the early 1980s, the pace of economic and social change in rural 
China was rapid, and the people caught up in the change had 
difficulty making sense of the process. 

Consequences of Rural Reform 

The state retained both its powers and its role in the rural econ- 
omy in the 1980s. Decollectivization, like the collectivization of the 
1950s, was directed from the top down. Sometimes, apparently, 
it was imposed on communities that had been content with their 
collective methods. But in permitting households and communi- 
ties greater leeway to decide what to produce and in allowing the 
growth of rural markets and small-scale industries, the state stepped 
back from the close supervision and mandatory quotas of the 1960s 
and 1970s. 

Decollectivization obviated the supervisory functions of low-level 
cadres, who no longer needed to oversee work on the collective 
fields. Some cadres became full-time administrators in township 
offices, and others took advantage of the reforms by establishing 
specialized production households or by leasing collective property 
at favorable rates. Former cadres, with their networks of connec- 
tions and familiarity with administrative procedures, were in a better 
position than ordinary farmers to take advantage of the opportu- 
nities offered by the growth of markets and commercial activity. 
Even those cadres not wholly devoted to increasing their own 
families' income found that to serve their fellow villagers as expected 
it was necessary to act as entrepreneurs. Village-level cadres in the 
mid-1980s were functioning less as overseers and more as exten- 
sion agents and marketing consultants (see Post-Mao Policies, 
ch. 6). 

By 1987 rural society was more open and diverse than in the 
1960s and 1970s, and the rigid collective units of that period, which 
had reflected the state's overwhelming concern for security, had 
been replaced by networks and clusters of smaller units. The new, 
looser structure demonstrated the priority placed on efficiency and 
economic growth. Basic security, in the sense of an adequate sup- 
ply of food and guarantees of support for the disabled, orphaned, 
or aged, was taken for granted. Less than half of China's popula- 
tion remembered the insecurity and risks of pre- 1950 society, but 
the costs and inefficiencies of the collective system were fresh in 
their minds. Increased specialization and division of labor were 



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China: A Country Study 



trends not likely to be reversed. In the rural areas the significance 
of the work unit appeared to have diminished, although people still 
lived in villages, and the actions of low-level administrative cadres 
still affected ordinary farmers or petty traders in immediate ways. 

The state and its officials still dominated the economy, controlled 
supplies of essential goods, taxed and regulated businesses and mar- 
kets, and awarded contracts. The stratification system of the Maoist 
period had been based on a hierarchy of functionally unspecial- 
ized cadres directing the labors of a fairly uniform mass of peasants. 
It was replaced in the 1980s by a new elite of economically special- 
ized households and entrepreneurs who had managed to come to 
terms with the administrative cadres who controlled access to many 
of the resources necessary for economic success. Local cadres still 
had the power to impose fees, taxes, and all manner of exactions. 
The norms of the new system were not clear, and the economic 
and social system continued to change in response to the rapid 
growth of rural commerce and industry and to national economic 
policies and reforms. 

Regulations and Favors 

Increased commercial activity produced a high degree of nor- 
mative ambiguity, especially in areas like central Guangdong and 
Jiangsu provinces, where rural economic growth was fastest. Neither 
the proper role of local officials nor the rights and obligations of 
new entrepreneurs or traders were clear. The line between the nor- 
mal use of personal contacts and hospitality and extraordinary and 
criminal favoritism and corruption was ambiguous. There were 
hints of the development of a system of patron-client ties, in which 
administrative cadres granted favors to ordinary farmers in return 
for support, esteem, and an occasional gift. The increased num- 
ber of corruption cases reported in the Chinese press and the 
widespread assumption that the decollectivization and rural eco- 
nomic reforms had led to growing corruption probably reflected 
both the increased opportunities for deals and favors of all sorts 
and the ambiguous nature of many of the transactions and rela- 
tionships. The party's repeated calls for improved "socialist spiritual 
civilization" and the attempts of the central authorities both to create 
a system of civil law and to foster respect for it can be interpreted 
as responses to the problem (see The First Wave of Reform, 1979- 
84, ch. 11; Return to Socialist Legality, ch. 13). On the local level, 
where cadres and entrepreneurs were engaged in constant negotia- 
tion on the rules of their game, the problem was presumably being 
addressed in a more straightforward fashion. 



128 



Grandparents 
near Tiananmen Square 
Courtesy Stephanie Marcus 



An elderly attendant 
surveys his kingdom, 
Forbidden City, Beijing. 
Courtesy Stephanie Marcus 



China: A Country Study 



Family and Household 

In past Chinese society, the family provided every individual's 
support, livelihood, and long-term security. Today the state guaran- 
tees such security to those with no families to provide for them, 
and families and work units share long-term responsibility for the 
individual. The role of families has changed, but they remain 
important, especially in the countryside. Family members are 
bound, in law and custom, to support their aged or disabled mem- 
bers. The state, acting through work units, provides support and 
benefits only when families cannot. Households routinely pool 
income, and any individual's standard of living depends on the 
number of household wage earners and the number of dependents. 
In both cities and villages, the highest incomes usually are earned 
by households with several wage earners, such as unmarried adult 
sons or daughters. 

In late traditional society, family size and structural complexity 
varied directly with class. Rural landlords and government offi- 
cials had the largest families, poor peasants the smallest. The poorest 
segment of the population, landless laborers, could not afford to 
marry and start families. The need to provide for old age and the 
general association between the numbers of sons surviving to adult- 
hood and long-term family success motivated individuals to create 
various nonstandard family forms. Couples who produced no sons, 
or no children at all, adopted or purchased infants outright. Families 
with daughters but no sons tried to find men willing to marry their 
daughters and move into their families, abandoning their original 
families and sometimes even their original surnames. Families with 
daughters but no property to attract a son-in-law were sometimes 
forced to sell their daughters as concubines or prostitutes. The varia- 
tion in family size and complexity was the result of variation in 
class position and of the dual role of the household as both family 
and economic enterprise. 

In contemporary society, rural families no longer own land or 
pass it down to the next generation. They may, however, own and 
transmit houses. Rural families pay medical expenses and school 
fees for their children. Under the people's commune system in force 
from 1958 to 1982, the income of a peasant family depended directly 
on the number of laborers it contributed to the collective fields. 
This, combined with concern over the level of support for the aged 
or disabled provided by the collective unit, encouraged peasants 
to have many sons. Under the agricultural reforms that began in 
the late 1970s, households took on an increased and more respon- 
sible economic role. The labor of family members is still the primary 



130 



The Social System 



determinant of income. But rural economic growth and commer- 
cialization increasingly have rewarded managerial and technical 
skills and have made unskilled farm labor less desirable. As long 
as this economic trend continues in the countryside in the late 1980s, 
peasant families are likely to opt for fewer but better educated 
children. 

The consequence of the general changes in China's economy and 
the greater separation of families and economic enterprises has been 
a greater standardization of family forms since 1950. In 1987 most 
families approximated the middle peasant (a peasant owning some 
land) norm of the past. Such a family consisted of five or six peo- 
ple and was based on marriage between an adult son and an adult 
woman who moved into her husband's family. The variant family 
forms — either the very large and complex or those based on minor, 
nonstandard forms of marriage — were much less common. The 
state had outlawed concubinage, child betrothal, and the sale of 
infants or females, all of which were formerly practiced, though 
not common. Increased life expectancy meant that a greater propor- 
tion of infants survived to adulthood and that more adults lived 
into their sixties or seventies. More rural families were able to 
achieve the traditional goal of a three-generation family in the 1980s. 
There were fewer orphans and young or middle-aged widows or 
widowers. Far fewer men were forced to retain lifelong single status. 
Divorce, although possible, was rare, and families were stable, 
on-going units. 

A number of traditional attitudes toward the family have sur- 
vived without being questioned. It is taken for granted that every- 
one should marry, and marriage remains part of the definition of 
normal adult status. Marriage is expected to be permanent. That 
marriage requires a woman to move into her husband's family and 
to become a daughter-in-law as well as a wife is still largely accepted. 
The norm of patrilineal descent and the assumption that it is sons 
who bear the primary responsibility for their aged parents remain. 
The party and government have devoted great effort to control- 
ling the number of births and have attempted to limit the number 
of children per couple (see Population Control Programs, ch. 2). 
But the authorities have not attempted to control population growth 
by suggesting that some people should not marry at all. 

In the past, kinship principles were extended beyond the domestic 
group and were used to form large-scale groups, such as lineages. 
Lineages were quite distinct from families; they were essentially 
corporate economic-political groups. They controlled land and, in 
some areas of China, dominated whole villages and sets of villages 
and held title to most of the farmland. Like most other late 



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China: A Country Study 



traditional associations, lineages were dominated by wealthy and 
educated elites. Ordinary peasants paid as much of their crop to 
their lineage group as they might have to a landlord. The Com- 
munists denounced these organizations as feudal systems by means 
of which landlords exploited others. The lineages were suppressed 
in the early 1950s and their land confiscated and redistributed in 
the land reform. Communal worship of distant lineage ancestors 
lost much of its justification with the dissolution of the lineage estate 
and was easily suppressed over the next several years. Domestic 
ancestor worship, in which members of a single family worshiped 
and memorialized their immediate ancestors, continued at least until 
1966 and 1967, in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, when 
Red Guards destroyed altars and ancestral tablets. In 1987 the party 
was still condemning ancestor worship as superstitious but had made 
little effort to end it. 

Marriage 

The Marriage Law of 1950 guaranteed everyone the freedom 
to choose his or her marriage partner. Nevertheless, especially in 
the countryside, there are few opportunities to meet potential mates. 
Rural China offers little privacy for courtship, and in villages there 
is little public tolerance for flirting or even extended conversation 
between unmarried men and women. Introductions and go- 
betweens continue to play a major role in the arrangement of mar- 
riages. In most cases each of the young people, and their parents, 
has an effective veto over any proposed match. 

In the past, marriage was seen as the concern of families as well 
as of the two parties to the match. Families united by marriage 
were expected to be of equivalent status, or the groom's family to 
be of somewhat higher status. This aspect of marriage patterns has 
continued while the definitions of status have changed. Because 
inherited wealth has been eliminated as a significant factor, evalua- 
tion has shifted to estimates of earning power and future prosperity. 
The most desirable husbands have been administrative cadres, party 
members, and employees of large state enterprises. Conversely, 
men from poor villages have had difficulty finding wives. From 
the early 1950s to the late 1970s, when hereditary class labels were 
very significant, anyone with a "counterrevolutionary" back- 
ground, that is, anyone previously identified with the landlord or 
even rich peasant class, was a bad prospect for marriage. Such 
pariahs often had no choice but to marry the offspring of other 
families with "bad" class backgrounds. At the other end of the 
social scale, there appears to be a high level of intermarriage among 
the children of high-level cadres. 



182 



The Social System 



Community Structure 

Most rural Chinese live in one of some 900,000 villages, which 
have an average population of from 1,000 to 2,000 people. Vil- 
lages have never been self-contained, self-sufficient units, and the 
social world of Chinese peasants has extended beyond their home 
villages. Almost all new wives come into a village from other set- 
tlements, and daughters marry out. All villagers have close kin- 
ship ties with families in other villages, and marriage go-betweens 
shuttle from village to village. 

Before 1950 clusters of villages centered on small market towns 
that linked them to the wider economy and society. Most peasants 
were only a few hours' walk or less from a market town, which 
provided not only opportunities to buy and sell but also opportu- 
nities for entertainment, information, social life, and a host of 
specialized services. The villages around a market formed a social 
unit that, although less immediately visible than the villages, was 
equally significant. 

From the early 1950s on, China's revolutionary government 
made great efforts to put the state and its ideology into direct con- 
tact with the villages and to sweep aside the intermediaries and 
brokers who had traditionally interpreted central policies and 
national values for villagers. The state and the party were gener- 
ally successful, establishing unprecedented degrees of political and 
ideological integration of villages into the state and of village-level 
awareness of state policies and political goals. 

The unintended consequence of the economic and political poli- 
cies of the 1950s and 1960s was to increase the closed, corporate 
quality of China's villages and to narrow the social horizons of vil- 
lagers. Land reform and the reorganization of villages as subunits 
of people's communes meant that villages became collective land- 
holding units and had clear boundaries between their lands and 
those of adjacent villages. Central direction of labor on collective 
fields made the former practices of swapping labor between vil- 
lages impossible. The household registration and rationing systems 
confined villagers to their home settlements and made it impossi- 
ble for them to seek their fortune elsewhere. Cooperation with fel- 
low villagers and good relations with village leaders became even 
more important than they had been in the past. The suppression 
of rural markets, which accompanied the drive for self-sufficiency 
in grain production and other economic activities, had severe social 
as well as economic consequences. Most peasants had neither rea- 
son nor opportunity for regular trips to town, and their opportu- 
nities for exchange and cooperation with residents of other villages 



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China: A Country Study 



were diminished. Villages became work units, with all that that 
implied. 

Decollectivization in the early 1980s resulted in the revival of 
rural marketing, and a limited relaxation of controls on outmigra- 
tion opened villages and diminished the social boundaries around 
them. The social world of peasants expanded, and the larger mar- 
keting community took on more significance as that of the village 
proper was diminished. Village membership, once the single most 
important determinant of an individual's circumstances, became 
only one of a number of significant factors, which also included 
occupation, personal connections, and managerial talent. 

Urban Society 

There is considerable confusion in both Chinese and foreign 
sources over definitions of urban places and hence considerable vari- 
ation in estimates of China's urban population (see Migration, 
ch. 2). The problem of determining the size of the urban popula- 
tion reflects inconsistent and changing administrative categories; 
the distinction between rural and urban household registry and 
between categories of settlements; the practice of placing subur- 
ban or rural districts under the administration of municipal govern- 
ments; and the differences in the status accorded to small towns. 
In sociological terms, urban refers to an area characterized by a rela- 
tively high degree of specialization in occupational roles, many 
special-purpose institutions, and uniform treatment of people in 
impersonal settings. In this sense, a Chinese market town is more 
urban than a village, and settlements become more urban as they 
grow in size and economic complexity. Large municipalities like 
Beijing and Shanghai have the highest degree of division of labor 
and the most specialized institutions. 

Distinctive Features 

Legal status as an urban dweller in China is prized (see Differen- 
tiation, this ch.). As a result of various state policies and practices, 
contemporary Chinese urban society has a distinctive character, 
and life in Chinese cities differs in many ways from that in cities 
in otherwise comparable developing societies. The most consequen- 
tial policies have been the household registration system, the legal 
barriers to migration, the fostering of the all-embracing work unit, 
and the restriction of commerce and markets, including the hous- 
ing market. In many ways, the weight of official control and super- 
vision is felt more in the cities, whose administrators are concerned 
with controlling the population and do so through a dual adminis- 
trative hierarchy. The two principles on which these control 



134 



The Social System 



structures arc based arc locality and occupation. Household registers 
are maintained by the police, whose presence is much stronger in 
the cities than in the countryside (see Public Security Forces, 
ch. 13). Cities are subdivided into districts, wards, and finally into 
small units of some fifteen to thirty households, such as all those 
in one apartment building or on a small lane. For those employed 
in large organizations, the work unit either is coterminous with 
the residential unit or takes precedence over it; for those employed 
in small collective enterprises or neighborhood shops, the residen- 
tial committee is their unit of registration and provides a range 
of services. 

The control of housing by work units and local governments and 
the absence of a housing market have led to a high degree of residen- 
tial stability (see The Work Place, this ch.). Most urban residents 
have spent decades in the same house or apartment. For this rea- 
son, urban neighborhoods are closely knit, which in turn contrib- 
utes to the generally low level of crime in Chinese cities. 

Since the early 1950s, the party leadership has consistently made 
rapid industrialization a primary goal and, to this end, has gener- 
ally favored investment in heavy industry over consumption. For 
cities, these policies have meant an expansion of factories and 
industrial employment, along with a very low level of spending in 
such "nonproductive" areas as housing or urban transit systems 
(see Economic Policies, 1949-80, ch. 5). The emphasis on produc- 
tion and heavy industry and the discouragement of consumption 
and exchange, along with state takeovers of commerce and the ser- 
vice sector, led to cities having many factories but no peddlers, 
snack stalls, or entertainment districts. In the 1950s and early 1960s, 
major efforts were made to bring women into the paid labor force. 
This served the goals of increasing production and achieving sex- 
ual equality through equal participation in productive labor, a classic- 
Marxist remedy for sexual inequality. By 1987 almost all young 
and middle-aged women in the cities worked outside the home. 

Chinese cities, in contrast to those in many developing coun- 
tries, contain a high proportion of workers in factories and offices 
and a low proportion of workers in the service sector. Workers enjoy 
a high level of job security but receive low wages. Between 1963 
and 1977 most wages were frozen, and promotions and raises were 
very rare. Even with the restoration of material incentives in the 
late 1970s, two general wage raises in the 1980s, and increased 
opportunities for bonuses and promotions, wages remained low and 
increased primarily with seniority. As in most parts of the world, 
one reason that so many Chinese urban women are in the work 
force is that one income is not enough to support a family. 



135 



China: A Country Study 



In the 1980s it was possible to purchase such consumer dura- 
bles as television sets and bicycles on the market, but housing 
remained scarce and subject to allocation by work units or municipal 
housing bureaus. Although housing was poor and crowded, Chinese 
neighborhoods had improved greatly over the slum conditions that 
existed before 1950. Most people were gainfully employed at secure 
if low-paying jobs; the municipal government provided a minimal 
level of services and utilities (water and sanitation); the streets were 
fairly clean and orderly; and the crime rate was low (see Wages 
and Benefits, this ch.; Living Standards, ch. 5). 

Housing 

Chinese urban dwellers, as a category, receive subsidies on food, 
housing, and transportation services. In the 1980s such subsidies 
came to occupy an increasingly large share of the state budget. Even 
with subsidies, food purchases took the largest share of household 
budgets. Rents, in contrast, were very low, seldom taking more 
than 5 percent of household income even with water and electricity 
charges included. Little new housing was built between 1950 and 
1980, and although more urban housing was erected between 1980 
and 1985 than in the previous thirty years, housing remained in 
short supply. Entire families often lived in one room and shared 
cooking and toilet facilities with other families. Marriages were 
sometimes delayed until housing became available from the munici- 
pal office or the work unit. Young people were expected to live 
with their parents at least until marriage. This was consonant with 
traditional family patterns but was also reinforced by the shortage 
of housing. The pattern of long-term residential stability and great 
pressure on the stock of available housing meant that city neigh- 
borhoods were less stratified by occupation or income than those 
of many other countries. Not only were incomes more egalitarian 
to begin with, but more money could not buy a bigger or better 
equipped apartment. Managers and technical specialists lived under 
much the same conditions as manual workers, often in the same 
buildings. While many urban families enjoyed higher real incomes 
in the 1980s, they usually could not translate those incomes into 
better housing, as peasants could. 

The combination of full adult employment with a minimal service 
sector put heavy burdens on urban households. By the 1980s both 
the public and the government recognized the burdens on urban 
households and the associated drain on the energies of workers, 
managers, and professionals. After 1985 more money was budgeted 
for housing and such municipal services as piped-in cooking gas. 
But state encouragement of the private or collective service sector 



136 



Workers' mid- rise 
housing, Beijing 
Courtesy Robert L. Worden 



Entrance to a private 
residence in north China 
Courtesy R inn -Sup Shinn 



China: A Country Study 

had greater effect. Unemployed urban youth were permitted and 
sometimes advised to set up small restaurants or service establish- 
ments. Peasants were permitted to come into cities to sell produce 
or local products. Municipal authorities seemed to ignore the move- 
ment of substantial numbers of rural people into the urban service 
sector as peddlers, carpenters, and other skilled workers or, occa- 
sionally, as domestic workers. In the mid-1980s the Chinese press 
reported an influx of teenage girls from the country seeking short- 
term work as housekeepers or nannies. Like other rural migrants, 
they usually used ties with relatives or fellow villagers resident in 
the city to find positions. 

Families and Marriage 

Urban families differ from their rural counterparts primarily in 
being composed largely of wage earners who look to their work 
units for the housing, old-age security, and opportunities for a better 
life that in the countryside are still the responsibility of the family. 
With the exception of those employed in the recently revived urban 
service sector (restaurants, tailoring, or repair shops) who some- 
times operate family businesses, urban families do not combine 
family and enterprise in the manner of peasant families. Urban 
families usually have multiple wage earners, but children do not 
bring in extra income or wages as readily as in the countryside. 
Urban families are generally smaller than their rural counterparts, 
and, in a reversal of traditional patterns, it is the highest level 
managers and cadres who have the smallest families. Late mar- 
riages and one or two children are characteristic of urban managerial 
and professional groups. As in the past, elite family forms are being 
promoted as the model for everyone. 

Three-generation families are not uncommon in cities, and a 
healthy grandparent is probably the ideal solution to the child-care 
and housework problems of most families. About as many young 
children are cared for by a grandparent as are enrolled in a work- 
unit nursery or kindergarten, institutions that are far from universal. 
Decisions on where a newly married couple is to live often depend 
on the availability of housing. Couples most often establish their 
own household, frequently move in with the husband's parents, 
or, much less often, may move in with the wife's parents. Both 
the state and the society expect children to look after their aged 
parents. In addition, a retired worker from a state enterprise will 
have a pension and often a relatively desirable apartment as well. 
Under these circumstances elderly people are assets to a family. 
Those urban families employing unregistered maids from the coun- 
tryside are most likely those without healthy grandparents. 



138 



The Social System 



Families play less of a role in marriage choices in cities than in 
the countryside, at least in part because the family itself is not the 
unit promising long-term security and benefits to its members. By 
the late 1970s, perhaps half of all urban marriages were the result 
of introductions by workmates, relatives, or parents. The marriage 
age in cities has been later than that in the countryside, which 
reflects greater compliance with state rules and guidelines as well 
as social and economic factors common to many other countries. 
People in cities and those with secondary and postsecondary edu- 
cation or professional jobs tend to marry later than farmers. In 
China it is felt that marriage is appropriate only for those who have 
jobs and thus are in a position to be full members of society. Peasant 
youth, who have an automatic claim on a share of the collective 
fields and the family house, qualify, but college students or urban 
youths who are "waiting for assignment" to a lifetime job do not. 
In any case, work-unit approval is necessary for marriage. 

Urban weddings are usually smaller and more subdued than their 
rural counterparts, which reflects the diminished role of the fami- 
lies in the process. More guests will be workmates or friends of 
the bride and groom than distant kin or associates of the parents. 
The wedding ceremony focuses on the bride and groom as a cou- 
ple rather than on their status as members of families. Similarly, 
a brief honeymoon trip rather than a three-day celebration in which 
the entire village plays a part is an increasingly common practice. 
Long engagements are common in cities, sometimes because the 
couple is waiting for housing to become available. 

Providing for the Next Generation 

Although Chinese families continue to be marked by respect for 
parents and a substantial degree of filial subordination, parents have 
weighty obligations toward their children as well. Children are 
obliged to support parents in their old age, and parents are obliged 
to give their children as favorable a place in the world as they can. 
In the past this meant leaving them property and providing the 
best education or training possible. For most rural parents today 
the choice of a career for their children is not a major issue. Most 
children of peasants will be peasants like their parents, and the 
highest realistic ambition is a position as a low-level cadre or teacher 
or perhaps a technician. The primary determinant of a rural child's 
status and well-being remains his or her family, which is one rea- 
son for the intense concern with the marriage choices of sons and 
daughters and for the greater degree of parental involvement in 
those decisions. 



139 



China: A Country Study 

Urban parents are less concerned with whom their children marry 
but are more concerned with their education and eventual careers. 
Urban parents can expect to leave their children very little in the 
way of property, but they do their best to prepare them for secure 
and desirable jobs in the state sector. The difficulty is that such 
jobs are limited, competition is intense, and the criteria for entry 
have changed radically several times since the early 1950s. Many 
of the dynamics of urban society revolve around the issue of job 
allocation and the attempts of parents in the better-off segments 
of society to transmit their favored position to their children. The 
allocation of scarce and desirable goods, in this case jobs, is a 
political issue and one that has been endemic since the late 1950s. 
These questions lie behind the changes in educational policy, the 
attempts in the 1960s and 1970s to settle urban youth in the coun- 
tryside, the upheaval of the Cultural Revolution, and the post- 1980 
encouragement of small-scale private and collective commerce and 
service occupations in the cities. All are attempts to solve the 
problem, and each attempt has its own costs and drawbacks. 

Opportunities and Competition 

Cities, by definition, are places with a high degree of occupa- 
tional specialization and division of labor. They are places offer- 
ing their inhabitants a range of occupational choice and also, to 
the degree that some occupations are seen as better than others, 
competition for the better occupations. Cities also provide the train- 
ing for specialized occupations, either in schools or on the job. 

In China there is a cultural pattern stressing individual achieve- 
ment and upward mobility. These are best attained through for- 
mal education and are bound up with the mutual expectations and 
obligations of parents and children. There is also a social struc- 
ture in which a single, bureaucratic framework defines desirable 
positions, that is, managerial or professional jobs in the state sec- 
tor or secure jobs in state factories. Banned migration, lifetime 
employment, egalitarian wage structures, and the insular nature 
of work units were intended by the state, at least in part, to curtail 
individual competition. Nevertheless, some jobs are still seen as 
preferable to others, and it is urbanites and their children who have 
the greatest opportunities to compete for scarce jobs. The ques- 
tion for most families is how individuals are selected and allocated 
to those positions. The lifetime tenure of most jobs and the firm 
control of job allocation by the party make these central issues for 
parents in the favored groups and for local authorities and party 
organizations. 



140 



The Social System 



Between the early 1950s and mid-1980s, policies on recruitment 
of personnel and their allocation to desirable jobs changed several 
times. As the costs and drawbacks of each method became appar- 
ent, pressure mounted to change the policy. In the early and 
mid-1950s, the problem was not acute. State offices were expand- 
ing rapidly, and there were more positions than people qualified 
to fill them. Peasants moved into cities and found employment in 
the expanding industrial sector. Most of those who staffed the new 
bureaucratic sectors were young and would not begin to retire until 
the 1980s and 1990s. Those who graduated from secondary schools 
or universities, however, or were discharged from the armed forces 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s found few jobs of the sort they 
were qualified for or had expected to hold. 

Attempts to manage the competition for secure jobs were among 
the many causes of the radical, Utopian policies of the period from 
1962 to 1976. Among these, the administrative barriers erected 
between cities and countryside and the confinement of peasants 
and their children to their villages served to diminish competition 
and perhaps to lower unrealistic expectations. Wage freezes and 
the rationing of both staples and scarce consumer goods in cities 
attempted to diminish stratification and hence competition. The 
focusing of attention on the sufferings and egalitarian communal 
traditions of the past, which was so prominent in Maoist rhetoric 
and replaced the future orientation of the 1950s, in part diverted 
attention from frustrations with the present. Tensions were most 
acute within the education system, which served, as it does in most 
societies, to sort children and select those who would go on to 
managerial and professional jobs. It was for this reason that the 
Cultural Revolution focused so negatively on the education sys- 
tem. Because of the rising competition in the schools and for the 
jobs to which schooling could lead, it became increasingly evident 
that those who did best in school were the children of the "bour- 
geoisie" and urban professional groups rather than the children 
of workers and peasants (see Education Policy, ch. 4). 

Cultural Revolution-era policies responded with public depre- 
cation of schooling and expertise, including closing of all schools 
for a year or more and of universities for nearly a decade, exalta- 
tion of on-the-job training and of political motivation over exper- 
tise, and preferential treatment for workers and peasant youth. 
Educated urban youth, most of whom came from "bourgeois" 
families, were persuaded or coerced to settle in the countryside, 
often in remote frontier districts. Because there were no jobs in 
the cities, the party expected urban youth to apply their education 
in the countryside as primary school teachers, production team 



141 



China: A Country Study 



accountants, or barefoot doctors (see Glossary); many did manual 
labor. The policy was intensely unpopular, not only with urban 
parents and youth but also with peasants and was dropped soon 
after the fall of the Gang of Four (see Glossary) in late 1976. Dur- 
ing the late 1970s and early 1980s, many of the youth who had 
been sent down to the countryside managed to make their way back 
to the cities, where they had neither jobs nor ration books. By the 
mid-1980s most of them had found jobs in the newly expanded ser- 
vice sector (see Internal Trade and Distribution, ch. 8). 

In terms of creating jobs and mollifying urban parents, the 1980s 
policies on urban employment have been quite successful. The jobs 
in many cases are not the sort that educated young people or their 
parents would choose, but they are considerably better than a 
lifelong assignment to remote frontier areas. 

The Maoist policies on education and job assignment were suc- 
cessful in preventing a great many urban "bourgeois" parents from 
passing their favored social status on to their children. This reform, 
however, came at great cost to the economy and to the prestige 
and authority of the party itself. 

Examinations, Hereditary Transmission of Jobs, and Connections 

Beginning in the late 1970s, China's leaders stressed expertise 
and education over motivation and ideology and consequently 
placed emphasis again on examinations. Competition in the schools 
was explicit, and examinations were frequent. A major step in the 
competition for desirable jobs was the passage from senior middle 
school to college and university, and success was determined by 
performance on a nationwide college and university entrance 
examination (see Education Policy, ch. 4). Examinations also were 
used to select applicants for jobs in factories, and even factory 
managers had to pass examinations to keep their positions. The 
content of these examinations has not been made public, but their 
use represents a logical response to the problem of unfair competi- 
tion, favoritism, and corruption. 

One extreme form of selection by favoritism in the 1980s was 
simple hereditary transmission, and this principle, which operated 
on a de facto basis in rural work units, seems to have been fairly 
widely used in China's industrial sector. From the 1960s to the 
1980s, factories and mines in many cases permitted children to 
replace their parents in jobs, which simplified recruitment and was 
an effective way of encouraging aging workers to retire. The govern- 
ment forbade this practice in the 1980s, but in some instances state- 
run factories and mines, especially those located in rural or remote 
areas, used their resources to set up subsidiaries or sideline 



142 



The Social System 



enterprises to provide employment for their workers' children. The 
leaders of these work units evidently felt responsible for providing 
employment to the children of unit members. 

The party and its role in personnel matters, including job assign- 
ments, can be an obstacle to the consistent application of hiring 
standards. At the grass-roots level, the party branch's control of 
job assignments and promotions is one of the foundations of its 
power, and some local party cadres in the mid-1980s apparently 
viewed the expanded use of examinations and educational qualifi- 
cations as a threat to their power. The party, acting through local 
employment commissions, controlled all job assignments. Party 
members occupied the most powerful and desirable positions; the 
way party members were evaluated and selected for positions 
remained obscure. Local party cadres were frequently suspected 
by the authorities of using their connections to secure jobs for their 
relatives or clients (see Informal Mechanisms of Exchange, this ch.). 

Women 

Traditional Chinese society was male-centered. Sons were pre- 
ferred to daughters, and women were expected to be subordinate 
to fathers, husbands, and sons. A young woman had little voice 
in the decision on her marriage partner (neither did a young man). 
When married, it was she who left her natal family and community 
and went to live in a family and community of strangers where 
she was subordinate to her mother-in-law. Far fewer women were 
educated than men, and sketchy but consistent demographic evi- 
dence would seem to show that female infants and children had 
higher death rates and less chance of surviving to adulthood than 
males. In extreme cases, female infants were the victims of infan- 
ticide, and daughters were sold, as chattels, to brothels or to wealthy 
families. Bound feet, which were customary even for peasant 
women, symbolized the painful constraints of the female role. 

Protests and concerted efforts to alter women's place in society 
began in China's coastal cities in the early years of the twentieth 
century. By the 1920s formal acceptance of female equality was 
common among urban intellectuals. Increasing numbers of girls 
attended schools, and young secondary school and college students 
approved of marriages based on free choice. Footbinding declined 
rapidly in the second decade of the century, the object of a nation- 
wide campaign led by intellectuals who associated it with national 
backwardness. 

Nevertheless, while party leaders condemned the oppression and 
subordination of women as one more aspect of the traditional society 
they were intent on changing, they did not accord feminist issues 



143 



China: A Country Study 

very high priority. In the villages, party members were interested 
in winning the loyalty and cooperation of poor and lower-middle- 
class male peasants, who could be expected to resist public criti- 
cism of their treatment of their wives and daughters. Many party 
members were poor and lower-middle-class peasants from the 
interior, and their attitudes toward women reflected their back- 
ground. The party saw the liberation of women as depending, in 
a standard Marxist way, on their participation in the labor force 
outside the household. 

The position of women in contemporary society has changed from 
the past, and public verbal assent to propositions about the equal- 
ity of the sexes and of sons and daughters seems universal. Women 
attend schools and universities, serve in the People's Liberation 
Army, and join the party. Almost all urban women and the majority 
of rural women work outside the home. But women remain disad- 
vantaged in many ways, economic and social, and there seems no 
prospect for substantive change. 

The greatest change in women's status has been their movement 
into the paid labor force. The jobs they held in the 1980s, though, 
were generally lower paying and less desirable than those of men. 
Industries staffed largely by women, such as the textiles industry, 
paid lower wages than those staffed by men, such as the steel or 
mining industries. Women were disproportionately represented in 
collective enterprises, which paid lower wages and offered fewer 
benefits than state-owned industries. In the countryside, the work 
of males was consistently better rewarded than that of women, and 
most skilled and desirable jobs, such as driving trucks or repairing 
machines, were held by men. In addition, Chinese women suffered 
the familiar double burden of full-time wage work and most of the 
household chores as well. 

As there come to be both more opportunities and more explicit 
competition for them in both city and countryside, there are some 
hints of women's being excluded from the competition. In the coun- 
tryside, a disproportionate number of girls drop out of primary 
school because parents do not see the point of educating a daugh- 
ter who will marry and leave the family and because they need her 
labor in the home. There are fewer female students in key rural 
and urban secondary schools and universities. As economic growth 
in rural areas generates new and potentially lucrative jobs, there 
is a tendency in at least some areas for women to be relegated to 
agricultural labor, which is poorly rewarded. There have been 
reports in the Chinese press of outright discrimination against 
women in hiring for urban jobs and of enterprises requiring female 
applicants to score higher than males on examinations for hiring. 



144 



The Social System 



On the whole, in the 1980s women were better off than their 
counterparts 50 or a 100 years before, and they had full legal equal- 
ity with men. In practice, their opportunities and rewards were 
not entirely equal, and they tended to get less desirable jobs and 
to retain the burden of domestic chores in addition to full-time jobs. 

Religion 

Traditionally, China's Confucian elite disparaged religion and 
religious practitioners, and the state suppressed or controlled orga- 
nized religious groups. The social status of Buddhist monks and 
Taoist priests was low, and ordinary people did not generally look 
up to them as models. In the past, religion was diffused through- 
out the society, a matter as much of practice as of belief, and had 
a weak institutional structure. Essentially the same pattern con- 
tinues in contemporary society, except that the ruling elite is even 
less religious and there are even fewer religious practitioners. 

The attitude of the party has been that religion is a relic of the 
past, evidence of prescientific thinking, and something that will 
fade away as people become educated and acquire a scientific view 
of the world. On the whole, religion has not been a major issue. 
Cadres and party members, in ways very similar to those of Con- 
fucian elites, tend to regard many religious practitioners as charla- 
tans out to take advantage of credulous people, who need protection. 
In the 1950s many Buddhist monks were returned to secular life, 
and monasteries and temples lost their lands in the land reform. 
Foreign missionaries were expelled, often after being accused of 
spying, and Chinese Christians, who made up only a very small 
proportion of the population, were the objects of suspicion because 
of their foreign contacts. Chinese Christian organizations were 
established, one for Protestants and one for Roman Catholics, which 
stressed that their members were loyal to the state and party. Semi- 
naries were established to train "patriotic" Chinese clergy, and 
the Chinese Catholic Church rejected the authority of the Vati- 
can, ordaining its own priests and installing its own bishops. The 
issue in all cases, whether involving Christians, Buddhists, or mem- 
bers of underground Chinese sects, was not so much doctrine or 
theology as recognition of the primacy of loyalty to the state and 
party. Folk religion was dismissed as superstition. Temples were 
for the most part converted to other uses, and public celebration 
of communal festivals stopped, but the state did not put much 
energy into suppressing folk religion. 

During the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, in 1966 and 
1967, Red Guards destroyed temples, statues, and domestic 
ancestral tablets as part of their violent assault on the "four olds" 



145 



China: A Country Study 



(old ideas, culture, customs, and habits). Public observances of ritual 
essentially halted during the Cultural Revolution decade. After 
1978, the year marking the return to power of the Deng Xiaoping 
reformers, the party and state were more tolerant of the public 
expression of religion as long as it remained within carefully defined 
limits (see Political Realignments at the Party Center, ch. 11). Some 
showcase temples were restored and opened as historical sites, and 
some Buddhist and even Taoist practitioners were permitted to wear 
their robes, train a few successors, and perform rituals in the 
reopened temples. These actions on the part of the state can be 
interpreted as a confident regime's recognition of China's tradi- 
tional past, in the same way that the shrine at the home of Con- 
fucius in Shandong Province has been refurbished and opened to 
the public. Confucian and Buddhist doctrines are not seen as a 
threat, and the motive is primarily one of nationalistic identifica- 
tion with China's past civilization. 

Similar tolerance and even mild encouragement is accorded to 
Chinese Christians, whose churches were reopened starting in the 
late 1970s. As of 1987 missionaries were not permitted in China, 
and some Chinese Catholic clergy were imprisoned for refusing 
to recognize the authority of China's "patriotic" Catholic Church 
and its bishops. 

The most important result of state toleration of religion has been 
improved relations with China's Islamic and Tibetan Buddhist 
minority populations. State patronage of Islam and Buddhism also 
plays a part in China's foreign relations (see Relations with the 
Third World, ch. 12). Much of traditional ritual and religion sur- 
vives or has been revived, especially in the countryside. In the 
mid-1980s the official press condemned such activities as wasteful 
and reminded rural party members that they should neither par- 
ticipate in nor lead such events, but it did not make the subject 
a major issue. Families could worship their ancestors or traditional 
gods in the privacy of their homes but had to make all ritual 
paraphernalia (incense sticks, ancestral tablets, and so forth) them- 
selves, as it was no longer sold in shops. The scale of public celebra- 
tions was muted, and fuli-time professional clergy played no role. 
Folk religious festivals were revived in some localities, and there 
was occasional rebuilding of temples and ancestral halls. In rural 
areas, funerals were the ritual having the least change, although 
observances were carried out only by family members and kin, with 
no professional clergy in attendance. Such modest, mostly 
household-based folk religious activity was largely irrelevant to the 
concerns of the authorities, who ignored or tolerated it. 



146 



The Social System 



Trends and Tensions 

By the mid-1980s the pace of social change in China was increas- 
ing, and, more than in any decade since the 1950s, fundamental 
changes in the structure of society seemed possible. The ultimate 
direction of social changes remained unclear, but social trends and 
tensions that could generate social change were evident. These 
trends were toward greater specialization and division of labor and 
toward new, more open and loosely structured forms of associa- 
tion (see Rural Society; Urban Society, this ch.). The uniform pat- 
tern of organization of work units in agriculture, industry, public 
administration, and the military was beginning to shift to an 
organization structured to reflect its purpose. Education and tech- 
nical qualification were becoming more significant for attaining 
high status in villages, industries, the government, or the armed 
forces. Opportunities for desirable jobs remained limited, however, 
and competition for those jobs or for housing, urban residence, 
or college admission was keen. 

The primary tension in Chinese society resulted from the value 
political leaders and ordinary citizens placed on both the social 
values of security and equality and the goals of economic growth 
and modernization. China remained a society in which all desired 
goods were in short supply, from arable land to secure nonmanual 
jobs, to a seat on a city bus. Crowding was normal and pervasive. 
Competition and open social strife were restrained by the public 
belief that scarce goods were being distributed as equitably as pos- 
sible and that no individual or group was being deprived of liveli- 
hood or a fair share. In the mid-1980s Chinese authorities feared 
that social disorder might result from popular discontent over price 
increases or the conspicuous wealth of small segments of the popu- 
lation, such as free-market traders. The press frequently condemned 
the expressions of jealousy and envy that some people directed at 
those who were prospering by taking advantage of the opportuni- 
ties the reformed economy offered. The rise in living standards in 
the 1980s may have contributed to rising expectations that could 
not be met without considerably more economic growth. 

The tension between security and economic growth was reflected 
in the people's attitudes toward the work unit and the degree of 
control it exercised over their lives. There was no apparent reason 
why even a socialist, planned economy had to organize its work 
force into closed, insular, and sometimes nearly hereditary units. 
People generally liked the security and benefits provided by their 
units but disliked many other aspects of "unit life," such as the 
prohibition on changing jobs. Limited surveys in cities indicated 



147 



China: A Country Study 



that most people were assigned to work units arbitrarily, without 
regard to their wishes or skills, and felt little loyalty toward or iden- 
tification with their work units. People adapted to unit life but 
reserved loyalties for their families at the one extreme and for the 
nation and "the people" at the other. 

Rural reforms had essentially abolished the work unit in the coun- 
tryside, along with its close control over people's activities. State 
and party control over the rural economy and society persisted, 
but individuals were accorded more autonomy, and most rural peo- 
ple seemed to welcome the end of production teams and produc- 
tion brigades (see Glossary). The success of these rural reforms made 
modification or even abolition of work units in the urban and state 
sectors a possibility. 

By the mid-1980s the Chinese press and academic journals were 
discussing recruitment and movement of employees among work 
units. Although the discussion initially focused on scientists and 
technicians, whose talents were often wasted in units where they 
could not make full use of them, the questions raised were of general 
import. Such blocked mobility was recognized by China's leader- 
ship as an impediment to economic growth, and a "rational" flow 
of labor was listed as a goal for reform of the economy and the 
science and technology system (see The Reform Program, ch. 9). 
But few concrete steps had been taken to promote labor mobility, 
although government resolutions granted scientists and technicians 
the right to transfer to another unit, subject to the approval of their 
original work unit. The issue was politically sensitive, as it touched 
on the powers and perquisites of the party and of managers. 
Managers often refused permission to leave the unit, even to those 
scientists and engineers who had the formal right to apply for a 
transfer. 

Similarly, foreign-funded joint ventures, on which China's 
government placed its hopes for technology transfer, found it 
impossible to hire the engineers and technicians they needed for 
high-technology work. There may have been personnel at other 
enterprises in the same city eager to work for the new firm, but 
there was no way to transfer them. In 1986 the State Council, in 
a move that had little immediate effect but considerable potential, 
decreed that henceforth state enterprises would hire people on con- 
tracts good for only a few years and that these contract employees 
would be free to seek other jobs when their contracts expired (see 
The State Council, ch. 10). The contract system did not apply, 
as of late 1986, to workers already employed in state enterprises, 
but it did indicate the direction in which at least some leaders wished 
to go. 



148 



The Social System 



The fundamental issues of scarcity, equity, and opportunity lay 
behind problems of balance and exchange among work units, 
among the larger systems of units such as those under one indus- 
try ministry, or between city and country (see Differentiation, this 
ch.; Urban Society, this ch.; Reform of the Economic System 
Beginning in 1979, ch. 5; Lateral Economic Cooperation, ch. 8). 
One of the major goals of the economic reform program in the 
mid-1980s was to break down barriers to the exchange of infor- 
mation, personnel, and goods and services that separated units, 
industrial systems, and geographic regions. National-level leaders 
decried the waste of scarce resources inherent in the attempts of 
industries or administrative divisions to be self-sufficient in as many 
areas as possible, in their duplication of research and production, 
and in their tendencies to hoard raw materials and skilled workers. 
Attempts to break down administrative barriers (such as bans on 
the sale of industrial products from other administrative divisions 
or the refusal of municipal authorities to permit factories subor- 
dinate to national ministries to collaborate with those subordinate 
to the municipality) were often frustrated by the efforts of those 
organizations that perceived themselves as advantageously placed 
to maintain the barriers and their unduly large share of the limited 
goods. Economic growth and development, which accelerated in 
the 1980s, was giving rise to an increasingly differentiated economic 
and occupational structure, within which some individuals and 
enterprises succeeded quite well. 

Economic reforms in rural areas generated a great income spread 
among households, and some geographically favored areas, such 
as central Guangdong and southern Jiangsu provinces, experienced 
more rapid economic growth than the interior or mountainous 
areas. The official position was that while some households were 
getting rich first, no one was worse off and that the economy as 
a whole was growing. Press commentary, however, indicated a fairly 
high level of official concern over public perceptions of growing 
inequality. The problem confronting China's leaders was to pro- 
mote economic growth while retaining public confidence in society's 
fundamental equity and fair allocation of burdens and rewards. 

The major question was whether the basic pattern of Chinese 
society, a cellular structure of equivalent units coordinated by the 
ruling party, would continue with modifications, or whether its costs 
were such that it would be replaced by a different and less uni- 
form system. In the late 1980s, either alternative seemed possible. 
The outcome would depend on both political forces and economic 
pressures. In either case, balancing individual security with 



149 



China: A Country Study 

opportunity would remain the fundamental task of those who direct 
Chinese society. 

Among the best works on China's traditional society and cul- 
ture are Derk Bodde's brief overview, China's Traditional Culture: 
What and Whither? and the American missionary Arthur H. Smith's 
Village Life in China and Chinese Characteristics, both written after many 
years in Shandong Province and north China at the end of the 
nineteenth century. Late traditional society is detailed in G. William 
Skinner's The City in Late Imperial China. Chinese society during 
World War II is presented in Graham Peck's Two Kinds of Time. 
Sociologist C. K. Yang's yl Chinese Village in Early Communist Transi- 
tion supplies a field study of a village just outside Guangzhou and 
an account of the initial stages of the transformation of rural soci- 
ety in 1949. Ida Pruitt's A Daughter of the Han is a well-done life 
history of a servant woman from Shandong Province. The changes 
of the 1950s are summarized in Franz Schurmann's authoritative 
Ideology and Organization in Communist China. Ezra F. Vogel's Can- 
ton under Communism and Lynn T. White's Careers in Shanghai cover 
the transformation of urban society. The Cultural Revolution is 
covered in William Hinton's Hundred Day War and Stanley Rosen's 
Red Guard Factionalism and the Cultural Revolution in Guangzhou. Susan 
Shirk's Competitive Comrades illuminates competition within urban 
schools and its consequences. Son of the Revolution by Liang Heng 
and Judith Shapiro and To the Storm by Yue Daiyu and Carolyn 
Wakeman provide autobiographical accounts of the Cultural Revo- 
lution and its aftermath. 

Two primary texts on modern Chinese society, based on inter- 
views in Hong Kong in the mid-1970s, are Village and Family in 
Contemporary China and Urban Life in Contemporary China written by 
sociologists Martin King Whyte and William L. Parish. Also based 
on interviews in Hong Kong are Chen Village by Anita Chan, 
Richard Madsen, and Jonathan Unger; Chan's Children of Mao \ 
and Madsen' s Morality and Power in a Chinese Village. 

The most important English-language journal covering modern 
Chinese society is the China Quarterly published in London. Social 
trends and official policies are described in a range of English- 
language journals published in China; the primary ones are Bei- 
jing Review and China Daily. (For further information and complete 
citations, see Bibliography.) 



150 



Chapter 4. Education and Culture 




A somber figure playing a sheng, a reed-pipe instrument, is represented by 
a Tang dynasty (A.D. 618-907) clay tomb figure. 



SINCE THE REPUDIATION of the Cultural Revolution 
(1966-76), the development of the education system in China has 
been geared particularly to the advancement of economic modern- 
ization. Among the notable official efforts to improve the system 
were a 1984 decision to formulate major laws on education in the 
next several years and a 1985 plan to reform the education sys- 
tem. In unveiling the education reform plan in May 1985, the 
authorities called for nine years of compulsory education and the 
establishment of the State Education Commission (created the fol- 
lowing month). Official commitment to improved education was 
nowhere more evident than in the substantial increase in funds for 
education in the Seventh Five- Year Plan (1986-90), which 
amounted to 72 percent more than funds allotted to education in 
the previous plan period (1981-85). In 1986 some 16.8 percent of 
the state budget was earmarked for education, compared with 10.4 
percent in 1984. 

Since 1949, education has been a focus of controversy in China. 
As a result of continual intraparty realignments, official policy alter- 
nated between ideological imperatives and practical efforts to fur- 
ther national development. But ideology and pragmatism often have 
been incompatible. The Great Leap Forward (1958-60) and the 
Socialist Education Movement (1962-65) sought to end deeply 
rooted academic elitism, to narrow social and cultural gaps between 
workers and peasants and between urban and rural populations, 
and to "rectify" the tendency of scholars and intellectuals to dis- 
dain manual labor. During the Cultural Revolution, universal edu- 
cation in the interest of fostering social equality was an overriding 
priority. 

The post-Mao Zedong Chinese Communist Party leadership 
viewed education as the foundation of the Four Modernizations. 
In the early 1980s, science and technology education became an 
important focus of education policy. By 1986 training skilled per- 
sonnel and expanding scientific and technical knowledge had been 
assigned the highest priority. Although the humanities were con- 
sidered important, vocational and technical skills were considered 
paramount for meeting China's modernization goals. The reorien- 
tation of educational priorities paralleled Deng Xiaoping' s strategy 
for economic development. Emphasis also was placed on the fur- 
ther training of the already-educated elite, who would carry on the 
modernization program in the coming decades. Renewed emphasis 



153 



China: A Country Study 



on modern science and technology, coupled with the recognition 
of the relative scientific superiority of the West, led to the adop- 
tion, beginning in 1976, of an outward-looking policy that encour- 
aged learning and borrowing from abroad for advanced training 
in a wide range of scientific fields. 

Beginning at the Third Plenum of the Eleventh National Party 
Congress Central Committee in December 1978, intellectuals were 
encouraged to pursue research in support of the Four Moderniza- 
tions and, as long as they complied with the party's "four cardi- 
nal principles" — upholding socialism, the dictatorship of the 
proletariat, the leadership of the party, and Marxism-Leninism- 
Mao Zedong Thought — they were given relatively free rein. But 
when the party and the government determined that the strictures 
of the four cardinal principles had been stretched beyond tolera- 
ble limits, they did not hesitate to restrict intellectual expression. 

Literature and the arts also experienced a great revival in the 
late 1970s and 1980s. Traditional forms flourished once again, and 
many new kinds of literature and cultural expression were 
introduced from abroad. 

Education Policy 

During the Cultural Revolution, higher education in particular 
suffered tremendous losses; the system was shut down, and a ris- 
ing generation of college and graduate students, academicians and 
technicians, professionals and teachers, was lost. The result was 
a lack of trained talent to meet the needs of society, an irrationally 
structured higher education system unequal to the needs of the eco- 
nomic and technological boom, and an uneven development in 
secondary technical and vocational education. In the post-Mao 
period, China's education policy continued to evolve. The prag- 
matist leadership, under Deng Xiaoping, recognized that to meet 
the goals of modernization it was necessary to develop science, tech- 
nology, and intellectual resources and to raise the population's 
education level. Demands on education — for new technology, 
information science, and advanced management expertise — were 
levied as a result of the reform of the economic structure and the 
emergence of new economic forms. In particular, China needed 
an educated labor force to feed and provision its 1 -billion-plus popu- 
lation. 

By 1980 achievement was once again accepted as the basis for 
admission and promotion in education. This fundamental change 
reflected the critical role of scientific and technical knowledge and 
professional skills in the Four Modernizations. Also, political activ- 
ism was no longer regarded as an important measure of individual 



154 



Teacher and students in a traditional academic setting. Woodcut. 

Courtesy Library of Congress 

performance, and even the development of commonly approved 
political attitudes and political background was secondary to 
achievement. Education policy promoted expanded enrollments, 
with the long-term objective of achieving universal primary and 
secondary education. This policy contrasted with the previous one, 
which touted increased enrollments for egalitarian reasons. In 1985 
the commitment to modernization was reinforced by plans for nine- 
year compulsory education and for providing good quality higher 
education. 

Deng Xiaoping' s far-ranging educational reform policy, which 
involved all levels of the education system, aimed to narrow the 
gap between China and other developing countries. Modernizing 
China was tied to modernizing education. Devolution of educa- 
tional management from the central to the local level was the means 
chosen to improve the education system. Centralized authority 
was not abandoned, however, as evidenced by the creation of the 
State Education Commission. Academically, the goals of reform 
were to enhance and universalize elementary and junior middle 
school education; to increase the number of schools and qualified 
teachers; and to develop vocational and technical education. A uni- 
form standard for curricula, textbooks, examinations, and teacher 
qualifications (especially at the middle-school level) was established, 
and considerable autonomy and variations in and among the 



155 



China: A Country Study 



provinces, autonomous regions, and special municipalities were 
allowed. Further, the system of enrollment and job assignment in 
higher education was changed, and excessive government control 
over colleges and universities was reduced. 

The Education System 

To provide for its population, China has a vast and varied school 
system. There are preschools, kindergartens, schools for the deaf 
and for the blind, key schools (similar to college preparatory 
schools), primary schools, secondary schools (comprising junior and 
senior middle schools, secondary agricultural and vocational schools, 
regular secondary schools, secondary teachers' schools, secondary 
technical schools, and secondary professional schools), and vari- 
ous institutions of higher learning (consisting of regular colleges 
and universities, professional colleges, and short-term vocational 
universities). In terms of access to education, China's system repre- 
sented a pyramid; because of the scarcity of resources allotted to 
higher education, student numbers decreased sharply at the higher 
levels. Although there were dramatic advances in primary educa- 
tion after 1949, achievements in secondary and higher education 
were not as great. 

Although the government has authority over the education sys- 
tem, the Chinese Communist Party has played a role in manag- 
ing education since 1949. The party established broad education 
policies and under Deng Xiaoping, tied improvements in the quality 
of education to its modernization plan. The party also monitored 
the government's implementation of its policies at the local level 
and within educational institutions through its party committees. 
Party members within educational institutions, who often have a 
leading management role, are responsible for steering their schools 
in the direction mandated by party policy. 

New Directions 

The May 1985 National Conference on Education recognized 
five fundamental areas for reform to be discussed in connection 
with implementing the party Central Committee's "Draft Deci- 
sion on Reforming the Education System." The reforms were 
intended to produce "more able people"; to make the localities 
responsible for developing "basic education" and systematically 
implement a nine-year compulsory education program; to improve 
secondary education; to develop vocational and technical education; 
to reform the graduate-assignment system of institutions of higher 
education and to expand their management and decision-making 
powers; and to give administrators the necessary encouragement 



156 



Education and Culture 



and authority to ensure smooth progress in educational reform. 

The National Conference on Education paved the way for the 
abolition of the Ministry of Education and the establishment of the 
State Education Commission, both of which occurred in June 1985. 
Created to coordinate education policy, the commission assumed 
roles previously played by the State Planning Commission and the 
Ministry of Education. As a State Council commission, the new 
State Education Commission had greater status than the old Minis- 
try of Education had had and was in charge of all education 
organizations except military ones (see The State Council, ch. 10). 
Although the State Education Commission assumed a central role 
in the administration of education, the reform decentralized much 
of the power previously wielded by the Ministry of Education and 
its constituent offices and bureaus, which had established curricu- 
lum and admissions policies in response to the State Planning Com- 
mission's requirements. 

The State Education Commission, with its expanded adminis- 
trative scope and power, was responsible for formulating guiding 
principles for education, establishing regulations, planning the 
progress of educational projects, coordinating the educational pro- 
grams of different departments, and standardizing educational 
reforms. Simplification of administration and delegation of authority 
were made the bases for improving the education system. This devo- 
lution of management to the provinces, autonomous regions, and 
special municipalities meant local governments had more decision- 
making power and were able to develop basic education. State- 
owned enterprises, mass organizations, and individuals were 
encouraged to pool funds to accomplish education reform. Local 
authorities used state appropriations and a percentage of local 
reserve financial resources (basically township financial revenues) 
to finance educational projects. 

Compulsory Education Law 

The Law on Nine-Year Compulsory Education, which took effect 
July 1 , 1986, established requirements and deadlines for attaining 
universal education tailored to local conditions and guaranteed 
school-age children the right to receive education. People's con- 
gresses at various local levels were, within certain guidelines and 
according to local conditions, to decide the steps, methods, and 
deadlines for implementing nine-year compulsory education in 
accordance with the guidelines formulated by the central authori- 
ties. The program sought to bring rural areas, which had four to 
six years of compulsory schooling, into line with their urban 



157 



China: A Country Study 



counterparts. Education departments were exhorted to train mil- 
lions of skilled workers lor all trades and professions and to offer 
guidelines, curricula, and methods to comply with the reform pro- 
gram and modernization needs. 

Provincial-level authorities were to develop plans, enact decrees 
and rules, distribute funds to counties, and administer directly a 
few key secondary schools. County authorities were to distribute 
funds to each township government, which were to make up any 
deficiencies. County authorities were to supervise education and 
teaching and to manage their own senior middle schools, teachers' 
schools, teachers' in-service training schools, agricultural vocational 
schools, and exemplary primary and junior middle schools. The 
remaining schools were to be managed separately by the county 
and township authorities. 

The compulsory education law divided China into three 
categories: cities and economically developed areas in coastal 
provinces and a small number of developed areas in the hinter- 
land; towns and villages with medium development; and economi- 
cally backward areas. By November 1985 the first category — the 
larger cities and approximately 20 percent of the counties (mainly 
in the more developed coastal and southeastern areas of China) 
had achieved universal 9-year education. By 1990 cities, economi- 
cally developed areas in coastal provincial-level units, and a small 
number of developed interior areas (approximately 25 percent of 
China's population) and areas where junior middle schools were 
already popularized were targeted to have universal junior-middle- 
school education. Education planners envisioned that by the 
mid-1990s all workers and staff in coastal areas, inland cities, and 
moderately developed areas (with a combined population of 300 
million to 400 million people) would have either compulsory 9-year 
or vocational education and that 5 percent of the people in these 
areas would have a college education — building a solid intellectual 
foundation for China. Further, the planners expected that second- 
ary education and university entrants would also increase by the 
year 2000. 

The second category targeted under the 9-year compulsory edu- 
cation law consisted of towns and villages with medium-level 
development (around 50 percent of China's population), where 
universal education was expected to reach the junior-middle-school 
level by 1995. Technical and higher education was projected to 
develop at the same rate. 

The third category, economically backward (rural) areas (around 
25 percent of China's population) were to popularize basic educa- 
tion without a timetable and at various levels according to local 



158 



Education and Culture 



economic development, though the state would "do its best" to 
support educational development. The state also would assist edu- 
cation in minority nationality areas (see Minority Nationalities, 
ch. 2). In the past, rural areas, which lacked a standardized and 
universal primary education system, had produced generations of 
illiterates; only 60 percent of their primary school graduates had 
met established standards. 

As a further example of the government's commitment to nine- 
year compulsory education, in January 1986 the State Council 
drafted a bill passed at the Fourteenth Session of the Standing 
Committee of the Sixth National People's Congress that made it 
illegal for any organization or individual to employ youths before 
they had completed their nine years of schooling. The bill also 
authorized free education and subsidies for students whose fami- 
lies had financial difficulties. 

Key Schools 

"Key schools," shut down during the Cultural Revolution, 
reappeared in the late 1970s and, in the early 1980s, became an 
integral part of the effort to revive the lapsed education system. 
Because educational resources were scarce, selected ("key") 
institutions — usually those with records of past educational accom- 
plishment — were given priority in the assignment of teachers, equip- 
ment, and funds. They also were allowed to recruit the best students 
for special training to compete for admission to top schools at the 
next level. Key schools constituted only a small percentage of all 
regular senior middle schools and funneled the best students into 
the best secondary schools, largely on the basis of entrance scores. 
In 1980 the greatest resources were allocated to the key schools that 
would produce the greatest number of college entrants. 

In early 1987 efforts had begun to develop the key school from 
a preparatory school into a vehicle for diffusing improved curricula, 
materials, and teaching practices to local schools. Moreover, the 
appropriateness of a key school's role in the nine-year basic edu- 
cation plan was questioned by some officials because key schools 
favored urban areas and the children of more affluent and better 
educated parents. In 1985 entrance examinations and the key-school 
system had already been abolished in Changchun, Shenyang, 
Shenzhen, Xiamen, and other cities, and education departments 
in Shanghai and Tianjin were moving to establish a student recom- 
mendation system and eliminate key schools. In 1986 the Shang- 
hai Educational Bureau abolished the key junior-middle-school 
system to ensure "an overall level of education. " 



159 



China: A Country Study 

Primary Education 
Primary Schools 

The development of primary education in so vast a country as 
China was a formidable accomplishment. In contrast to the 
20-percent enrollment rate before 1949, in 1985 about 96 percent 
of primary-school-age children were enrolled in approximately 
832,300 primary schools (see table 10, Appendix A). This enroll- 
ment figure compared favorably with the record figures of the late 
1960s and early 1970s, when enrollment standards were more 
egalitarian. In 1985 the World Bank estimated that enrollments 
in primary schools would decrease from 136 million in 1983 to 
95 million in the late 1990s and that the decreased enrollment would 
reduce the number of teachers needed. Qualified teachers, however, 
would continue to be in demand. 

Under the Law on Nine-Year Compulsory Education, primary 
schools were to be tuition-free and reasonably located for the con- 
venience of children attending them; students would attend primary 
schools in their neighborhoods or villages. Parents paid a small fee 
per term for books and other expenses such as transportation, food, 
and heating. Previously, fees were not considered a deterrent to 
attendance, although some parents felt even these minor costs were 
more than they could afford. Under the education reform, students 
from poor families received stipends, and state enterprises, insti- 
tutions, and other sectors of society were encouraged to establish 
their own schools. A major concern was that scarce resources be 
conserved without causing enrollment to fall and without weaken- 
ing of the better schools. In particular, local governments were 
warned not to pursue middle-school education blindly while 
primary-school education was still developing, or to wrest money, 
teaching staff, and materials from primary schools. 

Children usually entered primary school at seven years of age 
for six days a week. The two-semester school year consisted of 9.5 
months, with a long vacation in July and August. Urban primary 
schools typically divided the school week into twenty-four to twenty- 
seven classes of forty-five minutes each, but in the rural areas the 
norm was half-day schooling, more flexible schedules, and itiner- 
ant teachers. Most primary schools had a five-year course, except 
in such cities as Beijing and Shanghai, which had reintroduced six- 
year primary schools and accepted children at six and one-half years 
rather than seven. The primary-school curriculum consisted of 
Chinese, mathematics, physical education, music, drawing, and 
elementary instruction in nature, history, and geography, com- 
bined with practical work experiences around the school compound. 



160 



Kindergarten 
children 
Courtesy 
Xinhua News Agency 



A general knowledge of politics and moral training, which stressed 
love of the motherland, love of the party, and love of the people 
(and previously love of Chairman Mao), was another part of the 
curriculum. A foreign language, often English, was introduced in 
about the third grade. Chinese and mathematics accounted for 
about 60 percent of the scheduled class time; natural science and 
social science accounted for about 8 percent. Putonghua (common 
spoken language, see Glossary) was taught in regular schools and 
pinyin romanization in lower grades and kindergarten. The State 
Education Commission required that all primary schools offer 
courses on communist ideology and morality. Beginning in the 
fourth grade, students usually had to perform productive labor two 
weeks per semester to relate classwork with production experience 
in workshops or on farms and subordinate it to academic study. 
Most schools had after-hour activities at least one day per week — 
often organized by the Young Pioneers — to involve students in 
recreation and community service. 

By 1980 the percentage of students enrolled in primary schools 
was high, but the schools reported high dropout rates and regional 
enrollment gaps (most enrollees were concentrated in the cities). 
Only one in four counties had universal primary education. On 
the average, 10 percent of the students dropped out between each 
grade. During the 1979-83 period, the government acknowledged 
the "9-6-3" rule, that is, that nine of ten children began primary 



161 



China: A Country Study 



school, six completed it, and three graduated with good perfor- 
mance. This meant that only about 60 percent of primary students 
actually completed their five year program of study and graduated, 
and only about 30 percent were regarded as having primary-level 
competence. Statistics in the mid-1980s showed that more rural 
girls than boys dropped out of school. 

Within the framework of the Law on Nine-Year Compulsory 
Education and the general trend toward vocational and technical 
skills, attempts were made to accommodate and correct the gap 
between urban and rural education. Urban and key schools almost 
invariably operated on a six day full-time schedule to prepare stu- 
dents for further education and high-level jobs. Rural schools gener- 
ally operated on a flexible schedule geared to the needs of the 
agricultural seasons and sought to prepare students for adult life 
and manual labor in lower-skilled jobs. They also offered a more 
limited curriculum, often only Chinese, mathematics, and morals. 
To promote attendance and allow the class schedule and academic 
year to be completed, agricultural seasons were taken into account. 
School holidays were moved, school days shortened, and full-time, 
half-time, and spare-time classes offered in the slack agricultural 
seasons. Sometimes itinerant teachers were hired for mountain vil- 
lages and served one village in the morning, another village in the 
afternoon. 

Rural parents were generally well aware that their children had 
limited opportunities to further their education. Some parents saw 
little use in having their children attend even primary school, 
especially after the establishment of the agricultural responsibility 
system (see Glossary). Under that system, parents preferred that 
their children work to increase family income — and withdrew them 
from school — for both long and short periods of time (see Agricul- 
tural Policies, ch. 6). 

Preschool Education 

Preschool education, which began at age three and one-half, was 
another target of education reform in 1985. Preschool facilities were 
to be established in buildings made available by public enterprises, 
production teams, municipal authorities, local groups, and fami- 
lies. The government announced that it depended on individual 
organizations to sponsor their own preschool education and that 
preschool education was to become a part of the welfare services 
of various government organizations, institutes, and state- and col- 
lectively operated enterprises. Costs for preschool education varied 
according to services rendered. Officials also called for more 
preschool teachers with more appropriate training. 



162 



Education and Culture 



Special Education 

The 1985 National Conference on Education also recognized the 
importance of special education, in the form of programs for gifted 
children and for slow learners. Gifted children were allowed to skip 
grades. Slow learners were encouraged to reach minimum stan- 
dards, although those who did not maintain the pace seldom reached 
the next stage. For the most part, children with severe learning 
problems and those with handicaps and psychological needs were 
the responsibilities of their families. Extra provisions were made 
for blind and severely hearing-impaired children, although in 1984 
special schools enrolled fewer than 2 percent of all eligible children 
in those categories. The China Welfare Fund, established in 1984, 
received state funding and had the right to solicit donations within 
China and from abroad, but special education remained a low 
government priority. 

Secondary Education 

Middle Schools 

Secondary education in China has a complicated history. In the 
early 1960s, education planners followed a policy called "walking 
on two legs," which established both regular academic schools and 
separate technical schools for vocational training. The rapid expan- 
sion of secondary education during the Cultural Revolution created 
serious problems; because resources were spread too thinly, educa- 
tional quality declined. Further, this expansion was limited to regu- 
lar secondary schools; technical schools were closed during the 
Cultural Revolution because they were viewed as an attempt to 
provide inferior education to children of worker and peasant 
families. In the late 1970s, government and party representatives 
criticized what they termed the "unitary" approach of the 1960s, 
arguing that it ignored the need for two kinds of graduates: those 
with an academic education (college preparatory) and those with 
specialized technical education (vocational). Beginning in 1976 with 
the renewed emphasis on technical training, technical schools 
reopened, and their enrollments increased (as did those of^key 
schools, also criticized during the Cultural Revolution). In the drive 
to spread vocational and technical education, regular secondary- 
school enrollments fell. By 1986 universal secondary education was 
part of the nine year compulsory education law that made primary 
education (six years) and junior-middle-school education (three 
years) mandatory. The desire to consolidate existing schools and 
to improve the quality of key middle schools was, however, under 
the education reform, more important than expanding enrollment. 



163 



China: A Country Study 



Chinese secondary schools are called middle schools and are 
divided into junior and senior levels. In 1985 more than 104,000 
middle schools (both regular and vocational) enrolled about 51 mil- 
lion students. Junior, or lower, middle schools offered a three year 
course of study, which students began at twelve years of age. Senior, 
or upper, middle schools offered a tw r o or three year course, which 
students began at age fifteen. 

The regular secondary-school year usually had two semesters, 
totaling nine months. In some rural areas, schools operated on a 
shift schedule to accommodate agricultural cycles. The academic 
curriculum consisted of Chinese, mathematics, physics, chemis- 
try, geology, foreign language, history, geography, politics, physi- 
ology, music, fine arts, and physical education. Some middle schools 
also offered vocational subjects. There were thirty or thirty-one 
periods a week in addition to self-study and extracurricular activity. 
Thirty-eight percent of the curriculum at a junior middle school 
was in Chinese and mathematics, 16 percent in a foreign language. 
Fifty percent of the teaching at a senior middle school was in natural 
sciences and mathematics, 30 percent in Chinese and a foreign 
language. 

Rural secondary education has undergone several transforma- 
tions since 1980, when county-level administrative units closed some 
schools and took over certain poorer schools run by the people's 
communes (see Glossary). In 1982 the communes were eliminated. 
In 1985 educational reform legislation officially placed rural second- 
ary schools under local administration. There was a high dropout 
rate among rural students in general and among secondary stu- 
dents in particular, largely because of parental attitudes. All stu- 
dents, however, especially males, were encouraged to attend 
secondary school if it would lead to entrance to a college or univer- 
sity (still regarded as prestigious) and escape from village life. 

In China a senior-middle-school graduate is considered an edu- 
cated person, although middle schools are viewed as a training 
ground for colleges and universities. And, while middle-school stu- 
dents are offered the prospect of higher education, they are also 
confronted with the fact that university admission is limited. Mid- 
dle schools are evaluated in terms of their success in sending gradu- 
ates on for higher education, although efforts persist to educate 
young people to take a place in society as valued and skilled mem- 
bers of the work force. 

Vocational and Technical Schools 

Both regular and vocational secondary schools sought to serve 
modernization needs. A number of technical and "skilled- worker" 



164 



Education and Culture 



training schools reopened after the Cultural Revolution, and an 
effort was made to provide exposure to vocational subjects in general 
secondary schools (by offering courses in industry, services, busi- 
ness, and agriculture). By 1985 there were almost 3 million voca- 
tional and technical students. 

Under the educational reform tenets, polytechnic colleges were 
to give priority to admitting secondary vocational and technical 
school graduates and providing on-the-job training for qualified 
workers. Education reformers continued to press for the conver- 
sion of about 50 percent of upper secondary education into voca- 
tional education, which traditionally had been weak in the rural 
areas. Regular senior middle schools were to be converted into voca- 
tional middle schools, and vocational training classes were to be 
established in some senior middle schools. Diversion of students 
from academic to technical education was intended to alleviate skill 
shortages and to reduce the competition for university enrollment. 
Although enrollment in technical schools of various kinds had not 
yet increased enough to compensate for decreasing enrollments in 
regular senior middle schools, the proportion of vocational and tech- 
nical students to total senior-middle-school students increased from 
about 5 percent in 1978 to almost 36 percent in 1985, although 
development was uneven. Further, to encourage greater numbers 
of junior-middle-school graduates to enter technical schools, voca- 
tional and technical school graduates were given priority in job 
assignments, while other job seekers had to take technical tests. 

In 1987 there were four kinds of secondary vocational and tech- 
nical schools: technical schools that offered a four year, post-junior 
middle course and two- to three-year post-senior middle training 
in such fields as commerce, legal work, fine arts, and forestry; work- 
ers' training schools that accepted students whose senior-middle- 
school education consisted of two years of training in such trades 
as carpentry and welding; vocational technical schools that accepted 
either junior- or senior-middle-school students for one- to three- 
year courses in cooking, tailoring, photography, and other services; 
and agricultural middle schools that offered basic subjects and 
agricultural science. 

These technical schools had several hundred different programs. 
Their narrow specializations had advantages in that they offered 
in-depth training, reducing the need for on-the-job training and 
thereby lowering learning time and costs. Moreover, students were 
more motivated to study if there were links between training and 
future jobs. Much of the training could be done at existing enter- 
prises, where staff and equipment were available at little additional 
cost. 



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China: A Country Study 

There were some disadvantages to this system, however. Under 
the Four Modernizations, technically trained generalists were 
needed more than highly specialized technicians. Also, highly 
specialized equipment and staff were underused, and there was an 
overall shortage of specialized facilities to conduct training. In 
addition, large expenses were incurred in providing the necessary 
facilities and staff, and the trend in some government technical agen- 
cies was toward more general technical and vocational education. 

Further, the dropout rate continued to have a negative effect on 
the labor pool as upper-secondary-school technical students dropped 
out and as the percentage of lower-secondary-school graduates 
entering the labor market without job training increased. Occupa- 
tional rigidity and the geographic immobility of the population, 
particularly in rural areas, further limited educational choices. 

Although there were 668,000 new polytechnic school enrollments 
in 1985, the Seventh Five-Year Plan called for annual increases 
of 2 million mid-level skilled workers and 400,000 senior techni- 
cians, indicating that enrollment levels were still far from sufficient. 
To improve the situation, in July 1986 officials from the State Edu- 
cation Commission, State Planning Commission, and Ministry of 
Labor and Personnel convened a national conference on develop- 
ing China's technical and vocational education. It was decided that 
technical and vocational education in rural areas should accom- 
modate local conditions and be conducted on a short-term basis. 
Where conditions permitted, emphasis would be placed on organiz- 
ing technical schools and short-term training classes. To alleviate 
the shortage of teachers, vocational and technical teachers' colleges 
were to be reformed and other colleges and universities were to 
be mobilized for assistance. The State Council decision to improve 
training for workers who had passed technical examinations (as 
opposed to unskilled workers) was intended to reinforce the devel- 
opment of vocational and technical schools. 

Higher Education 
Background 

Higher education reflects the changes in political policies that 
have occurred in contemporary China. Since 1949 emphasis has 
continually been placed on political re-education, and in periods 
of political upheaval, such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cul- 
tural Revolution, ideology has been stressed over professional or 
technical competence. During the early stages of the Cultural Revo- 
lution, tens of thousands of college students joined Red Guard 
(see Glossary) organizations, effectively closing down the higher 



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Education and Culture 



education system (see The Cultural Revolution Decade, 1966-76, 
ch. 1). In general, when universities reopened in the early 1970s, 
enrollments were reduced from pre-Cultural Revolution levels, and 
admission was restricted to individuals who had been recommended 
by their work unit (danwei — see Glossary) possessed good political 
credentials, and had distinguished themselves in manual labor. In 
the absence of stringent and reasonably objective entrance exami- 
nations, political connections became increasingly important in 
securing the recommendations and political dossiers necessary to 
qualify for university admission. As a result, the decline in educa- 
tional quality was profound. Deng Xiaoping reportedly wrote Mao 
Zedong in 1975 that university graduates were "not even capable 
of reading a book" in their own fields when they left the university. 
University faculty and administrators, moreover, were demoral- 
ized by what they faced. 

Efforts made in 1975 to improve educational quality were 
unsuccessful. By 1980 it appeared doubtful that the politically ori- 
ented admission criteria had accomplished even the purpose of 
increasing enrollment of worker and peasant children. Successful 
candidates for university entrance were usually children of cadres 
and officials who used personal connections that allowed them to 
"enter through the back door." Students from officials' families 
would accept the requisite minimum two year work assignment 
in the countryside, often in a suburban location that allowed them 
to remain close to their families. Village cadres, anxious to please 
the parent-official, gladly recommended these youths for univer- 
sity placement after the labor requirement had been met. The child 
of an official family was then on his or her way to a university 
without having academic ability, a record of political activism, or 
a distinguished work record. 

After 1976 steps were taken to improve educational quality by 
establishing order and stability, and calling for an end to political 
contention on university campuses, and expanding university enroll- 
ments. This pressure to maintain quality and minimize expendi- 
tures led to efforts both to run existing institutions more efficiently 
and to develop other college and university programs. As a result, 
labor colleges for training agro-technicians and factory-run colleges 
for providing technical education for workers were established. In 
addition, eighty-eight institutions and key universities were provided 
with special funding, top students and faculty members, and other 
support, and they recruited the most academically qualified students 
without regard to family background or political activism. 



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China: A Country Study 



Modernization Goals in the 1980s 

The commitment to the Four Modernizations required great 
advances in science and technology. Under the modernization pro- 
gram, higher education was to be the cornerstone for training and 
research. Because modernization depended on a vastly increased 
and improved capability to train scientists and engineers for needed 
breakthroughs, the renewed concern for higher education and aca- 
demic quality — and the central role that the sciences were expected 
to play in the Four Modernizations — highlighted the need for scien- 
tific research and training. This concern can be traced to the criti- 
cal personnel shortages and qualitative deficiencies in the sciences 
resulting from the unproductive years of the Cultural Revolution, 
when higher education was shut down. In response to the need 
for scientific training, the Sixth Plenum of the Twelfth National 
Party Congress Central Committee, held in September 1986. 
adopted a resolution on the guiding principles for building a socialist 
society that strongly emphasized the importance of education and 
science. 

Reformers realized, however, that the higher education system 
was far from meeting modernization goals and that additional 
changes were needed. The Provisional Regulations Concerning the 
Management of Institutions of Higher Learning, promulgated by 
the State Council in 1986, initiated vast changes in administra- 
tion and adjusted educational opportunity, direction, and content. 
With the increased independence accorded under the education 
reform, universities and colleges were able to choose their own 
teaching plans and curricula; to accept projects from or cooperate 
with other socialist establishments for scientific research and tech- 
nical development in setting up 1 'combines' 1 involving teaching, 
scientific research, and production; to suggest appointments and 
removals of vice presidents and other staff members; to take charge 
of the distribution of capital construction investment and funds 
allocated by the state; and to be responsible for the development 
of international exchanges by using their own funds. 

The changes also allowed the universities to accept financial aid 
from work units and decide how this money was to be used without 
asking for more money from departments in charge of education. 
Further, higher education institutions and work units could sign 
contracts for the training of students. 

Higher education institutions also were assigned a greater role 
in running interregional and interdepartmental schools. Within their 
state-approved budgets, universities secured more freedom to 
allocate funds as they saw fit and to use income from tuition and 



168 




Students from Tongji University, Shanghai, work with construction 
models under direction of Western adviser. 

Courtesy Xinhua News Agency 

technical and advisory services for their own development, including 
collective welfare and bonuses. 

There also was a renewed interest in television, radio, and 
correspondence classes. Some of the courses, particularly in the 
college-run factories, were serious, full-time enterprises, with a two- 
to three-year curriculum. 

Entrance Examinations and Admission Criteria 

National examinations to select students for higher education (and 
positions of leadership) were an important part of China's culture, 
and, traditionally, entrance to a higher education institution was 
considered prestigious. Although the examination system for admis- 
sion to colleges and universities has undergone many changes since 
the Cultural Revolution, it remains the basis for recruiting academ- 
ically able students. When higher education institutions were 
reopened in the early 1970s, candidates for entrance examinations 
had to be senior-middle-school graduates or the equivalent, gener- 
ally below twenty-six years of age. Work experience requirements 
were eliminated, but workers and staff members needed permission 
from their enterprises to take the examinations. 

Each provincial-level unit was assigned a quota of students to 
be admitted to key universities, a second quota of students for 



169 



China: A Country Study 



regular universities within that administrative division, and a third 
quota of students from other provinces, autonomous regions, and 
special municipalities who would be admitted to institutions oper- 
ated at the provincial level. Provincial-level administrative units 
selected students with outstanding records to take the examinations. 
Additionally, preselection examinations were organized by the 
provinces, autonomous regions, and special municipalities for 
potential students (from three to five times the number of places 
allotted). These candidates were actively encouraged to take the 
examination to ensure that a sufficient number of good applicants 
would be available. Cadres with at least two years of work experi- 
ence were recruited for selected departments in a small number 
of universities on an experimental basis. Preferential admission 
treatment (in spite of lower test scores) was given to minority can- 
didates, students from disadvantaged areas, and those who agreed 
in advance to work in less developed regions after graduation. 

In December 1977, when uniform national examinations were 
reinstated, 5.7 million students took the examinations, although 
university placement was available for only the 278,000 applicants 
with the highest scores. In July 1984, about 1.6 million candidates 
(30,000 fewer than in 1983) took the entrance examinations for 
the 430,000 places in China's more than 900 colleges and univer- 
sities. Of the 1.6 million examinees, more than 1 million took the 
test for placement in science and engineering colleges; 415,000 for 
places in liberal arts colleges; 88,000 for placement in foreign lan- 
guage institutions; and 15,000 for placement in sports universities 
and schools. More than 100,000 of the candidates were from 
national minority groups. A year later, there were approximately 
1.8 million students taking the 3-day college entrance examina- 
tion to compete for 560,000 places. Liberal arts candidates were 
tested on politics, Chinese, mathematics, foreign languages, his- 
tory, and geography. Science and engineering candidates were 
tested on politics, Chinese, mathematics, chemistry, and biology. 
Entrance examinations also were given in 1985 for professional and 
technical schools, which sought to enroll 550,000 new students. 

Other innovations in enrollment practices included allowing col- 
leges and universities to admit students with good academic records 
but relatively low entrance-examination scores. Some colleges were 
allowed to try an experimental student recommendation system — 
fixed at 2 percent of the total enrollment for regular colleges and 
5 percent for teachers' colleges — instead of the traditional entrance 
examination. A minimum national examination score was estab- 
lished for admission to specific departments at specially designated 
colleges and universities, and the minimum score for admission 



170 



Education and Culture 



to other universities was set by provincial-level authorities. Key 
universities established separate classes for minorities. When several 
applicants attained the minimum test score, the school had the 
option of making a selection, a policy that gave university faculty 
and administrators a certain amount of discretion but still protected 
admission according to academic ability. 

In addition to the written examination, university applicants had 
to pass a physical examination and a political screening. Less than 
2 percent of the students who passed the written test were eliminated 
for reasons of poor health. The number disqualified for political rea- 
sons was unknown, but publicly the party maintained that the num- 
ber was very small and that it sought to ensure that only the most 
able students actually entered colleges and universities. 

By 1985 the number of institutions of higher learning had again 
increased — to slightly more than 1,000. The State Education Com- 
mission and the Ministry of Finance issued a joint declaration for 
nationwide unified enrollment of adult students — not the regular 
secondary-school graduates but the members of the work force who 
qualified for admission by taking a test. The State Education Com- 
mission established unified questions and time and evaluation 
criteria for the test and authorized provinces, autonomous regions, 
and special municipalities to administer the test, grade the papers 
in a unifoim manner, and determine the minimum points required 
for admission. The various schools were to enroll students accord- 
ing to the results. Adult students needed to have the educational 
equivalent of senior-middle-school graduates, and those applying 
for release or partial release from work to study were to be under 
forty years of age. Staff members and workers were to apply to 
study job-related subjects with review by and approval of their 
respective work units. If employers paid for the college courses, 
the workers had to take entrance examinations. In 1985 colleges 
enrolled 33,000 employees from various enterprises and compa- 
nies, approximately 6 percent of the total college enrollment. 

In 1985 state quotas for university places were set, allowing both 
for students sponsored by institutions and for those paying their 
own expenses. This policy was a change from the previous system 
in which all students were enrolled according to guidelines estab- 
lished in Beijing. All students except those at teachers' colleges, 
those who had financial difficulties, and those who were to work 
under adverse conditions after graduation had to pay for their own 
tuition, accommodations, and miscellaneous expenses. 

Changes in Enrollment and Assignment Policies 

The student enrollment and graduate assignment system also 



171 



China: A Country Study 



was changed to reflect more closely the personnel needs of modern- 
ization. By 1986 the state was responsible for drafting the enroll- 
ment plan, which took into account future personnel demands, the 
need to recruit students from outlying regions, and the needs of 
trades and professions with adverse working conditions. Moreover, 
a certain number of graduates to be trained for the People's Libera- 
tion Army were included in the state enrollment plan. In most cases, 
enrollment in higher education institutions at the employers' request 
was extended as a supplement to the state student enrollment plan. 
Employers were to pay a percentage of training fees, and students 
were to fulfill contractual obligations to the employers after gradua- 
tion. The small number of students who attended colleges and 
universities at their own expense could be enrolled in addition to 
those in the state plan. 

Accompanying the changes in enrollment practices were reforms, 
adopted in 1986, in the faculty appointment system, which ended 
the "iron rice bowl" (see Glossary) employment system and gave 
colleges and universities freedom to decide what departments, 
majors, and numbers of teachers they needed. Teachers in insti- 
tutions of higher learning were hired on a renewable contract basis, 
usually for two to four years at a time. The teaching positions avail- 
able were teaching assistant, lecturer, associate professor, and 
professor. The system was tested in eight major universities in Bei- 
jing and Shanghai before it was instituted nationwide at the end 
of 1985. University presidents headed groups in charge of 
appointing professors, lecturers, and teaching assistants according 
to their academic levels and teaching abilities, and a more rational 
wage system, geared to different job levels, was inaugurated. 
Universities and colleges with surplus professors and researchers 
were advised to grant them appropriate academic titles and encour- 
age them to work for their current pay in schools of higher learn- 
ing where they were needed. The new system was to be extended 
to schools of all kinds and other education departments within two 
years. 

Under the 1985 reforms, all graduates were assigned jobs by the 
state; a central government placement agency told the schools where 
to send graduates. By 1985 Qinghua University and a few other 
universities were experimenting with a system that allowed gradu- 
ates to accept job offers or to look for their own positions. For 
example, of 1,900 Qinghua University graduates in 1985, 1,200 
went on to graduate school, 48 looked for their own jobs, and the 
remainder were assigned jobs by the school after consultation with 
the students. The college students and postgraduates scheduled to 
graduate in 1986 were assigned primarily to work in forestry, 



172 



Education and Culture 



education, textiles, and the armaments industry. Graduates still 
were needed in civil engineering, computer science, finance, and 
English. 

Scholarship and Loan System 

In July 1986 the State Council announced that the stipend sys- 
tem for university and college students would be replaced with a 
new scholarship and loan system. The new system, to be tested 
in selected institutions during the 1986-87 academic year, was 
designed to help students who could not cover their own living 
expenses but who studied hard, obeyed state laws, and observed 
discipline codes. Students eligible for financial aid were to apply 
to the schools and the China Industrial and Commercial Bank for 
low-interest loans. Three categories of students eligible for aid were 
established: top students encouraged to attain all-around excellence; 
students specializing in education, agriculture, forestry, sports, and 
marine navigation; and students willing to work in poor, remote, 
and border regions or under harsh conditions, such as in mining 
and engineering. In addition, free tuition and board were to be 
offered at teachers' colleges, and the graduates were required to 
teach at least five years in primary and middle schools. After gradua- 
tion, a student's loans were to be paid off by his or her employer 
in a lump sum, and the money was to be repaid to the employer 
by the student through five years of payroll deductions. 

Study Abroad 

In addition to loans, another means of raising educational qual- 
ity, particularly in science, was to send students abroad to study. 
A large number of Chinese students studied in the Soviet Union 
before educational links and other cooperative programs with the 
Soviet Union were severed in the late 1950s. In the 1960s and 1970s, 
China continued to send a small number of students abroad, 
primarily to European universities. In October 1978 Chinese stu- 
dents began to arrive in the United States; their numbers acceler- 
ated after normalization of relations between the two countries in 
January 1979, a policy consistent with modernization needs. 
Although figures vary, more than 36,000 students, including 7,000 
self-supporting students (those who paid their own way, received 
scholarships from host institutions, or received help from relatives 
and "foreign friends"), studied in 14 countries between 1978 and 
1984. Of this total, 78 percent were technical personnel sent abroad 
for advanced study. As of mid- 1986 there were 15,000 Chinese 
scholars and graduates in American universities, compared with 
the total of 19,000 scholars sent between 1979 and 1983. 



173 



China: A Country Study 



Chinese students sent to the United States generally were not 
typical undergraduates or graduate students but were mid-career 
scientists, often thirty-five to forty-five years of age, seeking 
advanced training in their areas of specialization. Often they were 
individuals of exceptional ability who occupied responsible posi- 
tions in Chinese universities and research institutions. Fewer than 
15 percent of the earliest arrivals were degree candidates. Nearly 
all the visiting scholars were in scientific fields. 

Educational Investment 

Many of the problems that had hindered higher educational 
development in the past continued in 1987. Funding remained a 
major problem because science and technology study and research 
and study abroad were expensive. Because education was competing 
with other modernization programs, capital was critically short. 
Another concern was whether or not the Chinese economy was suffi- 
ciently advanced to make efficient use of the highly trained tech- 
nical personnel it planned to educate. For example, some observers 
believed that it would be more realistic to train a literate work force 
of low-level technicians instead of research scientists. Moreover, 
it was feared that using an examination to recruit the most able 
students might advance people who were merely good at taking 
examinations. Educational reforms also made some people uncom- 
fortable by criticizing the traditional practice of rote memoriza- 
tion and promoting innovative teaching and study methods. 

The prestige associated with higher education caused a demand 
for it. But many qualified youths were unable to attend colleges 
and universities because China could not finance enough univer- 
sity places for them. To help meet the demand and to educate a 
highly trained, specialized work force, China established alternate 
forms of higher education — such as spare-time, part-time, and radio 
and television universities. 

China cannot afford a heavy investment, either ideologically or 
financially, in the education of a few students. Since 1978 China's 
leaders have modified the policy of concentrating education resources 
at the university level, which, although designed to facilitate modern- 
ization, conflicted directly with the party's principles. The policies 
that produced an educated elite also siphoned off resources that might 
have been used to accomplish the compulsory nine year education 
more speedily and to equalize educational opportunities in the city 
and the countryside. The policy of key schools has been modified 
over the years. Nevertheless, China's leaders believe an educated 
elite is necessary to reach modernization goals. 



174 




175 



China: A Country Study 



Teachers 

Among the most pressing problems facing education reformers 
was the scarcity of qualified teachers, which has led to a serious 
stunting of educational development. In 1986 there were about 
8 million primary- and middle-school teachers in China, but many 
lacked professional training. Estimates indicated that in order to 
meet the goals of the Seventh Five- Year Plan and realize compul- 
sory 9-year education, the system needed 1 million new teachers 
for primary schools, 750,000 new teachers for junior middle schools, 
and 300,000 new teachers for senior middle schools. Estimates 
predict, however, that the demand for teachers will drop in the 
late 1990s because of an anticipated decrease in primary-school 
enrollments. 

To cope with the shortage of qualified teachers, the State Edu- 
cation Commission decreed in 1985 that senior-middle-school 
teachers should be graduates with two years' training in profes- 
sional institutes and that primary-school teachers should be 
graduates of secondary schools. To improve teacher quality, the 
commission established full-time and part-time (the latter preferred 
because it was less costly) in-service training programs. Primary- 
school and preschool in-service teacher training programs devoted 
84 percent of the time to subject teaching, 6 percent to pedagogy 
and psychology, and 10 percent to teaching methods. In-service 
training for primary-school teachers was designed to raise them 
to a level of approximately two years' postsecondary study, with 
the goal of qualifying most primary-school teachers by 1990. 
Secondary-school in-service teacher training was based on a unified 
model, tailored to meet local conditions, and offered on a spare- 
time basis. Ninety-five percent of its curricula was devoted to sub- 
ject teaching, 2 to 3 percent to pedagogy and psychology, and 2 to 
3 percent to teaching methods. There was no similar large-scale 
in-service effort for technical and vocational teachers, most of whom 
worked for enterprises and local authorities. 

By 1985 there were more than 1,000 teacher training schools — an 
indispensable tool in the effort to solve the acute shortage of quali- 
fied teachers. These schools, however, were unable to supply the 
number of teachers needed to attain modernization goals through 
1990. Although a considerable number of students graduated as 
qualified teachers from institutions of higher learning, the relatively 
low social status and salary levels of teachers hampered recruit- 
ment, and not all of the graduates of teachers' colleges became 
teachers. To attract more teachers, China tried to make teaching 
a more desirable and respected profession. To this end, the 



176 



Education and Culture 



government designated September 10 as Teachers' Day, granted 
teachers pay raises, and made teachers' colleges tuition free. To 
further arrest the teacher shortage, in 1986 the central government 
sent teachers to underdeveloped regions to train local schoolteachers. 

Because urban teachers continued to earn more than their rural 
counterparts and because academic standards in the countryside 
had dropped, it remained difficult to recruit teachers for rural areas. 
Teachers in rural areas also had production responsibilities for their 
plots of land, which took time from their teaching. Rural primary 
teachers needed to supplement their pay by farming because most 
were paid by the relatively poor local communities rather than by 
the state. 

Adult Education 

Role in Modernization 

Because only 4 percent of the nation's middle-school graduates 
are admitted to universities, China has found it necessary to develop 
other ways of meeting the demand for education. Adult education 
has become increasingly important in helping China meet its 
modernization goals. Adult, or "nonformal," education is an 
alternative form of higher education that encompasses radio, tele- 
vision, and correspondence universities, spare-time and part-time 
universities, factory-run universities for staff and workers, and 
county-run universities for peasants, many operating primarily dur- 
ing students' off-work hours. These alternative forms of education 
are economical. They seek to educate both the "delayed genera- 
tion" — those who lost educational opportunities during the Cul- 
tural Revolution — and to raise the cultural, scientific, and general 
education levels of workers on the job. 

Alternative Forms 

Schools have been established by government departments, busi- 
nesses, trade unions, academic societies, democratic parties (see 
Glossary), and other organizations. In 1984 about 70 percent of 
China's factories and enterprises supported their own part-time 
classes, which often were referred to as workers' colleges. In Bei- 
jing alone, more than ninety adult-education schools with night 
schools enrolled tens of thousands of students. More than 20,000 
of these students graduated annually from evening universities, 
workers' colleges, television universities, and correspondence 
schools — more than twice the number graduating from regular col- 
leges and universities. The government spent ¥200 (for value of 
the yuan — see Glossary) to ¥500 per adult education student and 



177 



China: A Country Study 



at least ¥1,000 per regular university student. In 1984 approxi- 
mately 1.3 million students enrolled in television, correspondence, 
and evening universities, about a 30-percent increase over 1983. 

Spare-time education for workers and peasants and literacy classes 
for the entire adult population were other components of basic edu- 
cation. Spare-time education included a very broad range of educa- 
tional activities at all levels. Most spare-time schools were sponsored 
by factories and run for their own workers; they provided fairly 
elementary education, as well as courses to upgrade technical skills. 
Most were on-the-job training and retraining courses, a normal 
part of any industrial system. These schools continually received 
publicity in the domestic media as a symbol of social justice, but 
it was unclear whether they received adequate resources to achieve 
this end. 

China's educational television system began in 1960 but was sus- 
pended during the Cultural Revolution in 1966. In 1979 the Cen- 
tral Radio and Television University was established in Beijing with 
branches in twenty-eight provincial-level universities. Many Central 
Radio and Television University students are recent senior-middle- 
school graduates who scored just below the cut-off point for 
admission to conventional colleges and universities. Full-time (who 
take four courses) and part-time students (two courses) have at least 
two years' work experience, and they return to their jobs after 
graduation. Spare-time students (one course) study after work. Stu- 
dents whose work units grant them permission to study in a televi- 
sion university are paid their normal wages; expenses for most of 
their books and other educational materials are paid for by the state. 
A typical Central Radio and Television University student spends 
up to six hours a day over a three-year period watching lectures 
on videotapes produced by some of the best teachers in China. 
These lectures are augmented by face-to-face tutoring by local 
instructors and approximately four hours of homework each even- 
ing. The major problem with the system is that there are too few 
television sets. 

In 1987 the Central Television and Radio University had its pro- 
grams produced, transmitted, and financed by the Ministry of 
Radio, Cinema, and Television (see Telecommunications Services, 
ch. 8). The State Education Commission developed its curriculum 
and distributed its printed support materials. Curriculum included 
both basic, general-purpose courses in science and technology and 
more specialized courses. Programs in English-language instruc- 
tion were particularly popular. The Central Television and Radio 
University offered more than 1 ,000 classes in Beijing and its suburbs 
and 14 majors in 2- to 3-year courses through 56 working centers. 



178 



Education and Culture 



Students who passed final examinations were given certificates 
entitling them to the same level of remuneration as graduates of 
regular, full-time colleges and universities. The state gave certain 
allowances to students awaiting jobs during their training period. 

Literacy and Language Reform 

The continuing campaigns to eradicate illiteracy also were a part 
of basic education. Chinese government statistics indicated that 
of a total population of nearly 1.1 billion in 1985, about 230 mil- 
lion people were illiterate or semiliterate. The dif ficulty of master- 
ing written Chinese makes raising the literacy rate particularly 
difficult. In general, language reform was intended to make writ- 
ten and spoken Chinese easier to learn, which in turn would foster 
both literacy and linguistic unity and serve as a foundation for a 
simpler written language. In 1951 the party issued a directive that 
inaugurated a three-part plan for language reform. The plan sought 
to establish universal comprehension of a standardized common 
language, simplify written characters, and introduce, where pos- 
sible, romanized forms based on the Latin alphabet. In 1956 putong- 
hua was introduced as the language of instruction in schools and 
in the national broadcast media, and by 1977 it was in use through- 
out China, particularly in the government and party, and in edu- 
cation. Although in 1987 the government continued to endorse the 
goal of universalizing putonghua, hundreds of regional and local 
dialects continued to be spoken, complicating interregional com- 
munication. 

A second language reform required the simplification of ideo- 
graphs because ideographs with fewer strokes are easier to learn. 
In 1964 the Committee for Reforming the Chinese Written Lan- 
guage released an official list of 2,238 simplified characters most 
basic to the language. Simplification made literacy easier, although 
people taught only in simplified characters were cut off from the 
wealth of Chinese literature written in traditional characters. Any 
idea of replacing ideographic script with romanized script was soon 
abandoned, however, by government and education leaders. 

A third area of change involved the proposal to use the pinyin 
romanization system more widely. Pinyin (first approved by the 
National People's Congress in 1958) was encouraged primarily to 
facilitate the spread of putonghua in regions where other dialects and 
languages are spoken. By the mid-1980s, however, the use of pinyin 
was not as widespread as the use of putonghua. 

Retaining literacy was as much a problem as acquiring it, par- 
ticularly among the rural population. Literacy rates declined 
between 1966 and 1976. Political disorder may have contributed 



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China: A Country Study 



to the decline, but the basic problem was that the many Chinese 
ideographs can be mastered only through rote learning and are often 
forgotten because of disuse. 

Policy Toward Intellectuals 
Background 

The current status of Chinese intellectuals reflects traditions 
established in the imperial period. For most of this period, govern- 
ment officials were selected from among the literati on the basis 
of the Confucian civil service examination system (see Restoration 
of Empire, ch. 1; Traditional Society and Culture, ch. 3). Intellec- 
tuals were both participants in and critics of the government. As 
Confucian scholars, they were torn between their loyalty to the 
emperor and their obligation to ik correct wrong thinking" when 
they perceived it. Then, as now, most intellectual and government 
leaders subscribed to the premise that ideological change was a 
prerequisite for political change. Historically. Chinese intellectuals 
rarely formed groups to oppose the established government. Rather, 
individual intellectuals or groups of intellectuals allied themselves 
with cliques within the government to lend support to the policies 
of that clique. 

With the abolition of the civil service examination system in 1905 
and the end of the last imperial dynasty in 1911. intellectuals no 
longer had a vehicle for direct participation in the government. 
Although the absence of a strong national government would have 
been expected to provide a favorable situation for maximum 
intellectual independence, other inhibiting factors — such as the con- 
centration of intellectuals in foreign-controlled treaty ports, isolated 
from the mainstream of Chinese society, or in universities depen- 
dent on government or missionary financing — remained. Proba- 
bly the greatest obstacle to the development of an intellectual 
community free of outside control was the rising tide of national- 
ism coupled with the fear of being accused of selling out to foreign 
interests. In 1927 the newly established Guomindang government 
in Nanjing attempted to establish an intellectual orthodoxy based 
on the ideas of Sun Yat-sen, but intellectuals continued to operate 
with a certain degree of freedom in universities and treaty ports 
(see Nationalism and Communism, ch. 1). Following the Japanese 
invasion and occupation of large parts of China in the 1930s, the 
Guomindang government tightened control over every aspect of 
life, causing a large number of dissident intellectuals to seek refuge 
in Communist-administered areas or in Hong Kong. 

When the People's Republic of China w r as established in 1949. 



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Education and Culture 



intellectuals came under strict government control. Educated over- 
seas Chinese (see Glossary) were invited to return home, and those 
intellectuals who remained in China were urged to contribute their 
technical expertise to rebuilding the country. Intellectuals were 
expected to serve the party and the state. Independent thinking 
was stifled, and political dissent was not tolerated. 

In mid- 1956 the Chinese Communist Party felt secure enough 
to launch the Hundred Flowers Campaign (see Glossary), solicit- 
ing criticism under the classical "double hundred" slogan "Let 
a hundred flowers bloom, let the hundred schools of thought con- 
tend." "Let a hundred flowers bloom" applied to the development 
of the arts, and "let the hundred schools of thought contend" 
encouraged the development of science. The initiation of this cam- 
paign was followed by the publication in early 1957 of Mao 
Zedong's essay "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among 
the People," in which he drew a distinction between "construc- 
tive criticisms among the people" and "hateful and destructive criti- 
cism between the enemy and ourselves." In August 1957, when 
it was clear to the leadership that widespread criticism of the party 
and party cadres had gotten out of hand, the Anti-Rightist Cam- 
paign was launched to suppress all divergent thought and firmly 
reestablish orthodox ideology. Writers who had answered the party's 
invitation to offer criticisms and alternative solutions to China's 
problems were abruptly silenced, and many were sent to reform 
camps or internal exile. By the early 1960s, however, a few intellec- 
tuals within the party were bold enough to again propose policy 
alternatives, within stringent limits. 

When the Cultural Revolution began, in 1966, party function- 
aries assumed positions of leadership at most research institutes 
and universities, and many schools were closed or converted to 
"soldiers', workers', and peasants' universities." Intellectuals, 
denounced as the "stinking ninth category," either were purged 
or had their work heavily edited for political "purity," which 
severely hampered most serious research and scholarship. 

Following the fall of Lin Biao, minister of national defense and 
Mao's heir apparent, in 1971, the atmosphere for intellectuals began 
to improve. Under the aegis of Zhou Enlai and later Deng Xiao- 
ping, many intellectuals were restored to their former positions and 
warily resumed their pre-Cultural Revolution duties. In January 
1975 Zhou Enlai set out his ambitious Four Modernizations (see 
Glossary) program and solicited the support of China's intellec- 
tuals in turning China into a modern industrialized nation by the 
end of the century (see The Cultural Revolution Decade, 1966-76; 
The Post-Mao Period, 1976-78, ch. 1). 



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China: A Country Study 



Post-Mao Development 

The Third Plenum of the Eleventh National Party Congress Cen- 
tral Committee in December 1978 officially made the Four Modern- 
izations basic national policy and reemphasized the importance of 
intellectuals in achieving them. The policy of "seeking truth from 
facts" was stressed, and scholars and researchers were given freer 
rein to pursue scientific research. Most mainstream intellectuals 
were content to avoid political involvement and to take on the role 
of scholar-specialists within their spheres of competence, with the 
understanding that as long as they observed the four cardinal 
principles — upholding socialism, the dictatorship of the proletariat, 
the leadership of the party, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong 
Thought — they would be permitted to conduct their research with 
minimal bureaucratic interference. This was accomplished more 
easily in the natural sciences, which are generally recognized as 
apolitical, than in the social sciences, humanities, and the arts. 

The first serious challenge to the more tolerant policy toward 
intellectuals came in 1980, as conservative ideologues in the mili- 
tary and the party stepped up their calls to combat "bourgeois liber- 
alization," a loosely defined appellation for any writing or activity 
believed to stretch the limits of the four cardinal principles. By early 
1981 opposition to "bourgeois liberalization" was focused on Bai 
Hua, a writer with the Political Department of what was then the 
Wuhan Military Region. Bai had long been a strong advocate for 
relaxation of cultural and social policy, but what especially alarmed 
the guardians of cultural orthodoxy was his screenplay "Bitter 
Love," which depicted the frustrated patriotism of an old painter 
who faces misunderstanding and ill-treatment when he returns to 
China from the United States. When the screenplay first appeared 
in a nationally circulated literary magazine in the fall of 1979, it 
caused little stir. The motion picture version, however, which was 
shown to selected officials, drew strong censure. A commentary 
in the April 18, 1981, issue of Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily) 
accused Bai Hua of violating the four cardinal principles and 
described the screenplay as an example of "bourgeois liberaliza- 
tion." The commentary was reprinted in the next month's issue 
oi Jiefangjun Wenyi (Liberation Army Literature and Art), along 
with other articles critical of "Bitter Love." Over the next few 
months the criticism was taken up by most civilian newspapers, 
and the acting minister of culture, Zhou Weizhi, singled out "Bit- 
ter Love" for attack in a speech delivered to the Twentieth Ses- 
sion of the Fifth National People's Congress Standing Committee 
in September. Finally, Bai Hua yielded to the ostracism and wrote 



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Education and Culture 



a letter of self-criticism addressed to Jiefangjun Bao and Wenyibao 
(Literary Gazette), in which he apologized for a "lack of balance" 
in "Bitter Love" and for failing to recognize the power of the party 
and the people to overcome obstacles in Chinese society. Bai Hua 
was out of public view for the next year but remained active, writ- 
ing four short stories in the period. In January 1983 he was invited 
by the Ministry of Culture to participate in a Shanghai conference 
on film scripts, and in May of that year the Beijing People's Art 
Theater presented his new historical play, "The King of Wu's 
Golden Spear and the King of Yue's Sword," thought by many 
to be a veiled criticism of Mao Zedong and perhaps even of Deng 
Xiaoping. Although the "Bitter Love" controversy caused con- 
siderable anxiety in the intellectual community, it is as noteworthy 
for what it did not do as for what it did do. Unlike previous cam- 
paigns in which writers and all of their works were condemned, 
criticism in this case focused on one work, "Bitter Love." Neither 
Bai Hua's other works nor his political difficulties in the 1950s and 
1960s were part of the discussion. In fact, as if to emphasize the 
limited nature of the campaign, at its height in May 1981 Bai was 
given a national prize for poetry by the Chinese Writers' 
Association. 

After a mild respite in 1982 and most of 1983, "antibourgeois 
liberalization" returned in full force in the short-lived campaign 
against "spiritual pollution" launched by a speech given by Deng 
Xiaoping at the Second Plenum of the Twelfth Central Commit- 
tee in October 1983. In the speech, Deng inveighed against advo- 
cates of abstract theories of human nature, "bourgeois 
humanitarianism," "bourgeois liberalization," and socialist alien- 
ation, as well as the growing fascination in China with "decadent 
elements" from Western culture. Conservatives, led by Political 
Bureau member Hu Qiaomu and party Propaganda Department 
head Deng Liqun, used the campaign in an effort to oppose those 
aspects of society that they disliked. The campaign soon was out 
of control and extended to areas beyond the scope that Deng Xiao- 
ping had intended, raising fears at home and abroad of another 
Cultural Revolution. 

Because of the campaign against spiritual pollution, intellectuals 
(including scientists and managerial and technical personnel) and 
party and government cadres were hesitant to take any action that 
could expose them to criticism. Peasants, whose production had 
greatly increased under the responsibility system adopted in 1981, 
felt uncertain about the future course of central policy (see Post- 
Mao Policies, ch. 6). Because of this, many of them returned their 
specialized certificates and contracts to local authorities, sold their 



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China: A Country Study 



equipment, and lowered production targets. Many ordinary 
citizens, especially the young, resented the sudden interference in 
their private lives. Foreign businessmen and government leaders 
expressed serious reservations about the investment climate and 
China's policy of opening to the world. 

Because of these adverse results, the central leadership reevalu- 
ated the campaign and limited it to theoretical, literary, and artis- 
tic circles and did not permit it to extend to science and technology, 
the economy, or rural areas. All ideological, theoretical, literary, 
and artistic issues were to be settled through discussion, criticism, 
and self-criticism, without resorting to labeling or attacks. By Janu- 
ary 1984 the campaign against spiritual pollution had died out. 
and attention was once more turned to reducing leftist influence 
in government and society. 

Following the campaign's failure, and perhaps because of it, the 
position and security of intellectuals improved significantly. In 1984 
the party and government turned their attention to promoting urban 
economic reforms. A more positive approach to academic and cul- 
tural pursuits was reflected in periodic exhortations in the official 
press calling on the people to support and encourage the building 
of "socialist spiritual civilization," a term used to denote general 
intellectual activity, including ethics and morality, science, and 
culture. 

Writers and other intellectuals were heartened by a speech deliv- 
ered by Hu Qili, secretary of the party Secretariat, to the Fourth 
National Writers' Congress (December 29. 1984. to January 5. 
1985). In the speech, Hu decried the political excesses that produced 
derogatory labels and decrees about what writers should and should 
not write and called literary freedom "a vital part of socialist litera- 
ture." But as writers began to test the limits of the free expression 
called for by Hu Qili, they were reminded of their "social respon- 
sibilities," a thinly veiled warning for them to use self-censorship 
and to remain within the limits of free expression. 

These limits, still poorly defined, were tested once again when 
Song Longxian, a young researcher at Nanjing University, using 
the pseudonym Ma Ding, published an article entitled "Ten 
Changes in Contemporary Chinese Economic Research" in the 
November 2, 1985, issue of the trade union paper Gongren Ribao 
(Workers' Daily). The article urged a pragmatic approach to eco- 
nomic theory and sharply attacked much previous economic 
research. A somewhat toned-downed version was republished in 
a subsequent issue of Beijing Review, a weekly magazine for for- 
eign readers, and immediately became the center of a controversy 
continuing well into 1986. Ma Ding's supporters, however, far 



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Education and Culture 



outnumbered his critics and included some important government 
officials. In May 1986 the editor otGongren Ribao, writing in another 
economic journal, summed up the controversy. He termed the criti- 
cism of the article of far greater significance than the article itself 
and commended the "related departments" for handling the "Ma 
Ding incident very prudently" and "relatively satisfactorily," and 
he expressed the hope that "more people in our country, particu- 
larly leaders," would join in '"providing powerful protection to the 
theoretical workers who are brave enough to explore." 

In 1986 there were numerous calls for a new Hundred Flowers 
Campaign, and there were indications that these calls were being 
orchestrated from the top. At a May 1986 conference to com- 
memorate the thirtieth anniversary of the original Hundred Flow- 
ers Campaign. Zhu Houze, new head of the party's Propaganda 
Department, sounded the keynote when he said, "Only through 
the comparison and contention of different viewpoints and ideas 
can people gradually arrive at a truthful understanding. ..." Qin 
Jianxian, editor of Shijie Jingji Daobao (World Economic Journal), 
carried this theme further when he called for "unprecedented shocks 
to political, economic, and social life as well as to people's ideas, 
spiritual state, lifestyle, and thinking methods." In a July 1986 
interview with Beijing Review, Wang Meng, the newly appointed 
minister of culture, held out great expectations for a new Hundred 
Flowers Campaign that he said "could arouse the enthusiasm of 
writers and artists and give them the leeway to display their 
individual artistic character." During the summer of 1986, expec- 
tations were raised for a resolution to come out of the Sixth Plenum 
of the Twelfth Central Committee in September, a resolution that 
General Secretary Hu Yaobang promised would have a "profound 
influence on the development of spiritual civilization." The actual 
document, however, was a watered-down compromise that fell far 
short of expectations. It became clear that intellectual policy is not 
a matter to be easily resolved in the short-term but requires lengthy 
debate. 

Culture and the Arts 
Traditional Literature 

Classics 

China has a wealth of classical literature, both poetry and prose, 
dating from the Eastern Zhou dynasty (770-221 B.C.) and including 
the Classics attributed to Confucius (see The Zhou Period, ch. 1; 
Traditional Society and Culture, ch. 3). Among the most impor- 
tant classics in Chinese literature is the Yijing (Book of Changes), 



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China: A Country Study 



a manual of divination based on eight trigrams attributed to the 
mythical emperor Fu Xi. (By Confucius' time these eight trigrams 
had been multiplied to sixty-four hexagrams.) The Yijing is still 
used by adherents of folk religion. The Shijing (Classic of Poetry) 
is made up of 305 poems divided into 160 folk songs; 74 minor 
festal songs, traditionally sung at court festivities; 31 major festal 
songs, sung at more solemn court ceremonies; and 40 hymns and 
eulogies, sung at sacrifices to gods and ancestral spirits of the royal 
house. The Shujing (Classic of Documents) is a collection of docu- 
ments and speeches alleged to have been written by rulers and offi- 
cials of the early Zhou period and before. It contains the best 
examples of early Chinese prose. The Liji (Record of Rites), a resto- 
ration of the original Lijing (Classic of Rites), lost in the third cen- 
tury B.C., describes ancient rites and court ceremonies. The Chun 
Qiu (Spring and Autumn) is a historical record of the principality 
of Lu, Confucius' native state, from 722 to 479 B.C. It is a log 
of concise entries probably compiled by Confucius himself. The 
Lunyu (Analects) is a book of pithy sayings attributed to Confucius 
and recorded by his disciples. 

Early Prose 

The proponents of the Hundred Schools of Thought in the War- 
ring States period made important contributions to Chinese prose 
style (see The Hundred Schools of Thought, ch. 1). The writings 
of Mo Zi (Mo Di; 470-391 B.C.?), Mencius (Meng Zi; 372-289 
B.C.), and Zhuang Zi (369-286 B.C.) contain well-reasoned, care- 
fully developed discourses and show a marked improvement in 
organization and style over what went before. Mo Zi is known for 
extensively and effectively using methodological reasoning in his 
polemic prose. Mencius contributed elegant diction and, along with 
Zhuang Zi, is known for his extensive use of comparisons, anec- 
dotes, and allegories. By the third century B.C., these writers had 
developed a simple, concise prose noted for its economy of words, 
which served as a model of literary form for over 2,000 years. 

Early Poetry 

Among the earliest and most influential poetic anthologies was 
the Chuci (Songs of Chu), made up primarily of poems ascribed 
to the semilegendary Qu Yuan (ca. 340-278 B.C.) and his follower 
Song Yu (fourth century B.C.). The songs in this collection are 
more lyrical and romantic and represent a different tradition from 
the earlier Shijing. During the Han dynasty (206 B.C.-A.D. 220), 
this form evolved into the fu, a poem usually in rhymed verse except 
for introductory and concluding passages that are in prose, often 



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Education and Culture 



in the form of questions and answers. The era of disunity that fol- 
lowed the Han period saw the rise of romantic nature poetry heavily 
influenced by Taoism. 

Classical poetry reached its zenith during the Tang dynasty 
(A.D. 618-907). The early Tang period was best known for its lilshi 
(regulated verse), an eight-line poem with five or seven words in 
each line; zi (verse following strict rules of prosody); and jueju (trun- 
cated verse), a four-line poem with five or seven words in each line. 
The two best-known poets of the period were Li Bai (701-762) and 
Du Fu (712-770). Li Bai was known for the romanticism of his 
poetry; Du Fu was seen as a Confucian moralist with a strict sense 
of duty toward society. 

Later Tang poets developed greater realism and social criticism 
and refined the art of narration. One of the best known of the later 
Tang poets was Bai Juyi (772-846), whose poems were an inspired 
and critical comment on the society of his time. 

Subsequent writers of classical poetry lived under the shadow 
of their great Tang predecessors, and although there were many 
fine poets in subsequent dynasties, none reached the level of this 
period. As the classical style of poetry became more stultified, a 
more flexible poetic medium, the ci, arrived on the scene. The ci, 
a poetic form based on the tunes of popular songs, some of Cen- 
tral Asian origin, was developed to its fullest by the poets of the 
Song dynasty (960-1279). 

As the ci gradually became more literary and artificial after Song 
times, the san qu, a freer form, based on new popular songs, devel- 
oped. The use of san qu songs in drama marked an important step 
in the development of vernacular literature. 

Later Prose 

The Tang period also saw a rejection of the ornate, artificial style 
of prose developed in the previous period and the emergence of 
a simple, direct, and forceful prose based on Han and pre-Han 
writing. The primary proponent of this neoclassical style of prose, 
which heavily influenced prose writing for the next 800 years, was 
Han Yu (768-824), a master essayist and strong advocate of a return 
to Confucian orthodoxy. 

Vernacular fiction became popular after the fourteenth century, 
although it was never esteemed in court circles. Covering a broader 
range of subject matter and longer and less highly structured than 
literary fiction, vernacular fiction includes a number of master- 
pieces. The greatest is the eighteenth-century domestic novel Hong 
Lou Meng (Dream of the Red Chamber). A semiautobiographical 
work by a scion of a declining gentry family, Hong Lou Meng has 



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China: A Country Study 

been acknowledged by students of Chinese fiction to be the master- 
work of its type. 

Modern Prose 

In the New Culture Movement (1917-23; see Glossary), liter- 
ary writing style was largely replaced by the vernacular in all areas 
of literature (see Nationalism and Communism, ch. 1). This was 
brought about mainly by Lu Xun (1881-1936), China's first major 
stylist in vernacular prose (other than the novel), and the literary 
reformers Hu Shi (1891-1962) and Chen Duxiu (1880-1942). 

The late 1920s and 1930s were years of creativity in Chinese 
fiction, and literary journals and societies espousing various artis- 
tic theories proliferated. Among the major writers of the period 
were Guo Moruo (1892-1978), a poet, historian, essayist, and critic; 
Mao Dun (1896-1981), the first of the novelists to emerge from 
the League of Left-Wing Writers and one whose work reflected 
the revolutionary struggle and disillusionment of the late 1920s; 
and Ba Jin (b. 1904), a novelist whose work was influenced by Ivan 
Turgenev and other Russian writers. In the 1930s Ba Jin produced 
a trilogy that depicted the struggle of modern youth against the 
age-old dominance of the Confucian family system. Comparison 
often is made between Jia (Family), one of the novels in the trilogy, 
and Hong Lou Meng. Another writer of the period was the gifted 
satirist and novelist Lao She (1899-1966). Many of these writers 
became important as administrators of artistic and literary policy 
after 1949. Most of those still alive during the Cultural Revolu- 
tion were either purged or forced to submit to public humiliation 
(see The Cultural Revolution Decade, 1966-76, ch. 1). 

The League of Left-Wing Writers was founded in 1930 and 
included Lu Xun in its leadership. By 1932 it had adopted the Soviet 
doctrine of socialist realism, that is, the insistence that art must 
concentrate on contemporary events in a realistic way, exposing 
the ills of nonsocialist society and promoting the glorious future 
under communism. After 1949 socialist realism, based on Mao's 
famous 1942 "Yan'an Talks on Literature and Art," became the 
uniform style of Chinese authors whose works were published. Con- 
flict, however, soon developed between the government and the 
writers. The ability to satirize and expose the evils in contemporary 
society that had made writers useful to the Chinese Communist 
Party before its accession to power was no longer welcomed. Even 
more unwelcome to the party was the persistence among writers 
of what was deplored as "petty bourgeois idealism," "humanitari- 
anism," and an insistence on freedom to choose subject matter. 

At the time of the Great Leap Forward, the government increased 



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Education and Culture 



its insistence on the use of socialist realism and combined with it 
so-called revolutionary realism and revolutionary romanticism (see 
The Great Leap Forward, 1958-60, ch. 1). Authors were permit- 
ted to write about contemporary China, as well as other times dur- 
ing China's modern period — as long as it was accomplished with 
the desired socialist revolutionary realism. Nonetheless, the politi- 
cal restrictions discouraged many writers. Although authors were 
encouraged to write, production of literature fell off to the point 
that in 1962 only forty-two novels were published. 

During the Cultural Revolution, the repression and intimida- 
tion led by Mao's fourth wife, Jiang Qing, succeeded in drying 
up all cultural activity except a few "model" operas and heroic 
stories. Although it has since been learned that some writers con- 
tinued to produce in secret, during that period no significant liter- 
ary work was published. 

Literature in the Post-Mao Period 

The arrest of Jiang Qing and the other members of the Gang 
of Four (see Glossary) in 1976, and especially the reforms initiated 
at the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in Decem- 
ber 1978, led more and more older writers and some younger writers 
to take up their pens again. Much of the literature discussed the 
serious abuses of power that had taken place at both the national 
and the local levels during the Cultural Revolution. The writers 
decried the waste of time and talent during that decade and 
bemoaned abuses that had held China back. At the same time, the 
writers expressed eagerness to make a contribution to building 
Chinese society. 

This literature, often called "the literature of the wounded," 
contained some disquieting views of the party and the political sys- 
tem. Intensely patriotic, these authors wrote cynically of the politi- 
cal leadership that gave rise to the extreme chaos and disorder of 
the Cultural Revolution. Some of them extended the blame to the 
entire generation of leaders and to the political system itself. The 
political authorities were faced with a serious problem: how could 
they encourage writers to criticize and discredit the abuses of the 
Cultural Revolution without allowing that criticism to go beyond 
what they considered tolerable limits? 

During this period, a large number of novels and short stories 
were published; literary magazines from before the Cultural Revo- 
lution were revived, and new ones were added to satisfy the seem- 
ingly insatiable appetite of the reading public. There was a special 
interest in foreign works. Linguists were commissioned to trans- 
late recently published foreign literature, often without carefully 



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China: A Country Study 



considering its interest for the Chinese reader. Literary magazines 
specializing in translations of foreign short stories became very 
popular, especially among the young. 

It is not surprising that such dramatic change brought objec- 
tions from some leaders in government and literary and art cir- 
cles, who feared it was happening too fast. The first reaction came 
in 1980 with calls to combat "bourgeois liberalization," a cam- 
paign that was repeated in 1981. These two difficult periods were 
followed by the campaign against spiritual pollution in late 1983, 
but by 1986 writers were again enjoying greater creative freedom 
(see Policy Toward Intellectuals, this ch.). 

Traditional Arts 

Drama 

Traditional drama, often called "Chinese opera," grew out of 
the zaju (variety plays) of the Yuan dynasty (1279-1368) and con- 
tinues to exist in 368 different forms, the best known of which is 
Beijing Opera, which assumed its present form in the mid- 
nineteenth century and was extremely popular in the Qing dynasty 
(1644-1911) court. In Beijing Opera, traditional Chinese string 
and percussion instruments provide a strong rhythmic accompani- 
ment to the acting. The acting is based on allusion: gestures, foot- 
work, and other body movements express such actions as riding 
a horse, rowing a boat, or opening a door. Spoken dialogue is 
divided into recitative and Beijing colloquial speech, the former 
employed by serious characters and the latter by young females 
and clowns. Character roles are strictly defined. The traditional 
repertoire of Beijing Opera includes more than 1,000 works, mostly 
taken from historical novels about political and military struggles. 

In the early years of the People's Republic, the development of 
Beijing Opera was encouraged; many new operas on historical and 
modern themes were written, and earlier operas continued to be 
performed. As a popular art form, opera has usually been the first 
of the arts to reflect changes in Chinese policy. In the mid-1950s, 
for example, it was the first to benefit under the Hundred Flowers 
Campaign. Similarly, the attack in November 1965 on Beijing 
Deputy Mayor Wu Han and his historical play, "Hai Rui's Dis- 
missal from Office," signaled the beginning of the Cultural Revo- 
lution. During the Cultural Revolution, most opera troupes were 
disbanded, performers and scriptwriters were persecuted, and all 
operas except the eight "model operas" approved by Jiang Qing 
and her associates were banned. After the fall of the Gang of Four 
in 1976, Beijing Opera enjoyed a revival and continued to be a 



190 



Beijing Opera characters. The figure at right is Baogong, a high 
official known for his upright and unbending character. 

Courtesy Xinhua News Agency 



191 



China: A Country Study 



very popular form of entertainment both in theaters and on tele- 
vision. 

In traditional Chinese theater, no plays were performed in the 
vernacular or without singing. But at the turn of the twentieth cen- 
tury, Chinese students returning from abroad began to experiment 
with Western plays. Following the May Fourth Movement of 1919, 
a number of Western plays were staged in China, and Chinese 
playwrights began to imitate this form. The most notable of the 
new-style playwrights was Cao Yu (b. 1910). His major works — 
"Thunderstorm," "Sunrise," "Wilderness," and "Peking 
Man" — written between 1934 and 1940, have been widely read 
and performed in China. 

In the 1930s, theatrical productions performed by traveling Red 
Army cultural troupes in Communist-controlled areas were con- 
sciously used to promote party goals and political philosophy. By 
the 1940s theater was well-established in the Communist-controlled 
areas. 

In the early years of the People's Republic, Western-style theater 
was presented mainly in the form of "socialist realism." During 
the Cultural Revolution, however, Western-style plays were con- 
demned as "dead drama" and "poisonous weeds" and were not 
performed. 

Following the Cultural Revolution, Western-style theater experi- 
enced a revival. Many new works appeared, and revised and 
banned plays from China and abroad were reinstated in the national 
repertoire. Many of the new plays strained at the limits of creative 
freedom and were alternately commended and condemned, depend- 
ing on the political atmosphere. One of the most outspoken of the 
new breed of playwrights was Sha Yexin. His controversial play 
"The Imposter," which dealt harshly with the favoritism and per- 
quisites accorded party members, was first produced in 1979. In 
early 1980 the play was roundly criticized by Secretary General 
Hu Yaobang — the first public intervention in the arts since the Cul- 
tural Revolution. In the campaign against bourgeois liberalism in 
1981 and the antispiritual pollution campaign in 1983, Sha and 
his works were again criticized. Through it all Sha continued to 
write for the stage and to defend himself and his works in the press. 
In late 1985 Sha Yexin was accepted into the Chinese Communist 
Party and appointed head of the Shanghai People's Art Theater, 
where he continued to produce controversial plays. 

Music 

Chinese music appears to date back to the dawn of Chinese civi- 
lization, and documents and artifacts provide evidence of a 



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Education and Culture 



well-developed musical culture as early as the Zhou dynasty 
(1027-221 B.C.). The Imperial Music Bureau, first established in 
the Qin dynasty (221-207 B.C.), was greatly expanded under the 
Han emperor Wu Di (140-87 B.C.) and charged with supervising 
court music and military music and determining what folk music 
would be officially recognized. In subsequent dynasties, the devel- 
opment of Chinese music was strongly influenced by foreign music, 
especially that of Central Asia. 

Chinese vocal music has traditionally been sung in a thin, non- 
resonant voice or in falsetto and is usually solo rather than choral. 
All traditional Chinese music is melodic rather than harmonic. 
Instrumental music is played on solo instruments or in small 
ensembles of plucked and bowed stringed instruments, flutes, and 
various cymbals, gongs, and drums. The scale has five notes. 

The New Culture Movement of the 1910s and 1920s evoked a 
great deal of lasting interest in Western music as a number of 
Chinese musicians who had studied abroad returned to perform 
Western classical music and to compose works of their own based 
on the Western musical notation system. Symphony orchestras were 
formed in most major cities and performed to a wide audience in 
the concert halls and on radio. Popular music — greatly influenced 
by Western music, especially that of the United States — also gained 
a wide audience in the 1940s. After the 1942 Yan'an Forum on 
Literature and Art, a large-scale campaign was launched in the 
Communist-controlled areas to adapt folk music to create revolu- 
tionary songs to educate the largely illiterate rural population on 
party goals. 

After the establishment of the People's Republic, revolutionary 
songs continued to be performed, and much of the remainder of 
popular music consisted of popular songs from the Soviet Union 
with the lyrics translated into Chinese. Symphony orchestras 
flourished throughout the country, performing Western classical 
music and compositions by Chinese composers. Conservatories and 
other institutions of musical instruction were developed and 
expanded in the major cities. A number of orchestras from Eastern 
Europe performed in China, and Chinese musicians and musical 
groups participated in a wide variety of international festivals. 

During the height of the Cultural Revolution, musical composi- 
tion and performance were greatly restricted. After the Cultural 
Revolution, musical institutions were reinstated and musical com- 
position and performance revived. In 1980 the Chinese Musicians' 
Association was formally elected to the International Musicologi- 
cal Society. Chinese musical groups toured foreign countries, and 
foreign musical organizations performed in China. In the mid-1980s 



193 



China: A Country Study 

popular ballads and Western folk and elassieal music still drew the 
greatest audiences, but other kinds of music, including previously 
banned Western jazz and rock and roll, were being performed and 
were receiving increasing acceptance, especially among young 
people. 

Painting and Calligraphy 

In imperial times, painting and calligraphy were the most highly 
appreciated arts in court circles and were produced almost exclu- 
sively by amateurs — aristocrats and scholar-officials — who alone 
had the leisure to perfect the technique and sensibility necessary 
for great brushwork. Calligraphy was thought to be the highest and 
purest form of painting. The implements were the brush pen, made 
of animal hair, and black inks made from pine soot and animal 
glue. In ancient times, writing, as well as painting, was done on 
silk. But after the invention of paper in the first century A.D., silk 
was gradually replaced by the new and cheaper material. Original 
writings by famous calligraphers have been greatly valued through- 
out China's history and are mounted on scrolls and hung on walls 
in the same way that paintings are. 

Painting in the traditional style involves essentially the same tech- 
niques as calligraphy and is done with a brush dipped in black or 
colored ink; oils are not used. As with calligraphy, the most popu- 
lar materials on which paintings are made are paper and silk. The 
finished work is then mounted on scrolls, which can be hung or 
rolled up. Traditional painting also is done in albums and on walls, 
lacquerwork, and other media. 

Beginning in the Tang dynasty (A.D. 618-907), the primary sub- 
ject matter of painting was the landscape, known as shan-shui 
(mountain-water) painting. In these landscapes, usually monochro- 
matic and sparse, the purpose was not to reproduce exactly the 
appearance of nature but rather to grasp an emotion or atmosphere 
so as to catch the "rhythm" of nature. In Song dynasty (960-1279) 
times, landscapes of more subtle expression appeared; immeasura- 
ble distances were conveyed through the use of blurred outlines, 
mountain contours disappearing into the mist, and impressionis- 
tic treatment of natural phenomena. Emphasis was placed on the 
spiritual qualities of the painting and on the ability of the artist 
to reveal the inner harmony of man and nature, as perceived 
according to Taoist and Buddhist concepts (see The Hundred 
Schools of Thought, ch. 1). 

Beginning in the thirteenth century, there developed a tradition 
of painting simple subjects — a branch with fruit, a few flowers, or 
one or two horses. Narrative painting, with a wider color range 



194 



Education and Culture 



and a much busier composition than the Song painting, was 
immensely popular at the time of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644). 

During the Ming period, the first books illustrated with colored 
woodcuts appeared. As the techniques of color printing were per- 
fected, illustrated manuals on the art of painting began to be pub- 
lished. Jieziyuan Huazhuan (Manual of the Mustard Seed Garden), 
a five-volume work first published in 1679, has been in use as a 
technical textbook for artists and students ever since. 

Beginning with the New Culture Movement, Chinese artists 
started to adopt Western techniques. It also was during this time 
that oil painting was introduced to China. 

In the early years of the People's Republic, artists were encour- 
aged to employ socialist realism. Some Soviet socialist realism was 
imported without modification, and painters were assigned sub- 
jects and expected to mass-produce paintings. This regimen was 
considerably relaxed in 1953, and after the Hundred Flowers Cam- 
paign of 1956-57, traditional Chinese painting experienced a sig- 
nificant revival. Along with these developments in professional art 
circles, there was a proliferation of peasant art depicting everyday 
life in the rural areas on wall murals and in open-air painting 
exhibitions. 

During the Cultural Revolution, art schools were closed, and 
publication of art journals and major art exhibitions ceased. 
Nevertheless, amateur art continued to flourish throughout this 
period. 

Following the Cultural Revolution, art schools and professional 
organizations were reinstated. Exchanges were set up with groups 
of foreign artists, and Chinese artists began to experiment with new 
subjects and techniques. 

Contemporary Performing Arts 

Motion Pictures 

Motion pictures were introduced to China in 1896, but the film 
industry was not started until 1917. During the 1920s film techni- 
cians from the United States trained Chinese technicians in Shang- 
hai, an early filmmaking center, and American influence continued 
to be felt there for the next two decades. In the 1930s and 1940s, 
several socially and politically important films were produced. 

The film industry continued to develop after 1949. In the 17 years 
between the founding of the People's Republic and the Cultural 
Revolution, 603 feature films and 8,342 reels of documentaries and 
newsreels were produced. The first wide-screen film was produced 
in 1960. Animated films using a variety of folk arts, such as 



195 



China: A Country Study 



papercuts, shadow plays, puppetry, and traditional paintings, also 
were very popular for entertaining and educating children. 

During the Cultural Revolution, the film industry was severely 
restricted. Most previous films were banned, and only a few new 
ones were produced. In the years immediately following the Cul- 
tural Revolution, the film industry again flourished as a medium 
of popular entertainment. Domestically produced films played to 
large audiences, and tickets for foreign film festivals sold quickly. 

In the 1980s the film industry fell on hard times, faced with the 
dual problems of competition from other forms of entertainment 
and concern on the part of the authorities that many of the popu- 
lar thriller and martial arts films were socially unacceptable. In 
January 1986 the film industry was transferred from the Ministry 
of Culture to the newly formed Ministry of Radio, Cinema, and 
Television to bring it under "stricter control and management" 
and to "strengthen supervision over production." 

Radio and Television 

Radio and television expanded rapidly in the 1980s as important 
means of mass communication and popular entertainment (see 
Telecommunications, ch. 8; The Media, ch. 10). By 1985 radio 
reached 75 percent of the population through 167 radio stations, 
215 million radios, and a vast wired loudspeaker system. Televi- 
sion, growing at an even more rapid rate, reached two-thirds of the 
population through more than 104 stations (up from 52 in 1984 and 
44 in 1983); an estimated 85 percent of the urban population had 
access to television. As radio and television stations grew, the con- 
tent of the programming changed drastically from the political lec- 
tures and statistical lists of the previous period. Typical radio listening 
included soap operas based on popular novels and a variety of 
Chinese and foreign music. Most television shows were entertain- 
ment, including feature films, sports, drama, music, dance, and chil- 
dren's programming. In 1985 a survey of a typical week of television 
programming made by the Shanghai publication Wuxiandian Yu 
Dianshi (Journal of Radio and Television) revealed that more than 
half of the programming could be termed entertainment; education 
made up 24 percent of the remainder of the programming and news 
15 percent. A wide cross section of international news was presented 
each evening. Most news broadcasts were borrowed from foreign 
news organizations, and a Chinese summary was dubbed over. 
China Central Television also contracted with several foreign broad- 
casters for entertainment programs. Between 1982 and 1985, six 
United States television companies signed agreements to provide 
American programs to China. 



196 





One of China's many folk arts is juggling. 

Courtesy Douglass M. Do lan 



Folk and Variety Arts 

Folk and variety arts have a long history in China. One of the 
oldest forms of folk art is puppetry. Puppeteers use various kinds 
of puppets, including marionettes, rod puppets, cloth puppets, and 
wire puppets in performances incorporating folk songs and dances 
and some dialogues. The subject matter is derived mainly from 
children's stories and fables. The shadow play is a form of pup- 
petry that is performed by moving figures made of animal skins 
or cardboard held behind a screen lit by lamplight. The subject 
matter and singing style in shadow plays are closely related to local 
opera. Another popular folk art is the quyi, which consists of vari- 
ous kinds of storytelling and comic monologues and dialogues, often 
to the accompaniment of clappers, drums, or stringed instruments. 

Variety arts, including tightrope walking, acrobatics, animal acts, 
and sleight of hand date back at least as far as the Han dynasty 
(206 B.C.-A.D. 220) and were very popular in the imperial court. 
Later, many of these feats were incorporated into the traditional 
theater, and they continued to be performed by itinerant troupes. 
As these troupes traveled around the countryside, they developed 
and enriched their repertoire. Since 1949 these art forms have 
gained new respectability. Troupes have been established in the 
provinces, autonomous regions, and special municipalities, and 



197 



China: A Country Study 



theaters speeifically dedicated to the variety arts have been built 
in major cities. Some troupes have become world famous, playing 
to packed houses at home and on foreign tours. 

Publishing 

Background 

Publishing in China dates from the invention of woodblock print- 
ing around the eighth century A.D. and was greatly expanded with 
the invention of movable clay type in the eleventh century. From 
the tenth to the twelfth century, Kaifeng, Meishan, Hangzhou, 
and Jianyang were major printing centers. In the nineteenth cen- 
tury, China acquired movable lead type and photogravure print- 
ing plates and entered the age of modern book and magazine 
printing. The largest of the early publishing houses were the Com- 
mercial Press (Shangwu Yinshuguan), established in 1897, and the 
China Publishing House (Zhonghua Shuju), established in 1912, 
both of which were still operating in 1987. Following the May 
Fourth Movement of 1919, publishers, especially those associated 
with various groups of intellectuals, proliferated. During the Chinese 
civil war, New China Booksellers (Xinhua Shudian) published a 
large amount of Marxist literature and educational materials in 
the Communist-controlled areas. On the eve of the establishment 
of the People's Republic in 1949, there were over 700 New China 
Booksellers offices. 

Between 1949 and 1952, the New China Booksellers offices scat- 
tered throughout the country were nationalized and given respon- 
sibility for publishing, printing, and distribution. Also, several small 
private publishers were brought under joint state-private owner- 
ship, and by 1956 all private publishers had been nationalized. After 
a brief nourishing during the Hundred Flowers Campaign of 
1956-57, the publishing industry came under strong political pres- 
sure in the Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957 (see The Transition 
to Socialism, 1953-57, ch. 1). The industry had not fully recovered 
from this campaign when it was plunged into the Cultural Revo- 
lution, a period in which publishing was severely curtailed and 
limited mainly to political tracts supporting various campaigns. Fol- 
lowing the Cultural Revolution, publishing again flourished in 
unprecedented ways. In 1982 the China National Publishing 
Administration, the umbrella organization of Chinese publishers, 
was placed under the Ministry of Culture, but actual management 
of the industry was directed through four systems of administra- 
tion: direct state administration; administration by committees or 
organizations of the State Council or the party Central Committee; 



198 



Education and Culture 



armed forces administration; and administration by provinces, 
autonomous regions, or special municipalities. 

In 1984 statistics showed that 17 of the country's 418 publish- 
ing establishments were in Shanghai, whereas Beijing was home 
to 160 publishers. In 1985 plans were announced to foster the 
growth of the publishing industry in Chongqing, Xi'an, Wuhan, 
and Shenyang to take some of the workload from Beijing and 
Shanghai. 

Different publishers were assigned to specific kinds of publica- 
tions. For example, the People's Publishing House was responsi- 
ble for publishing works on politics, philosophy, and the social 
sciences; the People's Literature Publishing House produced ancient 
and modern Chinese and foreign literature and literary history and 
theory; the China Publishing House had the principal responsi- 
bility for collating and publishing Chinese classical literary, histori- 
cal, and philosophical works; and the Commercial Press was the 
principal publisher of Chinese-to-foreign-language reference works 
and translations of foreign works in the social sciences. Other pub- 
lishers dealt with works in specialized fields of science. 

In addition to the routine method of distributing books to book- 
stores in major cities, other methods of distribution were devised 
to meet the special needs of readers in urban and rural areas 
throughout the country. Mobile bookshops made regular visits to 
factories, mines, rural villages, and People's Liberation Army units, 
and service was provided in those locations through which individu- 
als could request books. Arrangements were made with the libraries 
of educational institutions and enterprises to supply them with the 
books that they required, and books specifically applicable to cer- 
tain industries were systematically recommended and provided to 
the departments concerned. Also, book fairs and exhibits frequently 
were provided at meetings and in public parks on holidays and other 
special occasions. 

Newspapers 

In 1987 China had two news agencies, the Xinhua (New China) 
News Agency and the China News Service (Zhongguo Xinwenshe) 
(see The Media, ch. 10). Xinhua was the major source of news 
and photographs for central and local newspapers. The official 
newspapers Renmin Ribao (People's Daily) and Guangming Ribao 
(Enlightenment Daily), and the People's Liberation Army's Jiefang- 
jun Bao (Liberation Army Daily) continued to have the largest cir- 
culation. In addition to these major party and army organs, most 
professional and scientific organizations published newspapers or 
journals containing specialized information in fields as varied as 



199 



China: A Country Study 



astronomy and entomology. Local morning and evening news- 
papers concentrating on news and feature stories about local peo- 
ple and events were extremely popular, selling out each day shortly 
after they arrived at the newsstands. In June 1981 the English- 
language China Daily began publication. This newspaper, which 
was provided for foreigners living or traveling in China but which 
also was read by a large number of Chinese literate in English, 
offered international news and sports from the major foreign wire 
services as well as interesting domestic news and feature articles. 
Cankao Xiaoxi (Reference News), an official news organ that car- 
ried foreign news items in Chinese translation, was available to 
cadres and their families. In 1980 it enjoyed a circulation of 
11 million, but, with the subsequent proliferation of other news 
sources, its circulation dropped to 4 million in 1985, causing the 
subscription policy to be changed to make it available to all Chinese. 
Another source of foreign reporting was Cankao Ziliao (Reference 
Information), a more restricted Chinese reprint of foreign report- 
age available only to middle- and upper-level cadres. Both of these 
publications often included foreign reports critical of China. 

Libraries and Archives 

Very early in Chinese civilization, scholars had extensive pri- 
vate libraries, and all of the imperial dynasties constructed libraries 
and archives to house literary treasures and official records. The 
first modern libraries, however, did not appear in China until the 
late nineteenth century; even then, library service grew slowly and 
sporadically. In 1949 there were only fifty-five public libraries at 
the county level and above, most concentrated in major coastal com- 
mercial centers. 

Following the founding of the People's Republic, government 
and education leaders strove to develop library services and make 
them available throughout the country. The National Book Coor- 
dination Act of 1957 authorized the establishment of two national 
library centers, one in Beijing and the other in Shanghai, and nine 
regional library networks. Even so, libraries still were scarce, and 
those facilities that were available were cramped and offered only 
rudimentary services. Seeing the lack of libraries as a major impedi- 
ment to modernization efforts, government leaders in the early 
1980s took special interest in the development of library services. 
The special concentration of funds and talent began to produce 
significant results. By 1986 China had over 200,000 libraries, 
including a national library and various public, educational, 
scientific, and military libraries. More than forty Chinese institu- 
tions of higher learning also had established library-science or 



200 



Anhui Provincial Library 
Courtesy Alfonz Lengyel 



information-science departments. There were more than 2,300 pub- 
lic libraries at the county level and above, containing nearly 256 
million volumes, and below the county level some 53,000 cultural 
centers included a small library or reading room. 

The country's main library, the National Library of China, in 
central Beijing, housed a rich collection of books, periodicals, 
newspapers, maps, prints, photographs, manuscripts, microforms, 
tape recordings, and inscriptions on bronze, stone, bones, and tor- 
toiseshells. In 1987 a new National Library building, one of the 
world's largest library structures, was completed in the western 
suburbs. The Shanghai Municipal Library, one of the largest public 
libraries in the country, contained over 7 million volumes, nearly 
1 million of which were in foreign languages. The Beijing Univer- 
sity Library took over the collections of the Yanjing University 
Library in 1950 and by the mid-1980s — with more than 3 million 
volumes, one-fourth of them in foreign languages — was one of the 
best university libraries in the country. 

On the basis of the General Rules for Archives published in 1983, 
historical archives were being expanded at the provincial and county 
levels. Two of the most important archives were the Number One 
Historical Archives of China, located in Beijing containing the 
archives of the Ming and Qing dynasties, and the Number Two 
Historical Archives of China, located in Nanjing containing the 



201 



China: A Country Study 

archives of the Guomindang period. A number of foreign scholars 
have been granted access to these archives. In 1987 public and 
research libraries still faced serious space, management, and ser- 
vice problems. Even with the special efforts being made to solve 
these problems, it was clear that they would not be quickly resolved. 

In the late 1980s, China was experiencing an active educational 
and cultural life. Students were staying in school longer, educa- 
tional standards were being raised, and facilities were being 
improved. Intellectuals were encouraged to develop their exper- 
tise, especially in the scientific and technical spheres, and a wide 
variety of traditional and foreign literary and art forms were allowed 
to flourish. This situation was likely to continue as long as it served 
the interest of economic modernization and posed no threat to the 
political establishment. 

* * * 

Several general works provide a good overview of China's edu- 
cation and culture. However, because the most important educa- 
tional reforms did not evolve or become effective until 1985-86, 
and were still changing in 1987, these books generally did not 
address many of the latest educational reforms. Some of the most 
valuable books available include China Issues and Prospects in Educa- 
tion, Annex 1, 1985 by the World Bank, which provides an over- 
view of the system, detailed statistics, and projections; John 
Cleverly's The Schooling of China, which has excellent chapters on 
the anatomy of the educational system and its problems and 
prospects; and Ruth Hayhoe's Contemporary Chinese Education, which 
has valuable chapters on primary, secondary, and teacher educa- 
tion. Other informative works are the chapter on "Education" by 
Stanley Rosen in a book he co-edited with John Burns, entitled 
Policy Conflicts in Post-Mao China, and a brief article by Eli Seifman 
in the March 1986 issue of Asian Thought and Society. 

Carol Lee Hamrin and Timothy Cheek's China's Establishment 
Intellectuals , Merle Goldman's China's Intellectuals, and Michael S. 
Duke's Blooming and Contending are indispensable sources of infor- 
mation on Chinese intellectual policy past and present. Liu Wu-chi's 
An Introduction to Chinese Literature gives an excellent summary of 
traditional literature and drama, and C.T. Hsia's/1 History of Modern 
Chinese Fiction gives insight into modern Chinese literature before 
the Cultural Revolution. Encyclopedia of China Today, edited by 
Fredric M. Kaplan, Julian M. Sobin, and Stephen Andors, con- 
tains valuable information about linguistic reform and gives a good 
overview of the arts in the post-Cultural Revolution period. 



202 



Education and Culture 



The Zhongguo Chuban Nianjian (China Publishing Yearbook), put 
out by the Commercial Press since 1980, provides rare data on that 
industry. Chi Wang's "An Overview of Libraries in the People's 
Republic of China" in the September 1984 issue of China Exchange 
News is an excellent source on Chinese libraries in the 1980s. 

Other useful articles providing information on the changes and 
directions of China's education and cultural policy can be found 
in various issues of Beijing Review, China News Analysis, China Exchange 
News, China Reconstructs , and the Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service Daily Report: China, and the Joint Publications Research 
Service China Report: Political, Sociological, and Military Affairs . Peo- 
ple's Republic of China Yearbook also provides useful information and 
statistics. (For further information and complete citations, see Bib- 
liography.) 



203 



A Sui dynasty (A.D. 581-617) architectural house model made of clay shows 
the complexity of that period's construction. 



IN THE LATE 1980s the Chinese economy was a system in tran- 
sition, moving cautiously away from central planning and gradu- 
ally adopting some of the institutions and mechanisms of a market 
economy. The process of economic reform began in earnest in 1979, 
after Chinese leaders concluded that the Soviet-style system that 
had been in place since the 1950s was making little progress in 
improving the standard of living of the Chinese people and also 
was failing to close the economic gap between China and the indus- 
trialized nations. 

The first major success of the economic reform program was the 
introduction of the responsibility system of production in agricul- 
ture, a policy that allowed farm families to work a piece of land 
under contract and to keep whatever profits they earned. By 1984 
the responsibility system had dramatically increased food produc- 
tion, and the government had eliminated the people's communes — 
the hallmark of Chinese socialism for over twenty years. In most 
other sectors of the economy the role of government was reduced, 
managers were given more decision-making power, enterprises were 
encouraged to produce for profit, the role of the private sector 
increased, and experimentation with new forms of ownership began 
in the state sector. Constraints on foreign trade were relaxed, and 
joint ventures with foreign firms were officially encouraged as 
sources of modern technology and scarce foreign exchange. With 
rising incomes, greater incentives, and rapid growth in the service 
and light industrial sectors, the People's Republic of China began 
to exhibit some of the traits of a consumer society. 

Movement toward a market system, however, was complex and 
difficult, and in 1987 the transition was far from complete. Relaxing 
restrictions on economic activity quickly alleviated some of China's 
most pressing economic difficulties, but it also gave rise to a new 
set of problems. Inflation — the greatest fear of Chinese consumers — 
became a problem for the first time since the early 1950s, and along 
with new opportunities to seek profit came growing inequality in 
income distribution and new temptations for crime, corruption, and 
Western cultural styles, regarded by many older Chinese people as 
decadent and "spiritually polluting." The state still owned and con- 
trolled the largest nonagricultural enterprises, and the major indus- 
tries were still primarily guided by the central plan. 

Thus, the Chinese economy in the late 1980s was very much 
a mixed system. It could not be accurately described as either a 



207 



China: A Country Study 

centrally planned economy or a market economy. The leadership 
was committed to further expansion of the reform program as a 
requisite for satisfactory economic growth, but at the same time 
it was compelled to keep a tight grip on key aspects of the 
economy — particularly inflation and grain production — to prevent 
the emergence of overwhelming political discontent. Under these 
circumstances, forces in the economic system worked against each 
other, producing what the Chinese leadership called internal "con- 
tradictions.' ' On the one hand, the economy was no longer tightly 
controlled by the state plan because of the large and growing mar- 
ket sector. On the other hand, the market could not operate effi- 
ciently because many commodities were still under government 
control and most prices were still set or restricted by government 
agencies. Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the entire nation 
was "riding the tiger" — making great progress but not entirely 
in control — and therefore unable to stop the process without 
risk. 

Despite the burst of progress in the 1980s, the Chinese economy 
still shared many basic characteristics with the economies of other 
developing countries. The gross national product per capita in 1986 
was¥849 (for value of the yuan — see Glossary), or about US$228 
(at the 1986 exchange rate), reflecting the low average level of labor 
productivity. As in many countries that did not begin sustained 
industrialization efforts until the middle of the twentieth century, 
the majority of the Chinese labor force — over 60 percent — was still 
employed in agriculture, which produced around 30 percent of the 
value of national output. Agricultural work still was performed 
primarily by hand. Modern equipment was in general use in indus- 
try but was largely typified by outdated designs and low levels of 
efficiency. 

In other respects China's economy was quite different from those 
of most developing nations. The most important difference was 
that the Chinese economy— although in the midst of far-reaching 
changes — was organized as a socialist system, directed by a cen- 
tral planning structure. The predominance of state and collective 
ownership, firm central control over the financial system, redistri- 
bution of resources among regions, rationing of grain, and subsi- 
dized provision of housing resulted in a pattern of income 
distribution that was much narrower than those in almost all other 
developing countries. There was relatively little true capitalism in 
the form of private ownership of productive assets. Agricultural 
land was farmed under lease by farm households but was formally 
owned by villages, towns, and townships — the collective units that 
had replaced the rural commune system. 



208 



Economic Context 



In the mid-1980s most Chinese were still very poor by Ameri- 
can standards, but several important measures indicated that the 
quality of their lives was considerably better than implied by the 
level of gross national product (GNP) per capita. According to 
World Bank data, in 1984 energy consumption per person was 485 
kilograms of oil equivalent, higher than that for any other country 
ranked as a low-income country and greater than the average for 
lower middle-income countries. In 1983 the daily calorie supply 
per capita was 2,620 — 11 percent above the basic requirement and 
nearly as high as the average for countries classified as upper middle- 
income countries. Significantly, infant mortality in 1985 was 39 
per 1,000, well below the average for upper middle-income coun- 
tries, and life expectancy at birth was 69 years, higher than the 
average for upper middle-income countries. 

Despite the major economic gains made by China since 1949 
and the dramatic advances of the 1980s, serious imbalances and 
deficiencies have persisted. Contributing to these deficiencies were 
the political turmoil that disrupted the economy during the Cul- 
tural Revolution decade (1966-76), insufficient flexibility in the 
planning process, and serious inaccuracies in price structures. Power 
shortages, inadequate transportation and communication networks, 
shortages of technicians and other highly trained personnel, insuffi- 
cient foreign exchange for procurement of advanced technology 
from other countries, and inadequate legal and administrative pro- 
visions for both foreign and domestic trade further hindered mod- 
ernization. 

An important by-product of the reform program since the late 
1970s has been an enormous increase in the amount of informa- 
tion available on the economy. The government collected and pub- 
lished basic national economic data in the 1950s, but the centralized 
statistics-keeping system broke down at the end of the 1950s, and 
very little statistical information was available during the 1960s and 
early 1970s. It was not until 1979 that the State Statistical Bureau 
ended the statistical "blackout" with the publication of an economic 
statistical communique. In subsequent years the State Statistical 
Bureau published larger and more frequent compendia, including 
annual almanacs of the economy and annual statistical yearbooks, 
which became progressively more sophisticated and informative. 
In addition, most provincial-level units and cities, as well as the 
major industries and economic sectors, such as coal mining and 
agriculture, began to produce their own specialized statistical year- 
books. In the early 1980s, numerous new periodicals, many of which 
specialized in economic data and analysis, started publication. 
Although Chinese statistical definitions and practices still differed 



209 



China: A Country Study 



from those in the West in many respeets and the aecuracy of some 
figures was called into doubt even by Chinese economists, foreign 
analysts in 1987 had access to a rich and growing body of data that 
would support extensive analysis of the Chinese economy. 

General Nature of the Economy 

Throughout most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as 
during much of earlier Chinese history, the economy was barely 
able to meet the basic needs of the country's huge population — 
the largest in the world (see Population, ch. 2). In normal years 
the economy produced just about the amount of food required to 
meet the minimum nutritional requirements of the populace. In 
times of drought, flood, warfare, or civil disorder, there was not 
enough food, and before 1949 such conditions often led to starva- 
tion on a vast scale. Under the government of the People's Republic, 
food shortages were countered by redistributing supplies within 
China and by importing grain from abroad, which successfully 
averted famine except in the catastrophic years of 1959, 1960, and 
1961. 

Despite formidable constraints and disruptions, the Chinese econ- 
omy was never stagnant. Production grew substantially between 
1800 and 1949 and increased fairly rapidly after 1949. Before the 
1980s, however, production gains were largely matched by popu- 
lation growth, so that productive capacity was unable to outdistance 
essential consumption needs significantly, particularly in agricul- 
ture. Grain output in 1979 was about twice as large as in 1952, 
but so was the population. As a result, little surplus was produced 
even in good years. Further, few resources could be spared for 
investment in capital goods, such as machinery, factories, mines, 
railroads, and other productive assets. The relatively small size of 
the capital stock caused productivity per worker to remain low, 
which in turn perpetuated the economy's inability to generate a 
substantial surplus (see fig. 7). 

China's socialist system, with state ownership of most industry 
and central control over planning and the financial system, has 
enabled the government to mobilize whatever surplus was avail- 
able and greatly increase the proportion of the national economic 
output devoted to investment. Western analysts estimated that 
investment accounted for about 25 percent of GNP in the 30 years 
after 1949, a rate surpassed by few other countries. Because of the 
comparatively low level of GNP, however, even this high rate of 
investment secured only a small amount of resources relative to 
the size of the country and the population. In 1978, for instance, 
only 16 percent of the GNP of the United States went into gross 



210 



A traditional country peddler. Woodcut. 
Courtesy Woodcuts of Wartime China 

investment, but this amounted to US$345.6 billion, whereas the 
approximately 25 percent of China's GNP that was invested came 
to about the equivalent of US$1 1 1 billion and had to serve a popu- 
lation 4.5 times the size of that in the United States. The limited 
resources available for investment prevented China from rapidly 
producing or importing advanced equipment. Technological devel- 
opment proceeded gradually, and outdated equipment continued 
to be used as long as possible. Consequently, many different levels 
of technology were in use simultaneously (see Historical Develop- 
ment of Science and Technology Policy, ch. 9). Most industries 
included some plants that were comparable to modern Western 
facilities, often based on imported equipment and designs. Equip- 
ment produced by Chinese factories was generally some years 
behind standard Western designs. Agriculture received a smaller 
share of state investment than industry and remained at a much 
lower average level of technology and productivity. Despite a sig- 
nificant increase in the availability of tractors, trucks, electric 
pumps, and mechanical threshers, most agricultural activities were 
still performed by people or animals (see Agricultural Policies, 
ch. 6). 

Although the central administration coordinated the economy 
and redistributed resources among regions when necessary, in prac- 
tice most economic activity was very decentralized, and there was 



211 



China: A Country Study 



Billions of 1986 yuan 




1 952 1 956 1 960 1 964 1 968 1 972 1 976 1 980 1 984 
For value of the yuan -- see Glossary. 

Gross national product. Includes other economic sectors, such as services. 



Source: Based on information from China, State Statistical Bureau, Statistical Year- 
book of China, 1986, Hong Kong, 1986. 



Figure 7. Gross National Product and Major Economic Sectors, 1952-86 



relatively little flow of goods and services between areas (see Internal 
Trade and Distribution, ch. 8). About 75 percent of the grain grown 
in China, for instance, was consumed by the families that produced 
it. One of the most important sources of growth in the economy 
was the improved ability to exploit the comparative advantages of 
each locality by expanding transportation capacity. The commu- 
nications and transportation sectors were growing and improving 
but still could not carry the volume of traffic required by a modern 
economy because of the scarcity of investment funds and advanced 
technology (see Transportation; Telecommunications, ch. 8). 

Because of limited interaction among regions, the great variety 
of geographic zones in China, and the broad spectrum of technolo- 
gies in use, areas differed widely in economic activities, organiza- 
tional forms, and prosperity (see Physical Environment, ch. 2). 
Within any given city, enterprises ranged from tiny, collectively 
owned handicraft units, barely earning subsistence-level incomes 
for their members, to modern state-owned factories, whose work- 
ers received steady wages plus free medical care, bonuses, and an 
assortment of other benefits. The agricultural sector was diverse, 
accommodating well-equipped, "specialized households" that 
supplied scarce products and services to local markets; wealthy 



212 



Economic Context 



suburban villages specializing in the production of vegetables, pork, 
poultry, and eggs to sell in free markets in the nearby cities; fish- 
ing villages on the seacoast; herding groups on the grasslands of 
Nei Monggol Autonomous Region (Inner Mongolia); and poor, 
struggling grain-producing villages in the arid mountains of Shaanxi 
and Gansu provinces. The economy had progressed in major ways 
since 1949, but after four decades experts in China and abroad 
agreed that it had a great distance yet to go. 

Economic Policies, 1949-80 

When the Chinese Communist Party came to power in 1949, 
its leaders' fundamental long-range goals were to transform China 
into a modern, powerful, socialist nation. In economic terms these 
objectives meant industrialization, improvement of living standards, 
narrowing of income differences, and production of modern mili- 
tary equipment. As the years passed, the leadership continued to 
subscribe to these goals. But the economic policies formulated to 
achieve them were dramatically altered on several occasions in 
response to major changes in the economy, internal politics, and 
international political and economic developments. 

An important distinction emerged between leaders who felt that 
the socialist goals of income equalization and heightened political 
consciousness should take priority over material progress and those 
who believed that industrialization and general economic moderni- 
zation were prerequisites for the attainment of a successful socialist 
order. Among the prominent leaders who considered politics the 
prime consideration were Mao Zedong, Lin Biao, and the mem- 
bers of the Gang of Four (see Glossary). Leaders who more often 
stressed practical economic considerations included Liu Shaoqi, 
Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping. For the most part, important 
policy shifts reflected the alternating emphasis on political and eco- 
nomic goals and were accompanied by major changes in the posi- 
tions of individuals in the political power structure. An important 
characteristic in the development of economic policies and the 
underlying economic model was that each new policy period, while 
differing significantly from its predecessor, nonetheless retained 
most of the existing economic organization. Thus the form of the 
economic model and the policies that expressed it at any given point 
in Chinese history reflected both the current policy emphasis and 
a structural foundation built up during the earlier periods. 

Recovery from War, 1949-52 

In 1949 China's economy was suffering from the debilitating 
effects of decades of warfare. Many mines and factories had been 



213 



China: A Country Study 

damaged or destroyed. At the end of the war with Japan in 1945, 
Soviet troops had dismantled about half the maehinery in the major 
industrial areas of the northeast and shipped it to the Soviet Union. 
Transportation, eommunieation, and power systems had been 
destroyed or had deteriorated because of lack of maintenance. 
Agriculture was disrupted, and food production was some 30 per- 
cent below its pre-war peak level. Further, economic ills were com- 
pounded by one of the most virulent inflations in world history. 

The chief goal of the government for the 1949-52 period was 
simply to restore the economy to normal working order. The admin- 
istration moved quickly to repair transportation and communica- 
tion links and revive the flow of economic activity. The banking 
system was nationalized and centralized under the People's Bank 
of China. To bring inflation under control by 1951, the govern- 
ment unified the monetary system, tightened credit, restricted 
government budgets at all levels and put them under central con- 
trol, and guaranteed the value of the currency. Commerce was 
stimulated and partially regulated by the establishment of state trad- 
ing companies (commercial departments), which competed with 
private traders in purchasing goods from producers and selling them 
to consumers or enterprises. Transformation of ownership in indus- 
try proceeded slowly. About a third of the country's enterprises 
had been under state control while the Guomindang government 
was in power (1927-49), as was much of the modernized trans- 
portation sector. The Chinese Communist Party immediately made 
these units state-owned enterprises upon taking power in 1949. The 
remaining privately owned enterprises were gradually brought 
under government control, but 17 percent of industrial units were 
still completely outside the state system in 1952. 

In agriculture a major change in landownership was carried out. 
Under a nationwide land reform program, titles to about 45 per- 
cent of the arable land were redistributed from landlords and more 
prosperous farmers to the 60 to 70 percent of farm families that 
previously owned little or no land. Once land reform was com- 
pleted in an area, farmers were encouraged to cooperate in some 
phases of production through the formation of small "mutual aid 
teams" of six or seven households each. Thirty-nine percent of all 
farm households belonged to mutual aid teams in 1952. By 1952 
price stability had been established, commerce had been restored, 
and industry and agriculture had regained their previous peak levels 
of production. The period of recovery had achieved its goals (see 
Rural Society, ch. 3; Agricultural Policies, ch. 6). 



214 



Eco n o m ic Co n text 



The First Five-Year Plan, 1953-57 

Having restored a viable economic base, the leadership under 
Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and other revolutionary veterans was 
prepared to embark on an intensive program of industrial growth 
and socialization. For this purpose the administration adopted the 
Soviet economic model, based on state ownership in the modern 
sector, large collective units in agriculture, and centralized eco- 
nomic planning. The Soviet approach to economic development 
was manifested in the First Five- Year Plan (1953-57) (sec The 
Transition to Socialism, ch. 1; Organization, ch. 7). As in the Soviet 
economy, the main objective was a high rate of economic growth, 
with primary emphasis on industrial development at the expense 
of agriculture and particular concentration on heavy industry and 
capital-intensive technology. Soviet planners helped their Chinese 
counterparts formulate the plan. Large numbers of Soviet engineers, 
technicians, and scientists assisted in developing and installing new 
heavy industrial facilities, including many entire plants and pieces 
of equipment purchased from the Soviet Union. Government con- 
trol over industry was increased during this period by applying 
financial pressures and inducements to convince owners of private, 
modern firms to sell them to the state or convert them into joint 
public-private enterprises under state control. By 1956 approxi- 
mately 67.5 percent of all modern industrial enterprises were state 
owned, and 32.5 percent were under joint public-private owner- 
ship. No privately owned firms remained. During the same period, 
the handicraft industries were organized into cooperatives, which 
accounted for 91.7 percent of all handicraft workers by 1956. 

Agriculture also underwent extensive organizational changes. 
To facilitate the mobilization of agricultural resources, improve 
the efficiency of farming, and increase government access to agricul- 
tural products, the authorities encouraged farmers to organize 
increasingly large and socialized collective units. From the loosely 
structured, tiny mutual aid teams, villages were to advance first 
to lower-stage, agricultural producers' cooperatives, in which 
families still received some income on the basis of the amount of 
land they contributed, and eventually to advanced cooperatives, 
or collectives. In the advanced producers' cooperatives, income 
shares were based only on the amount of labor contributed. In 
addition, each family was allowed to retain a small private plot on 
which to grow vegetables, fruit, and livestock for its own use. The 
collectivization process began slowly but accelerated in 1955 and 
1956. In 1957 about 93.5 percent of all farm households had joined 
advanced producers' cooperatives. 



215 



China: A Country Study 



In terms of economic growth the First Five- Year Plan was quite 
successful, especially in those areas emphasized by the Soviet-style 
development strategy. A solid foundation was created in heavy 
industry. Key industries, including iron and steel manufacturing, 
coal mining, cement production, electricity generation, and machine 
building were greatly expanded and were put on a firm, modern 
technological footing. Thousands of industrial and mining enter- 
prises were constructed, including 156 major facilities. Industrial 
production increased at an average annual rate of 19 percent 
between 1952 and 1957, and national income grew at a rate of 
9 percent a year. 

Despite the lack of state investment in agriculture, agricultural 
output increased substantially, averaging increases of about 4 per- 
cent a year. This growth resulted primarily from gains in efficiency 
brought about' by the reorganization and cooperation achieved 
through collectivization. As the First Five- Year Plan wore on. 
however, Chinese leaders became increasingly concerned over the 
relatively sluggish performance of agriculture and the inability of 
state trading companies to increase significantly the amount of grain 
procured from rural units for urban consumption. 

The Great Leap Forward, 1958-60 

Before the end of the First Five- Year Plan, the growing imbalance 
between industrial and agricultural growth, dissatisfaction with 
inefficiency, and lack of flexibility in the decision-making process 
convinced the nation's leaders — particularly Mao Zedong — that 
the highly centralized, industry-based Soviet model was not 
appropriate for China. In 1957 the government adopted measures 
to shift a great deal of the authority for economic decision making 
to the provincial-level, county, and local administrations. In 1958 
the Second Five- Year Plan (1958-62), which was intended to con- 
tinue the policies of the first plan, was abandoned. In its place the 
leadership adopted an approach that relied on spontaneous heroic 
efforts by the entire population to produce a dramatic "great leap" 
in production for all sectors of the economy at once (see The Great 
Leap Forward, 1958-60, ch. 1; Rural Society, ch. 3; The 1950s, 
ch. 6). Further reorganization of agriculture was regarded as the 
key to the endeavor to leap suddenly to a higher stage of produc- 
tivity. A fundamental problem was the lack of sufficient capital to 
invest heavily in both industry and agriculture at the same time. 
To overcome this problem, the leadership decided to attempt to 
create capital in the agricultural sector by building vast irrigation 
and water control works employing huge teams of farmers whose 
labor was not being fully utilized. Surplus rural labor also was to 



216 



Economic Context 



be employed to support the industrial sector by setting up thousands 
of small-scale, low-technology, "backyard" industrial projects in farm 
units, which would produce machinery required for agricultural 
development and components for urban industries. Mobilization of 
surplus rural labor and further improvements in agricultural effi- 
ciency were to be accomplished by a "leap" to the final stage of 
agricultural collectivization — the formation of people's communes. 

People's communes were created by combining some 20 or 30 
advanced producers' cooperatives of 20,000 to 30,000 members 
on average, although membership varied from as few as 6,000 to 
over 40,000 in some cases. When first instituted, the communes 
were envisaged as combining in one body the functions of the lowest 
level of local government and the highest level of organization in 
agricultural production. Communes consisted of three organiza- 
tional levels: the central commune administration; the production 
brigade (roughly equivalent to the advanced producers' coopera- 
tives, or a traditional rural village); and the production team, which 
generally consisted of around thirty families. At the inception of 
the Great Leap Forward, the communes were intended to acquire 
all ownership rights over the productive assets of their subordinate 
units and to take over most of the planning and decision making 
for farm activities. Ideally, communes were to improve efficiency 
by moving farm families into dormitories, feeding them in com- 
munal mess halls, and moving whole teams of laborers from task 
to task. In practice, this ideal, extremely centralized form of com- 
mune was not instituted in most areas. 

Ninety-eight percent of the farm population was organized into 
communes between April and September of 1958. Very soon it 
became evident that in most cases the communes were too unwieldy 
to carry out successfully all the managerial and administrative func- 
tions that were assigned to them. In 1959 and 1960, most produc- 
tion decisions reverted to the brigade and team levels, and eventually 
most governmental responsibilities were returned to county and 
township administrations. Nonetheless, the commune system was 
retained and continued to be the basic form of organization in the 
agricultural sector until the early 1980s. 

During the Great Leap Forward, the industrial sector also was 
expected to discover and use slack labor and productive capacity 
to increase output beyond the levels previously considered feasi- 
ble. Political zeal was to be the motive force, and to "put politics 
in command" enterprising party branches took over the direction 
of many factories. In addition, central planning was relegated to 
a minor role in favor of spontaneous, politically inspired produc- 
tion decisions from individual units. 



217 



China: A Country Study 



The result of the Great Leap Forward was a severe economic 
crisis. In 1958 industrial output did in fact "leap" by 55 percent, 
and the agricultural sector gathered in a good harvest. In 1959, 
1960, and 1961, however, adverse weather conditions, improperly 
constructed water control projects, and other misallocations of 
resources that had occurred during the overly centralized commu- 
nization movement resulted in disastrous declines in agricultural 
output. In 1959 and 1960, the gross value of agricultural output 
fell by 14 percent and 13 percent, respectively, and in 1961 it 
dropped a further 2 percent to reach the lowest point since 1952. 
Widespread famine occurred, especially in rural areas, according 
to 1982 census figures, and the death rate climbed from 1.2 per- 
cent in 1958 to 1.5 percent in 1959, 2.5 percent in 1960, and then 
dropped back to 1.4 percent in 1961. From 1958 to 1961, over 14 
million people apparently died of starvation, and the number of 
reported births was about 23 million fewer than under normal con- 
ditions. The government prevented an even worse disaster by can- 
celing nearly all orders for foreign technical imports and using the 
country's foreign exchange reserves to import over 5 million tons 
of grain a year beginning in 1960. Mines and factories continued 
to expand output through 1960, partly by overworking personnel 
and machines but largely because many new plants constructed 
during the First Five-Year Plan went into full production in these 
years. Thereafter, however, the excessive strain on equipment and 
workers, the effects of the agricultural crisis, the lack of economic 
coordination, and, in the 1960s, the withdrawal of Soviet assistance 
caused industrial output to plummet by 38 percent in 1961 and 
by a further 16 percent in 1962. 

Readjustment and Recovery: "Agriculture First/' 1961-65 

Faced with economic collapse in the early 1960s, the government 
sharply revised the immediate goals of the economy and devised 
a new set of economic policies to replace those of the Great Leap 
Forward. Top priority was given to restoring agricultural output 
and expanding it at a rate that would meet the needs of the grow- 
ing population. Planning and economic coordination were to be 
revived — although in a less centralized form than before the Great 
Leap Forward — so as to restore order and efficient allocation of 
resources to the economy. The rate of investment was to be reduced 
and investment priorities reversed, with agriculture receiving first 
consideration, light industry second, and heavy industry third. 

In a further departure from the emphasis on heavy industrial 
development that persisted during the Great Leap Forward, the 
government undertook to mobilize the nation's resources to bring 



218 



Economic Context 



about technological advancement in agriculture. Organizational 
changes in agriculture mainly involved decentralization of produc- 
tion decision making and income distribution within the commune 
structure. The role of the central commune administration was 
greatly reduced, although it remained the link between local govern- 
ment and agricultural producers and was important in carrying 
out activities that were too large in scale for the production brigades. 
Production teams were designated the basic accounting units and 
were responsible for making nearly all decisions concerning produc- 
tion and the distribution of income to their members. Private plots, 
which had disappeared on some communes during the Great Leap 
Forward, were officially restored to farm families (see Importance 
of Agriculture Recognized; Planning and Organization, ch. 6). 

Economic support for agriculture took several forms. Agricul- 
tural taxes were reduced, and the prices paid for agricultural 
products were raised relative to the prices of industrial supplies for 
agriculture. There were substantial increases in supplies of chemi- 
cal fertilizer and various kinds of agricultural machinery, notably 
small electric pumps for irrigation. Most of the modern supplies 
were concentrated in areas that were known to produce "high and 
stable yields" in order to ensure the best possible results. 

In industry, a few key enterprises were returned to central state 
control, but control over most enterprises remained in the hands 
of provincial-level and local governments. This decentralization had 
taken place in 1957 and 1958 and was reaffirmed and strength- 
ened in the 1961-65 period. Planning rather than politics once again 
guided production decisions, and material rewards rather than 
revolutionary enthusiasm became the leading incentive for produc- 
tion. Major imports of advanced foreign machinery, which had 
come to an abrupt halt with the withdrawal of Soviet assistance 
starting in 1960, were initiated with Japan and West European 
countries. 

During the 1961-65 readjustment and recovery period, economic 
stability was restored, and by 1966 production in both agriculture 
and industry surpassed the peak levels of the Great Leap Forward 
period. Between 1961 and 1966, agricultural output grew at an 
average rate of 9.6 percent a year. Industrial output was increased 
in the same years at an average annual rate of 10.6 percent, largely 
by reviving plants that had operated below capacity after the eco- 
nomic collapse in 1961. Another important source of growth in this 
period was the spread of rural, small-scale industries, particularly 
coal mines, hydroelectric plants, chemical fertilizer plants, and 
agricultural machinery plants. The economic model that emerged 
in this period combined elements of the highly centralized, 



219 



China: A Country Study 



industrially oriented, Soviet-style system of the First Five-Year Plan 
with aspects of the decentralization of ownership and decision mak- 
ing that characterized the Great Leap Forward and with the strong 
emphasis on agricultural development and balanced growth of the 
"agriculture First" policy. Important changes in economic policy 
occurred in later years, but the basic system of ownership, decision- 
making structure, and development strategy that was forged in the 
early 1960s was not significantly altered until the reform period 
of the 1980s. 

Events During the Cultural Revolution Decade, 1966-76 

The Cultural Revolution was set in motion by Mao Zedong in 
1966 and called to a halt in 1968, but the atmosphere of radical leftism 
persisted until Mao's death and the fall of the Gang of Four in 1976 
(see The Cultural Revolution Decade, 1966-76, ch. 1). During this 
period, there were several distinct phases of economic policy. 

High Tide of the Cultural Revolution, 1966-68 

The Cultural Revolution, unlike the Great Leap Forward, was 
primarily a political upheaval and did not produce major changes 
in official economic policies or the basic economic model. Nonethe- 
less, its influence was felt throughout urban society, and it pro- 
foundly affected the modern sector of the economy. Agricultural 
production stagnated, but in general the rural areas experienced 
less turmoil than the cities. Production was reduced in the modern 
nonagricultural sectors in several ways. The most direct cause of 
production halts was the political activity of students and workers 
in the mines and factories. A second cause was the extensive dis- 
ruption of transportation resulting from the requisitioning of trains 
and trucks to carry Red Guards (see Glossary) around the coun- 
try. Output at many factories suffered from shortages of raw materi- 
als and other supplies. A third disruptive influence was that the 
direction of factories was placed in the hands of revolutionary com- 
mittees, consisting of representatives from the party, the workers, 
and the People's Liberation Army, whose members often had lit- 
tle knowledge of either management or the enterprise they were 
supposed to run. In addition, virtually all engineers, managers, 
scientists, technicians, and other professional personnel were "criti- 
cized," demoted, "sent down" to the countryside to "participate 
in labor," or even jailed, all of which resulted in their skills and 
knowledge being lost to the enterprise. The effect was a 14-percent 
decline in industrial production in 1967. A degree of order was 
restored by the army in late 1967 and 1968, and the industrial sec- 
tor returned to a fairly high rate of growth in 1969. 



220 



Economic Context 



Other aspects of the Cultural Revolution had more far-reaching 
effects on the economy. Imports of foreign equipment, required 
for technological advancement, were curtailed by rampant xenopho- 
bia. Probably the most serious and long-lasting effect on the econ- 
omy was the dire shortage of highly educated personnel caused by 
the closing of the universities. China's ability to develop new tech- 
nology and absorb imported technology would be limited for years 
by the hiatus in higher education (see Higher Education, ch. 4). 

Resumption of Systematic Growth, 1970-74 

As political stability was gradually restored, a renewed drive for 
coordinated, balanced development was set in motion under the 
leadership of Premier Zhou Enlai. To revive efficiency in indus- 
try, Chinese Communist Party committees were returned to posi- 
tions of leadership over the revolutionary committees, and a 
campaign was carried out to return skilled and highly educated 
personnel to the jobs from which they had been displaced during 
the Cultural Revolution. Universities began to reopen, and for- 
eign contacts were expanded. Once again the economy suffered 
from imbalances in the capacities of different industrial sectors and 
an urgent need for increased supplies of modern inputs for agricul- 
ture. In response to these problems, there was a significant increase 
in investment, including the signing of contracts with foreign firms 
for the construction of major facilities for chemical fertilizer produc- 
tion, steel finishing, and oil extraction and refining. The most nota- 
ble of these contracts was for thirteen of the world's largest and 
most modern chemical fertilizer plants (see Chemicals, ch. 7). Dur- 
ing this period, industrial output grew at an average rate of 8 per- 
cent a year. 

Agricultural production declined somewhat in 1972 because of 
poor weather but increased at an average annual rate of 3.8 per- 
cent for the period as a whole. The party and state leadership under- 
took a general reevaluation of development needs, and Zhou Enlai 
presented the conclusions in a report to the Fourth National Peo- 
ple's Congress in January 1975. In it he called for the Four Modern- 
izations (see Glossary). Zhou emphasized the mechanization of 
agriculture and a comprehensive two-stage program for the modern- 
ization of the entire economy by the end of the century. 

The Gang of Four, 1974-76 

During the early and mid-1970s, the radical group later known 
as the Gang of Four attempted to dominate the power center 
through their network of supporters and, most important, through 
their control of the media. More moderate leaders, however, were 



221 



China: A Country Study 



developing and promulgating a pragmatic program for rapid mod- 
ernization of the economy that contradicted the set of policies 
expressed in the media. Initiatives by Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiao- 
ping were vehemently attacked in the press and in political cam- 
paigns as "poisonous weeds." Using official news organs, the Gang 
of Four advocated the primacy of nonmaterial, political incentives, 
radical reduction of income differences, elimination of private farm 
plots, and a shift of the basic accounting unit up to the brigade 
level in agriculture. They opposed the strengthening of central plan- 
ning and denounced the use of foreign technology. 

In the face of such contradictory policy pronouncements and 
uncertain political currents, administrators and economic decision 
makers at all levels were virtually paralyzed. Economic activity 
slowed, and the incipient modernization program almost ground 
to a halt. Uncertainty and instability were exacerbated by the death 
of Zhou Enlai in January 1976 and the subsequent second purge 
of Deng Xiaoping in April. The effects of the power struggle and 
policy disputes were compounded by the destruction resulting from 
the Tangshan earthquake in July 1976. Output for the year in both 
industry and agriculture showed no growth over 1975. The inter- 
lude of uncertainty finally ended when the Gang of Four was 
arrested in October — one month after Mao's death. 

The Post-Mao Interlude, 1976-78 

After the fall of the Gang of Four, the leadership under Hua 
Guofeng — and by July 1977 the rehabilitated Deng Xiaoping — 
reaffirmed the modernization program espoused by Zhou Enlai in 
1975. They also set forth a battery of new policies for the purpose 
of accomplishing the Four Modernizations. The new policies 
strengthened the authority of managers and economic decision mak- 
ers at the expense of party officials, stressed material incentives 
for workers, and called for expansion of the research and educa- 
tion systems (see The Post-Mao Period, 1976-78, ch. 1). Foreign 
trade was to be increased, and exchanges of students and "foreign 
experts" with developed countries were to be encouraged. This 
new policy initiative was capped at the Fifth National People's Con- 
gress in February and March 1978, when Hua Guofeng presented 
the draft of an ambitious ten-year plan for the 1976-85 period. The 
plan called for high rates of growth in both industry and agricul- 
ture and included 120 construction projects that would require mas- 
sive and expensive imports of foreign technology. 

Between 1976 and 1978, the economy quickly recovered from 
the stagnation of the Cultural Revolution. Agricultural production 
was sluggish in 1977 because of a third consecutive year of adverse 



222 



Economic Context 



weather conditions but rebounded with a record harvest in 1978. 
Industrial output jumped 14 percent in 1977 and increased by 
13 percent in 1978. 

Reform of the Economic System, Beginning in 1979 

At the milestone Third Plenum of the National Party Congress 
Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978, the party leaders 
decided to undertake a program of gradual but fundamental reform 
of the economic system. They concluded that the Maoist version 
of the centrally planned economy had failed to produce efficient 
economic growth and had caused China to fall far behind not only 
the industrialized nations of the West but also the new industrial 
powers of Asia: Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, 
and Hong Kong. In the late 1970s, while Japan and Hong Kong 
rivaled European countries in modern technology, China's citizens 
had to make do with barely sufficient food supplies, rationed cloth- 
ing, inadequate housing, and a service sector that was inadequate 
and inefficient. All of these shortcomings embarrassed China inter- 
nationally. 

The purpose of the reform program was not to abandon com- 
munism but to make it work better by substantially increasing the 
role of market mechanisms in the system and by reducing — not 
eliminating — government planning and direct control. The process 
of reform was incremental. New measures were first introduced 
experimentally in a few localities and then were popularized and 
disseminated nationally if they proved successful. By 1987 the pro- 
gram had achieved remarkable results in increasing supplies of food 
and other consumer goods and had created a new climate of dyna- 
mism and opportunity in the economy. At the same time, however, 
the reforms also had created new problems and tensions, leading 
to intense questioning and political struggles over the program's 
future. 

The Period of Readjustment, 1979-81 

The first few years of the reform program were designated the 
"period of readjustment," during which key imbalances in the econ- 
omy were to be corrected and a foundation was to be laid for a 
well-planned modernization drive. The schedule of Hua Guofeng's 
ten-year plan was discarded, although many of its elements were 
retained. The major goals of the readjustment process were to 
expand exports rapidly; overcome key deficiencies in transporta- 
tion, communications, coal, iron, steel, building materials, and elec- 
tric power; and redress the imbalance between light and heavy 
industry by increasing the growth rate of light industry and reducing 



223 



China: A Country Study 



investment in heavy industry. Agricultural production was stimu- 
lated in 1979 by an increase of over 22 percent in the procurement 
prices paid for farm products. 

The central policies of the reform program were introduced 
experimentally during the readjustment period. The most successful 
reform policy, the contract responsibility system of production in 
agriculture, was suggested by the government in 1979 as a way 
for poor rural units in mountainous or arid areas to increase their 
incomes. The responsibility system allowed individual farm fami- 
lies to work a piece of land for profit in return for delivering a set 
amount of produce to the collective at a given price. This arrange- 
ment created strong incentives for farmers to reduce production 
costs and increase productivity. Soon after its introduction the 
responsibility system was adopted by numerous farm units in all 
sorts of areas. 

Agricultural production was also stimulated by official encourage- 
ment to establish free farmers' markets in urban areas, as well as 
in the countryside, and by allowing some families to operate as 
tl specialized households," devoting their efforts to producing a 
scarce commodity or service on a profit-making basis (see Post- 
Mao Policies, ch. 6). 

In industry, the main policy innovations increased the autonomy 
of enterprise managers, reduced emphasis on planned quotas, 
allowed enterprises to produce goods outside the plan for sale on 
the market, and permitted enterprises to experiment with the use 
of bonuses to reward higher productivity. The government also 
tested a fundamental change in financial procedures with a limited 
number of state-owned units: rather than remitting all of their profits 
to the state, as was normally done, these enterprises were allowed 
to pay a tax on their profits and retain the balance for reinvest- 
ment and distribution to workers as bonuses. 

The government also actively encouraged the establishment of 
collectively owned and operated industrial and service enterprises 
as a means of soaking up some of the unemployment among young 
people and at the same time helping to increase supplies of light 
industrial products. Individual enterprise — true capitalism — also 
was allowed, after having virtually disappeared during the Cul- 
tural Revolution, and independent cobblers, tailors, tinkers, and 
vendors once again became common sights in the cities. Foreign- 
trade procedures were greatly eased, allowing individual enterprises 
and administrative departments outside the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade (which became the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations 
and Trade in 1984) to engage in direct negotiations with for- 
eign firms. A wide range of cooperation, trading, and credit 



224 



Shanghai \s Baoshan iron and steel works 
Courtesy Xinhua News Agency 

arrangements with foreign firms were legalized so that China could 
enter the mainstream of international trade (see Foreign Trade, 
eh. 8). 

Reform and Opening, Beginning in 1982 

The period of readjustment produced promising results, increas- 
ing incomes substantially; raising the availability of food, hous- 
ing, and other consumer goods; and generating strong rates of 
growth in all sectors except heavy industry, which was intention- 
ally restrained. On the strength of these initial successes, the reform 
program was broadened, and the leadership under Deng Xiaoping 
frequently remarked that China's basic policy was "reform and 
opening," that is, reform of the economic system and opening to 
foreign trade. 

In agriculture the contract responsibility system was adopted as 
the organizational norm for the entire country, and the commune 
structure was largely dismantled. By the end of 1984, approximately 
98 percent of all farm households were under the responsibility sys- 
tem, and all but a handful of communes had been dissolved. The 
communes' administrative responsibilities were turned over to town- 
ship and town governments, and their economic roles were assigned 
to townships and villages. The role of free markets for farm produce 
was further expanded and, with increased marketing possibilities 



225 



China: A Country Study 



and rising productivity, farm incomes rose rapidly (sec Post-Mao 
Policies, ch. 6). 

In industry the complexity and interrelation of production 
activities prevented a single, simple policy from bringing about the 
kind of dramatic improvement that the responsibility system 
achieved in agriculture. Nonetheless, a cluster of policies based on 
greater flexibility, autonomy, and market involvement significantly 
improved the opportunities available to most enterprises, gener- 
ated high rates of growth, and increased efficiency. Enterprise 
managers gradually gained greater control over their units, includ- 
ing the right to hire and fire, although the process required end- 
less struggles with bureaucrats and party cadres. The practice of 
remitting taxes on profits and retaining the balance became univer- 
sal by 1985, increasing the incentive for enterprises to maximize 
profits and substantially adding to their autonomy. A change of 
potentially equal importance was a shift in the source of invest- 
ment funds from government budget allocations, which carried no 
interest and did not have to be repaid, to interest-bearing bank 
loans. As of 1987 the interest rate charged on such loans was still 
too low to serve as a check on unproductive investments, but the 
mechanism was in place. 

The role of foreign trade under the economic reforms increased 
far beyond its importance in any previous period. Before the reform 
period, the combined value of imports and exports had seldom 
exceeded 10 percent of national income. In 1980 it was 15 per- 
cent, in 1984 it was 21 percent, and in 1986 it reached 35 percent. 
Unlike earlier periods, when China was committed to trying to 
achieve self-sufficiency, under Deng Xiaoping foreign trade was 
regarded as an important source of investment funds and modern 
technology. As a result, restrictions on trade were loosened fur- 
ther in the mid-1980s, and foreign investment was legalized. The 
most common foreign investments were joint ventures between for- 
eign firms and Chinese units. Sole ownership by foreign investors 
also became legal, but the feasibility of such undertakings remained 
questionable. 

The most conspicuous symbols of the new status of foreign trade 
were the four coastal special economic zones (see Glossary), which 
were created in 1979 as enclaves where foreign investment could 
receive special treatment. Three of the four zones — the cities of 
Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Sha'ntou — were located in Guangdong 
Province, close to Hong Kong. The fourth, Xiamen, in Fujian 
Province, was directly across the strait from Taiwan. More sig- 
nificant for China's economic development was the designation in 
April 1984 of economic development zones in the fourteen largest 



226 




Roadside stand on the route to the Ming tombs near Beijing 

Courtesy Stephanie Marcus 
North China fruit seller 
Courtesy Ann Matles 



227 



China: A Country Study 

coastal cities — including Dalian, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Guang- 
zhou — all of which were major commercial and industrial centers. 
These zones were to create productive exchanges between foreign 
firms with advanced technology and major Chinese economic 
networks. 

Domestic commerce also was stimulated by the reform policies, 
which explicitly endeavored to enliven the economy by shifting the 
primary burden of the allocation of goods and services from the 
government plan to the market. Private entrepreneurship and free- 
market activities were legalized and encouraged in the 1980s, 
although the central authorities continuously had to fight the efforts 
of local government agencies to impose excessive taxes on indepen- 
dent merchants. By 1987 the state-owned system of commercial 
agencies and retail outlets coexisted with a rapidly growing pri- 
vate and collectively owned system that competed with it vigorously, 
providing a wider range of consumption choices for Chinese citizens 
than at any previous time. 

Although the reform program achieved impressive successes, it 
also gave rise to several serious problems. One problem was the 
challenge to party authority presented by the principles of free- 
market activity and professional managerial autonomy. Another 
difficulty was a wave of crime, corruption, and — in the minds of 
many older people — moral deterioration caused by the looser eco- 
nomic and political climate. The most fundamental tensions were 
those created by the widening income disparities between the peo- 
ple who were "getting rich" and those who were not and by the 
pervasive threat of inflation. These concerns played a role in the 
political struggle that culminated in party general secretary Hu Yao- 
bang's forced resignation in 1987 (see Resistance and the Cam- 
paign Against Bourgeois Liberalization, ch. 11). Following Hu's 
resignation, the leadership engaged in an intense debate over the 
future course of the reforms and how to balance the need for effi- 
ciency and market incentives with the need for government guidance 
and control. The commitment to further reform was affirmed, but 
its pace, and the emphasis to be placed on macroeconomic and 
microeconomic levers, remained objects of caution. 

Structure and Operation of the Economy 

Roles of the Government and the Party 

Under China's socialist political and economic system, the 
government was explicitly responsible for planning and managing 
the national economy. The State Constitution of 1982 specifies that 
the state is to guide the country's economic development and that 



228 



Economic Context 



the State Council is to direct its subordinate bodies in drawing up 
and carrying out the national economic plan and the state budget 
(see Constitutional Framework, ch. 10). A major portion of the gov- 
ernmental apparatus was devoted to managing the economy; all but 
a few of the more than 100 ministries, commissions, administrations, 
bureaus, academies, and corporations under the State Council were 
concerned with economic matters (see The State Council, ch. 10). 

Each significant economic sector was supervised and controlled 
by one or more of these organizations, which included the Peo- 
ple's Bank of China, State Planning Commission, State Economic 
Commission, State Machine-Building Industry Commission, and 
the ministries of agriculture, animal husbandry, and fishery; coal 
industry; commerce; communications; finance; light industry; 
metallurgical industry; petroleum industry; railways; textile indus- 
try; and water resources and electric power. Several aspects of the 
economy were administered by specialized departments under the 
State Council, including the State Statistical Bureau, General 
Administration of Civil Aviation of China, and China Travel and 
Tourism Bureau. Each of the economic organizations under the 
State Council directed the units under its jurisdiction through subor- 
dinate offices at the provincial and local levels. 

Economic policies and decisions adopted by the National Peo- 
ple's Congress and the State Council were passed on to the eco- 
nomic organizations under the State Council, which incorporated 
them into the plans for the various sectors of the economy. Eco- 
nomic plans and policies were implemented by a variety of direct 
and indirect control mechanisms. Direct control was exercised by 
designating specific physical output quotas and supply allocations 
for some goods and services. Indirect instruments — also called "eco- 
nomic levers" — operated by affecting market incentives. These 
included levying taxes, setting prices for products and supplies, 
allocating investment funds, monitoring and controlling financial 
transactions by the banking system, and controlling the allocation 
of scarce key resources, such as skilled labor, electric power, trans- 
portation, steel, and chemical fertilizer. A major objective of the 
reform program was to reduce the use of direct controls and to 
increase the role of indirect economic levers. Major state-owned 
enterprises still received detailed plans specifying physical quanti- 
ties of key inputs and products from their ministries. Even these 
units, however, were increasingly affected by prices and allocations 
that were determined through market interaction and only indirectly 
influenced by the central plan. 

By 1987 the majority of state-owned industrial enterprises, which 
were managed at the provincial level or below, were partially 



229 



China: A Country Study 



regulated by a combination of specific allocations and indirect con- 
trols, but they also produced goods outside the plan for sale in the 
market. Important, scarce resources — for example, engineers or 
finished steel — might be assigned to this kind of unit in exact num- 
bers. Less critical assignments of personnel and materials would 
be authorized in a general way by the plan, but with procurement 
arrangements left up to the enterprise management. Enterprises 
had increasing discretion over the quantities of inputs purchased, 
the sources of inputs, the variety of products manufactured, and 
the production process. 

Collectively owned units and the agricultural sector were regu- 
lated primarily by indirect instruments. Each collective unit was 
"responsible for its own profit and loss," and the prices of its inputs 
and products provided the major production incentives. 

Consumer spending was subject to a limited degree of direct 
government influence but was primarily determined by the basic 
market forces of income levels and commodity prices. Before the 
reform period, key goods were rationed when they were in short 
supply, but by the mid-1980s availability had increased to the point 
that rationing was discontinued for everything except grain, which 
could also be purchased in the free markets. 

Foreign trade was supervised by the Ministry of Foreign Eco- 
nomic Relations and Trade, General Administration of Customs, 
and Bank of China, the foreign exchange arm of the Chinese bank- 
ing system, which controlled access to the scarce foreign currency 
required for imports. Because of the reduced restrictions on for- 
eign trade, however, there were broad opportunities for individual 
work units to engage in exchanges with foreign firms without much 
interference from official agencies (see Organization of Foreign 
Trade, ch. 8). 

The role of the government in the economy was buttressed by 
the pervasive influence of the Chinese Communist Party. The struc- 
ture of the party organization paralleled that of the government 
but also extended below the lowest level of government into indi- 
vidual work units. Important economic decision makers at all levels, 
from the members of the State Council down to the managers of 
factories, either were party members themselves or worked closely 
with colleagues who were party members. The party served as a 
powerful supplementary network for transmitting and implementing 
the economic goals and policies of the government. 

Although the government dominated the economy, the extent 
of its control was limited by the sheer volume of economic activity. 
Furthermore, the concept of government supervision of the econ- 
omy had changed — at least in the minds of the advocates of 



230 



Economic Context 



reform — from one of direct but stilling state control to one of indirect 
guidance of a more dynamic economy (see The First Wave of 
Reform, 1979-84, ch. 11). 

The Two Major Sectors: Agriculture and Industry 

The two most important sectors of the economy were agricul- 
ture and industry, which together employed 80 percent of the labor 
force and in 1985 produced 72 percent of GNP. The two sectors 
differed in nearly all respects. Technology, labor productivity, and 
incomes advanced much more rapidly in industry than in agricul- 
ture. Agricultural output was vulnerable to the effects of weather, 
while industry was more directly influenced by political upheavals. 
The organization of industry was based on state and collective 
ownership, planning, and wage labor, while that of agriculture was 
built around household farming, self-reliance, and market incen- 
tives. The disparities between the two sectors combined to form 
an economic-cultural-social gap between the rural and urban 
areas — the major division in Chinese society. 

Agriculture 

In the late 1980s, China remained a predominantly agricultural 
country. As of 1985 about 63 percent of the population lived in 
rural areas, and nearly 63 percent of the national labor force was 
engaged in agriculture (see Migration; Labor Force, ch. 2). Modern 
technology had spread slowly in the vast farm areas, and the avail- 
ability of modern supplies was less than adequate, causing growth 
in agricultural output to lag behind production increases in the rest 
of the economy. The proportion of GNP produced by agriculture 
declined from over 43 percent in the early 1950s to about 29 per- 
cent in 1985. The low agricultural growth rate as compared with 
other sectors of the economy reflected the fact that the average 
farmer had far less machinery and electric power and fewer other 
modern production aids to work with than the average worker in 
industry. Under the responsibility system (see Glossary), farm 
households and collective organizations purchased large amounts 
of new machinery, particularly small tractors and trucks. The horse- 
power of agricultural machinery per farmer increased by almost 
30 percent between 1979 and 1985 but still came to less than 1 horse- 
power per person. 

Before the early 1980s, most of the agricultural sector was orga- 
nized according to the three-tier commune system (see Rural 
Society, ch. 3; Agricultural Policies, ch. 6). There were over 50,000 
people's communes, most containing around 30,000 members. 
Each commune was made up of about sixteen production brigades, 



231 



China: A Country Study 

and each production brigade was composed of around seven produc- 
tion teams. The production teams were the basic agricultural col- 
lective units. They corresponded to small villages and typically 
included about 30 households and 100 to 250 members. The com- 
munes, brigades, and teams owned all major rural productive assets 
and provided nearly all administrative, social, and commercial ser- 
vices in the countryside. The largest part of farm family incomes 
consisted of shares of net team income, distributed to members 
according to the amount of work each had contributed to the col- 
lective effort. Farm families also worked small private plots and 
were free to sell or consume their products. 

By the end of 1984, approximately 98 percent of the old produc- 
tion teams had adopted the contract responsibility system, and all 
but 249 communes had been dissolved, their governmental func- 
tions passed on to 91,000 township and town governments. Pro- 
duction team organizations were replaced by 940,000 village 
committees. Under the responsibility system, farm families no 
longer devoted most of their efforts to collective production but 
instead generally signed contracts with the village or town to culti- 
vate a given crop on a particular piece of land. After harvest a cer- 
tain amount of the crop had to be sold to the unit at a predetermined 
price, and any output beyond that amount was the property of the 
family, either to be sold in the market or to be consumed. Beyond 
the amount contracted for delivery to the collective, farmers were 
allowed to determine for themselves what and how to produce. 

Market activity played a central role in the rural economy of 
the 1980s. Farmers sold a growing share of their produce in rural 
or urban free markets and purchased many of the inputs that had 
formerly been supplied by the team or brigade. A prominent new 
institution that thrived in the market environment was the "special- 
ized household." Specialized households operated in the classic pat- 
tern of the entrepreneur, buying or renting equipment to produce 
a good or service that was in short supply locally. Some of the most 
common specialties were trucking, chicken raising, pig raising, and 
technical agricultural services, such as irrigation and pest control. 
Many of the specialized households became quite wealthy relative 
to the average farmer. 

The new economic climate and the relaxation of restrictions on 
the movements of rural residents gave rise to numerous opportu- 
nities for profit-making ventures in the countryside. Towns, vil- 
lages, and groups of households referred to as "rural economic 
unions" established small factories, processing operations, construc- 
tion teams, catering services, and other kinds of nonagricultural 
concerns. Many of these organizations had links with urban 



232 



nese and American technicians conduct a drilling operation 
at the Antibao coal mine, Shanxi Province 
Courtesy Xinhua News Agency 



233 



China: A Country Study 



enterprises that found the services of these rural units to be less 
expensive and more efficient than those of their formal urban coun- 
terparts. 

The growth of these nonagricultural enterprises in the country- 
side created a large number of new jobs, making it possible for 
many workers who were no longer needed in agriculture to "leave 
the land but stay in the country," significantly changing the struc- 
ture of the rural economy and increasing rural incomes. In 1986 
nonagricultural enterprises in the countryside employed 21 per- 
cent of the rural labor force and for the first time produced over 
half the value of rural output. 

Although the chief characteristic of the new rural system was 
household farming for profit, collective organizations still played 
a major role. Agricultural land still was owned by township or town 
governments, which determined the crops farmers contracted to 
grow and the financial terms of the contracts. Many township, town, 
and village governments also engaged in major entrepreneurial 
undertakings, establishing factories, processing mills, brick works, 
and other large-scale enterprises. Finally, the maintenance and 
operation of public works, such as irrigation systems, power plants, 
schools, and clinics, generally still was regarded as the responsi- 
bility of the collective administrations. 

Four percent of the nation's farmland was cultivated by state 
farms, which employed 4.9 million people in 1985. State farms were 
owned and operated by the government much in the same way 
as an industrial enterprise. Management was the responsibility of 
a director, and workers were paid set wages, although some ele- 
ments of the responsibility system were introduced in the mid-1980s. 
State farms were scattered throughout China, but the largest num- 
bers were located in frontier or remote areas, including Xinjiang- 
Uygur Autonomous Region in the northwest, Nei Monggol 
Autonomous Region, the three northeastern provinces of Heilong- 
jiang, Jilin, and Liaoning and the southeastern provinces of Guang- 
dong, Fujian, and Jiangxi. 

Industry 

The industrial sector employed only about 17 percent of the labor 
force in 1985 but, as a result of much higher labor productivity 
than the agricultural sector, accounted for over 46 percent of 
national income. Industrial units were very diverse in size and tech- 
nological sophistication, ranging from tiny handicraft manufactur- 
ing enterprises to giant modern complexes producing such goods 
as steel, chemical fertilizer, and synthetic fibers. The majority of 
the country's large industrial units were clustered in the major 



234 



Economic Context 



industrial centers in the northeast, the Beijing-Tianjin-Tangshan 
area, the Chang Jiang (Yangtze River) Valley, and Shanghai. Small 
and medium-size units were found throughout the country, and 
a number of first-rank plants were located far from the leading cit- 
ies (see Geographical Distribution of Industry, ch. 7). Ownership 
of industrial enterprises fell into three general categories: state 
ownership, urban collective ownership, and rural collective owner- 
ship. Industry was dominated by the state-owned sector, which 
included the largest, most technically advanced, and most impor- 
tant enterprises. 

In 1985 state-owned enterprises produced 70 percent of national 
industrial output by value, held 75 percent of fixed industrial assets, 
and employed 46 percent of the industrial labor force (including 
rural industrial enterprises). Although all of these units were owned 
by "the state" in the abstract sense, operational control and effec- 
tive ownership of specific enterprises were divided among the differ- 
ent levels of government. A few of the largest enterprises were under 
the direct authority of their respective ministries in the central 
government. Most major enterprises were owned by the province, 
autonomous region, or special municipality where they were located 
or were subject to shared control by the central ministry and the 
provincial-level government. Small and medium-size units usually 
were owned by city, prefecture, county, or town governments. 
Control of some enterprises was shared with higher administra- 
tive levels. 

Workers in state-owned enterprises were paid regular wages 
according to an established pay scale, as well as bonuses that were 
supposed to be related to personal or enterprise performance or 
both. In addition, they received a number of important benefits, 
including free health care, subsidized housing, and subsidies for 
such work-related expenses as special clothing and commuting costs. 
The average income of industrial workers was considerably higher 
than that of most farmers and was much more stable. 

Urban, collectively owned enterprises (owned by the workers) 
for the most part were small units equipped with relatively little 
machinery. Many of these units were engaged in handicraft produc- 
tion or other labor-intensive activities, such as manufacturing fur- 
niture or assembling simple electrical items. In the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, the government promoted them as a means of using 
surplus labor to increase supplies of consumer and export goods. 
By 1985 urban collective industrial enterprises employed over 
17 million people, 20 percent of the total industrial labor force. 
These enterprises held only 13 percent of all industrial fixed assets 
but produced 19 percent of total industrial output value. 



235 



China: A Country Study 



Rural, collectively owned industrial enterprises — commonly 
referred to as "township enterprises" — were the most rapidly grow- 
ing portion of the industrial sector in the mid-1980s. The govern- 
ment regarded them as a means of expanding industrialization 
(without further taxing the overcrowded major urban centers), 
alleviating rural unemployment, and increasing supplies of indus- 
trial products in rural areas. Most of the township enterprises were 
operated by township and town governments, but a large number 
of very small units were operated by private cooperative organiza- 
tions called "rural economic unions." In 1985 township enterprises 
employed 30 million workers, over a third of the total industrial 
labor force. The value of their fixed assets, however, was only 
12 percent of the national total, and their output value came to 
less than 10 percent of the national total. Nonetheless, in 1985 their 
income grew by 44 percent over the 1984 levels. The most com- 
mon products of township industries were building materials, 
agricultural machinery, textiles, and processed foods. 

Other Important Sectors 

Transportation, the postal system, and telecommunications 
employed over 12 million people in 1985. Long-distance transpor- 
tation was carried primarily by railroads, inland waterways, and 
highways. The government-run railroad network was the backbone 
of the freight system, and rail lines extended to nearly all parts of 
China. In most areas, however, the rail system had too few feeder 
lines and was inadequately integrated. Much of the rail system had 
been improved in the 1980s; many heavily used stretches were con- 
verted to double track or upgraded, and several key new lines were 
constructed to relieve congested areas. Most locomotives in use in 
the early 1980s were picturesque but outdated steam engines. By 
1987, however, several railroad districts had converted entirely to 
more modern and efficient diesel or electric locomotives, and domes- 
tic production of modern engines was supplemented by imported 
models. Within their limitations the railroads functioned fairly 
efficiently and made intensive use of the rail network. In 1986 the 
railroads carried 874.5 billion ton-kilometers of freight, 45 percent 
of the national freight total and a 7.8 percent increase over 1985. 
They also carried nearly 1.1 billion passengers, 20 percent of the 
national total. Despite reasonably good performance, the ability 
of the economy to move goods between cities and regions was 
severely limited by deficiencies in the system, and improvement 
of the railroads continued to be a high priority for state investment 
(see Railroads, ch. 8). 

Inland navigation grew more quickly than the rail system and 



236 



Economic Context 



in 1986 carried 827.8 billion ton-kilometers of freight, nearly as 
much as the railroads. The principal inland waterway was the 
Chang Jiang and its tributaries, which constituted the major artery 
linking the industrial and agricultural areas of central China and 
the southwest to the great port and industrial center of Shanghai. 
Improvements to the water routes enabled larger and faster modern 
vessels to use them, extended their navigable length, and reduced 
the amount of time they were closed each year. In addition to 
modern vessels, the lakes, rivers, and canals were plied by thou- 
sands of motorized and nonmotorized traditional craft of all sizes 
(see Inland Waterways, ch. 8). 

Local road networks were extensive, but many were narrow and 
unpaved, and all were overcrowded with trucks, jeeps, buses, carts 
pulled by tractors and animals, bicycles, pedestrians, and grain 
laid out to dry by local farmers. Owing to rapid increases in the 
volume of private and work-unit trucking, highway freight traffic 
was the fastest growing major portion of the transportation sys- 
tem aside from ocean shipping. In 1986 highway freight traffic 
totaled 259.6 billion ton-kilometers, an increase of 47 percent over 
1985, and 80 percent of the volume was carried by vehicles that 
were not managed by state highway departments. In 1986 buses 
served 4.3 billion passengers for relatively short trips (see High- 
ways and Roads, ch. 8). 

Civil aviation provided important links both to isolated areas 
of the country and to foreign nations. It carried, however, only 
a small fraction of total freight and passenger traffic (see Civil Avia- 
tion, ch. 8). 

The service sector expanded quickly during the reform period, 
making up for major deficiencies that had developed in the preced- 
ing quarter century. In the 1950s and 1960s, services were regarded 
as nonproductive and were therefore neglected. During the Cul- 
tural Revolution, they were relentlessly attacked as "remnants of 
capitalism." By the late 1970s, the service trades, such as food ser- 
vice, barbering, laundering, tailoring, and repair work, were seri- 
ously understaffed and were far from able to meet the needs of the 
population. Furthermore, they were all concentrated in large, 
inefficient state-owned units. The service occupations requiring 
advanced training, such as health care, education, and legal ser- 
vices, were decimated by the breakdown of the education system 
during the Cultural Revolution decade. 

Revival of the service sector was a well-publicized goal of the 
reform program. Legalization of private and collective enterprise 
quickly led to the appearance of tinkers, cobblers, tailors, barbers, 
and small food-service stands, particularly in the free markets. 



237 



China: A Country Study 



Between 1978 and 1985, the number of people engaged in the ser- 
vice trades, retail sales, and catering grew from only 6.1 million 
to over 25 million, of whom 21 million were in collective or indi- 
vidual enterprises. In 1986 the government further stimulated the 
growth of the sector by leasing to private individuals or groups a 
large number of small, state-owned, service establishments, includ- 
ing restaurants, repair shops, and barber shops, that had consis- 
tently been operating at a loss under state management. 

Other service sectors that employed significant quantities of labor 
included health care, education and culture, and government 
administration. These sectors were important to the national econ- 
omy and employed over 25 million people. 

China produced nearly all of its own medicines and medical 
equipment, but most hospitals were poorly equipped by Western 
standards. A more serious shortage was the relatively small num- 
ber of doctors and other highly trained medical personnel. In 1985 
some 4.3 million people worked in health-care institutions. Of these, 
1 .4 million were doctors — including 336,000 doctors of traditional 
(rather than Western) medicine, 637,000 were nurses, and 1.4 mil- 
lion were midwives, laboratory technicians, pharmacists, and other 
technical personnel. The number of doctors of Western medicine 
grew by over 35 percent between 1978 and 1985, and renewed con- 
tact with the West opened training opportunities in Europe, the 
United States, and Japan. 

Only a little over 10 percent of all Chinese received free medi- 
cal care. Free care was provided to government workers, military 
personnel, teachers, college students, and workers in state-owned 
enterprises. A portion of the medical expenses incurred by their 
dependent family members was covered by the work units. Most 
rural towns and villages operated voluntary cooperative medical 
systems (see Health Care, ch. 2). 

Educational and cultural institutions employed 12.7 million peo- 
ple in 1985. This total included 871 ,000 teachers and staff in insti- 
tutions of higher education, an increase of 68 percent over the 
number in 1978, reflecting the intensive reconstruction of the edu- 
cation system in the 1980s. There were nearly 8 million people work- 
ing in government administration in 1985. 

Planning 

Until the 1980s the economy was directed and coordinated by 
means of economic plans that were formulated at all levels of 
administration. The reform program significantly reduced the role 
of central planning by encouraging off-plan production by state- 
owned units and by promoting the growth of collective and 



238 



Urban market 
Courtesy Xinhua News Agency 



individual enterprises that did not fall under the planning system. 
The government also endeavored to replace direct plan control with 
indirect guidance of the economy through economic levers, such 
as taxes and investment support. Despite these changes, overall 
direction of the economy was still carried out by the central plan, 
as was allocation of key goods, such as steel and energy. 

When China's planning apparatus was first established in the 
early 1950s, it was patterned after the highly centralized Soviet sys- 
tem. That system basically depended on a central planning bureau- 
cracy that calculated and balanced quantities of major goods 
demanded and supplied. This approach was substantially modi- 
fied during the Great Leap Forward (1958-60; see Glossary), when 
economic management was extensively decentralized. During the 
1960s and 1970s, the degree of centralization in the planning sys- 
tem fluctuated with the political currents, waxing in times of prag- 
matic growth and waning under the influence of the Cultural 
Revolution and the Gang of Four. 

At the national level, planning began in the highest bodies of the 
central government. National economic goals and priorities were de- 
termined by the party's Central Committee, the State Council, and 
the National People's Congress. These decisions were then commu- 
nicated to the ministries, commissions, and other agencies under the 
State Council to be put into effect through national economic plans. 



239 



China: A Country Study 



The State Planning Commission worked with the State Economic 
Commission, State Statistical Bureau, the former State Capital Con- 
struction Commission, People's Bank of China, the economic minis- 
tries, and other organs subordinate to the State Council to formulate 
national plans of varying duration and import. Long-range plans 
as protracted as ten and twelve years also were announced at vari- 
ous times. These essentially were statements of future goals and 
the intended general direction of the economy, and they had little 
direct effect on economic activity. As of late 1987 the most recent 
such long-range plan was the draft plan for 1976-85, presented 
by Hua Guofeng in February 1978. 

The primary form of medium-range plan was the five-year plan, 
another feature adopted from the Soviet system. The purpose of 
the five-year plan was to guide and integrate the annual plans to 
achieve balanced growth and progress toward national goals. In 
practice, this role was only fulfilled by the First Five- Year Plan 
(1953-57), which served effectively as a blueprint for industriali- 
zation. The second (1958-62), third (1966-70), fourth (1971-75), 
and fifth (1976-80) five-year plans were all interrupted by politi- 
cal upheavals and had little influence. The Sixth Five- Year Plan 
(1981-85) was drawn up during the planning period and was more 
a reflection of the results of the reform program than a guide for 
reform. The Seventh Five- Year Plan (1986-90) was intended 
to direct the course of the reforms through the second half of the 
1980s, but by mid- 1987 its future was already clouded by political 
struggle. 

A second form of medium-range planning appeared in the read- 
justment and recovery periods of 1949-52, 1963-65, and 1979-81 , 
each of which followed a period of chaos — the civil war, the Great 
Leap Forward, and the Gang of Four, respectively. In these 
instances, normal long- and medium-range planning was suspended 
while basic imbalances in the economy were targeted and corrected. 
In each case, objectives were more limited and clearly defined than 
in the five-year plans and were fairly successfully achieved. 

The activities of economic units were controlled by annual plans. 
Formulation of the plans began in the autumn preceding the year 
being planned, so that agricultural output for the current year could 
be taken into account. The foundation of an annual plan was a 
"material balance table." At the national level, the first step in 
the preparation of a material balance table was to estimate — for 
each province, autonomous region, special municipality, and 
enterprise under direct central control — the demand and supply 
for each centrally controlled good. Transfers of goods between 
provincial-level units were planned so as to bring quantities 



240 



Economic Context 



supplied and demanded into balance. As a last resort, a serious 
overall deficit in a good could be made up by imports. 

The initial targets were sent to the provincial-level administra- 
tions and the centrally controlled enterprises. The provincial-level 
counterparts of the state economic commissions and ministries broke 
the targets down for allocation among their subordinate counties, 
districts, cities, and enterprises under direct provincial-level con- 
trol. Counties further distributed their assigned quantities among 
their subordinate towns, townships, and county-owned enterprises, 
and cities divided their targets into objectives for the enterprises 
under their jurisdiction. Finally, towns assigned goals to the state- 
owned enterprises they controlled. Agricultural targets were dis- 
tributed by townships among their villages and ultimately were 
reduced to the quantities that villages contracted for with individual 
farm households. 

At each level, individual units received their target input allo- 
cations and output quantities. Managers, engineers, and accoun- 
tants compared the targets with their own projections, and if they 
concluded that the planned output quotas exceeded their capabili- 
ties, they consulted with representatives of the administrative body 
superior to them. Each administrative level adjusted its targets on 
the basis of discussions with subordinate units and sent the revised 
figures back up the planning ladder. The commissions and minis- 
tries evaluated the revised sums, repeated the material balance table 
procedure, and used the results as the final plan, which the State 
Council then officially approved. 

Annual plans formulated at the provincial level provided the 
quantities for centrally controlled goods and established targets for 
goods that were not included in the national plan but were impor- 
tant to the province, autonomous region, or special municipality. 
These figures went through the same process of disaggregation, 
review, discussion, and reaggregation as the centrally planned tar- 
gets and eventually became part of the provincial-level unit's annual 
plan. Many goods that were not included at the provincial level 
were similarly added to county and city plans. 

The final stage of the planning process occurred in the individual 
producing units. Having received their output quotas and the 
figures for their allocations of capital, labor, and other supplies, 
enterprises generally organized their production schedules into ten- 
day, one-month, three-month, and six-month plans. 

The Chinese planning system has encountered the same problems 
of inflexibility and inadequate responsiveness that have emerged 
in other centrally planned economies. The basic difficulty has been 
that it is impossible for planners to foresee all the needs of the 



241 



China: A Country Study 

economy and to specify adequately the characteristics of planned 
inputs and products. Beginning in 1979 and 1980, the first reforms 
were introduced on an experimental basis. Nearly all of these poli- 
cies increased the autonomy and decision-making power of the vari- 
ous economic units and reduced the direct role of central planning. 
By the mid-1980s planning still was the government's main mecha- 
nism for guiding the economy and correcting imbalances, but its 
ability to predict and control the behavior of the economy had been 
greatly reduced. 

The Budget 

The nature of the state budget also was significantly altered by 
the reform program. Before 1979 the state budget was the finan- 
cial component of the national economic plan. It was made up of 
the budgets of both the central government and the local govern- 
ments and included the revenues and expenditures of all state-owned 
enterprises. All profits from state enterprises were remitted to the 
state budget, and investment funds were allocated from the state 
budget. Under the reform, there was increased separation of enter- 
prises from direct state control. Enterprises now paid proportional 
taxes on their incomes rather than remitting their entire profits to 
the state. Investment funds were, in principle, no longer to be 
allocated directly to state enterprises from the state budget but were 
to be obtained from the banking system in the form of interest- 
bearing loans. 

In 1985 total state revenues of ¥186.6 billion included ¥51 .4 
billion in income taxes from state-owned enterprises and only 
¥4.4 billion in enterprise incomes. The largest category of revenues 
was industrial and commercial taxes, which amounted to ¥110.1 
billion. Agricultural taxes were ¥4. 2 billion, continuing the previ- 
ous policy of levying only negligible taxes on the farm sector. 
Revenues also included borrowing equal to ¥9 billion, a practice 
followed annually since 1978. As of 1983 roughly 30 percent of total 
revenues were collected by the central government and 70 percent 
by local governments, while each accounted for about 50 percent 
of expenditures. 

In 1985 the largest category of budget expenditure was appropria- 
tions for capital construction, which received 31.3 percent of the 
total allotment. Culture, education, science, and public health con- 
stituted the next largest category, with 17 percent of expenditures. 
National defense, which averaged 19 percent of budgetary expen- 
ditures in the 1960s and 1970s, received only 10.3 percent of the 
total in 1985. Administrative expenses were 7.7 percent of the bud- 
get and new technology in enterprises 5.5 percent. In 1984 the 



242 



Economic Context 



state paid out ¥37 billion in price subsidies, an amount equal to 
24 percent of total expenditures in that year. The bulk of the 
subsidies — ¥32 billion — was for consumer goods. 

An important function of the state budget was to transfer 
resources from prosperous regions to poor regions. The budgets 
that were finally approved by the Ministry of Finance for the 
provinces, autonomous regions, and special municipalities allowed 
surplus funds from affluent areas to be transferred to cover planned 
expenditures in the deficit areas, while bringing the budget for the 
entire country into balance. The resulting pattern of revenue sharing 
between provincial-level administrations and the central govern- 
ment was one in which the advanced industrialized regions paid 
a much higher rate of net taxation than most areas, and the least- 
developed regions were heavily subsidized. For example, in 1985 
Shanghai remitted ¥8. 4 billion in profits and taxes, equal to 4.5 per- 
cent of national budget revenues, although it had only 1.1 percent 
of the national population. 

The Banking System 

The history of the Chinese banking system has been somewhat 
checkered. Nationalization and consolidation of the country's banks 
received the highest priority in the earliest years of the People's 
Republic, and banking was the first sector to be completely social- 
ized. In the period of recovery after the Chinese civil war (1949-52), 
the People's Bank of China moved very effectively to halt raging 
inflation and bring the nation's finances under central control. Over 
the course of time, the banking organization was modified repeat- 
edly to suit changing conditions and new policies. 

The banking system was centralized early on under the Minis- 
try of Finance, which exercised firm control over all financial ser- 
vices, credit, and the money supply. During the 1980s the banking 
system was expanded and diversified to meet the needs of the reform 
program, and the scale of banking activity rose sharply. New 
budgetary procedures required state enterprises to remit to the state 
only a tax on income and to seek investment funds in the form 
of bank loans. Between 1979 and 1985, the volume of deposits near- 
ly tripled and the value of bank loans rose by 260 percent. By 1987 
the banking system included the People's Bank of China, Agricul- 
tural Bank, Bank of China (which handled foreign exchange mat- 
ters), China Investment Bank, China Industrial and Commercial 
Bank, People's Construction Bank, Communications Bank, Peo- 
ple's Insurance Company of China, rural credit cooperatives, and 
urban credit cooperatives. 



243 



China: A Country Study 

The People's Bank of China was the eentral bank and the foun- 
dation of the banking system. Although the bank overlapped in 
function with the Ministry of Finance and lost many of its respon- 
sibilities during the Cultural Revolution, in the 1970s it was restored 
to its leading position. As the central bank, the People's Bank of 
China had sole responsibility for issuing currency and controlling 
the money supply. It also served as the government treasury, the 
main source of credit for economic units, the clearing center for 
financial transactions, the holder of enterprise deposits, the national 
savings bank, and a ubiquitous monitor of economic activities. 

Another financial institution, the Bank of China, handled all deal- 
ings in foreign exchange. It was responsible for allocating the coun- 
try's foreign exchange reserves, arranging foreign loans, setting 
exchange rates for China's currency, issuing letters of credit, and 
generally carrying out all financial transactions with foreign firms 
and individuals. The Bank of China had offices in Beijing and other 
cities engaged in foreign trade and maintained overseas offices in 
major international financial centers, including Hong Kong, Lon- 
don, New York, Singapore, and Luxembourg. 

The Agricultural Bank was created in the 1950s to facilitate finan- 
cial operations in the rural areas. The Agricultural Bank provided 
financial support to agricultural units. It issued loans, handled state 
appropriations for agriculture, directed the operations of the rural 
credit cooperatives, and carried out overall supervision of rural 
financial affairs. The Agricultural Bank was headquartered in Bei- 
jing and had a network of branches throughout the country. It 
flourished in the late 1950s and mid-1960s but languished there- 
after until the late 1970s, when the functions and autonomy of the 
Agricultural Bank were increased substantially to help promote 
higher agricultural production. In the 1980s it was restructured 
again and given greater authority in order to support the growth 
and diversification of agriculture under the responsibility system. 

The People's Construction Bank managed state appropriations 
and loans for capital construction. It checked the activities of loan 
recipients to ensure that the funds were used for their designated 
construction purpose. Money was disbursed in stages as a project 
progressed. The reform policy shifted the main source of invest- 
ment funding from the government budget to bank loans and 
increased the responsibility and activities of the People's Construc- 
tion Bank. 

Rural credit cooperatives were small, collectively owned savings 
and lending organizations that were the main source of small-scale 
financial services at the local level in the countryside. They han- 
dled deposits and short-term loans for individual farm families, 



244 



Economic Context 



villages, and cooperative organizations. Subject to the direction 
of the Agricultural Bank, they followed uniform state banking poli- 
cies but acted as independent units for accounting purposes. In 
1985 rural credit cooperatives held total deposits of ¥72.5 billion. 

Urban credit cooperatives were a relatively new addition to the 
banking system in the mid-1980s, when they first began widespread 
operations. As commercial opportunities grew in the reform period, 
the thousands of individual and collective enterprises that sprang 
up in urban areas created a need for small-scale financial services 
that the formal banks were not prepared to meet. Bank officials 
therefore encouraged the expansion of urban credit cooperatives 
as a valuable addition to the banking system. In 1986 there were 
more than 1,100 urban credit cooperatives, which held a total 
of ¥3.7 billion in deposits and made loans worth ¥1.9 billion. 

In the mid-1980s the banking system still lacked some of the 
services and characteristics that were considered basic in most coun- 
tries. Interbank relations were very limited, and interbank bor- 
rowing and lending were virtually unknown. Checking accounts 
were used by very few individuals, and bank credit cards did not 
exist. In 1986 initial steps were taken in some of these areas. Inter- 
bank borrowing and lending networks were created among twenty- 
seven cities along the Chang Jiang and among fourteen cities in 
north China. Interregional financial networks were created to link 
banks in eleven leading cities all over China, including Shenyang, 
Guangzhou, Wuhan, Chongqing, and Xi'an and also to link the 
branches of the Agricultural Bank. The first Chinese credit card, 
the Great Wall Card, was introduced in June 1986 to be used for 
foreign exchange transactions. Another financial innovation in 1986 
was the opening of China's first stock exchanges since 1949. Small 
stock exchanges began operations somewhat tentatively in Shen- 
yang, Liaoning Province, in August 1986 and in Shanghai in Sep- 
tember 1986. 

Throughout the history of the People's Republic, the banking 
system has exerted close control over financial transactions and the 
money supply. All government departments, publicly and collec- 
tively owned economic units, and social, political, military, and 
educational organizations were required to hold their financial 
balances as bank deposits. They were also instructed to keep on 
hand only enough cash to meet daily expenses; all major financial 
transactions were to be conducted through banks. Payment for 
goods and services exchanged by economic units was accomplished 
by debiting the account of the purchasing unit and crediting that 
of the selling unit by the appropriate amount. This practice effec- 
tively helped to minimize the need for currency. 



245 



China: A Country Study 



Since 1949 China's leaders have urged the Chinese people to 
build up personal savings accounts to reduce the demand for con- 
sumer goods and increase the amount of capital available for 
investment. Small branch offices of savings banks were conveniently 
located throughout the urban areas. In the countryside savings were 
deposited with the rural credit cooperatives, which could be found 
in most towns and villages. In 1986 savings deposits for the entire 
country totaled over ¥223.7 billion. 

Prices 

Determination of Prices 

Until the reform period of the late 1970s and 1980s, the prices 
of most commodities were set by government agencies and changed 
infrequently. Because prices did not change when production costs 
or demand for a commodity altered, they often failed to reflect the 
true values of goods, causing many kinds of goods to be misallo- 
cated and producing a price system that the Chinese government 
itself referred to as "irrational." 

The best way to generate the accurate prices required for eco- 
nomic efficiency is through the process of supply and demand, and 
government policy in the 1980s increasingly advocated the use of 
prices that were "mutually agreed upon by buyer and seller," that 
is, determined through the market. The prices of products in the 
farm produce free markets were determined by supply and demand, 
and in the summer of 1985 the state store prices of all food items 
except grain also were allowed to float in response to market con- 
ditions. Prices of most goods produced by private and collectively 
owned enterprises in both rural and urban areas generally were 
free to float, as were the prices of many items that state-owned enter- 
prises produced outside the plan. Prices of most major goods 
produced by state-owned enterprises, however, along with the grain 
purchased from farmers by state commercial departments for retail 
sales in the cities, still were set or restricted by government agen- 
cies and still were not sufficiently accurate. 

In 1987 the price structure in China was chaotic. Some prices 
were determined in the market through the forces of supply and 
demand, others were set by government agencies, and still others 
were produced by procedures that were not clearly defined. In many 
cases, there was more than one price for the same commodity, 
depending on how it was exchanged, the kind of unit that produced 
it, or who the buyer was. While the government was not pleased 
with this situation, it was committed to continued price reform. 
It was reluctant, however, to release the remaining fixed prices 



246 



Selling fish under the floating-price policy, Jiangsu Province 

Courtesy Xinhua News Agency 



247 



China: A Country Study 



because of potential political and economic disruption. Sudden 
unpredictable price changes would leave consumers unable to con- 
tinue buying some goods; some previously profitable enterprises 
under the old price structure would begin to take losses, and others 
would abruptly become very wealthy. 

The Role of Prices 

As a result of the economic reform program and the increased 
importance of market exchange and profitability, in the 1980s prices 
played a central role in determining the production and distribu- 
tion of goods in most sectors of the economy. Previously, in the 
strict centrally planned system, enterprises had been assigned output 
quotas and inputs in physical terms. Now, under the reform pro- 
gram, the incentive to show a positive profit caused even state- 
owned enterprises to choose inputs and products on the basis of 
prices whenever possible. State-owned enterprises could not alter 
the amounts or prices of goods they were required to produce by 
the plan, but they could try to increase their profits by purchasing 
inputs as inexpensively as possible, and their off-plan production 
decisions were based primarily on price considerations. Prices were 
the main economic determinant of production decisions in agricul- 
ture and in private and collectively owned industrial enterprises 
despite the fact that regulations, local government fees or harass- 
ment, or arrangements based on personal connections often pre- 
vented enterprises from carrying out those decisions. 

Consumer goods were allocated to households by the price 
mechanism, except for rationed grain. Families decided what com- 
modities to buy on the basis of the prices of the goods in relation 
to household income. 

Problems in Price Policy 

The grain market was a typical example of a situation in which 
the government was confronted with major problems whether it 
allowed the irrational price structure to persist or carried out price 
reform. State commercial agencies paid farmers a higher price for 
grain than the state received from the urban residents to whom 
they sold it. In 1985 state commercial agencies paid farmers an 
average price of Y416.4 per ton of grain and then sold it in the 
cities at an average price of ¥383. 3 a ton, for a loss of ¥33.1 per 
ton. Ninety million tons were sold under this arrangement, caus- 
ing the government to lose nearly ¥3 billion. If the state reduced 
the procurement price, farmers would reduce their grain produc- 
tion. Because grain was the staple Chinese diet, this result was 
unacceptable. If the state increased the urban retail price to equal 



248 



Economic Context 



the procurement price, the cost of the main food item for Chinese 
families would rise 9 percent, generating enormous resentment. 
But even this alternative would probably not entirely resolve the 
problem, as the average free-market price of grain — ¥510.5 a ton 
in 1987 — indicated that its true value was well above the state 
procurement price. 

There was no clear solution to the price policy dilemma. The 
approach of the government was to encourage the growth of non- 
planned economic activity and thereby expand the proportion of 
prices determined by market forces. These market prices could then 
serve as a guide for more accurate pricing of planned items. It was 
likely that the Chinese economy would continue to operate with 
a dual price system for some years to come. 

Inflation 

One of the most striking manifestations of economic instability 
in China in the 1930s and 1940s was runaway inflation. Inflation 
peaked during the Chinese civil war of the late 1940s, when whole- 
sale prices in Shanghai increased 7.5 million times in the space of 
3 years. In the early 1950s, stopping inflation was a major govern- 
ment objective, accomplished through currency reform, unifica- 
tion and nationalization of the banks, and tight control over prices 
and the money supply. These measures were continued until 1979, 
and China achieved a remarkable record of price stability. Between 
1952 and 1978, retail prices for consumer goods grew at an aver- 
age rate of only 0.6 percent a year. 

During the reform period, higher levels of inflation appeared 
when government controls were reduced. The first serious jump 
in the cost of living for urban residents occurred in 1980, when 
consumer prices rose by 7.5 percent. In 1985 the increase was 
11.9 percent, and in 1986 it was 7.6 percent. There were several 
basic reasons for this burst of inflation after thirty years of steady 
prices. First, the years before the reform saw a generally high rate 
of investment and concentration on the manufacture of producer 
goods. The resultant shortage of consumer commodities caused a 
gradual accumulation of excess demand: personal savings were rela- 
tively large, and, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, there was a 
booming market for such expensive consumer durables as watches 
and television sets. Second, the real value of many items changed 
as some resources became more scarce and as technology altered 
both manufacturing processes and products. The real cost of produc- 
ing agricultural products rose with the increased use of modern 
inputs. Manufactured consumer goods that were more technologi- 
cally advanced and more expensive than those previously on the 



249 



China: A Country Study 



market — such as washing machines and color television sets — 
became available. 

During the early 1980s, both consumer incomes and the amount 
of money in circulation increased fairly rapidly and. at times, 
unexpectedly. Consumer incomes grew because of the reform pro- 
gram's emphasis on material incentives and because of the overall 
expansion in productivity and income-earning possibilities. The 
higher profits earned and retained by enterprises were passed on 
to workers, in many cases, in the form of wage hikes, bonuses, 
and higher subsidies. At the same time, the expanded and diversi- 
fied role of the banking system caused the amounts of loans and 
deposits to increase at times beyond officially sanctioned levels, 
injecting unplanned new quantities of currency into the economy. 

Living Standards 
Progress since 1949 

Before 1949 the Chinese economy was characterized by 
widespread poverty, extreme income inequalities, and endemic 
insecurity of livelihood. By means of centralized economic plan- 
ning, the People's Republic was able to redistribute national income 
so as to provide the entire population with at least the minimal 
necessities of life (except during the kk three bad years" of 1959, 
1960, and 1961) and to consistently allocate a relatively high propor- 
tion of national income to productive investment. Equally impor- 
tant to the quality of life were the results of mass public-health and 
sanitation campaigns, which rid the country of most of the condi- 
tions that had bred epidemics and lingering disease in the past. 
The most concrete evidence of improved living standards was that 
average national life expectancy more than doubled, rising from 
around thirty-two years in 1949 to sixty-nine years in 1985 (see 
Mortality and Fertility; Health Care, ch. 2). 

In 1987 the standard of living in China was much lower than 
in the industrialized countries, but nearly all Chinese people had 
adequate food, clothing, and housing. In addition, there was a posi- 
tive trend toward rapid improvements in living conditions in the 
1980s as a result of the economic reforms, though improvements 
in the standard of living beyond the basic level came slowly. Until 
the end of the 1970s, the fruits of economic growth were largely 
negated by population increases, which prevented significant 
advances in the per capita availability of food, clothing, and hous- 
ing beyond levels achieved in the 1950s (see Population, ch. 2). 
The second major change in the standard of living came about as 
a result of the rapid expansion of productivitv and commerce 



250 



Economic Context 



generated by the reform measures of the 1980s. After thirty years 
of austerity and marginal sufficiency, Chinese consumers suddenly 
were able to buy more than enough to eat from a growing variety 
of food items. Stylish clothing, modern furniture, and a wide array 
of electrical appliances also became part of the normal expectations 
of ordinary Chinese families. 

Food 

While food production rose substantially after 1949, population 
increases were nearly as great until the 1980s. Production of grain, 
the source of about 75 percent of the calories in the Chinese diet, 
grew at an average rate of 2.7 percent a year between 1952 and 
1979, while population growth averaged almost 2 percent a year. 
Total grain output per capita grew from 288 kilograms a year in 
1952 to 319 kilograms in 1978, an increase of only 11 percent in 
26 years. In 1984, however, a remarkably good harvest produced 
396 kilograms of grain per capita, an increase of 24 percent in only 
6 years. In 1985 grain output fell below the peak level of 1984, 
to 365 kilograms per person, and recovered only partially in 1986 
to 369 kilograms per capita (see table B; Crops, ch. 6). 

Other important food items that remained in short supply before 
the economic reforms included edible oil, sugar, and aquatic prod- 
ucts. Production of oil-bearing crops increased at an average rate 
of about 2 percent a year from 1952 to 1979, and annual consump- 
tion of edible oil was less than 2 kilograms per person in 1979. 
Between 1978 and 1985, output grew at over 16 percent a year, 
and annual consumption increased to 5.1 kilograms per person. 
Sugar production grew at an average annual rate of 4.5 percent 
after 1952, but in 1979 consumption per person still was only 
3.5 kilograms per year. From 1979 to 1985, sugar production grew 
by 10 percent a year, and the total amount of sugar available per 
person rose to 5.6 kilograms in 1985. Output of aquatic products 
rose at an average rate of only 2 percent a year between 1957 and 
1978 and declined slightly in 1979; between 1979 and 1985, 
however, output grew at an average rate of 8.5 percent a year, and 
individual annual consumption rose from 3.2 kilograms to 
4.9 kilograms. 

Pork, eggs, and vegetables were increasingly available before the 
1980s (see Animal Husbandry, ch. 6). Annual consumption of 
pork — the most commonly eaten meat in China — grew from 
5.9 kilograms per person in 1952 to 7.5 kilograms per person in 
the mid-1970s. In 1979 a sharp increase in procurement prices for 
pork brought about a surge in supply — to 9.6 kilograms per per- 
son. Beginning in 1980, availability increased steadily, reaching 



251 



China: A Country Study 



14 kilograms of pork per capita in 1985, an increase of 9 percent 
each year from 1978. Consumption of fresh eggs followed a simi- 
lar pattern, climbing from an average of just over one kilogram 
per person in 1952 to almost two kilograms in 1978. The economic 
reforms elicited rapid increases in the supply of eggs, as they had 
with pork, and by 1985 consumption had more than doubled, to 
5 kilograms of eggs per person a year, for an increase of over 
14 percent a year. 

Vegetables were the major supplement to grain in the Chinese 
diet and were very important nutritionally. In 1957 annual vegetable 
consumption per capita in Chinese cities averaged 109 kilograms 
and by 1981 had grown to 152 kilograms. Household survey data 
indicated that in 1985 vegetable consumption had leveled off, at 
148 kilograms per person per year in urban areas and 131 kilo- 
grams in the countryside, as people used their higher incomes to 
increase their purchases of more expensive foods, such as meat, 
fish, and edible oil. 

As of the late 1970s, famine and malnutrition were no longer 
major problems in China, but the average diet lacked variety and 
provided little more than basic nutritional requirements. Protein, 
in particular, was barely adequate for health maintenance. By the 
mid-1980s the availability of food had improved dramatically. 
Bustling street markets offered a good variety of fruits and vegeta- 
bles throughout the year, and per capita consumption of high- 
protein foods — meat, poultry, eggs, and fish — increased by 
63 percent over the 1979 level, to nearly 27 kilograms a year in 
1985. 

Clothing 

Before the reform period, clothing purchases were restricted by 
rationing. Cotton cloth consumption was limited to between four 
and six meters a year per person in the 1970s. In the 1980s one 
of the most visible signs of the economic "revolution" was the 
appearance in Chinese cities of large quantities of relatively modern, 
varied, colorful, Western-style clothes, a sharp contrast to the mono- 
tone image of blue and gray suits that typified Chinese dress in 
earlier years. Cloth consumption increased from eight meters per 
person in 1978 to almost twelve meters in 1985, and rationing was 
ended in the early 1980s. Production of synthetic fibers more than 
tripled during this period; in 1985 synthetics constituted 40 per- 
cent of the cloth purchased (see Textiles, ch. 7). Consumers also 
tripled their purchases of woolen fabrics in these years and bought 
growing numbers of garments made of silk, leather, or down. In 
1987 Chinese department stores and street markets carried clothing 



252 



Economic Context 




253 



China: A Country Study 



in a large variety of styles, colors, quality, and prices. Many peo- 
ple displayed their new affluence with relatively expensive and styl- 
ish clothes, while those with more modest tastes or meager incomes 
still could adequately outfit themselves at very low cost. 

Consumer Goods 

As with food supplies and clothing, the availability of housewares 
went through several stages. Simple, inexpensive household items, 
like thermoses, cooking pans, and clocks were stocked in depart- 
ment stores and other retail outlets all over China from the 1950s 
on. Relatively expensive consumer durables became available more 
gradually. In the 1960s production and sales of bicycles, sewing 
machines, wristwatches, and transistor radios grew to the point that 
these items became common household possessions, followed in 
the late 1970s by television sets and cameras (see Other Consumer 
Goods, ch. 7). In the 1980s supplies of furniture and electrical 
appliances increased along with family incomes. Household sur- 
vey data indicated that by 1985 most urban families owned two 
bicycles, at least one sofa, a writing desk, a wardrobe, a sewing 
machine, an electric fan, a radio, and a television. Virtually all 
urban adults owned wristwatches, half of all families had washing 
machines, 10 percent had refrigerators, and over 18 percent owned 
color televisions. Rural households on average owned about half 
the number of consumer durables owned by urban dwellers. Most 
farm families had 1 bicycle, about half had a radio, 43 percent 
owned a sewing machine, 12 percent had a television set, and about 
half the rural adults owned wristwatches. 

Housing 

Housing construction in towns and cities lagged behind urban 
population growth. A 1978 survey of housing conditions in 192 cit- 
ies found that their combined population had increased by 
83 percent between 1949 and 1978, but housing floor space had 
only grown by 46.7 percent. In 1978 there were only 3.6 square 
meters of living space per inhabitant in these cities, a reduction 
of 0.9 square meter since 1949. To remedy this problem, construc- 
tion of modern urban housing became a top priority in the late 
1970s, and by the mid-1980s new high-rise apartment blocks and 
the tall cranes used in their construction were ubiquitous features 
of large cities. Some apartments in the new buildings had their own 
lavatories, kitchens, and balconies, but others shared communal 
facilities. Nearly all were of much higher quality than older houses, 
many of which were built of mud bricks and lacked plumbing. 

By 1981 living space in urban housing had increased to 5.3 square 



254 



Economic Context 



meters per person, and by 1985 the figure was 6.7 square meters 
(see Housing Construction, ch. 7). Despite this progress, scarcity 
of housing continued to be a major problem in the cities, and many 
young married couples had to live with parents or make do with 
a single room (see Housing, ch. 3). 

Housing conditions in rural areas varied widely. During the 1960s 
and 1970s, thousands of production brigades built sturdy, sani- 
tary houses and apartments and in many cases entire new villages. 
With the introduction of the responsibility system and the more 
than doubling of rural incomes in the early 1980s, another wave 
of housing construction took place as farm families moved quickly 
to invest in their major personal assets — their homes — which for 
the most part were privately owned. Many farm family houses 
lacked running water, but virtually all had electricity and were con- 
siderably more spacious than urban dwellings. In 1980 farm homes 
averaged 9.4 square meters of living space per person, and by 1985 
the figure had risen to 14.7 square meters. Despite extensive con- 
struction of new housing, in poorer regions some farm families still 
lived in traditional dwellings, such as mud-brick and thatch houses 
or, in some regions, cave houses. Many of the nomadic herders 
in Nei Monggol, Xinjiang, and Xizang (Tibet) autonomous regions 
still lived in tents or felt yurts. In the Chang Jiang Valley and in 
south China, some fishing and boat transportation communities 
continued to live on their vessels (see Minority Nationalities, ch. 2). 

Income Distribution 

Income differences in China since the 1950s have been much 
smaller than in most other countries. There was never any attempt, 
however, at complete equalization, and a wide range of income 
levels remained. Income differences grew even wider in the 1980s 
as the economic reform policies opened up new income opportu- 
nities. More than two-thirds of all urban workers were employed 
in state-owned units, which used an eight-grade wage system. The 
pay for each grade differed from one industry to another, but gener- 
ally workers in the most senior grades earned about three times 
as much as beginning workers, senior managers could earn half 
again as much as senior workers, and engineers could earn twice 
as much as senior workers. In 1985 the average annual income 
of people employed in state-owned units was ¥1,2 13. An impor- 
tant component of workers' pay was made up of bonuses and sub- 
sidies. In 1985 bonuses contributed 13 percent of the incomes of 
workers in state-owned units; subsidies for transportation, food, 
and clothing added another 15 percent. One of the most impor- 
tant subsidies — one that did not appear in the income figures — 



255 



China: A Country Study 



was for housing, nearly all of which was owned and allocated by 
the work unit and rented to unit members at prices well below real 
value. In 1985 urban consumers spent just over 1 percent of their 
incomes on housing (see Wages and Benefits; Urban Society, ch. 3). 

The 27 percent of the urban labor force that was employed in 
collectively owned enterprises earned less on average than workers 
in state-owned units. The income of workers in collectively owned 
enterprises consisted of a share of the profit earned by the enter- 
prise. Most such enterprises were small, had little capital, and did 
not earn large profits. Many were engaged in traditional services, 
handicrafts, or small-scale, part-time assembly work. In 1985 work- 
ers in urban collective units earned an average annual income 
of ¥968. In the more open commercial environment of the 1980s, 
a small but significant number of people earned incomes much 
larger than those in regular state-owned and collectively owned 
units. Employees of enterprises run by overseas Chinese (see Glos- 
sary), for instance, earned an average of ¥2,437 in 1985, over twice 
the average income of workers in state-owned units. 

The small but dynamic domestic private sector also produced 
some lucrative opportunities. Private, part-time schools, which 
appeared in large numbers in the mid-1980s, offered moonlight- 
ing work to university professors, who could double or triple their 
modest incomes if they were from prestigious institutions and taught 
desirable subjects, such as English, Japanese, or electronics. Small- 
scale entrepreneurs could earn considerably more in the free mar- 
kets than the average income. Business people who served as a 
liaison between foreign firms and the domestic economy could earn 
incomes many times higher than those of the best-paid employees 
of state-owned units. A handful of millionaire businessmen could 
be found in the biggest cities. These people had owned firms before 
1949, cooperated with the government in the 1950s in return for 
stock in their firms, and then lost their incomes in the political tur- 
moil of the Cultural Revolution. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
when these businessmen were politically rehabilitated, their incomes 
were returned with the accrued interest, and some suddenly found 
themselves quite wealthy. Although the number of people earning 
incomes far beyond the normal wage scale was tiny relative to the 
population, they were important symbols of the rewards of eco- 
nomic reform and received a great deal of media attention. In 1985 
most of these people worked in enterprises classified as "units of 
other ownership" (private rather than state- or collectively owned 
enterprises). These enterprises employed only 440,000 people out 
of the total urban labor force of 128 million in 1985 and paid 



256 



Shuangyushu department store in Beijing; the sign advertises 

fabrics, apparel, shoes, and hats. 
Courtesy R inn-Sup Shinn 

average annual salaries of ¥1,373, only slightly higher than the 
overall urban national average. 

In China, as in other countries, an important determinant of 
the affluence of a household was the dependency ratio — the num- 
ber of nonworkers supported by each worker. In 1985 the average 
cost of living for one person in urban areas was ¥732 a year, and 
the average state enterprise worker, even with food allowance and 
other benefits added to the basic wage, had difficulty supporting 
one other person. Two average wage earners, however, could eas- 
ily support one dependent. Families with several workers and few 
or no dependents had substantial surplus earnings, which they saved 
or used to buy nonessential goods. An important positive influence 
on the per capita consumption levels of urban families was a decline 
in the number of dependents per urban worker, from 2.4 in 1964 
to 0.7 in 1985. In farm families the dependency ratio fell from 1.5 
in 1978 to 0.7 in 1985. Farm incomes rose rapidly in the 1980s 
under the stimulus of the responsibility system but on average 
remained considerably lower than urban incomes. Household sur- 
veys found that in 1985 average net per capita income for rural 
residents was ¥398, less than half the average per capita urban 
income, which was ¥821. The value of goods farmers produced 
and consumed themselves accounted for 31 percent of rural income 



257 



China: A Country Study 



in 1985. The largest component of income in kind was food, 
58 percent of which was self-produced. 

Farm family members on average consumed much less of most 
major kinds of goods than urban residents. For instance, a house- 
hold survey found in 1985 that the average urban dweller consumed 
148 kilograms of vegetables, 20 kilograms of meat, 2.6 kilograms 
of sugar, and 8 kilograms of liquor. At the same time, a survey 
of rural households found that the average rural resident consumed 
131 kilograms of vegetables, 11 kilograms of meat, 1.5 kilograms 
of sugar, and 4 kilograms of liquor. Differences of a similar nature 
existed for consumer durables. 

Another indication of the gap between urban and rural income 
levels was the difference in personal savings accounts, which in 1985 
averaged Y277 per capita for urban residents but only ¥85 per cap- 
ita for the rural population. There was great variation in rural in- 
come levels among different provincial-level units, counties, towns, 
villages, and individual families. While the average net per capita 
income for rural residents in 1985 was ¥398, provincial-level aver- 
ages ranged from a high of ¥805 for farm families living in Shang- 
hai to a low of ¥255 for the rural population of Gansu Province. 

The fundamental influence on rural prosperity was geography 
(see Physical Environment, ch. 2). Soil type and quality, rainfall, 
temperature range, drainage, and availability of water determined 
the kinds and quantities of crops that could be grown. Equally 
important geographic factors were access to transportation routes 
and proximity to urban areas (see Internal Trade and Distribu- 
tion, ch. 8). 

The highest agricultural incomes were earned by suburban units 
that were able to sell produce and sideline products in the nearby 
cities. Under the responsibility system, household incomes depended 
on the number of workers in each household and the household's 
success in holding down production costs and in supplying goods 
and services to local markets. Most of the rural families with the 
highest incomes — the "10,000-yuan households" — were "special- 
ized households" that concentrated family efforts on supplying a 
particular service or good. Many of these families owned their own 
equipment, such as trucks or specialized buildings, and operated 
essentially as private concerns. 

An increasingly important influence on rural incomes in the 
mid-1980s was the expansion of nonagricultural rural enterprises, 
often referred to as "township enterprises." These were factories, 
construction teams, and processing operations, most of which were 
owned by collectives, primarily villages, towns, and townships. 
Some were owned by voluntary groups of families. Township 



258 



Economic Context 



enterprises were considered by the government to be the main 
source of employment for rural workers who were leaving agricul- 
ture because of rising productivity under the responsibility system. 
By the end of 1986, township enterprises employed 21 percent of 
the rural labor force. The movement of rural labor into township 
enterprises helped to increase average rural incomes because of the 
higher productivity in nonagricultural jobs. In 1986 industrial work- 
ers in rural areas produced an average annual value of ¥4,300 per 
person, compared with about ¥1,000 per farmer in the same year. 

The change in farm production from primarily collective to 
primarily household operations is reflected in household survey data 
on the sources of rural incomes. Before the 1980s farmers received 
income in the form of shares of the profits earned by their produc- 
tion teams plus supplementary income from household sideline 
activities. In 1978 two-thirds of the net income of farm families 
came from the collective, and only 27 percent was derived from 
household production. With the shift to the responsibility system 
these ratios were reversed. By 1982 the collective provided only 
21 percent of farm income, while household production provided 
69 percent. In 1985 the collective share of farm income had fallen 
to just over 8 percent, and the family production share had risen 
to 81 percent. 

Perhaps the most serious gaps in living standards between rural 
and urban areas were in education and health care. Primary schools 
existed in most rural localities, and 80 percent of the country's 
primary-school teachers worked in rural schools. Secondary schools 
were less widely distributed; only 57 percent of the total number 
of secondary-school teachers served in rural schools. Most rural 
schools were less well equipped and their staffs less adequately 
trained than their urban counterparts. Health care had been greatly 
improved in rural areas in the 1960s and 1970s through sanitation 
campaigns and the introduction of large numbers of barefoot doc- 
tors (see Glossary), midwives, and health workers. Most modern 
hospitals, fully trained doctors, and modern medical equipment, 
however, were located in urban areas and were not easily accessi- 
ble to rural families. In 1985 two-thirds of all hospital beds and 
medical staff personnel were located in urban hospitals. The eco- 
nomic reforms affected rural education and health care positively 
in places where farm communities used their higher incomes to 
improve schools and hospitals and negatively in localities where 
the reduced role of the collective resulted in deterioration of col- 
lective services (see Health Care, ch. 2; Primary Education, ch. 4; 
Secondary Education, ch. 4). 



259 



China: A Country Study 

Potential for Achieving National Goals 

By 1987, under the stimulus of the reform program, the Chinese 
economy had made major strides toward achieving modernization 
and improved living standards. The potential for further improve- 
ments in efficiency and productivity was greatly increased by the 
revival of the education system, the opening of the economy to 
broader trade and cooperation with other countries, the expanded 
use of the market to enliven commerce and production, and the 
increased decision-making power of individual economic units (see 
Modernization Goals in the 1980s, ch. 4; Trade Policy in the 1980s, 
ch. 8). 

The country's most important resource was its labor force, the 
largest in the world. The rapid expansion and improvement of the 
education system that began in the late 1970s was creating larger 
numbers of workers who were skilled and well educated, as well 
as the first substantial numbers of advanced-degree holders to staff 
the nation's universities and research institutes. In addition, the 
decentralization of management encouraged the participation in 
planning and decision making of growing numbers of local and 
enterprise-level managers, planners, administrators, and scientists. 
It also trained future economic leaders for higher administrative 
responsibilities. 

In terms of material resources, China was adequately endowed 
to meet the needs of modernization in all but a few materials. Under 
the new policy of encouraging cooperation and joint ventures with 
foreign firms, advanced technology was more widely used to exploit 
China's large deposits of iron ore and other important minerals, 
along with the country's vast coal and petroleum reserves and its 
enormous hydroelectric potential — the largest in the world. Much 
of the investment in expanding the transportation network in the 
1980s was aimed at improving access to previously remote mineral 
and energy resources for both domestic needs and foreign trade. 

The most stringent resource constraint was the limited amount 
of arable land, which actually declined in the 1980s as cropland 
was appropriated for new rural housing and urban expansion. 
Between 1978 and 1985, the total area sown to crops declined by 
over 4 percent. The loss of farmland, however, was more than com- 
pensated for by improved productivity of the land that remained 
under cultivation. Farmers expanded the irrigated area, increased 
fertilizer application, acquired improved crop varieties, and made 
better use of comparative advantage in determining which crops 
to grow, resulting in an average rate of growth in the value of crop 
production of better than 5 percent a year over the same 7-year 



260 



A supermarket run by the Sanlian Company in the 
Zhuhai special economic zone, Guangdong Province 
Courtesy Xinhua News Agency 

period. Although agricultural growth rates had begun to fall off 
in the mid-1980s, the incentives of the responsibility system and 
greater access to international technical advances suggested that 
the farm sector could continue to meet the needs of the growing 
economy in the foreseeable future. 

The industrial sector, while much less advanced than those of 
the developed countries, was nonetheless a solid base for modern- 
ization. Industrial enterprises were dispersed throughout the country 
and included units capable of producing all major kinds of 
machinery, equipment, chemicals, building materials, and light 
industrial goods. Chinese enterprises could make most of the 
products required for modernization, and the growing pool of 
industrial technicians and managers was increasingly capable of 
effectively integrating advanced foreign technology into Chinese 
production processes. Key industries were being technologically 
strengthened by the purchase of advanced foreign equipment and 
the adoption of modern management techniques. Despite promis- 
ing potential, formidable obstacles still impeded the drive for mod- 
ernization. Physical restraints included a renewed increase in birth 
rates and population growth rates as the number of women of child- 
bearing age began to rise in 1986 and 1987. Some crucial 
resources — especially educated personnel and modern equipment — 



261 



China: A Country Study 



still were in very short supply because of the sheer size of the econ- 
omy. In the realm of policy, the administration faced the daunt- 
ing problem of trying to integrate market measures — for 
efficiency — with government planning and control, the source of 
stability. In 1987 both kinds of mechanisms exerted extensive 
influence, with the result that market efficiency was hindered by 
government intervention and government plans were undermined 
by off-plan activities. Finally, the most serious concern of govern- 
ment leaders was the possibility of future political upheavals. While 
nearly all Chinese people enjoyed better living conditions as a result 
of the progress achieved by the reform program, the new policies 
also had given rise to new social problems and political tensions. 
Increasing crime and corruption, greater emphasis on the profit 
motive, widening income disparities, and inflation aroused resis- 
tance in many conservative quarters and resulted in the political 
struggle that caused Hu Yaobang to be forced from his position 
as Chinese Communist Party general secretary in early 1987. By 
mid- 1987 it was not yet clear what the outcome of the struggle would 
be or how it would affect the future course of economic reform. 



Among the most useful works on economic development in China 
before 1949 are Mark Elvin's The Pattern of the Chinese Past and 
Dwight H. Perkins' Agricultural Development in China, 1368-1968. 
These books examine the fundamental relationships between tech- 
nology, population, society, and economic growth in China. A 
good, brief integration of much of the scholarship on the Chinese 
economy in the modern period may be found in Ramon H. Myers' 
The Chinese Economy Past and Present. China 's Modern Economy in Histori- 
cal Perspective, edited by Perkins, is a valuable collection of articles 
by leading scholars dealing with various aspects of China's modern 
economic development. A concise description of the Chinese econ- 
omy in the eighty years before 1949 is presented in two brief works 
by Albert Feuerwerker, The Chinese Economy, ca. 1 870-1 91 1 and 
Economic Trends in the Republic of China, 1912-1949. The most author- 
itative and detailed sources of information on the economy of the 
People's Republic are the annual statistical yearbooks compiled 
by the State Statistical Bureau. As of 1987 the most recent was 
Statistical Yearbook of China, 1986, which contains updated informa- 
tion on most major aspects of the Chinese economy since 1949, 
as well as a set of explanatory notes that define the terms and mea- 
sures used. Another useful annual Chinese publication is the Almanac 
of China's Economy. Recent general treatments of the Chinese 



262 



Economic Context 



economy by Western scholars include a good overview, China's 
Political Economy by Carl Riskin, and a mathematically oriented 
work, The Chinese Economy by Gregory C. Chow. Some of the earlier 
classic works on the post- 1949 economy are China's Economic Revo- 
lution by Alexander Eckstein, China's Economy by Christopher Howe, 
China 's Economic System by Audrey Donnithorne, The Economy of the 
Chinese Mainland by Ta-Chung Liu and Kung-Chia Yeh, and The 
Chinese Economy under Communism by Nai-Ruenn Chen and Walter 
Galenson. China's Development Experience in Comparative Perspective, 
edited by Robert F. Dernberger, is a collection of studies by noted 
economists dealing with China's modern economic development. 
A good description of the Maoist economic model is presented in 
John G. Gurley's China's Economy and the Maoist Strategy. The United 
States Congress Joint Economic Committee has published a series 
of useful volumes on the Chinese economy: An Economic Profile of 
Mainland China (1967); People's Republic of China: An Economic Assess- 
ment (1972); China: A Reassessment of the Economy (1975); Chinese Econ- 
omy Post-Mao (1978); China under the Four Modernizations (1982); and 
China 's Economy Looks Toward the Year 2000 (1986). There are many 
useful works dealing with specific aspects of the Chinese economy. 
Economic planning is analyzed by Perkins in Market Control and Plan- 
ning in Communist China and more recently by Nicholas R. Lardy 
in Economic Growth and Distribution in China. The banking system 
is described in Money and Monetary Policy in Communist China by 
Katherine H. Hsiao and in China's Financial System by William A. 
Byrd. The Political Economy of Reform in Post-Mao China, edited by 
Elizabeth J. Perry and Christine Wong, is a collection of insight- 
ful analyses of the reform process. Prominent among the many 
works on Chinese agriculture are Food for One Billion: China's Agricul- 
ture since 1949 by Robert C. Hsu, Agriculture in China 's Modern Eco- 
nomic Development by Lardy, and The Chinese Agricultural Economy, 
edited by Randolph Barker, Radha Sinha, and Beth Rose. Cur- 
rent economic information appears in several official English- 
language periodicals from China, including Beijing Review, China 
Daily, and China Reconstructs . Major periodicals published outside 
China that monitor the Chinese economy include Asian Wall Street 
fournal, China Quarterly, Economist, and Far Eastern Economic Review. 
(For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



263 



Chapter 6. Agriculture 



The original of this Han dynasty (206 B. C. -A.D. 220) pottery sheep was 
discovered in Henan Province. 



CHINA HAS THE WORLD'S LARGEST agricultural economy 
and one of the most varied. The nation stands first among all others 
in the production of rice, cotton, tobacco, and hogs and is a major 
producer of wheat, corn, millet, tea, jute, and hemp. This wide 
range of crops is possible because of the country's varied climate 
and agricultural zones. China participates on a large scale in inter- 
national agricultural markets, both as an exporter and as an 
importer. 

For over 4,000 years, China has been a nation of farmers. By 
the time the People's Republic of China was established in 1949, 
virtually all arable land was under cultivation; irrigation and 
drainage systems constructed centuries earlier and intensive farming 
practices already produced relatively high yields. But little prime 
virgin land was available to support population growth and eco- 
nomic development. However, after a decline in production as a 
result of the Great Leap Forward (1958-60), agricultural reforms 
implemented in the 1980s increased yields and promised even 
greater future production from existing cultivated land. 

A successful agricultural sector is critical to China's development. 
First, it must feed more than 1 billion people, about 21 percent 
of the world's population, using only 7 percent of the world's ara- 
ble land. Second, it must provide raw materials for the industrial 
sector. Third, agricultural exports must earn the foreign exchange 
needed to purchase key industrial items from other countries. 

Since 1949 China's political leaders have tried a variety of large- 
scale social experiments to boost agricultural production. First, a 
massive land reform program eliminated landlords and gave land 
to those who farmed it. Next, farm families were progressively 
organized into cooperatives, collectives, and finally people's com- 
munes. After more than twenty-five years of experience with com- 
munes, officials abolished these institutions, which had become too 
bureaucratic and rigid to respond to the flexible requirements of 
agricultural production. Also, farm production incentives lan- 
guished in the commune system. In 1978 China's leaders began 
a program of far-reaching agricultural reforms. Townships and vil- 
lages were organized, and new incentives were incorporated into 
contractual relationships tying farmers to economic cooperatives 
and businesses. 

Since the revolution in 1949, China has devoted most of its 
investments and administrative energy to the industrial sector. 



267 



China: A Country Study 



Generally, the agricultural sector received special attention only 
when the leaders perceived that the sector was beginning to restrain 
China's overall economic development. Agricultural output basi- 
cally kept pace with the growth of population but did not expand 
fast enough to raise living standards. Per capita consumption of 
grains, fibers, edible oil, sugar, fruits, vegetables, fish, meat, eggs, 
and dairy products remained low. The value of goods generated 
by the agricultural sector has grown, but not as fast as output gener- 
ated by other sectors in the economy. In 1949 about half of the 
country's output came from the agricultural sector. This ratio 
dropped to 41 percent by 1955, declined to 31 percent by 1965, 
and fell another few percentage points in 1975 to 25 percent. But 
agricultural reforms initiated in the early 1980s brought a rise in 
agriculture to 33 percent of GNP in 1985. At the same time, more 
than 60 percent of the national labor force was employed in 
agriculture. 

China in the late 1980s was thus poised to confront growing 
demands for agricultural production with a combination of time- 
tested farming methods and modern agro-technology. The size and 
diversity of the country — in geography and in population — 
however, presented a unique challenge to China's policy makers 
and implementors. 

Resources Endowment 

Arable land in China is scarce; little more than 10 percent of 
the total land area, most of it in the eastern third of the country, 
can be cultivated. This compares with more than 20 percent for 
the continental United States, which is slightly smaller than China. 
Further agricultural expansion would be relatively difficult because 
almost no land that could be profitably cultivated remains unused 
and because, despite intensive cultivation, yields from some mar- 
ginal lands are low. Some possibility for expansion exists in thinly 
populated parts of the country, especially in the northeast, but the 
growing season there is short and the process of land reclamation 
prolonged and costly. 

China Proper (see Glossary) is divided by the Oin Ling range 
into highly dissimilar north and south agricultural areas (see fig. 8). 
In semitropical south China, rainfall is relatively abundant and 
the growing season long. Rice is the predominant grain crop. The 
paddies can generally be irrigated with water from rivers or other 
sources. Although much of the soil is acid red clay, the heavy use 
of fertilizer (at one time organic but by the mid-1980s also includ- 
ing a large proportion of chemical nutrients) supports high yields. 
Frequently two or even three crops a year are cultivated on the 



268 



Agriculture 




Figure 8. Agricultural Regions, 1987 

same land. Food crops other than rice are also grown, most fre- 
quently in hilly areas or during the winter. These include potatoes 
and winter wheat. The highest grain yields in the country in the 
mid-1980s were generally found in the Sichuan Basin, the lower 
Chang Jiang (Yangtze River) Valley, and Guangdong and Fujian 
provinces, where multiple cropping of rice and other crops was the 
typical pattern. Cotton, tea, and industrial crops were also produced 
there. 

Wheat has traditionally been the main crop in north China, a 
considerably drier region than south China. The winter wheat crop 
accounts for nearly 90 percent of China's total production. Spring 
wheat is grown mainly in the eastern portion of Nei Monggol 
Autonomous Region (Inner Mongolia) and the northeastern 
provinces. Other important grain crops include corn, sorghum, 



269 



China: A Country Study 



and millet. These are usually dryland crops. Since the late 1960s, 
irrigation has been greatly expanded, but water remains an important 
limiting factor. Compared with the south, soils in the north are gener- 
ally better; however, because of the shorter growing season and 
colder, drier climate, yields per cultivated hectare tend to be lower 
and irrigation less extensive. Labor is not as abundant in the north 
as in the south, but cropping patterns tend to require less labor, 
and mechanization (especially of plowing) is more advanced. 

The North China Plain, the most important growing area in 
north China, extends across several provinces. Winter wheat and 
corn are the leading grain crops; cotton is also grown, and Shan- 
dong Province produces peanuts. The North China Plain, although 
fertile, was traditionally subject to frequent floods and droughts, 
but water conservation measures ameliorated the problem (see 
Physical Environment, ch. 2). Winter wheat is grown in the moun- 
tainous areas west of this plain, but the climate is more severe and 
the danger of natural disasters even greater. The fertile soils of the 
northeastern plains have been used to plant corn, spring wheat, 
and even rice. High-quality soybeans are grown in the northeast 
and are exported to many Pacific Rim countries. Although Nei 
Monggol Autonomous Region produces some spring wheat and 
other grain, it is best known as a pastoral area. 

Much of China's vast and generally inhospitable northwest and 
southwest regions is unsuitable for cultivation. Xinjiang-Uygur 
Autonomous Region in the northwest, like Nei Monggol Autono- 
mous Region, is also best known as a pastoral area. In Xizang 
Autonomous Region (Tibet) in the southwest, most of the culti- 
vated area has been irrigated, and special strains of wheat, rice, 
and barley suitable for the climate of that high-altitude region have 
been developed. 

China's rural labor force in 1985 consisted of about 370 million 
people. The quality of the labor force had improved in the previ- 
ous three decades, primarily because of the introduction of rural 
schools, which stressed elementary education (see Primary Edu- 
cation, ch. 4). Nevertheless, a large portion of the rural popula- 
tion was illiterate or semiliterate in 1987, and very few high school 
and college graduates lived in villages and towns. Lack of educa- 
tion continued to retard the spread of advanced technology in rural 
areas. The scarcity of cultivable land and the abundance of man- 
power led to the development of labor-intensive production in most 
parts of the country. And, although China's agriculture was less 
labor intensive than that in some neighboring countries, it was 
characterized by meticulous tending of the land and other tech- 
niques employed in East Asia for centuries. 



270 



Agriculture 



In the 1980s the rural labor force also was employed in rural 
capital construction projects and small-scale industries. During the 
winter months, large numbers of rural people worked on construc- 
tion and maintenance of irrigation or land-leveling projects. Where 
rural industrial plants existed, they usually employed a small propor- 
tion of the rural labor force, and many peasants also engaged in 
sideline activities, such as handicrafts. The government tightly 
limited migration from rural to urban areas (see Migration, ch. 2). 

By the 1980s China had improved its agricultural resources, but 
important obstacles remained. The country's agricultural capital 
stock had been built up in large part by land modification. Through 
the centuries fields were leveled and consolidated, and substantial 
investments were made in building and modernizing irrigation 
facilities. Since the 1950s the production of mechanical agricultural 
equipment had been a major industry. But in the 1980s many 
observers still noted a shortage of transportation facilities to take 
crops to market and bring seed, fuel, and fertilizer to users (see 
Transportation, ch. 8). In addition to capital, China had availa- 
ble a supply of skilled labor and a stock of technical information 
on seed varieties and fertilizer use despite the damage done by the 
Cultural Revolution (1966-76; see Glossary). 

Agricultural Policies 

Agricultural policy has gone through three broad phases: the 
1950s, when agriculture was collectivized, ending with the Great 
Leap Forward (1958-60; see Glossary); the period from 1961 to 
the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, when more agricultural progress 
came to depend on the supply of capital and modern inputs; and 
the period under the post-Mao leadership, which has been charac- 
terized by greater reliance on markets, prices, and incentives to 
boost production and to diversify output. (Inputs in this chapter 
refer to components of production such as land, labor, seed, fer- 
tilizer, machinery, tools, and irrigation water.) 

The 1950s 

During the 1950s the government of the new People's Republic 
made a concerted effort to redistribute land more equitably. 
Although many peasants owned part or all of the small holdings 
they farmed before 1949, tenancy was common, especially in south 
China. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) implemented land 
reforms in areas under its control even before 1949, and subse- 
quently landlords and wealthy peasants became targets of party 
attack. Their elimination as a class was a major aim of the land 
reform movement begun under the Agrarian Reform Law of 



271 



China: A Country Study 



June 28, 1950 (see The Transition to Socialism, 1953-57, ch. 1). 
Collectivization of agriculture, which was accomplished in several 
stages, began about 1952. 

The first stage of land reform was characterized by mutual aid 
teams. The mutual aid system was kept simple at first, involving 
only the temporary sharing of labor and some capital; individual 
households remained the basic unit of ownership and production. 
In 1954 mutual aid teams were organized with increasing rapidity 
into agricultural producers' cooperatives, which differed from 
mutual aid teams in that tools, draft animals, and labor were shared 
on a permanent basis. Cooperative members retained ownership 
of their land but secured a share in the cooperative by staking their 
plots along with those of other members in the common land pool. 
By 1956 the transformation of mutual aid teams into agricultural 
cooperatives was nearly complete. By the end of that year, more- 
over, the great majority of cooperatives had moved to a still higher 
stage of collectivization, having become advanced producers' 
cooperatives. These cooperatives contrasted with those of the earlier 
stage in that members no longer earned income based on shares 
of land owned. Instead, collective farm profits were distributed to 
members primarily on the basis of labor contributions. The aver- 
age cooperative was made up of 170 families and more than 700 
people. Although small private plots were permitted, most of the 
land was owned collectively by the cooperative. Another develop- 
ment in this period was the establishment of state farms in which 
land became the property of the state (see Planning and Organi- 
zation, this ch.). 

This degree of collectivization was achieved with much less tur- 
moil than had occurred during collectivization in the Soviet Union. 
As in the Soviet Union, however, investment in the agricultural 
sector was kept low relative to industrial investment because plan- 
ners chose to achieve more rapid growth of basic industries. But 
collectivization did not prevent the growth of agricultural produc- 
tion; grain production, for example, increased by 3.5 percent a 
year under the First Five-Year Plan (1953-57). Growth was 
achieved mainly through the intensified use of traditional agricul- 
tural techniques, together with some technical improvements. 

Once collectivization was achieved and agricultural output per 
capita began to increase, the leadership embarked on the extremely 
ambitious programs of the Great Leap Forward of 1958-60 (see 
table 11, Appendix A). In agriculture this meant unrealistically 
high production goals and an even higher degree of collectiviza- 
tion than had already been achieved. The existing collectives were 
organized very rapidly into people's communes (see Glossary), 



272 



The Ming and Qjng 
emperors prayed for a 
successful harvest at the 
Temple of Heaven in Beijing. 
Courtesy Ronald E. Dolan 




much larger units with an average of 5,400 households and a total 
of 20,000 to 30,000 members on average. The production targets 
were not accompanied by a sufficient amount of capital and modern 
inputs such as fertilizer; rather, they were to be reached in large 
measure by heroic efforts on the part of the peasants. 

Substantial effort was expended during the Great Leap Forward 
on large-scale but often poorly planned capital construction projects, 
such as irrigation works. Because of the intense pressure for results, 
the rapidity of the change, and the inexperience and resistance of 
many cadres and peasants, the Great Leap Forward soon ran into 
difficulties. The peasants became exhausted from the unremitting 
pressure to produce. The inflation of production statistics, on the 
theory that accuracy mattered less than political effect, resulted in 
extravagant claims. Disruption of agricultural activity and trans- 
portation produced food shortages. In addition, the weather in 
1959-61 was unfavorable, and agricultural production declined 
sharply (see fig. 9). By the early 1960s, therefore, agriculture was 
severely depressed, and China was forced to import grain (during 
the 1950s it had been a net exporter) to supply urban areas. Other- 
wise, an excessive amount of grain would have been extracted from 
rural areas (see Economic Policies, 1949-80, ch. 5). 

Importance of Agriculture Recognized 

Faced with this depression, the country's leaders initiated policies 



273 



China: A Country Study 



to strengthen the agrieultural seetor. The government inereased 
ineentives for individual and eolleetive produetion, deeentralized 
eertain management funetions, and expanded the role of private 
plots and markets. The people's eommune system was reorganized 
so that production teams with 20 to 30 households and 90 to 140 
people owned most of the assets, accounted for profits or losses, 
made economic decisions, and distributed income. Most impor- 
tant, the leadership embarked on policies designed to put "agricul- 
ture first" in planning, at least in principle. This meant more 
modern inputs for the countryside. Chemical fertilizer production 
and imports increased. Modern high-yielding seed varieties began 
to be developed. Irrigation facilities — many of which had been 
washed out during disastrous Hoods in 1959-61 — were repaired and 
expanded, and the government began to provide more mechani- 
cal pumps and other irrigation equipment. 

These improvements were not haphazard; most were focused 
on more advanced and productive areas. The intent was to build 
areas of modernized agriculture with high and stable yields that 
would form the basis for more stable agricultural production. In 
general, the places designated as "high- and stable-yield areas" 
were those with adequate irrigation and drainage, so that the payoff 
for greater use of fertilizer and new seeds would be higher. 

Recovery 

By the mid-1970s China's economy had recovered from the 
failures of the Great Leap Forward. In 1979 per capita grain out- 
put first surpassed previous peak levels achieved in 1957. In addi- 
tion, small enterprises in the mid-1960s began to produce substantial 
quantities of chemical fertilizer. Government researchers developed 
fertilizer-responsive seeds. Focusing these inputs on the high- and 
stable-yield areas meant that parts of China that were already 
advanced tended to be favored over backward or less-developed 
regions, thus widening a gap that already had potentially serious 
implications (see Differentiation, ch. 3). 

At the same time, the government urged poorer areas to rely 
mainly on their own efforts. This was symbolized, especially dur- 
ing the Cultural Revolution, by the campaign to "learn from 
Dazhai." Dazhai was a village in Shaanxi Province that overcame 
poverty and poor production conditions to become relatively 
wealthy. The authorities claimed that this was accomplished through 
self-reliance and struggle. Dazhai became a model of political orga- 
nization and its leaders national emulation models as well. 

These policies — "agriculture first," emphasis on the supply of 
modern inputs, and the Dazhai and other models — formed the 



274 



Agriculture 



framework for agricultural development from the early 1960s until 
the post-Mao era. The Cultural Revolution caused some disrup- 
tion in the agricultural sector, such as political struggle sessions 
and changes in local leadership, but not nearly as much as in the 
industrial sector (see Trends in Industrial Production, ch. 7). 

Post-Mao Policies 

When the party leadership began to evaluate progress in the 
agricultural sector in the light of its campaign to move the nation 
toward the ambitious targets of the Four Modernizations (see Glos- 
sary), it noted disappointing failures along with some impressive 
gains. Furthermore, even though per capita grain production 
increased from the depressed levels of the early 1960s, output stag- 
nated in the 1975-77 period, so that in 1978 per capita production 
was still not above average levels of the 1950s. Production of other 
major crops grew even more slowly. The leadership decided in 1978 
to thoroughly revamp the rural economic system. 

Top government and party leaders decided to dismantle the peo- 
ple's commune system and restructure it into a new rural system — 
the township-collective-household system — consisting of five parts: 
local government, party, state and collective economic entities, and 
households. Whereas the commune system integrated politics, 
administration, and economics into one unit, the new system was 
designed to have separate institutions handle specific functions. 
Townships, the basic unit of government in pre-commune days, 
were reconstructed to handle government and administrative func- 
tions. Party committees were to concentrate on party affairs. Eco- 
nomic collectives were organized to manage economic affairs. 
Households were encouraged to sign contracts with economic 
collectives. 

The reform of the commune system fundamentally changed the 
way farmers were motivated to work. Nonmaterial incentive poli- 
cies, such as intergroup competitions for red flags, were down- 
played. Egalitarian distribution of grain rations declined, and the 
work payment system in effect on and off since the 1950s was 
scrapped (see Economic Policies, 1949-80, ch. 5). Rural cadres 
adopted an entirely new scheme to motivate farmers, called baogan 
(household production responsibility) system. Under baogan, eco- 
nomic cooperatives assigned specific plots of land to a family to 
cultivate for up to fifteen years. For each piece of land, the eco- 
nomic cooperative specified the quantity of output that had to be 
delivered to procurement stations. The contract also outlined house- 
hold obligations, such as contributions to capital accumulation and 
welfare funds; the number of days to be contributed to maintenance 



275 



China: A Country Study 



Percentage of 1970 
per capita GVAO 



170 ■ 








160 ■ 






/ 


150 ■ 






/ 


140" 






GVAO. J 


130 ■ 








120 ■ 








110- 




^^ROPS 




100 ■ 
90- 








80- 








70- 




i i i mYmi 1 1 1 1 





1 952 1956 1960 1964 1 968 1 972 1976 1 980 1 983 



Source: Based on information in U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research 
Service, China: Review of Agriculture in 1981 and Outlook for 1982, Washington, 
August 1982; 1983 estimated. 

Figure 9. Per Capita Gross Value of Agricultural Output (GVAO) and Crop 
Production, 1952-83. 



of water control systems; and debt repayment schedules. Output 
raised in excess of state and collective obligations was the reward 
to the household. Families could consume the surplus or sell it in 
rural markets as they wished. Baogan permitted families to raise 
income through hard work, good management, wise use of tech- 
nology, and reduction of production costs. 

While the overall level of investment within the agricultural sector 
did not change much during the reform period, substantial changes 
took place in investment patterns. National leaders called for greater 
investment in agriculture, but actual state expenditures declined 
in the first part of the 1980s. Whereas communes had invested con- 
siderable sums in agriculture, the rate of investment from the newly 
formed economic cooperatives was far below the rate before the 
reform. The revitalization and extension of the rural banking sys- 
tem (the Agricultural Bank and rural credit cooperatives) and 
favorable lending policies did provide a small but steady source 
of investment funds for the sector. The major change, however, 
was that after 1978 farm families were allowed to invest funds, and 
their investment in small tractors, rural industry, and housing was 
substantial. In 1983 rural households invested Y21 billion (for the 



276 



Agriculture 



value of the yuan — see Glossary) in housing compared with ¥11 
billion from state sources. 

Mao Zedong's policy of self-reliance was relaxed, and his dic- 
tum "grow grain everywhere" was abandoned. Farm households 
began to produce crops and animals best suited for their natural 
conditions. Excellent cotton growing land in Shandong Province 
that had grown grain during the Cultural Revolution returned to 
growing cotton. Areas sown with grain crops declined, and areas 
sown with cotton, oilseeds, and other cash crops expanded. Reform 
policies also reduced major administrative barriers that had limited 
labor and capital from moving beyond commune boundaries. 
Households with insufficient labor or little inclination to farm were 
able to transfer land contracts to families that were interested in 
cultivation and animal husbandry. Rural workers were permitted 
to shift from crop cultivation to commercial, service, construction, 
and industrial activities in rural townships. Capital in rural areas 
was permitted to move across administrative boundaries, and 
individuals invested not only in their own farm production but also 
in business ventures outside their own villages. 

The rural marketing system changed substantially in the post- 
Mao period. The system of mandatory sales of farm produce to 
local state purchasing stations ended, as did state rationing of food 
grains, cooking oil, and cotton cloth to consumers. Households with 
marketable surpluses had several options: goods could be consumed 
on the farm, sold in local markets, or sold to state stations accord- 
ing to signed purchase contracts. Rural markets disbanded dur- 
ing the Cultural Revolution were reopened, and the number of 
markets rose from 33,000 in 1978 to 61,000 in 1985. Total trade 
in these markets increased from¥12.5 billion in 1978 to¥63.2 bil- 
lion in 1985. Consumers purchased food and daily necessities in 
stores run by the state, cooperatives, and private entrepreneurs and 
in local free markets. Coincident with these reforms, the state raised 
procurement prices to improve incentives and increase production 
by farmers. From 1966 to 1982, wheat and rice procurement prices 
rose by 66 percent, while oilseed prices increased 85 percent. To 
avoid urban discontent over high prices, the state absorbed the 
increasing additional costs, and retail prices for these goods 
remained constant. 

The new policies quickly began to produce results. The gross 
value of agricultural output nearly doubled from 1978 to 1985. 
Production of grain, oilseeds, cotton, and livestock increased rapidly 
in this period (see Production, this ch.). Per capita net income of 
peasant households rose dramatically from ¥134 in 1978 to ¥397 
in 1985, but income inequality increased. The demise of collective 



277 



China: A Country Study 



institutions, however, brought decreases in health, education, and 
welfare services. Less attention was paid to maintaining the environ- 
ment, and some water, soil, and forest resources were wasted. 
Despite this, mid-1980s observers opined that prospects were good 
for an overall rise in rural prosperity. 

Reforms in the late 1970s and early 1980s also swept away poli- 
cies and administrative rules restricting business activity. Old com- 
mune production and brigade enterprises were reorganized, and 
a host of new firms were founded by economic cooperatives and 
citizens. Business activity included manufacturing, mining, trans- 
portation, catering, construction, and services. By the mid-1980s 
the value generated by these enterprises surpassed the value of out- 
put from raising crops and livestock. 

Planning and Organization 

The state's role in the mid-1980s was chiefly to plan production 
and manage resources. Among state institutions at the national 
level, the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, and Fish- 
ery was primarily responsible for coordinating agricultural pro- 
grams. Other central bodies of importance in agricultural policy 
matters included the State Economic Commission; the State Plan- 
ning Commission; the ministries of commerce, forestry, and the 
chemical industry; the State Statistical Bureau; and the Agricul- 
tural Bank; and various academies and institutions that conducted 
research on agricultural science, agricultural economics, and related 
subjects. 

Between state institutions at the national level and the townships 
and villages at the base of the administrative hierarchy were vari- 
ous provincial-level, prefectural, and county-level government 
organs that also administered programs, including some agricul- 
tural research and extension activities. Some 2,000 county-level 
units coordinated programs and enforced policies with the economic 
cooperatives and households in their jurisdictions. County-level 
units sometimes operated their own chemical fertilizer plants or 
other factories producing basic agricultural items, and they helped 
direct the allocation of the materials produced to peasant farmers. 

Some agricultural production occurred on state farms where 
workers received regular wages, like factory workers. State farms 
were mostly found on the fringes of the main agricultural areas, 
especially on newly reclaimed land and particularly in the north- 
east, where they nevertheless accounted for only about 4 percent 
of total cultivated land. 

Most of the economic activity in rural areas took place with- 
in the context of collectively and privately owned enterprises. 



278 



Agriculture 



Economic cooperatives, enterprises, and households were guided by 
their own self- sufficiency requirements, pursuit of profits, and com- 
pliance with annual economic plans. Forces of self-sufficiency con- 
tinued to play an important role in decision making, especially as 
farm households allocated resources to ensure their own food grain 
rations. The pursuit of profit traditionally had been a driving force 
in rural areas, and although this energy had largely been curbed 
in the past, in the 1980s farmers were encouraged to seek profits. 

The state drafted annual economic plans that were passed down 
through administrative channels to assist local cadres. Operators 
of farms and other enterprises reviewed the plan targets, which 
guided them to make proper economic decisions. The state has used 
both direct and indirect methods to affect decisions. In past decades 
cadres decided what would be produced, what production tech- 
niques were to be employed, and how output was to be distributed 
on the basis of annual plans. Indirect controls, such as prices and 
interest rates, became more important after 1980. Different com- 
binations of the forces of self-sufficiency, profits, and state plans 
affected decision making for a given product in a given year. For 
example, in 1985 cotton farmers were told via state plans how much 
area to plant in cotton, whereas farmers received no state plans 
to sow fields with melons; rather, they planted melons in the hope 
of increasing profits. 

The state continued to control the economic behavior of farm 
households, economic cooperatives, and enterprises through power- 
ful political and administrative mechanisms in the late 1980s. The 
first of these mechanisms was the more than 83,000 township 
governments, which were responsible for civil and military affairs, 
public security (police), family planning, and statistics. Village com- 
mittees numbered more than 940,000 and were subordinate to 
townships. Although they were not formal government institutions, 
they maintained public order, managed welfare services, and over- 
saw water conservancy projects. Probably the most powerful enti- 
ties on the local level were Chinese Communist Party committees 
in townships and the subordinate party branches in villages. More 
than 20 million rural party members staffed posts and headed com- 
mittees that supervised all aspects of rural life. They coordinated 
relations between party, government, and economic entities, and 
they ensured that party policies were followed. They nominated 
candidates to administrative posts and approved applications for 
military service, jobs, and opportunities for higher education (see 
Rural Society, ch. 3; The Cadre System, ch. 10). 

The second mechanism — control of marketing functions — gave 
the state powerful tools to influence agricultural decisions. As in 



279 



China: A Country Study 



other centrally planned economies, the state was responsible for 
organizing and directing a major part of the flow of resources 
between sectors. It could achieve this using a variety of means, 
including prices and markets as well as direct controls. It needed 
to balance the needs of various sectors for input such as fuel, cement, 
timber, and machinery (as well as the needs of consumers in both 
rural and urban areas) in trying to meet its goals (see Structure 
and Operation of the Economy; Living Standards, ch. 5). 

The government procured grain and other agricultural products 
from the peasants to supply urban areas and food-deficient regions 
with subsistence and to provide raw materials for textile and other 
light industries. Part of the required amount was obtained simply 
as a direct tax. The proportion obtained from taxes declined over 
time, however, and the tax in 1984 was less than 3 percent of the 
value of total production. The remainder was obtained through 
purchases by state procurement agencies. 

In the period from 1957 to 1978, the state raised prices for agricul- 
tural produce while lowering the prices of basic items such as fer- 
tilizer and fuel used in agricultural production. This was necessary 
to promote the use of more fertilizer and fuel to obtain greater 
production and to provide incentives for the production and sale 
of agricultural commodities. 

As a third mechanism, the state exercised considerable leverage 
in rural affairs through its control over credit and agricultural 
production supplies. The state owned and controlled some 27,000 
agricultural banks that served rural areas and provided produc- 
tion loans. Agricultural banks also supervised the activities of more 
than 42,000 credit cooperatives that provided banking services for 
cooperatives and rural households and provided production and 
consumer loans to customers. The state controlled banking activi- 
ties through administrative regulations, loan policy, and interest 
rates. The state regulated delivery of fertilizer, machinery, and fuel 
through its marketing channels. In addition, government control 
of water and electricity supplies provided the state with an impor- 
tant lever to induce farmers to comply with political policies and 
economic plans (see table 12, Appendix A). 

Finally, local governments possessed considerable influence in 
local affairs because they delivered social welfare services. Economic 
cooperatives and peasant households were not likely to engage in 
activities that could lead to diminishing supplies of social services. 
Rural families desired and increasingly felt entitled to medical, edu- 
cation, welfare, and cultural benefits. Villages competed to have 
these facilities located within their boundaries, not only to have more 



280 



Agriculture 



convenient access to their services but also to take advantage of 
the employment opportunities they afforded. 

Operational Methods and Inputs 

China's farmers have long used techniques such as fertilization 
and irrigation to increase the productivity of their scarce land. Over 
time, many farming techniques have been modernized: chemical 
fertilizers have supplemented organic fertilizers, and mechanical 
pumps have come into use in irrigation. Government planners in 
the 1980s emphasized increased use of fertilizer, improved irriga- 
tion, mechanization of agriculture, and extension of improved seed 
varieties as leading features of the agricultural modernization 
program. 

Cropping Patterns 

All of these elements of modern agriculture are used in the con- 
text of the traditional intensive cropping patterns. To maximize 
year-round use of the land, two or more crops are planted each 
year where possible. Rice, wheat, cotton, vegetable, and other crop 
seedlings are sometimes raised in special seedbeds and then trans- 
planted to fields. Transplanting shortens the time required for a 
crop to mature, which allows farmers the opportunity to squeeze 
in an additional crop each growing season. Another method to make 
optimum use of scarce land is to plant seedlings in a mature stand 
of another crop. For example, when planting winter wheat in 
October, farmers in the north leave spaces among the rows so that 
cotton seedlings can be planted or transplanted in April and May. 
Without intercropping, farmers could raise only one crop a year. 
Mechanization supports this intensive cropping pattern. Despite 
a huge rural labor force, labor shortages occur each season when 
farmers are required to harvest one crop and plant another in its 
place, all within the space of a few weeks. In the 1980s farmers 
invested in harvesting and planting machinery to overcome the 
shortage of labor. Seed breeders also supported intensive cropping 
patterns by selecting and breeding varieties that had shorter growing 
seasons. 

Fertilizer 

Intensive use of the arable soil made the use of fertilizer impera- 
tive to replace nutrients and to help improve yields. Organic fer- 
tilizers have long supplied the bulk of soil nutrients and have helped 
to maintain the structure of the soil. Over the centuries, use of 
organic fertilizers also increased with the growth in population and 
with the increased size of livestock herds. Peasants have traditionally 



281 



China: A Country Study 



used a large proportion of their labor in collecting organic materi- 
als for fertilizers. Use has been especially heavy in south China, 
where more intensive cropping has required more fertilizer and 
where the sources of fertilizer have been more abundant. Chemi- 
cal fertilizers, however, have been used more widely since the 1960s. 
Use of chemical fertilizers in 1985 was more than 150 kilograms 
per hectare, measured in nutrient weight. The country's consider- 
able future requirements will have to be met by chemical fertilizer 
because of the natural limits on rapid increases in production of 
organic fertilizers. 

Production and imports of chemical fertilizers increased rapidly 
under the "agriculture first" programs of the early 1960s. The 
domestic industry was expanded, partly with the help of imported 
fertilizer factories, and production reached 1.7 million tons by 1965. 
Imports in 1965 were more than 600,000 tons. In the mid-1960s 
the government also began to emphasize the production of nitro- 
gen fertilizer in small plants, usually operated by counties, that 
yielded about 10,000 tons per year. Their products were used 
locally, which helped conserve transportation resources. In 1972 
the government contracted to import thirteen large-scale urea 
plants, each capable of producing more than 1 million tons of stan- 
dard nitrogen fertilizer a year. By 1980 these were in operation, 
and total chemical fertilizer production in 1985 was 13.4 million 
tons, of which 12.3 million tons were nitrogen fertilizer. Imports 
added another 7.6 million tons. 

In the 1980s chemical fertilizer use per hectare was less than the 
Japanese and Korean averages but more than the Indonesian and 
Indian averages. Future production and imports were likely to 
emphasize phosphate and potassium content in order to balance 
the nutrients obtained from organic fertilizers and from existing 
factories. Institutional reforms in the early 1980s encouraged house- 
holds to cut costs and maximize earnings, which probably led to 
more efficient use of chemical fertilizer as farmers applied fertilizer 
to those crops giving the highest rates of return. 

Mechanization 

Post-Mao reforms dramatically affected farm mechanization. 
Most commune tractor stations were disbanded, and farm house- 
holds were allowed to purchase equipment. The percentage of pri- 
vately owned tractors increased from near zero in 1975 to more 
than 80 percent in 1985. The area plowed and planted by machine 
decreased in this period, but peasant use of tractors and trucks to 
transport goods soared dramatically. As much as 60 percent of trac- 
tor use was devoted to local hauling. Firms manufacturing farm 



282 



"Ploughing Corn. " Woodcut. 
Courtesy Woodcuts of Wartime China 

machinery adjusted to the shift in rural organization by produc- 
ing more small tractors, appropriate tractor-drawn equipment, bet- 
ter quality hand tools, and food and feed processing equipment. 
A rural electric power system — dams, generators, and transmis- 
sion lines — had been under construction since 1949, and in 1987 
most villages had access to electricity. In the period of the Four 
Modernizations, rural electric power consumption rose by 179 per- 
cent, from 18.3 billion kilowatt-hours in 1975 to 51.2 billion 
kilowatt-hours in 1985. 

Despite the large stock and high production rate of tractors, most 
farm tasks in the mid-1980s were performed manually. Rice con- 
tinued to be transplanted by hand, as local engineers had yet to 
develop and produce rice transplanters in substantial quantities. Only 
36 percent of the land was plowed by machines, only 8 percent sown 
by machines, and only 3 percent of the crop area was harvested by 
machines. Draft animals continued to be important sources of power, 
and the number of animals increased sharply in the post-Mao period. 
Success in mechanization enabled surplus rural laborers to leave the 
fields to find jobs in rural industry and commerce. In the 1980s most 
observers believed that China would continue for some time to use 
mechanization to solve labor shortages at times of peak labor demand 
and to concentrate mechanization in areas of large-scale farming, 
as in the North China Plain and the northeast. 



283 



China: A Country Study 

Water Conservancy 

Irrigation was important in China's traditional agriculture, and 
some facilities existed as long as 2,000 years ago. The extension 
of water conservancy facilities by labor-intensive means was an 
important part of the agricultural development programs of the 
1950s. During the Great Leap Forward, a number of water con- 
servancy projects were undertaken, but with insufficient planning 
and capital. During the turmoil and bad weather of 1959-61 , many 
water conservancy works were washed out by floods or otherwise 
destroyed, considerably reducing the irrigated acreage. Facilities 
were rebuilt in the early 1960s. By the 1980s irrigation facilities 
covered nearly half the cultivated land; systems installed since the 
late 1960s extended over a considerable part of north China, espe- 
cially on the North China Plain. 

In the era of post-Mao reform, irrigation and drainage systems 
expanded to increase the stock of stable and high-yielding land. 
The inventory of mechanical pumps also greatly increased; powered 
irrigation equipment reached almost 80 million horsepower in 1985. 
In this period the government began to charge fees for the water 
the farmers used, and farmers therefore limited the amount of water 
applied to their crops on a benefit cost basis. The reorganization 
of rural institutions weakened administrative measures necessary 
to make large-scale waterworks function. Lowered investment, poor 
maintenance, and outright damage to facilities lessened the effec- 
tiveness of the system. Adding additional acreage was likely to be 
increasingly costly because areas not under irrigation were remote 
from easily tapped water sources. In the mid-1980s government 
officials recognized the problems and undertook to correct them. 

North China is chronically short of water and subject to frequent 
droughts (see Climate, ch. 2). A considerable proportion of its 
irrigation water comes from wells. Officials in the Ministry of Water 
Resources and Electric Power (and its predecessors) have periodi- 
cally proposed diverting water from the Chang Jiang to irrigate 
the North China Plain. The enormous expense of constructing such 
a project has precluded its realization. Farmers have also been 
encouraged to use sprinkler systems, a more efficient use of scarce 
water resources than flood-type irrigation systems. 

Pest Control 

In 1987 the main method of weed and insect control continued 
to be labor-intensive cultivation. Fields were carefully tended, and 
a variety of biological controls, such as breeding natural enemies 
of crop pests, were used. Production and use of chemical herbicides 



284 



Agriculture 



and pesticides increased rapidly from the mid-1950s to the 
mid-1970s, but output fell subsequently by more than half (to about 
200,000 tons) because the products were relatively ineffective, 
expensive, and highly toxic. Chemical pesticide use, therefore, was 
low compared with use in other countries. 

Seed Varieties 

Improved seed varieties have contributed significantly to improv- 
ing crop yields. Highly fertilizer-responsive varieties came into use 
beginning in the mid-1960s. These were comparable to those devel- 
oped outside China but were adapted to the shorter growing sea- 
son imposed by multiple cropping. Their extensive use has 
complemented the large increases in fertilizer use and the increase 
in irrigated area. In the mid-1970s farmers began to plant hybrid 
rice, claiming yield increases of more than 20 percent. Hybrid rice 
is not used elsewhere because of the amount of labor it requires, 
but more than 6 million hectares of it were planted in the mid-1980s, 
accounting for 20 percent of total rice area. The China National 
Seed Company was established in 1978 to popularize improved seed 
varieties; it exported Chinese vegetable seeds and imported 
improved grain, cotton, forage, and oil seeds. About 5 percent of 
China's arable land was being used to raise seed in the mid-1980s, 
and the company operated more than 2,000 seed companies at 
provincial, prefectural, and county levels. 

Agricultural Science 

Agricultural science suffered from changes in policy and emphasis 
after the 1950s. The Cultural Revolution disrupted agricultural 
science training and research programs, but since the mid-1970s 
training and research programs have been restored. Government 
officials emphasized practical, production-oriented scientific work. 
The rural extension system popularized new techniques and new 
inputs, such as sprinkler irrigation systems. In 1987 eighty-four 
agricultural colleges and research institutes pursued research in 
seven broad fields: agriculture, forestry, aquatic production, land 
reclamation, mechanization, water conservation, and meteorology. 
In addition, almost 500 agricultural schools had a total staff of 
29,000 teachers and 71,000 students. In the 1980s thousands of 
researchers and students were sent abroad (see Educational Invest- 
ment, ch. 4). Research was being strengthened by the construc- 
tion of sixteen regionally distributed agricultural experiment 
stations. New agricultural journals and societies were established 
to promote the dissemination of research results within the coun- 
try. The Chinese sought technical information abroad as well 



285 



China: A Country Study 



through the import of technology and machinery and the interna- 
tional exchange of delegations. 

Production 

Five economic activities generated the bulk of agricultural out- 
put: crops, livestock, forestry, fishery, and sideline production (rural 
industry). Crop raising was the dominant activity, generating as 
much as 80 percent of the total value of output in the mid-1950s. 
The policy of stressing crop output was relaxed in the early 1980s, 
and by 1985 this figure fell to about 50 percent. The proportion 
of output generated by the livestock, forestry, and fishery sectors 
increased slowly after the 1950s. The sector that expanded the most 
rapidly was sideline production, whose share increased from 4 per- 
cent in 1955 to 30 percent in 1985. 

The results of China's agricultural policies in terms of output 
have been mixed. Food consumption was maintained at subsistence 
level despite the catastrophic drop in production following the Great 
Leap Forward but failed to increase much above that level until 
the 1980s. Investment in irrigation and water control projects 
blunted the effects of severe weather on output, but in many parts 
of the country production continued to be negatively affected by 
the weather. Production rates varied considerably throughout the 
country, creating income inequalities. Despite rapid gains in rural 
areas in the 1980s, a substantial gap remained between rural and 
urban living standards (see Differentiation, ch. 3). 

Crops 

In the mid-1980s China's farmers annually planted crops on 
about 145 million hectares of land. Eighty percent of the land was 
sown with grain, 5 percent with oilseed crops, 5 percent with fruits, 
3 percent with vegetables, 2 percent with fiber crops, and 0.5 per- 
cent with sugar crops and tobacco. Other crops made up the 
remaining 4 percent. In the 1960s and 1970s, when policies empha- 
sized grain output, the area sown with grain exceeded 85 percent. 
After the reforms were launched in the early 1980s, the area sown 
with grain fell below 80 percent and the area sown with other crops 
expanded correspondingly. 

Grain is China's most important agricultural product. It is the 
source of most of the calories and protein in the average diet and 
accounts for a sizable proportion of the value of agricultural produc- 
tion. China's statisticians define grain to include wheat, rice, corn, 
sorghum, millet, potatoes (at one-fifth their fresh weight), soybeans, 
barley, oats, buckwheat, field peas, and beans. Grain output 
paralleled the increase in population from 1949 through 1975 but 



286 




A bumper harvest at a granary in rural Jiangsu Province 
Courtesy Xinhua News Agency 
Harvesting rice, on the road from Wuxi to Suzhou 
Courtesy Stephanie Marcus 



287 



China: A Country Study 



rose rapidly in the deeade between 1975 and 1985 (see table 13, 
Appendix A). 

In 1987 China was the world's largest producer of rice, and the 
crop made up a little less than half of the country's total grain out- 
put. In a given year total rice output came from four different crops. 
The early rice crop grows primarily in provinces along the Chang 
Jiang and in provinces in the south; it is planted in February to 
April and harvested in June and July and contributes about 34 per- 
cent to total rice output. Intermediate and single-crop late rice grows 
in the southwest and along the Chang Jiang; it is planted in March 
to June and harvested in October and November and also con- 
tributed about 34 percent to total rice output in the 1980s. Double- 
crop late rice, planted after the early crop is reaped, is harvested 
in October to November and adds about 25 percent to total rice 
production. Rice grown in the north is planted from April to June 
and harvested from September to October; it contributes about 
7 percent to total production. 

All rice cultivation is highly labor intensive. Rice is generally 
grown as a wetland crop in fields Hooded to supply water during 
the growing season. Transplanting seedlings requires many hours 
of labor, as does harvesting. Mechanization of rice cultivation is 
only minimally advanced. Rice cultivation also demands more of 
other inputs, such as fertilizer, than most other crops. 

Rice is highly prized by consumers as a food grain, especially 
in south China, and per capita consumption has risen through the 
years. Also, as incomes have risen, consumers have preferred to 
eat more rice and less potatoes, corn, sorghum, and millet. Large 
production increases in the early 1980s and poor local transporta- 
tion systems combined to induce farmers to feed large quantities 
of lower quality rice to livestock. 

In 1987 China ranked third in the world as a producer of wheat. 
Winter wheat, which in the same year accounted for about 88 per- 
cent of total national output, is grown primarily in the Chang Jiang 
Valley and on the North China Plain. The crop is sown each fall 
from September through November and is harvested in May and 
June the subsequent year. Spring wheat is planted each spring in 
the north and northeast and is harvested in late summer. Spring 
wheat contributes about 12 percent of total wheat output. 

Wheat is the staple food grain in north China and is eaten in the 
form of steamed bread and noodles. Per capita consumption has 
risen, and the demand for wheat flour has increased as incomes have 
risen. Wheat has been by far the most important imported grain. 

Corn is grown in most parts of the country but is most common 
in areas that also produce wheat. Corn production has increased 



288 



Agriculture 



substantially over time and in some years has been second only 
to production of rice. Consumers have traditionally considered corn 
less desirable for human use than rice or wheat. Nevertheless, it 
frequently yields more per unit of land than other varieties of grain, 
making it useful for maintaining subsistence. As incomes rose in 
the early 1980s, consumer demand for corn as a food grain 
decreased, and increasing quantities of corn were allocated for 
animal feed. 

Millet and sorghum are raised in the northern provinces, primar- 
ily in areas affected by drought. Millet is used primarily as a food 
grain. Sorghum is not a preferred food grain and in the 1980s was 
used for livestock feed and maotai, a potent alcoholic beverage. 

Both Irish and sweet potatoes are grown in China. In the 1980s 
about 20 percent of output came from Irish potatoes grown mostly 
in the northern part of the country. The remaining 80 percent of 
output came primarily from sweet potatoes grown in central and 
south China (cassava output was also included in total potato 
production). Potatoes are generally considered to be a somewhat 
lower-quality food grain. Per capita consumption has declined 
through time. Potatoes are also used in the production of vodka 
and as a livestock feed. 

Other grains, such as field peas, beans, and pulses, are grown 
throughout China. These grains are good sources of plant protein 
and add variety to the diet. Barley is a major grain produced in 
the lower Chang Jiang Basin. It is used for direct human consump- 
tion, livestock feed, and increasingly is in great demand as a feed- 
stock to produce beer. 

Soybeans, a leguminous crop, are also included in China's grain 
statistics. The northeast has traditionally been the most important 
producing area, but substantial amounts of soybeans are also 
produced on the North China Plain. Production of soybeans 
declined after the Great Leap Forward, and output did not regain 
the 10-million-ton level of the late 1950s until 1985. Population 
growth has greatly outstripped soybean output, and per capita con- 
sumption has fallen. Soybeans are a useful source of protein and 
fat, an important consideration given the limited amount of meat 
available and the grain- and vegetable-based diet. Oilseed cakes, 
by-products of soybean oil extraction, are used as animal feed and 
fertilizer. 

Cotton is China's most important fiber crop. The crop is grown 
on the North China Plain and in the middle and lower reaches of 
the Chang Jiang Valley. In the 1970s domestic output did not meet 
demand, and significant quantities of raw cotton were imported. 
Production expanded dramatically in the early 1980s to reach a 



289 



China: A Country Study 



record 6 million tons in 1984. Although production declined to 4.2 
million tons in 1985, China was still by far the largest cotton 
producer in the world. In the 1980s raw cotton imports ceased, 
and China became a major exporter of cotton. 

Significant quantities of jute and hemp are also produced in 
China. Production of these crops expanded from 257,000 tons in 
1955 to 3.4 million tons in 1985. Major producing provinces include 
Heilongjiang and Henan and also provinces along the Chang Jiang. 

China is an important producer of oilseeds, including peanuts, 
rapeseed, sesame seed, sunflower seed, and safflower seed. Oil- 
seed output in 1955 was 4.8 million tons. Output, however, did 
not expand between 1955 and 1975, which meant per capita oil- 
seed availability decreased substantially because of population 
growth. Production from 1975 to 1985 more than tripled, to 
15.5 million tons, but China continues to have one of the world's 
lowest levels of per capita consumption of oilseeds. 

Sugarcane accounted for about 83 percent of total output of sugar 
crops in 1985. Major producing provinces include Guangdong, 
Fujian, and Yunnan provinces and Guangxi-Zhuang Autonomous 
Region. Production has grown steadily through the years from 
about 8 million tons in 1955 to over 51 million tons in 1985. 

Sugar beet production accounted for the remaining 17 percent 
of total output in 1985. Major producing provinces and autono- 
mous regions include Heilongjiang, Jilin, Nei Monggol, and Xin- 
jiang. Sugar beet production rose from 1.6 million tons in 1955 
to 8.9 million tons in 1985. Despite these impressive increases in 
output, per capita consumption was still very low, and large quan- 
tities were imported. 

China is the world's largest producer of leaf tobacco. Farmers 
produce many kinds of tobacco, but flue-cured varieties often make 
up more than 80 percent of total output. Major producing areas 
include Henan, Shandong, Sichuan, Guizhou, and Yunnan prov- 
inces. 

Tea and silk, produced mainly in the south, have traditionally 
been important commercial crops. The domestic market for these 
products has been substantial, and they continue to be important 
exports. Given China's different agricultural climatic regions, many 
varieties of vegetables are grown. Farmers raise vegetables in pri- 
vate plots for their own consumption. Near towns and cities, farmers 
grow vegetables for sale to meet the demand of urban consumers. 
Vegetables are an important source of vitamins and minerals in 
the diet. 

Temperate, subtropical, and tropical fruits are cultivated in 
China. Output expanded from 2.6 million tons in 1955 to more 



290 



Agriculture 



than 1 1 million tons in 1985. Reforms in the early 1980s eneouraged 
farmers to plant orchards, and the output of apples, pears, bananas, 
and citrus fruit was expected to expand in the late 1980s. 

Animal Husbandry 

In 1987 China had the largest inventory of hogs in the world. 
The number increased from about 88 million in 1955 to an esti- 
mated 331 million in 1985. Hogs are raised in large numbers in 
every part of China except in Muslim areas in the northwest. Most 
hogs are raised in pens by individual farm households, but in the 
mid-1980s the Chinese were constructing large mechanized feed- 
ing operations on the outskirts of major cities. Before the 1980s 
the state's major goal was to increase output with little regard to 
the ratio of meat to fat. In the 1980s consumers became more con- 
scious of fat content, and breeders and raisers were shifting to the 
production of leaner hogs. 

Draft animals are important sources of motive power in rural 
areas. Draft animal numbers increased steadily from about 56 mil- 
lion in 1955 to 67 million in 1985 despite rapid increases in the 
number of tractors and trucks in rural areas. Animals that pro- 
vide draft power for crop cultivation and rural transportation include 
water buffalo, horses, mules, donkeys, oxen, and camels. 

Sheep and goats are China's most important grazing animals. 
Most of these animals are bred in the semiarid steppes and deserts 
in the north, west, and northwest. The number of sheep and goats 
has expanded steadily from about 42 million in 1949 to approxi- 
mately 156 million in 1985. Overgrazed, fragile rangelands have 
been seriously threatened by erosion, and in the late 1980s authori- 
ties were in the midst of a campaign to improve pastures and range- 
lands and limit erosion. 

The dairy and poultry sectors of the livestock economy grew most 
rapidly in the 1980s. Dairy cows numbered just under 500,000 in 
1978 but tripled to around 1.5 million in 1985. Consumers with 
rising incomes demanded more fresh and powdered milk for infants 
and elderly people. A large part of this increased demand was met 
by individual farmers who were permitted to purchase and own 
their animals. The government supported increased milk output 
by importing breeding animals and constructing large dairies and 
processing facilities. Most poultry was still grown in farmyard flocks, 
but reforms encouraged individuals and groups of households to 
invest in confined feeding operations. Egg output, especially, in- 
creased rapidly in the 1980s. 

China's first modern feed mills were constructed in the 1970s, 
followed by many mills equipped with imported technology. 



291 



China: A Country Study 



Production of mixed and compound feed grew rapidly, reaching 
more than 12 million tons in 1985. This development supported 
the growth of animal husbandry. 

Forestry 

Forests were cleared in China's main agricultural areas centu- 
ries ago. Most timber, therefore, comes from northeast China and 
the less densely populated parts of the northwest and southwest. 
The yield totaled around 60 million cubic meters in 1985. Bam- 
boo poles and products are grown in the Chang Jiang Valley and 
in south China, and output reached 230 million poles in 1985. Rub- 
ber trees are cultivated in Guangdong Province; output rose steadily 
from 68,000 tons in 1975 to 190,000 tons in 1985. Other impor- 
tant forestry products include lacquer, tea oilseed, tung oil, pine 
resin, walnuts, chestnuts, plywood, and fiberboard. 

The area covered by forests amounted to some 12 percent of total 
land area, which officials hoped to increase over the long term to 
30 percent. Afforestation campaigns are carried out annually to 
re-establish forests, plant shelter belts, and set up soil stabilization 
areas. But because of continued overcutting of forests and low seed- 
ling survival rates in newly planted sections, China's forests are 
in a precarious situation. Better management and increased invest- 
ment over a long period of time will be required to increase out- 
put of valuable forest products. 

Fishery 

Aquatic production increased slowly after the 1950s, reaching 
6.2 million tons in 1985. Output is composed of both marine and 
freshwater fish, shellfish, and kelp. Marine products contributed 
63 percent to total aquatic production. Fishermen collected more 
than 83 percent of marine output from the open seas. The remaining 
17 percent of output came from sea farms along China's coasts. 

The freshwater catch accounted for 37 percent of total aquatic 
output in the mid-1980s. Fish farming in ponds accounted for 
80 percent of the total freshwater catch; only 20 percent was col- 
lected in natural rivers, lakes, and streams. Fish from all sources 
provides consumers with an important source of protein and added 
variety in their diet. 

Sideline Production 

In addition to improving the principal yield of agricultural units, 
the post-Mao economic reforms greatly stimulated sideline produc- 
tion in rural areas. Before 1984 sideline production generated by 
production brigades, production teams, and households included 



292 




Silkworms being fed mulberry leaves 
Courtesy Nanjing Slide Studio 
Clearing lotus pond, Hangzhou 
Courtesy Douglass M. Do lan 



293 



China: A Country Study 

hunting, fishing, collecting wild herbs, and producing family handi- 
crafts, as well as various kinds of industry, commerce, transpor- 
tation, and services. Sideline industrial output included fertilizer, 
farm machinery, textiles, bricks, electrical appliances, and vari- 
ous consumer goods. Sideline industrial activities also included 
processing cotton, grain, and oilseeds; mining coal, iron ore, and 
gold; and dredging gravel and sand. Among the services included 
in sideline output were barbering, entertainment, and catering. 
As part of the sideline economy, rural entities transported people 
and goods and operated retail stores; rural construction groups built 
dams, factory sites, roads, and houses. Of all kinds of sideline 
production, the state counted only the industrial output of enter- 
prises operated by counties and communes in its total industrial 
output. 

Output rose so rapidly that by 1985 the value of production gener- 
ated in sidelines exceeded the value of principal crop and livestock 
production. To make the gross value of agricultural output more 
realistically represent agricultural production, statisticians in 1985 
limited sideline production to hunting and fishing, collecting wild 
herbs, and producing family handicrafts. After 1985, therefore, 
there were at least three aggregate measures of economic perfor- 
mance: gross value of output; gross value of agricultural output 
(crops, livestock, forestry, aquatic, and sideline); and gross value 
of rural society, which included the gross value of agricultural output 
plus the value of rural industrial, transportation, construction, and 
other output (see Rural Industry, ch. 7). 

Agricultural Trade 

Since 1949 agricultural exports for most years have exceeded 
agricultural imports. China's officials have used this export sur- 
plus as an important source for financing the importation of high- 
priority industrial items. Agricultural exports have risen through 
the years but have not grown as fast as industrial exports. In 1970, 
for example, agricultural exports accounted for 45 percent of total 
exports, but in 1985 China's US$6.5 billion in agricultural exports 
was only 20 percent of the total exports. 

In the 1970s agricultural imports accounted for about 30 per- 
cent of total imports. For example, of the US$7.1 billion worth 
of products imported in 1977, US$2.1 billion (30 percent) were 
agricultural products. In 1985 US$4.7 billion worth of agricultural 
products were imported, which was only 5 percent of the US$42.8 
billion of total imports (see fig. 10; table 14, Appendix A). The 
ratio of agricultural imports to other imports was expected to rise 
in the late 1980s and 1990s. 



294 



Agriculture 



Wheat has been imported nearly every year since the early 1950s. 
These imports averaged about 5 million tons in the 1960s and 1970s 
but rose to a peak of more than 13 million tons in 1982. Wheat 
imports fell as wheat output expanded rapidly, so that by 1985 
imports fell to just under 5.5 million tons. Argentina, Australia, 
Canada, France, and the United States have been major sources 
of China's wheat imports. 

China is one of the world's largest rice exporters, annually ship- 
ping out about 1 million tons. Rice exports go primarily to Asian 
and East European countries and to Cuba. 

China is both an importer and an exporter of coarse grains. Up 
to 1984 sorghum, millet, and corn exports usually totaled only 
several hundred thousand tons but reached a peak of over 5 mil- 
lion tons in 1985 (see Crops, this ch.). In the mid-1980s corn was 
shipped primarily to Japan, North Korea, and the Soviet Union. 
Barley is imported as a livestock feed and as a feedstock to brew 
beer. Corn is imported for human consumption and for livestock 
feed. Quantities imported varied considerably depending on internal 
supply conditions and prices in international markets. Large quan- 
tities of corn were imported during the Great Leap Forward (when 
grain production fell dramatically), in the early 1970s, and at the 
end of the 1970s, when corn imports hit a peak of 3.6 million tons. 
Major coarse grain suppliers include Argentina, Australia, Canada, 
France, Thailand, and the United States. 

Soybeans have been a major foreign exchange earner for most 
of this century. Static production and rising domestic demand for 
soybeans and soybean products meant a decline in exports until the 
early 1980s. For example, in 1981 Argentina and the United States 
shipped more than 500,000 tons of soybeans to China; these two 
countries and Brazil also exported soybean oil to China. Domestic 
production expanded in the early 1980s, however, and by 1985 soy- 
bean imports fell and exports exceeded 1 million tons. Also in the 
early 1980s, China began to ship soybean meal to Asian markets. 

Before 1983 China was one of the world's largest importers of 
raw cotton. These imports averaged around 100,000 tons annually 
but climbed to a peak of nearly 900,000 tons in 1980. A dramatic 
increase in domestic cotton production filled domestic demand, and 
exports exceeded imports in 1983. In 1985 China shipped nearly 
500,000 tons of raw cotton to Asian and European markets. 

Sugar imports to China come primarily from Australia, Cuba, 
the Philippines, and Thailand. Quantities imported climbed steadily 
from 100,000 tons in 1955 to 500,000 tons in the mid-1970s and 
continued to rise dramatically to a peak of more than 2 million 
tons in 1985. 



295 



China: A Country Study 



EXPORTS 

Live Animals 




Coffee, Tea, and Spices 8% 0ilseed and Nuts 77% 



IMPORTS 




Grain 22.5% 



Figure 10. Composition of Agricultural Exports and Imports, 1985 



296 



Agriculture 



In addition to the commodities just noted, China also exports 
a host of other products from its vast agricultural resources. Large 
quantities of live animals, meat, fish, vegetables, and fruits are 
shipped to Asian markets. Tea, spices, and essential oils are shipped 
to major international markets. China also exports animal products, 
such as hog bristles, fur, and other animal products. 

Agricultural trade remains an important component of China's 
general agricultural modernization effort. China is likely to con- 
tinue to import grain and other agricultural products for the fore- 
seeable future. These imports would be used to maintain or improve 
living standards, especially in urban areas. In rural areas, imports 
help reduce the pressure for more procurement, freeing resources 
for increased consumption or investment in local agricultural 
programs. 

In the long run, China may reduce the expenditure of foreign 
exchange needed to finance agricultural imports. These expendi- 
tures reduce the amount of other imports that can be used for 
modernization and investment in the nonagricultural sectors of the 
economy. Success in reducing agricultural imports will eventually 
depend on the development of domestic sources of supply, for which 
China hopes to rely in part on new production bases for market- 
able crops. Pressure for increased consumption is likely to continue. 
The increase in population and the need for more agricultural goods 
(including grain, industrial crops, and grain-consuming livestock) 
to support higher real incomes both in urban areas and in the new 
agricultural base areas will continue to be factors creating this 
pressure. 

Useful general works on China's agricultural sector include 
Dwight H. Perkins' Agricultural Development in China 1368-1968; 
Randolph Barker, Radha Sinha, and Beth Rose's The Chinese 
Agricultural Economy; and Nicholas R. Lardy' s Agriculture in China's 
Modern Economic Development. Since 1981 China's State Statistical 
Bureau has published data on the agricultural sector in annual 
statistical yearbooks. More detailed statistics, summary informa- 
tion, and policy statements are published by the Ministry of Agricul- 
ture, Animal Husbandry, and Fishery in its Nongye Nianjian 
(Agricultural Yearbook). The China Daily, printed in English and 
published in China, contains important data and policy statements. 
Thousands of Chinese-language books on agricultural topics, and 
newspapers such as Zhongguo Nongbao (China Agriculture), are avail- 
able by purchase or subscription. China Quarterly, published in 



297 



China: A Country Study 



London, occasionally contains articles on Chinese agriculture by 
foreign observers. The National Academy of Sciences Committee 
on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China 
has published several interesting trip reports by United States 
agricultural delegations. 

The United States government also publishes information and 
analysis concerning China. The Joint Economic Committee of the 
United States Congress periodically publishes a volume on China's 
economy; the 1986 edition is entitled China's Economy Looks Toward 
the Year 2000. Each year the United States Department of Agricul- 
ture publishes China: Situation and Outlook Report, which reviews 
China's agricultural production and trade for the past year and 
provides an outlook for the coming year. The department also pub- 
lishes monthly forecasts of production and trade and prepares 
specialized reports on various topics. (For further information and 
complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



298 



Perseverance characterizes this Western Han dynasty (206 B.C.-A.D. 9) 
female overseer excavated at an archaeological site in Yunnan Provice. The 
original was bronze with gold inlay. 



CHINA'S INDUSTRIAL SECTOR has shown great progress 
since 1949, but in the late 1980s it remained undeveloped in many 
respects. Although the country manufactured nuclear weapons and 
delivery systems and could launch domestically produced satellites, 
many of its industries used technologies of the 1950s. Although 
China was one of the world's largest producers of fuel in the 
mid-1980s and had the world's largest hydroelectric power poten- 
tial, frequent energy shortages caused lengthy factory shutdowns. 
Despite massive coal reserves in north China, transportation defi- 
ciencies necessitated coal imports to south China. Research institutes 
developed sophisticated industrial technologies, but bureaucratic 
and political obstacles impeded implementation. 

To solve these and other problems, the Chinese leadership 
initiated sweeping economic reforms in the late 1970s. Although 
specific industrial reforms were not clearly defined, broad goals 
included loosening bureaucratic controls on enterprises and 
managers to promote a decentralization of authority. Other broad 
goals were to increase worker productivity by offering incentives; 
to give market forces greater influence on output mix, purchases, 
sales, and hiring; to make enterprises operate more efficiently and 
be responsible for profits and losses; and to restructure the price 
system to reflect supply and demand more accurately. 

Another major goal of the reform program was development of 
light industry. Beginning with the First Five- Year Plan (1953-57), 
China adopted the Soviet model of economic development, stress- 
ing a heavy industrial base. However, this emphasis seriously 
strained China's resources and capital and led the leadership in 
the late 1970s to shift to development of light industry. Because 
light industry is labor intensive, this shift helped to alleviate unem- 
ployment. It also satisfied growing consumer demand, which had 
not been met because of overemphasis on heavy industry. Another 
reason for diversification into light industry was the desire to 
increase exports to obtain much-needed foreign currency. 

By the mid-1980s industrial reforms had achieved substantial 
success in some areas. Industrial output was about twenty- five times 
that of 1952. A wide range of modern industries had been estab- 
lished, and the country was one of the world's leading producers 
of coal, textiles, and bicycles. There were major plants in almost 
every key industry, and a strong effort had been made to introduce 
manufacturing into undeveloped and rural areas. Light-industry 



301 



China: A Country Study 



output of consumer goods had increased dramatically. In some 
cases, enterprises reduced operating costs, managers were able to 
exercise greater autonomy, and technical innovations were imple- 
mented to increase efficiency. 

Despite these bright spots in the 1980s, overall results were dis- 
appointing to Chinese economic planners. Major problems included 
failure to reform the price system, interference of local cadres in 
the managers' operation of enterprises, and perpetuation of the 
life tenure, "iron rice bowl" (see Glossary) system for workers. 
Rapid industrial growth made energy shortages one of the most 
critical problems facing the economy, limiting industrial enterprises 
and mines to 70 or 80 percent of capacity. According to China's 
energy planners, the country would have to quadruple electricity 
production to meet the gross value of industrial and agricultural 
output target for the year 2000. For a quick increase in output, 
the industry emphasized short-term development of thermal power 
plants. For the long term, China planned to rely on its vast hydro- 
electric power potential and nuclear power to meet electricity 
demand. 

In the 1980s large-scale, centrally controlled plants dominated 
manufacturing. These large plants were supplemented with many 
small-scale town and township enterprises, which accounted for 
significant percentages of national output of coal, construction 
materials, and leather products. 

Trends in Industrial Production 

The shifts in economic policy typical of the People's Republic 
of China since 1949 have strongly affected industrial production 
(see Economic Policies, 1949-80, ch. 5). In the period of recovery 
from World War II and the Chinese civil war of 1945-49, indus- 
trial output more than doubled as plants were repaired and employ- 
ment rose. The First Five- Year Plan concentrated on constructing 
plants and equipment for heavy industry, much of it with Soviet 
assistance. The machinery, iron and steel, and mining industries 
all built their foundations in this period. The increases in produc- 
tive capacity resulted in a second doubling of output. 

The Great Leap Forward (1958-60; see Glossary) saw produc- 
tion surge by 45 percent in 1958 as new plants went into opera- 
tion, facilities operated beyond capacity, and great numbers of small 
local plants were established. But the overambitious plan to revamp 
China's economy soon encountered problems of misallocation and 
overextension of resources. The demands of the Great Leap For- 
ward left the work force physically exhausted. As the overburdened 
economy began to collapse, growth fell to 22 percent in 1959 and 



302 




Glazed-ware finishing at Jingdezhen, a major porcelain- 
manufacturing center in Jiangxi Province 
Courtesy Robert Tichane 

4 percent in 1960. Output dropped precipitously in 1961 because 
of the earlier withdrawal of Soviet technicians, misallocation of 
resources, and a serious food shortage (see The 1950s, ch. 6). In 
1962, with the restoration of planning and coordination, produc- 
tion began to recover. Industrial priorities were transferred from 
production of industrial goods to agricultural inputs and consumer 
goods. By 1965 most sectors of industry had regained their 1957 
production levels. 

In the early stages of the Cultural Revolution (1966-76; see Glos- 
sary), production declined when civil disturbances disrupted fac- 
tories and transport in the big industrial cities. In 1967 output fell, 
and it remained below the 1966 level in 1968. After order was 
restored, production recovered in 1969 and grew by 18 percent 
in 1970. With resumption of growth and the beginning of the Fourth 
Five-Year Plan (1971-75), output grew by over 10 percent in 1971 
and 1972 and by 13 percent in 1973. A wide-ranging program of 
investment in plants and equipment, including foreign imports, 
raised industrial capacity. Throughout the 1970s thousands of new, 
small-scale plants added significantly to levels of production, 
especially in coal, chemical fertilizer, cement, and electricity, 
although there were some setbacks. In the mid-1970s the influence 
of the Gang of Four (see Glossary) and disruption by the succession 



303 



China: A Country Study 



struggle again reduced industrial output. Political activities in fac- 
tories and uncertainty of managers and planners caused growth 
to fall to 4.4 percent in 1974. Growth recovered to 10.3 percent 
in 1975 but fell to zero in 1976 in the uncertainty surrounding the 
deaths of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, the second fall of Deng 
Xiaoping, and the destruction caused by the Tangshan earthquake 
(see The Post-Mao Period, 1976-78, ch. 1). 

In 1977 and 1978, the Four Modernizations (see Glossary) effort 
began in earnest. Growth reached 14 percent in 1977, when politi- 
cal stability was restored and plants resumed full operation. The 
high growth rate in 1977 and 1978 caused a serious overheating 
of the economy, however. At the end of 1978, the leadership 
introduced a comprehensive economic reform. In 1979 the economy 
entered a period of readjustment, emphasizing a slower, more 
rational rate of growth. Policy stressed development of light indus- 
try and gave priority to the textile and consumer industries in sup- 
plying raw and unfinished materials, power, fuel, and finances. 
Capital investment in light industry increased from 5.4 percent in 
1978 to about 8 percent in 1980. Between 1978 and 1981, the 
proportion of light industry in gross industrial output value 
increased by about 9 percent. The rate of capital construction 
decreased, and the government initiated a major drive to correct 
imbalances in the economy by gearing production to consumer 
needs and improving efficiency (see table 15, Appendix A). 

In 1983 the government took measures to economize on fuel, 
energy, raw materials, and working capital. The policy experimen- 
tally granted enterprises more autonomy. It introduced new kinds 
of contracts, permitting limited competition among enterprises serv- 
ing the same markets. The government began to allow market forces 
to determine production. At the Third Plenum of the Twelfth 
National Party Congress Central Committee in October 1984, the 
party officially reiterated its commitment to reform the urban econ- 
omy, signaling a high priority for industrial modernization. 

The Seventh Five- Year Plan (1986-90) called for greater respon- 
siveness to consumer demand, increased efficiency, and a further 
assimilation of modern technology. The plan sought to accelerate 
development of the energy and raw-materials industries and con- 
trol growth of manufacturing industries, making the two sectors 
develop more proportionately. Development of the transportation 
and communications sectors received high priority, and plans called 
for expanding the building industry. The leadership hoped to speed 
development of tertiary industry, such as restaurants and small 
shops, to meet consumer needs. 



304 



Industry 

Organization 

The government managed industry according to the kind and 
level of control, using various State Council organizations (see The 
State Council, ch. 10). In 1987 there were separate ministries con- 
cerned with industry, including those for aeronautics, astronau- 
tics, the chemical industry, the coal industry, the electronics 
industry, the metallurgical industry, the nuclear industry, the 
petroleum industry, the textile industry, light industry, railways, 
and water resources and electric power. There were two commis- 
sions concerned with industry — the National Defense Science, 
Technology, and Industry Commission and the State Machine- 
Building Industry Commission. 

In 1986 the government recognized four kinds of economic enter- 
prise ownership: "ownership by the whole people" (or state owner- 
ship), collective, individual, and other. Under state ownership, the 
productive assets of an enterprise were owned by the state, activi- 
ties of the enterprise were determined by national economic plans, 
and profits or losses accrued to the state budget. Most of the larg- 
est modern enterprises were state owned and directly controlled 
by the central government. Many other enterprises also were state 
owned but were jointly supervised by the central government and 
authorities at the provincial, prefectural, or county levels. Profits 
from these enterprises were divided among the central and lower- 
level units (see Local Administration, ch. 10). 

Under collective ownership, productive assets were owned by 
the workers themselves (in the case of an urban enterprise) or by 
the members of enterprises established by rural units. Profits and 
losses belonged to the members of the collective, and government 
authorities directed the enterprise loosely. Collectively owned enter- 
prises were generally small and labor intensive, employing approxi- 
mately 27 million people in cities and towns in 1983. Individual 
ownership belonged to the category of individual handicrafts in the 
1950s; by the mid-1980s it also included individual enterprises with 
a maximum of thirty employees. The Chinese authorities left the 
"other" category undefined. 

Geographical Distribution of Industry 

Before 1949 industry was concentrated in the large coastal cities 
and in the northeast. Shanghai was the largest industrial center, 
followed by Anshan, Fushun, and Shenyang. Qingdao and Tian- 
jin also were important industrial centers. Only a few cities in the 
interior had any modern industry; they included Wuhan, Chong- 
qing, and Taiyuan (see fig. 11). 



305 



China: A Country Study 



During the First Five- Year Plan, the government specifically 
emphasized development of the northeast and areas other than 
Shanghai, China's most important industrial base. Industrial sites 
were constructed in the north around the new steel mills at Baotou 
in Nei Monggol Autonomous Region (Inner Mongolia), and at 
Wuhan in Hubei Province. Industrial centers also arose in the 
southwest, mostly in Sichuan Province 

In the 1950s industrial centers in east and northeast China 
accounted for approximately two-thirds of total industrial output. 
By 1983, however, industrial centers in the north, central-south, 
and southwest had increased their share of output to more than 
40 percent. This increase was the result of a policy begun in the 
1950s to gradually expand existing industrial bases to new areas, 
to build new bases in the north and central-south, and to establish 
a new base in the southwest. 

From 1952 to 1983, central-south, southwest, and northwest 
China registered higher industrial growth than the east, northeast, 
and north regions. Total industrial output grew the fastest in the 
central-south region — from 13.7 percent of total output in 1952 
to 18.6 percent in 1983 (see table 16, Appendix A). The govern- 
ment had stressed developing the interior regions since the 1950s, 
but by 1986 it had abandoned that strategy in order to develop 
areas with more established infrastructures. According to this plan, 
the south would continue growing, but the east and northeast would 
be the main benefactors. 

Level of Technology 

Despite marked improvement over the early years of the Peo- 
ple's Republic, the technological level of Chinese industry gener- 
ally remained quite low in the late 1980s. The Chinese made 
remarkable technological progress in some areas, such as nuclear 
weaponry, satellites, and computers; but overall the industrial sector 
lagged far behind that of the developed countries (see The Reform 
Program, ch. 9). Much of China's machinery and equipment dated 
from the 1950s and 1960s. The Soviet Union had provided tech- 
nology assistance during the early and mid-1950s, but such aid 
ended in the late 1950s and early 1960s with the break in relations 
(see Sino-Soviet Relations, ch. 12). 

One of the main reasons for lagging technology was the lack of 
coordination between research institutes and production enterprises. 
Between 1979 and 1984, the number of major scientific and tech- 
nical research discoveries grew from 2,790 to 10,000, and the num- 
ber of inventions approved by the state rose from 42 to 264. Most 
of the discoveries and inventions were never implemented. This 



306 



Industry 




Figure 11. Major Industrial Facilities, 1987 



was mainly because research institutes and production enterprises 
operated independently and had little or no exchange of informa- 
tion. Also, most enterprise managers were more concerned with 
meeting production quotas than with technological innovations. 

There were no clear goals for research and development and no 
concept of the importance of research and development to indus- 
try. Instead, efforts were concentrated on research and develop- 
ment for purely scientific purposes. Therefore, China did not 
develop a broad base of industrial research and development. By 
the early 1980s only 8 percent of the total research and develop- 
ment work force was involved in industrial research compared with 
72 percent in the United States and in the ensuing years the situa- 
tion did not improve. Institutional obstacles and resource short- 
ages also plagued research institutes. 



307 



China: A Country Study 



In 1985 the Chinese Communist Party issued the "Resolution 
on the Reform of the Science and Technology Management Sys- 
tem." The resolution sought to coordinate research and produc- 
tion more closely. Part of the overall strategy of the Four 
Modernizations was to redirect science and technology toward eco- 
nomic progress. Research institutes were to compete for contracts 
from various industries and operate on a fee-for-service basis. 
Emphasis went to cooperation among factories and universities and 
other institutes. 

As of 1987 the status of this effort remained unclear. On the one 
hand, the metallurgical industry had applied more internal tech- 
nological innovation than the electronics industry because the tech- 
nologies in the former were more developed than in the latter. The 
metallurgical industry made a stronger effort to blend research and 
production in individual enterprises. Also, major metallurgical com- 
plexes had internal research facilities for new-product research. On 
the other hand, electronics was much more compartmentalized; 
by the late 1980s, there was no decisive breaking of the barriers 
between the technical and production elements. 

China's assimilation of imported technology had mixed results 
in the mid-1980s. There had been some remarkable accomplish- 
ments, but they had taken a long time. For example, advanced 
West German cold-rolling technology had moved into the Anshan 
iron and steel complex in Liaoning Province. The electronics sec- 
tor was not as successful because of shortages of raw materials, lack 
of a reliable power supply, low manpower skill, and a shortage of 
service and applications personnel. An exception was the Jiangnan 
semiconductor plant in Wuxi, Jiangsu Province, which received 
equipment from numerous Japanese and American companies. By 
1987 it was highly productive. China's electronics industry, 
however, like most other industries, was far from implementing 
advanced technology, whatever its source. 

Supplies of Industrial Resources 
Capital 

Since 1949 China has devoted a large percentage of investment 
to industry. By 1983 investment in industry was approximately 57 
percent of investment in fixed assets. In 1984 about ¥44 billion 
(for value of the yuan — see Glossary), or roughly 30 percent of total 
state expenditures, was slated for capital construction. In 1981 the 
leadership attempted to limit uncontrolled, excessive investment 
in capital construction. The results were not especially positive — 
partly because of reinvestment by enterprises allowed to retain 
profits and partly because of foreign investment. 



308 



Industry 



To supplement domestic sources of capital, China's leadership 
began allowing virtually all forms of foreign loans and credit by 
the end of 1979. By early 1980 the country had access to the equiva- 
lent of almost US$30 billion in foreign loans and credits extend- 
ing through 1985. The Chinese also sought foreign capital by 
encouraging joint-venture projects between Chinese and foreign 
enterprises (see Foreign Trade, ch. 8). But in early 1986 foreign 
companies viewed China as a high-cost and high-risk investment 
area. In 1985 US$8.5 billion worth of foreign capital had been com- 
mitted, compared with only US$500 million in the first quarter 
of 1986. 

Labor 

In the mid-1980s about 120 million people worked in the indus- 
trial sector (see Labor Force, ch. 2). In state-owned enterprises the 
annual output per worker (the Chinese measure of productivity) 
rose by 9.4 percent to¥15,349. In 1987 there was a severe urban 
unemployment problem and consequently a virtually unlimited sup- 
ply of unskilled and semiskilled labor. Skilled workers, engineers, 
scientists, technicians, and managerial personnel were in very short 
supply. During the Cultural Revolution, many specialists were 
forced to abandon their occupations, and most training and edu- 
cation programs ceased during the ten-year hiatus in higher edu- 
cation from 1966 to 1976 (see Education Policy, ch. 4). This led 
to a shortage of skilled personnel that seriously hampered the 
industrial sector's implementation of imported modern technology 
and independent development of new management and produc- 
tion forms. In 1980 a modern management training center was 
established in Dalian, Liaoning Province, with the help of foreign 
experts. In 1987 many Dalian graduates found it difficult to use 
their newly acquired skills because managerial autonomy was lack- 
ing, and many cadres had a vested interest in maintaining the sta- 
tus quo. It was unclear what effect students educated abroad were 
having on industry. 

Raw Materials 

China is well endowed with most of the important industrial ores, 
fuels, and other minerals. Only a few raw materials are not present 
in deposits large enough for domestic needs. Supplies of iron and 
coking coal, although of poor quality, are adequate. By the early 
to mid-1980s, China was a significant exporter of rare metals neces- 
sary for the aerospace and electronics industries. Nonetheless, China 
imported materials such as steel, pig iron, copper, and aluminum 
because of a large domestic demand and an inadequate transportation 



309 



China: A Country Study 

infrastructure (see Iron Ore; Other Minerals and Metals, this 
ch.). 

Energy 

Although China was the fourth largest world producer of fuel 
in 1985, energy shortages remained a major obstacle to industrial 
growth. Energy waste was considerable; to offset this, some energy 
prices were increased, and penalties for waste went into force. 

Coal was the primary energy source, accounting in 1985 for more 
than 70 percent of total fuel consumption. Proven reserves were 
more than 700 billion tons, and estimated reserves were 3,000 bil- 
lion tons. Onshore and offshore oil reserves in 1985 were around 
5.3 billion tons, mostly untapped. China had the world's sixth larg- 
est electric power generating potential, but output still fell far short 
of demand. Total natural gas output for 1985 was 12.7 billion cubic 
meters; 15 billion cubic meters was set as the target for 1990. 
Natural gas and oil received equal weight in the Seventh Five-Year 
Plan (see Electric and Nuclear Power, this ch.). 

Manufacturing 

China's manufacturing sector developed according to the prin- 
ciple of "walking on two legs," a policy of self-reliance introduced 
in the 1950s. In the 1980s one leg consisted of the state-funded and 
state-controlled large and medium-sized plants with the most quali- 
fied personnel and the most advanced equipment. The other leg 
was small-scale plants using inferior equipment and large amounts 
of local labor. Together, the two sectors produced a wide range 
of industrial products. In most cases the larger plants accounted 
for the bulk of production, but the smaller enterprises were increas- 
ing their share and producing a significant percentage of cement, 
fertilizers, and farm machinery. 

Iron and Steel 

Before 1949 the iron and steel industry was small and dispersed; 
the Japanese had built the only modern steel facility just after World 
War I at Anshan, Liaoning Province. Although Japan eventually 
built nine blast furnaces in Anshan, total steel output by all plants 
never exceeded 1 million tons annually. Much of the Japanese 
equipment was either damaged in the Chinese civil war (1945-49) 
or removed by the Soviets at the end of World War II. 

Since the establishment of the People's Republic, considerable 
investment has consistently gone to expand steel output. Steel 
production, however, has been very sensitive to changes in eco- 
nomic policies and political climate (see fig. 12). Steel output rose 



310 



Oil exploration in the 
Daqing oil field, 
Heilongjiang Province 
Courtesy Xinhua News Agency 



An offshore oil- drilling 
platform in the 
South China Sea 
Courtesy Xinhua News Agency 



China: A Country Study 

steadily in the 1950s, when Soviet advisers helped establish the basis 
of the iron and steel industry, installing numerous Soviet-designed 
blast and open-hearth furnaces. The Great Leap Forward saw a 
significant increase in the number of primitive backyard furnaces 
producing poor-quality pig iron; numerous new, small, modern 
plants; overuse of large plants; and exaggerated production reports. 
In 1961 the industry broke down. Nearly all small plants were 
closed, and output fell to less than half the amount reported for 
1960. From 1961 to 1965, output gradually recovered as equip- 
ment was repaired; basic oxygen furnaces were purchased from 
Austria and electric furnaces from Japan. Production fell in 1967 
and 1968 during the Cultural Revolution but grew rapidly in the 
relative political stability from 1969 through the early 1970s. In 
the mid-1970s political upheaval retarded output, as did the cata- 
strophic Tangshan earthquake of 1976. That event severely 
damaged the Tangshan steel plant and the Kailuan coal mines. 
The latter are major sources of coking coal. After 1976 output 
climbed steadily, reaching 34.5 million tons in 1979. Steel produc- 
tion for 1986 was 50 million tons. 

Steel was viewed as the cornerstone or "key link" of both the 
Great Leap Forward and the Four Modernizations programs (see 
Economic Policies, 1949-80, ch. 5). But the post-Mao leadership 
was determined not to repeat the economically disastrous Great 
Leap Forward policies: in 1978 it called for a period of readjust- 
ment and a cutback in steel investment. It had set a goal, however, 
of producing 80 million tons of steel by 2000. Production targets 
were to be met by renovating and improving existing facilities, 
rather than building new ones. Improvements in existing plants 
reduced steel-industry energy consumption from 73.8 million tons 
of coal in 1978 to 69.1 million tons in 1983, and production 
increased by 26 percent. The Chinese realized they would need 
outside assistance to fully modernize their steel industry. They 
sought hardware, technology transfer, and managerial and plan- 
ning assistance. 

In 1987 China was the world's fifth largest producer of iron and 
steel but lagged far behind developed countries in production 
methods and quality. Most steel capacity was in open-hearth fur- 
naces with basic oxygen furnaces, electric furnaces, and side-blown 
converters. Much of the iron and coking coal used in making steel 
was of low quality. Approximately 25 percent of the country's coal 
went for steel production in 1985. In 1985 capital construction, 
considered excessive by the Chinese, exacerbated existing short- 
ages of rolled steel, and imports filled 25 percent of domestic 
demand. 



312 



Industry 



The Ministry of Metallurgical Industry reported in 1985 that 
China had 13 plants capable of producing at least 1 million tons 
per year. Accounting for approximately 65 percent of total produc- 
tion, these mills were built mostly during the 1950s. The Anshan 
plant was the oldest and most productive of all, producing 7 mil- 
lion tons per year. The next largest was in Wuhan. It was con- 
structed in the 1950s with Soviet aid. China began construction 
in 1978 on its first integrated steel complex, the Baoshan iron and 
steel works in Shanghai, but the completion date moved from 1982 
to 1985 and finally to 1988. 

Besides the larger plants, about 800 smaller mills were dispersed 
throughout the country in 1985. They ranged from specialty mills 
producing 500,000 tons per year to very small operations under 
local jurisdiction or other ministries. Many of the smaller mills were 
legacies of the Great Leap Forward, when local authorities had hur- 
riedly established their own steel-making facilities. In the mid-1980s 
the government hoped to phase out these inefficient plants in favor 
of larger, more productive plants. 

In the late 1980s, it was apparent that steel output would remain 
insufficient to meet the needs of the Four Modernizations. Dur- 
ing the period covered by the Seventh Five- Year Plan, imports were 
expected to average 41 percent of domestic output. Thin rolled 
sheets, used to make such items as motor vehicles, washing 
machines, and refrigerators, were in extremely short supply. In 
1984 China had to import about half its steel sheet and about 80 per- 
cent of its steel plate. Production of tubes and pipes also was inade- 
quate, and approximately 50 percent of all tubes had to be imported. 
The country was most proficient in the production of steel bars, 
but it still had to import an estimated 1 .8 million tons of rods and 
bars in 1984. In 1985 China imported a record 15 million tons of 
steel, more than two-thirds of it from Japan. 

Machine Building 

The machinery industry has been a leading priority since the 
founding of the People's Republic. The industry expanded from 
a few small assembly and repair facilities before 1949 to a large, 
widely distributed machine-building sector producing many kinds 
of modern equipment. However, as of 1987 the overall level of tech- 
nology was still relatively backward. In the late 1970s and early 
1980s, China intended to use large-scale imports to modernize the 
machinery industry but later decided that limiting imports to critical 
areas would be less costly. The former Ministry of Machine- 
Building Industry's plans called for about 60 percent of the indus- 
try's products in 1990 to reach the technological level of the 



313 



China: A Country Study 




Figure 12. Steel Production and Capacity, 1948-86 



industrialized countries during the 1970s and 1980s. Products built 
to international standards received priority in allocation of funds, 
materials, and energy. 

In 1987 the machinery industry was distributed throughout the 
country. Nearly all counties and towns had one or more machine 
factories. Major machinery centers were Shanghai, Tianjin, Shen- 
yang, Beijing, Harbin, Changchun, Taiyuan, Luoyang, Wuhan, 
Chongqing, Chengdu, Xi'an, and Lanzhou. 

The machinery industry was selected by the State Council to 
lead the way in management reform. China's leaders realized that 
the quality of machinery would determine the success of moderni- 
zation in all areas of the economy. The industry's extreme compart - 
mentalization (a legacy of the Maoist obsession with self-reliance) 
showed a lack of communication among government offices or 
within regions. Skilled managers also were lacking. 

Machine Tools 

In 1986 about 120 major enterprises produced most of China's 
machine tools. Many of the large plants were in the east, north, 
and northeast, particularly in Beijing, Shanghai, Shenyang, Har- 
bin, and Tianjin. In the early and mid-1980s, a number of agree- 
ments with foreign manufacturers aimed to help China upgrade 
its machine-tool industry. The Shanghai municipal government 
also asked assistance from the World Bank in preparing and 



314 



Industry 



financing a comprehensive modernization scheme for the Shang- 
hai machine-tool industry. 

Overall, the machine-tool industry was based on 1960s technol- 
ogy. Many of the tools had a service life of only five to seven years, 
compared with twelve to fifteen years in industrialized countries. 
The tools were generally unreliable and were poorly suited for pre- 
cision work because of outdated design, low-quality purchased com- 
ponents, substandard manufacturing facilities, and a lack of 
production-management expertise. 

Electric Power Equipment 

By the early 1970s, major generator production centers in Har- 
bin, Shanghai, Beijing, and Deyang (in Sichuan Province) had built 
both hydroelectric and thermal generators as large as 300 mega- 
watts. There also were numerous small and medium-sized plants 
producing generators in the 3.2- to 80-megawatt range. As of 1986 
China manufactured condenser-type turbo-generating units with 
capacities of 6,000 to 300,000 kilowatts; back-pressure extraction 
generating units with capacities of 12,000 to 50,000 kilowatts; 
geothermal facilities with capacities of 1,000 to 3,000 kilowatts; and 
hydroelectric power equipment consisting of generator equipment 
with an 18-million-kilowatt capacity. Deficiencies showed in power- 
generating equipment and transmission technology, and signifi- 
cant problems existed in direct-current transmission, particularly 
in converter technology. China continued to lack experience in 
design and production of high-volt-ampere transformers and cir- 
cuit breakers. 

Transportation Equipment 

The automotive industry, which grew substantially after 1949, 
did not keep pace with the demands of modernization. In the early 
1980s, demand was still low. A surge in demand resulted in the 
production of 400,000 vehicles and the importation of another 
300,000 vehicles through early 1985. In the second half of 1985, 
stringent administrative measures curtailed most imports, and in 
early 1986 domestic production was reduced to 13 percent of that 
in early 1985. One cause for this was a large surplus created by 
high production and importation levels in 1984 and 1985. Although 
1986 production levels were considered a short-term slowdown, the 
targets of the Seventh Five-Year Plan were quite low. 

China's investment in the railroad industry during the Seventh 
Five- Year Plan was higher than that for any previous five-year plan, 
with an 80-percent increase over the Sixth Five- Year Plan (1981- 
85). The country allocated Y10 billion to manufacture and purchase 



315 



China: A Country Study 



locomotives, and the remainder went to repair and rebuild obso- 
lete equipment. During the Seventh Five-Year Plan, the Ministry 
of Railways set a production goal of 5,000 locomotives, including 
over 800 electric and over 2,000 diesel locomotives. The ministry 
also planned to manufacture 1 10,000 freight and 10,000 passenger 
cars. Despite these ambitious domestic production targets, China 
had to rely heavily on imported technology to modernize its rail- 
road rolling stock. 

From 1961 to 1987, China's maritime fleet grew faster than that 
of any other country in the world. During that time, the merchant 
fleet tonnage increased by an average 13.6 percent per year. From 
1982 to 1987, Chinese shipyards produced 55 ships, including bulk 
cargo vessels, freighters, tankers, container ships, partial container 
ships, and passenger-cargo vessels, with a total deadweight ton- 
nage of more than 700,000 million tons. At the end of 1985, about 
17 percent of China's merchant fleet was built domestically. 

In the late 1950s, China began developing its own aircraft, known 
as the Yun, or Y series. China built 135 civil aircraft between 1981 
and 1985 and was scheduled to build hundreds more during the 
Seventh Five-Year Plan. Civil aircraft and aircraft engines were 
produced in large plants located primarily in Shanghai, Xi'an, Har- 
bin, and Shenyang. Medium-sized factories produced the neces- 
sary test equipment, components, avionics, and accessories. China 
hoped for eventual self-reliance in all aircraft production, but it 
still imported aircraft in 1987. 

Metallurgical Equipment 

Much equipment in the metallurgical industry was based on 
Japanese designs of the 1930s and Soviet designs of the 1950s. Two- 
thirds of the major equipment at Anshan, one of the largest plants 
in China, was built during the 1930s and 1950s. In general, major 
metallurgical equipment was more technologically advanced than 
instruments and control systems. Measuring and monitoring instru- 
ments, essential to quality control, were in short supply. 

Most of the iron- and steel-making equipment in general use 
was domestically produced. This included blast furnaces based on 
Chinese improvements to old Soviet designs, ore-beneficiation 
plants, open-hearth furnaces, electric furnaces, and a wide range 
of steel-finishing equipment. To achieve a higher technological level, 
various pieces of equipment were imported because China had not 
assimilated the technology necessary for domestic production. In 
most instances the industry imported only the main equipment, 
neglecting necessary control instruments and auxiliary technologies. 



316 



Industry 



Electronics 

In 1987 China's electronics industry was about ten to fifteen years 
behind those of the industrialized nations. Key problems were the 
inability to transfer technology from research to production and 
continued reliance on hand labor. Also, impatience to reach 
Western standards sometimes proved counterproductive. For exam- 
ple, instead of buying a complex item such as a microprocessor 
abroad, China chose to develop its own, at great expense. 

In 1985 the electronics industry consisted of approximately 2,400 
enterprises, 100 research institutions, 4 institutes of higher learn- 
ing, and 20 secondary vocational schools. The industry employed 
some 1.4 million people, including 130,000 technical personnel. 
Besides the approximately 2,000 kinds of electronic components 
and large-scale integrated circuits produced by the industry, it made 
400 varieties of electronic machinery, including electronic com- 
puters, television broadcast transmitters and receivers, and radar 
and communications equipment. In the 1980s China made great 
strides in the production of consumer electronic products, such as 
televisions, radios, and tape recorders. 

Chemicals 

China's chemical industry evolved from a negligible base in 1949, 
grew substantially in the 1950s and early 1960s, and received major 
emphasis in the late 1960s and 1970s. In 1984 chemical products 
served primarily agriculture and light industry. The three main 
areas of chemical manufacturing were chemical fertilizers, basic 
chemicals, and organically synthesized products. Chemical fertilizer 
was consistently regarded as the key to increased agricultural out- 
put. The output of many chemical products rose steadily, some- 
times dramatically, from 1978 to 1986. 

Except for a few items, such as soda ash and synthetic rubber, 
the great majority of chemical products, including fertilizer, came 
from small factories. Small-scale plants could be built more quickly 
and inexpensively than large, modern plants and were designed 
to use low-quality local resources, such as small deposits of coal 
or natural gas. They also minimized demands on the overworked 
transportation system. 

Larger and more modern fertilizer plants were located in every 
special municipality, province, and autonomous region. In the early 
1970s, China negotiated contracts with foreign firms for construc- 
tion of thirteen large nitrogenous-fertilizer plants. By 1980 all thir- 
teen plants had been completed, and ten were fully operational. 



317 



China: A Country Study 



From 1980 to 1984, many inefficient fertilizer plants were shut 
down, and by 1984 additional plants were being built with the most 
advanced equipment available. To capitalize on China's rich min- 
eral resources, the new plants were being constructed close to coal, 
phosphate, and potassium deposits. 

Compared with advanced countries, China's chemical fertiliz- 
ers lacked phosphate and potassium and contained too much nitro- 
gen. To boost supplies of phosphate and potassium, China relied 
heavily on imports during the Sixth Five-Year Plan. 

Basic chemical production grew rapidly after 1949. In 1985 
production of sulfuric acid was approximately 6.7 million tons. 
Major production centers were in Nanjing and Liida, and large 
plants were located at many chemical-fertilizer complexes. Soda-ash 
output in 1985 was 2 million tons; production was concentrated 
near major sources of salt, such as large coastal cities, Sichuan and 
Qinghai provinces, and Nei Monggol Autonomous Region. 
Production of caustic soda was scattered at large facilities in Liida, 
Tianjin, Shanghai, Taiyuan, Shenyang, and Chongqing. In 1985 
output of caustic soda was 2.4 million tons. Nitric acid and hydro- 
chloric acid were produced in the northeast and in Shanghai and 
Tianjin. 

The chemical industry's organic-synthesis branch manufactured 
plastics, synthetic rubber, synthetic fibers, dyes, pharmaceuticals, 
and paint. Plastics, synthetic rubber, and synthetic fibers such as 
nylon were particularly important in the modernization drive 
because they were used to produce such basic consumer goods as 
footwear and clothing. From 1979 to 1985, plastics production grew 
from 793,000 tons to 1.2 million tons and chemical fibers from 
326,300 tons to 947,800 tons. The major centers for organic syn- 
thesis included Shanghai, Jilin, Beijing, Tianjin, Taiyuan, Jinxi, 
and Guangzhou. The industry received large amounts of foreign 
machinery in the 1970s. 

Building Materials 

Large-scale capital construction dramatically increased the 
demand for building materials. Like the chemical fertilizer indus- 
try, cement production featured simultaneous development of small- 
scale plants and large, modern facilities. Widespread construction 
of small-scale cement plants began in 1958. By the mid-1970s, these 
plants existed in 80 percent of China's counties; in 1984 they 
accounted for a major share of national cement output. These local 
plants varied widely in size and technology. In 1983 China produced 
approximately 108 million tons of cement, second in the world to 
the Soviet Union. In 1984 production increased 14 percent, to 



318 



A rotor-blade assembly 
being installed in an 
electric generator 
Courtesy China Reconstructs 



123 million tons and, except for Xizang (Tibet) and Ningxia-Hui 
autonomous regions, every province, autonomous region, and spe- 
cial municipality had plants capable of producing 500,000 tons of 
cement per year. In 1985 cement production increased to almost 
146 million tons. 

China's building-materials industry developed rapidly and 
reached an output value of ¥28.7 billion in 1984. It manufactured 
over 500 kinds of products and employed approximately 3.8 mil- 
lion people in 1984. These materials were used in the metallurgi- 
cal, machinery, electronics, aviation, and national defense industries 
and in civil engineering projects. The main production centers for 
building materials were Beijing, Wuhan, and Harbin. 

By the mid-1980s China was one of the world's primary pro- 
ducers of plate glass, a critical building material. Production in 
1985 reached 49.4 million cases, and twenty urban glass factories 
each produced 500,000 cases annually. Three large glass plants, 
each having a production capacity of 1.2 million standard cases, 
were scheduled for completion in 1985 in Luoyang, Qinhuangdao, 
and Nanning. 

Paper 

In the early 1980s, China's serious shortage of productive forest 
combined with outdated technology to create a shortage of pulp 
and paper at a time of increasing demand. From 1981 to 1986, 



319 



China: A Country Study 

the annual growth rate of paper produetion was 7.3 percent. In 
1986, however, only 20 percent of paper pulp was made of wood; 
the remainder derived from grass fiber. 

China's more than 1,500 paper mills produced approximately 
45.4 million tons and over 500 different kinds of machine-made 
paper in 1986. Approximately 1 million tons of pulp and paper 
were imported annually. In 1986 China focused on pollution con- 
trol, increased product variety, reduced use of fiber and chemical 
ingredients, and more efficient use of energy as measures to improve 
production. China also sought foreign assistance to achieve these 
goals. 

Textiles 

China has a long and rich history in production of silk, bast fiber, 
and cotton textiles. The earliest silk producer, China began export- 
ing to West Asia and Europe around 20 B.C. Ramie, a grass used 
to produce woven fabrics, fish lines, and fish nets, was first culti- 
vated around 1000 B.C. and is found in the provinces of Hunan, 
Hubei, Sichuan, Guangdong, and Guizhou and the Guangxi- 
Zhuang Autonomous Region. Cotton spinning and weaving was 
the largest domestic industry in the late nineteenth and early twen- 
tieth centuries. After a respectable but inconsistent performance 
from 1949 to 1978, textile production increased significantly with 
the introduction of the responsibility system (see Glossary) for 
agriculture in 1979 (see Crops, ch. 6). By 1979 supplies of textiles 
had improved, the cloth-rationing system (in force since 1949) had 
ended, and the industry had begun to flourish. 

From 1979 to 1984, the output value of the textile industry rose 
approximately 13 percent annually. In 1984 China had about 12,000 
enterprises producing cotton and woolen goods, silk, linen, chemi- 
cal fibers, prints and dyed goods, knitwear, and textile machinery. 
Textile production was 15.4 percent of the country's total industrial 
output value in 1984. Textile exports in 1984 (excluding silk goods) 
totaled US$4.2 billion, up 21.7 percent over 1983, and accounted 
for 18.7 percent of the nation's total export value. By 1986 textiles 
had replaced oil as the top foreign-exchange earner. 

Traditionally, the coastal areas had the most modern textile 
equipment and facilities. Shanghai and Jiangsu Province were the 
nerve centers of the industry, accounting for 31.6 percent of the 
total gross-output value for textiles in 1983. Other major textile 
areas were Shandong, Liaoning, Hubei, Zhejiang, and Hebei 
provinces. 

After 1949 cotton textile production was reorganized and 
expanded to meet consumer needs. Cotton cultivation increased 



320 



Silk textile weaver, Wuxi, Jiangsu Province 
Courtesy Nanjing Slide Studio 

in the areas around the established spinning centers in the port 
cities of Shanghai, Qingdao, Tianjin, and Guangzhou. New spin- 
ning and weaving facilities opened near the inland cotton-producing 
regions. In 1983 China produced 4.6 millions tons of cotton, more 
than double the 1978 total. 

China still was the world's largest silk producer in 1985, manufac- 
turing approximately 422,000 meters of silk textiles. Shanghai and 
Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces were the main silk centers. In 1985 
China also produced approximately 125,000 tons of knitting wool, 
218 million meters of woolen piece goods, 3.5 million tons of yarn, 
and 541,000 tons of chemical fibers. 

Food Processing 

Food processing made significant advances in China after 1949. 
The most basic improvement was the nearly universal establish- 
ment of mechanized grain-milling facilities in rural production units. 
The processing of food into finished and packaged products also 
grew extensively. 

Although a growing number of food products were packaged for 
export, China's food processing capacity was relatively low in the 
mid-1980s. An immense variety of baked goods and candies were 
produced for local consumption, and most Chinese continued to 
resist processed food. Rising standards of living, however, increased 



321 



China: A Country Study 



the demand for proeessed food because of its nutritional and 
hygienic advantages. 

The beverage industry was very large and widespread. All regions 
had breweries and distilleries producing beer and a variety of domes- 
tie and Western alcoholic beverages. China successfully exported 
several varieties of beer and liquor, and domestic soft-drink produc- 
tion was widespread. 

Other Consumer Goods 

In the first thirty years of the People's Republic, many basic con- 
sumer goods were scarce because of the emphasis on heavy indus- 
try. The 1979 economic reform program resulted, however, in a 
consumer goods explosion. For example, television production 
increased from approximately 500,000 sets in 1978 to over 16 mil- 
lion sets by 1985. During the same period, bicycle output increased 
by a factor of about three and one-half, production of electric fans 
increased twelvefold, and the output of radios doubled. In the first 
half of 1985, compared with the same period in 1984. production 
of television sets, washing machines, electric fans, and refrigera- 
tors increased dramatically. Refrigerators, washing machines, and 
televisions included imported components. In 1985 economic plan- 
ners decided to limit production of refrigerators because they esti- 
mated that supply would outstrip demand by 5.9 million units in 
1990. The following year, authorities curbed production of televi- 
sions to emphasize quality over quantity. 

Construction 

Housing Construction 

Modern housing has been in chronic shortage in contemporarv 
China. Housing conditions in 1949 were primitive and crowded, 
and massive population growth since then has placed great strains 
on the nation's building industry. According to 1985 estimates. 
46 million additional units of housing, or about 2.4 billion square 
meters of floor space, would be needed by the year 2000 to house 
every urban family. Adequate housing was defined as an average 
of eight square meters of living space per capita. As of 1985. 
however, the average per capita urban living space, for example, 
was only 6.7 square meters. Housing specialists suggested that the 
housing construction and allocation system be reformed and that 
the eight-square-meter target be achieved in two stages: six square 
meters by 1990 and the additional two square meters between 1990 
and 2000. To help relieve the situation, urban enterprises were 
increasing investment in housing for workers. In 1985 housing built 



322 



Industry 



by state and collective enterprises in eities and towns totaled 
130 million square meters of floor space. In the countryside, housing 
built by farmers was 700 million square meters. 

Capital Construction 

Since the 1950s, the capital construction industry has been 
plagued by excessive growth and compartmentalization. There were 
frequent cost overruns and construction delays, and resources were 
overtaxed. Project directors often failed to predict accurately the 
need for such elements as transportation, raw materials, and energy. 
A large number of small factories were built, providing surplus 
capacity at the national level but with deficient economies of scale 
at the plant level. Poor cooperation among ministries and provincial- 
level units resulted in unnecessary duplication. Because each area 
strove for self-sufficiency in all phases of construction, specializa- 
tion suffered. Since the early years of the People's Republic, over- 
investment in construction has been a persistent problem. Fiscal 
reforms in 1979 and 1980 exacerbated overinvestment by allow- 
ing local governments to keep a much greater percentage of the 
revenue from enterprises in their respective areas. Local govern- 
ments could then use the retained earnings to invest in factories 
in their areas. These investments, falling outside the national eco- 
nomic plan, interfered with the central government's control of capi- 
tal investment. 

From 1979 to 1981 the economy underwent a "period of read- 
justment," during which the investment budget for capital con- 
struction was sharply reduced (see Reform of the Economic System, 
Beginning in 1979, ch. 5). This administrative solution to over- 
investment proved ineffective, and later reforms concentrated on 
economic measures such as tax levies to discourage investment. 
The issuance of interest-bearing loans instead of grants was also 
intended to control construction growth. Despite reforms, capital 
construction continued at a heated pace in 1986. The majority of 
the new investment was unplanned, coming from loans or enter- 
prises' internal capital. 

During the Seventh Five-Year Plan, 925 medium- and large- 
scale projects were scheduled. The government planned to allo- 
cate ¥1.3 trillion for fixed assets, an increase of 70 percent over 
the Sixth Five- Year Plan. Forty percent of the funds were allocated 
for new projects and the remaining 60 percent for renovation or 
expansion of existing facilities. Some of the projects involved were 
power-generating stations, coal mines, railroads, ports, airports, 
and raw-material production centers. 



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China: A Country Study 



Mining 
Coal 

In the first half of the twentieth century, coal mining was more 
developed than most industries. Such major mines as Fushun, 
Datong, and Kailuan produced substantial quantities of coal for 
railroads, shipping, and industry. Expansion of coal mining was 
a major goal of the First Five- Year Plan. The state invested heavily 
in modern mining equipment and in the development of large, 
mechanized mines. The "longwall" mining technique was adopted 
widely, and output reached 130 million tons in 1957. 

During the 1960s and 1970s, investment in large mines and 
modern equipment lagged, and production fell behind the indus- 
try's growth. Much of the output growth during this period came 
from small local mines. A temporary but serious production set- 
back followed the July 1976 Tangshan earthquake, which severely 
damaged China's most important coal center, the Kailuan mines. 
It took two years for production at Kailuan to return to the 1975 
level. 

In 1987 coal was the country's most important source of primary 
energy, meeting over 70 percent of total energy demand. The 1984 
production level was 789 million tons. More than two-thirds of 
deposits were bituminous, and a large part of the remainder was 
anthracite. Approximately 80 percent of the known coal deposits 
were in the north and northwest, but most of the mines were located 
in Heilongjiang Province and east China because of their prox- 
imity to the regions of highest demand (see fig. 14). 

Although China had one of the world's largest coal supplies, there 
still were shortages in areas of high demand, mainly because of 
an inadequate transportation infrastructure. The inability to trans- 
port domestic coal forced the Chinese to import Australian coal 
to south China in 1985. The industry also lacked modern equip- 
ment and technological expertise. Only 50 percent of tunneling, 
extracting, loading, and conveying activities were mechanized, com- 
pared with the 95-percent mechanization level found in European 
nations. 

Iron Ore 

China had iron-ore reserves totaling approximately 44 billion 
tons in 1980. In the mid-1980s, however, China relied on imports 
because of domestic transportation and production problems. Siz- 
able iron-ore beds are distributed widely in about two-thirds of 
China's provinces and autonomous regions. The largest quanti- 
ties are found in Liaoning Province, followed by Sichuan, Hebei, 



324 



Industry 




Figure 13. Coal Reserves and Major Mining Areas, 1987 

Shanxi, Anhui, Hubei, Gansu, Shandong, and Yunnan provinces 
and Nei Monggol Autonomous Region. 

In the mid-1980s mines lacked modern excavation, transporta- 
tion, and ore-beneficiation equipment. Most of the ore mined had 
a low iron content and required substantial refining or beneficia- 
tion before use in blast furnaces. Most mines lacked modern plants 
for converting low-grade iron ore into concentrated pellets. 

Other Minerals and Metals 

After 1949 geological exploration discovered deposits of more 
than 130 useful minerals. China is among the world leaders in 
proven deposits of tungsten, antimony, rare earth metals, molybde- 
num, vanadium, titanium, pyrite, gypsum, barite, copper, tin, 
lead, zinc, aluminum, mercury, manganese, nickel, phosphorus, 



325 



China: A Country Study 



asbestos, fluorite, magnesite, and borax. Of these, China exported 
antimony, tin, and tungsten in significant quantities. In general, 
mineral extraction was inadequate for industrialization because of 
transportation bottlenecks and shortages of modern equipment for 
mining, smelting, and refining. A number of important mineral 
products were imported despite large domestic deposits, includ- 
ing aluminum, copper, and zinc. 

Among the rare earth metals and ferroalloys, beryllium, tung- 
sten, molybdenum, barium, manganese, mercury, niobium, zir- 
conium, and titanium were present in large reserves and were 
extracted in adequate quantities. Deficiencies existed in chromium, 
platinum, and gold. 

China produced sufficient quantities of most nonmetallic minerals 
to meet domestic needs. Barite, fluorite, salt, and talc were avail- 
able in massive reserves and were exported in large quantities. 
Graphite, magnesite, phosphates, and pyrite were less abundant 
but generally satisfied domestic demand. Sulfur deposits were large, 
but quality was low and imports were necessary. 

China is rich in uranium and has favorable geological conditions 
for the formation of uranium deposits. The ore is easy to mine and 
dress because of its relatively simple physical composition. 

Energy 

Oil and Natural Gas 

Before 1949 China imported most of its oil. During the First Five- 
Year Plan it invested heavily in exploration and development of 
wells. In 1959 vast reserves were discovered in the Songhua Jiang 
(Sungari River)-Liaohe Basin in northeast China. The Daqing oil 
field in Heilongjiang Province became operational in 1960. Daqing 
was producing about 2.3 million tons of oil by 1963, and it con- 
tinued to lead the industry through the 1970s. Further important 
discoveries, including the major oil fields of Shengli (in Shandong 
Province), and Dagang (in Tianjin special municipality) enabled 
China to meet domestic needs and eliminate nearly all imports by 
the mid-1960s (see fig. 15). In 1973, despite a steadily growing 
internal demand for petroleum products, output was large enough 
to export 1 million tons of crude oil to Japan. Exports increased 
to 6.6 million tons in 1974 and reached 13.5 millions tons in 1978. 
In 1985 exports of crude oil amounted to approximately 20 mil- 
lion tons, roughly 16 percent of total production. The majority of 
1985 exports were to Japan, but the government also had released 
increasing quantities on the spot market and sent some to Singa- 
pore for refining. Although the government temporarily abandoned 



326 



Industry 



its drive to broaden its oil export base in 1986, 130.7 million tons 
of crude oil still were produced, an increase of 5.8 million tons over 
1985. 

Oil reserves are large and widely dispersed. In general, develop- 
ment is concentrated on deposits readily accessible from major 
industrial and population centers. Deposits in remote areas such 
as the Tarim, Junggar, and Qaidam basins remain largely unex- 
plored. The quality of oil from the major deposits varies consider- 
ably. A few deposits, like the Shengli field, produce low-quality 
oil suitable mainly as fuel. Most of the oil produced in China from 
the big fields in the north and northeast is heavy, is low in sulfur, 
and has a very high paraffin content, making it difficult and 
expensive to extract and to refine. 

Offshore exploration and drilling were first undertaken in the 
early 1970s and became more widespread and advanced as the 
decade progressed. Chinese and foreign oil experts believed that 
offshore deposits were extensive and could equal onshore reserves. 
Offshore operations relied heavily on foreign technology. In 1982 
thirty-three foreign oil companies submitted bids for offshore drilling 
rights; twenty-seven eventually signed contracts. By the mid-1980s, 
when offshore exploration results were disappointing and only a 
handful of wells were actually producing oil, China began to empha- 
size onshore development. To continue offshore exploration, China 
established the China National Offshore Oil Corporation to assist 
foreign oil companies in exploring, developing, extracting, and 
marketing China's oil. 

Offshore exploration and drilling were concentrated in areas in 
the South China Sea, Gulf of Tonkin, and Zhu Jiang (Pearl River) 
Delta in the south, and the Bo Hai Gulf in the north. Disputes 
between China and several neighboring countries complicated the 
future of oil development in several promising offshore locations 
(see Physical Environment, ch. 2). 

Natural gas was a relatively minor source of energy. Output grew 
rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s. By 1985 production was approxi- 
mately 12 billion cubic meters — about 3 percent of China's primary 
energy supply. The following year, output increased by 13 billion 
cubic meters. Sichuan Province possesses about half of China's 
natural gas reserves and annual production. Most of the remaining 
natural gas is produced at the Daqing and Shengli oil fields in the 
northeast. Other gas-producing areas include the coastal plain in 
Shanghai and in Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces; the Huabei com- 
plex in Hebei Province; and the Liaohe oil field in Liaoning Province. 

The exact size of China's natural gas reserves was unknown. 
Estimates ranged from 129 billion to 24.4 trillion cubic meters. 



327 



China: A Country Study 

The Chinese hoped for a major discovery in the Zhongyuan Basin, 
a 5, 180-square-kilometer area along the border of Henan and Shan- 
dong provinces. Major offshore reserves have been discovered. If 
successfully tapped, these could increase gas output by 50 percent. 
The largest unexploited natural gas potential is believed to be in 
Qmghai Province and Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region. 

A rudimentary petroleum-refining industry was established with 
Soviet aid in the 1950s. In the 1960s and 1970s, this base was 
modernized and expanded, partially with European and Japanese 
equipment. In 1986 Chinese refineries were capable of processing 
about 2.1 million barrels per day. By 1990 China plans to reach 
2.5 million barrels per day. 

In the 1970s China constructed oil pipelines and improved ports 
handling oil tankers. The first oil pipeline was laid from Daqing 
to the port of Qinhuangdao; 1 , 150 kilometers long, it became opera- 
tional in 1974. The following year the pipeline was extended to 
Beijing; a second line connected Daqing to the port of Liida and 
branched off to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. A pipe- 
line from Linyi in Shandong Province to Nanjing was completed 
in 1978, linking the oil fields of Shengli and Huabei to ports and 
refineries of the lower Chang Jiang region. In 1986 plans had been 
made to construct a 105-kilometer pipeline linking an offshore well 
with the Chinese mainland via Hainan Island. 

Electric and Nuclear Power 

From 1949 to the mid-1980s, China pursued an inconsistent 
policy on the development of electric power. Significant under- 
investment in the readjustment period, starting in 1979, caused 
serious power shortages into the mid-1980s. Although China's 
hydroelectric power potential was the world's largest and the power 
capacity was the sixth largest, 1985 estimates showed that demand 
exceeded supply by about 40 billion kilowatt-hours per year. 
Because of power shortages, factories and mines routinely operated 
at 70- to 80-percent capacity, and in some cases factories only ran 
for 3 or 4 days a week. Whole sections of cities were frequently 
blacked out for hours. 

China's leaders began to acknowledge the seriousness of the power 
shortage in 1979. The government took no positive steps until the 
mid-1980s, when it announced import of 10,000 megawatts of ther- 
mal power-plant capacity to serve the east's large population centers. 
It also launched a nationwide campaign to create an additional 5,000 
megawatts of electric-power capacity. Under the Seventh Five- Year 
Plan, China planned to add 30,000 to 35,000 megawatts of capacity, 
a 55- to 80-percent increase over previous five-year plans. 



328 



Industry 




Figure 14. Major Oil Basins and Oil Fields, 1987 

The leadership decided to build thermal power plants to meet 
the country's electricity needs, because such plants were relatively 
inexpensive and required construction lead times of only three to 
six years. In 1985 approximately 68 percent of generating capacity 
was derived from thermal power, mostly coal fired, and observers 
estimated that by 1990 its share would increase to 72 percent. The 
use of oil-fired plants peaked in the late 1970s, and by the mid-1980s 
most facilities had been converted back to coal. Only a few ther- 
mal plants were fueled by natural gas. Hydroelectric power 
accounted for only about 30 percent of generating capacity. Observ- 
ers expected that during the Seventh Five-Year Plan, China would 
continue to emphasize the development of thermal power over 
hydroelectric power because of the need to expand the power sup- 
ply quickly to keep pace with industrial growth. However, in the 



329 



China: A Country Study 

long term, hydroelectric power gradually was to be given priority 
over thermal power. 

In 1986 China's total generating capacity was 76,000 megawatts: 
52,000 from thermal plants and 24,000 from hydroelectric power 
sources. China planned to construct large generators having capaci- 
ties of 100 to 300 megawatts to increase thermal power capacity. 
The new, larger generators would be much more efficient than 
generators having capacities of only fifty megawatts or less. With 
the larger generators, China would only have to increase coal con- 
sumption by 40 percent to achieve a 54-percent increase in gener- 
ating capacity by 1990. Foreign observers believed that as China 
increased its grid network, it could construct power plants close 
to coal mines, then run power lines to the cities. This method would 
eliminate the costly and difficult transportation of coal to smaller 
urban plants, which had already created a significant pollution 
problem. 

From 1949 to 1986, China built at least 25 large, 130 medium, 
and about 90,000 small-sized hydroelectric power stations. Accord- 
ing to the Ministry of Water Resources and Electric Power, China's 
1983 annual power output was 351.4 billion kilowatt-hours, of which 
86 billion kilowatt-hours were generated by hydroelectric power. 
While construction of thermal plants was designed as a quick 
remedy for alleviating China's power shortages, the development 
of hydroelectric power resources was considered a long-term solu- 
tion. The primary areas for the construction of hydroelectric power 
plants were the upper Huang He (Yellow River), the upper and 
middle stream tributaries and trunk of the Chang Jiang, and the 
Hongshui He in the upper region of the Zhu Jiang Basin. The con- 
struction of new hydroelectric power plants was expected to be a 
costly and lengthy process, undertaken with assistance from the 
United States, Canada, Kuwait, Austria, Norway, France, and 
Japan. 

To augment its thermal and hydroelectric power capacity, China 
was developing a nuclear energy capability. China's nuclear 
industry began in the 1950s with Soviet assistance. Until the early 
1970s, it had primarily military applications. In August 1972, 
however, reportedly by directive of Premier Zhou Enlai, China 
began developing a reactor for civilian energy needs. After Mao 
Zedong's death in 1976, support for the development of nuclear 
power increased significantly. Contracts were signed to import two 
French-built plants, but economic retrenchment and the Three Mile 
Island incident in the United States abruptly halted the nuclear 
program. Following three years of "investigation and demonstra- 
tion," the leadership decided to proceed with nuclear power 



330 



Industry 



development. By 1990 China intended to commit between 60 and 
70 percent of its nuclear industry to the civilian sector. By 2000 
China planned to have a nuclear generating capacity of 10,000 
megawatts, accounting for approximately 5 percent of the coun- 
try's total generating capacity. 

In 1986 a 300-megawatt domestically designed nuclear power 
plant was under construction at Qinshan, Zhejiang Province, with 
completion planned for 1989. Although most of the equipment in 
the plant was domestic, a number of key components were 
imported. The Seventh Five-Year Plan called for constructing two 
additional 600-megawatt reactors at Qinshan. Another plant, with 
two 900 megawatt reactors, was under construction at Daya Bay 
in Guangdong Province. The Daya Bay project was a joint ven- 
ture with Hong Kong, with considerable foreign loans and expertise. 

Rural Industry 

From 1980 to 1986, the number of rural town and village 
enterprises rose from 1.4 million to more than 12.2 million. There 
were five kinds of town and township enterprises: township enter- 
prises, village enterprises, cooperative enterprises, enterprises jointly 
run by several households, and household enterprises. In 1986 the 
assets of the enterprises at the township and village levels totaled 
¥134 billion. 

Their total output value for 1985 was¥272.8 billion, 17 percent 
of the gross national output and 44 percent of the gross agricultural 
output. Rural enterprises absorbed a large portion of the surplus 
agricultural labor displaced by the agricultural responsibility sys- 
tem and the breakdown of the people's commune system (see Post- 
Mao Policies, ch. 6). This absorption helped the state greatly by 
eliminating state support of millions of displaced workers. In 1986 
rural enterprises employed approximately 76 million people, or 
20 percent of China's total work force. 

The town and village enterprises made a significant contribution 
to overall economic growth. In 1985 an estimated 28 percent of 
coal, 53 percent of construction materials, 30 percent of paper, 20 
percent of textile goods, 33 percent of garments, and 75 percent 
of leather products came from rural enterprises. The enterprises 
also made extensive progress in the export market, with 8,000 
export-oriented factories, of which 870 were Chinese-foreign joint 
ventures. In 1985 town and village enterprises earned about 
¥4 billion in foreign currency. 

Despite the rapid growth and success of town and village enter- 
prises, continued expansion faced obstacles in 1987. The gov- 
ernment was trying to limit production because of economic 



331 



China: A Country Study 



and environmental concerns. Moreover, financial mismanagement, 
poor market analysis, rising energy and raw-material cost, sub- 
standard equipment, and constant interference from local govern- 
ment authorities hampered production and expansion. In certain 
areas, such as Zhejiang Province, efforts were made to solve some 
of the problems facing the rural enterprises. Local governments 
allowed the enterprises to keep 70 percent of profits, and of the 
remaining 30 percent remitted to the county government, 70 per- 
cent was invested in existing enterprises or used to establish new 
ones. 

Defense Industry 

China's defense industrial complex produced weapons and equip- 
ment based predominantly on Soviet designs of the 1950s and 1960s. 
Because of a lack of foreign exchange, a low short-term threat per- 
ception, and an emphasis on the other three of the Four Modern- 
izations (agriculture, industry, and science and technology), China 
had decided to develop its defense industries gradually. It would 
rely primarily on domestic production, importing foreign technol- 
ogy only in areas of critical need. 

The defense industries produced a wide range of military mate- 
riel. Large quantities of small arms and tanks were produced, and 
many were exported to Third World countries such as Iran. China 
had upgraded Soviet aircraft and was developing nuclear-powered 
ballistic-missile submarines, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and 
tanks equipped with infrared night-vision gear and laser range 
finders (see Military Modernization, ch. 14). 

Because defense was assigned the lowest priority in the Four 
Modernizations in the 1970s, China's large defense sector has 
devoted an increasing amount of its resources to civilian produc- 
tion. For example, in the mid-1980s approximately one-third of 
the ordnance industry's output was allocated to civilian produc- 
tion, and the share was expected to rise to two-thirds by 1990. The 
defense sector produced a wide variety of products, ranging from 
furniture to telescopes, cameras to heavy machinery. 

Despite the military's contribution to the industrial sector, in 
1987 Chinese industry lagged far behind that of the industrialized 
nations. Much of industrial technology was seriously outdated. 
Severe energy shortages, transportation bottlenecks, and bureau- 
cratic interference also hindered modernization. Although output 
was high in a number of industries, quality was often poor. 
However, China's industrial sector has made considerable progress 
since 1949. Output of most products has increased dramatically 
since the 1950s, and China now produces computers, satellites, 



332 



Oil tanks at Maoming, Guandong Province 
Courtesy Xinhua News Agency 

and other high-technology items. The reform program introduced 
in the late 1970s brought an era of more rational economic plan- 
ning and laid the groundwork for more balanced and sustained 
industrial growth. As of 1987 China's leaders were aware of the 
need for greater industrial efficiency and productivity and were 
striving to achieve these goals. 

* * * 

Industrial growth before 1949 is outlined by John K. Chang in 
Industrial Development in Pre- Communist China. Thomas G. Rawski 
describes the development of the producer goods industries, both 
before and after the founding of the People's Republic, in China's 
Transition to Industrialism. A wealth of material on Chinese indus- 
try is found in the United States Congress Joint Economic Com- 
mittee's China's Economy Looks Toward the Year 2000, which includes 
an overview article, as well as specific articles relating to the struc- 
ture, management, ownership and control, and finance and plan- 
ning of industry. It also describes and analyzes the energy sector 
in detail. 

The second volume of China: Socialist Economic Development in the 
World Bank Country Study series, contains information on indus- 
trial organization, policy, strengths and weaknesses, and issues 



333 



China: A Country Study 



and challenges. Another World Bank Country Study, China: Long- 
Term Development Issues and Options, looks at some of the major 
development issues facing China to the year 2000. Two Rand 
studies, Industrial Innovation in China with Special Reference to the Metal- 
lurgical Industry and Chinese Electronics Industry in Transition, are 
excellent case studies, documenting China's attempt to modernize 
its outdated industrial sector. The annual Statistical Yearbook of China 
provides figures on a wide range of industrial categories. The semi- 
monthly China Business Review provides well-researched articles on 
many topics related to industry, and the Country Report: China, North 
Korea, (formerly Quarterly Economic Review of China, North Korea) out- 
lines economic events on a quarterly basis and provides annual sum- 
maries. (For further information and complete citations, see 
Bibliography.) 



334 



Chapter 8. Trade and Transportation 




Rich in detail, this Tang dynasty (A.D. 618-907) pottery horse is typical 
of the lively art style of the period. The original on which this artist 's rendi- 
tion is based was polychromatic and stood about thirty-nine centimeters high. 



TRADE AND TRANSPORTATION are the lifeblood of an econ- 
omy. In the twenty-five years that followed the founding of the Peo- 
ple's Republic of China in 1949, China's trade institutions and 
transportation and communications networks were built into a par- 
tially modern but somewhat inefficient system. The drive to mod- 
ernize the economy that began in 1978 required a sharp acceleration 
in commodity flows and greatly improved efficiency in economic 
transactions. In the ensuing years economic reforms were adopted 
by the government to develop a "socialist planned commodity econ- 
omy" that combined central planning with market mechanisms. 
These changes resulted in the decentralization and expansion of 
domestic and foreign trade institutions, a greatly enlarged role for 
free markets in the distribution of goods, and a prominent role for 
foreign trade and investment in economic development. Despite 
increased investment and development in the 1980s, the transpor- 
tation and communications sectors were strained by the rapid 
expansion of production and the exchange of goods. 

Transportation, postal services, communications, and trade, 
including services, employed about 6.3 percent of the national labor 
force in the mid-1980s — about 22 percent of the nonagricultural 
labor force. Chinese statistics estimate that these sectors produced 
about 7.4 percent of the gross national product in 1983. 

Internal Trade and Distribution 
Agriculture 

Agricultural products were distributed in three major ways in 
China during the 1980s. They were either retained by the house- 
hold (now the primary production unit) for distribution among its 
members, procured by the state, or sold in free rural or urban 
markets. 

Approximately 63 percent of the population was located in rural 
areas, where the majority of the people worked in agriculture and 
rural industries. Under the responsibility system (see Glossary) for 
agriculture instituted in 1981, the household replaced the produc- 
tion team (see Glossary) as the basic production unit. Families con- 
tracted with the economic collective to farm a plot of land, delivered 
a set amount of grain or other produce and the agricultural tax 
to the state, and paid a fee to the collective. After meeting these 
obligations, the household was free to retain its surplus produce 



337 



China: A Country Study 



or sell it in free markets. Restrictions on private plots and house- 
hold sideline production were lifted, and much of the production 
from these was also sold on free markets (see Post-Mao Policies; 
Planning and Organization, ch. 6). 

Distribution of food and other agricultural goods to urban con- 
sumers, industry, and rural areas deficient in food was carried out 
primarily by the state and secondarily by producers or coopera- 
tives. The state procured agricultural goods by means of taxes in 
kind and by purchases by state commercial departments (state trad- 
ing companies) under the Ministry of Commerce. The agricultural 
tax was not large, falling from 12 percent of the total value of agricul- 
tural output in 1952 to 5 percent in 1979. In 1984 the number of 
agricultural and sideline products subject to state planning and pur- 
chasing quotas was reduced from twenty-nine to ten and included 
grains, edible oil, cured tobacco, jute, hemp, and pigs. In 1985 
the system of state purchasing quotas for agricultural products was 
abolished. Instead, the state purchased grain and cotton under con- 
tract at a set price. Once contracted quotas were met, the grain 
and cotton were sold on the market at floating prices. If market 
prices fell below the listed state price, the state purchased all avail- 
able market grain at the state price to protect the interests of pro- 
ducers. Vegetables, pigs, and aquatic products sold to urban, 
mining, and industrial areas were traded in local markets accord- 
ing to demand. Local commercial departments set the prices of these 
goods according to quality to protect the interests of urban con- 
sumers. All other agricultural goods were sold on the market to 
the state, to cooperatives, or to other producers. Restrictions on 
private business activities were greatly reduced, permitting peasants 
as well as cooperatives to transport agricultural goods to rural and 
urban markets and allowing a rapid expansion of free markets in 
the countryside and in cities. The number of wholesale produce 
markets increased by 450 percent between 1983 and 1986, reach- 
ing a total of 1,100 and easing pressure on the state produce dis- 
tribution network, which had been strained by the burgeoning 
agricultural production engendered by rural reforms. In 1986 free 
markets, called "commodity fairs," numbered 61,000 nationwide. 

Once food was procured and transported to urban areas, it was 
sold to consumers by state-owned stores and restaurants. In the 
mid-1980s food items were also available in free markets, where 
peasants sold their produce, and in privately owned restaurants. 
As noted previously, the prices of pigs, aquatic products, and 
vegetables were determined by local authorities according to quality 
and demand; prices of other products floated freely on the mar- 
ket. Except for grain, edible oil, and a few other rationed items, 



338 



Livestock are still 
an important form 
of power and 
transportation. 
Courtesy Stephanie Marcus 



Horse-drawn carts are 
still frequently seen in the 
countryside. 
Courtesy Stephanie Marcus 



China: A Country Study 



food items were in good supply. Industrial goods used in agricul- 
tural production were sold to agricultural units in the 1980s. Local 
cooperatives or state supply and marketing bureaus sold most 
agricultural producer goods, including chemical fertilizers and 
insecticides, to households at set prices. The state also offered 
preferential prices for agricultural inputs to grain farmers to encour- 
age grain production. Households were permitted to purchase 
agricultural machinery and vehicles to transport goods to market. 
In order to ensure that rural units could cover the costs of the 
increasing quantities of industrial inputs required for higher yields, 
the government periodically reduced the prices of the industrial 
goods sold to farmers, while raising the procurement prices for 
agricultural products. In the mid-1980s, however, the price gap 
between agricultural and industrial products was widening to the 
disadvantage of farmers. 

Industry 

After 1982, reforms moved China's economy to a mixed sys- 
tem based on mandatory planning, guidance planning (use of 
economic levers such as taxes, prices, and credit instead of admin- 
istrative fiat), and the free market. In late 1984 further reforms 
of the urban industrial economy and commerce reduced the scope 
of mandatory planning, increased enterprise autonomy and the 
authority of professional managers, loosened price controls to 
rationalize prices, and cut subsidies to enterprises. These changes 
created a "socialist planned commodity economy," essentially a 
dual economy in which planned allocation and distribution are sup- 
plemented by market exchanges based on floating or free prices 
(see Prices, ch. 5). 

As a result of these reforms, the distribution of goods used in 
industrial production was based on mandatory planning with fixed 
prices, guidance planning with floating prices, and the free mar- 
ket. Mandatory planning covered sixty industrial products, includ- 
ing coal, crude oil, rolled steel, nonferrous metals, timber, cement, 
electricity, basic industrial chemicals, chemical fertilizers, major 
machines and electrical equipment, chemical fibers, newsprint, 
cigarettes, and defense industry products. Once enterprises under 
mandatory planning had met the state's mandatory plans and sup- 
ply contracts, they could sell surplus production to commercial 
departments or other enterprises. Prices of surplus industrial 
producer goods floated within limits set by the state. The state also 
had a planned distribution system for important materials such as 
coal, iron and steel, timber, and cement. Enterprise managers who 
chose to exceed planned production goals purchased additional 



340 




Bicycle repair shop in Beijing 
Courtesy Rinn-Sup Shinn 
Bicycle parking area in Beijing 
Courtesy Rinn-Sup Shinn 

341 



China: A Country Study 



materials on the market. Major cities established wholesale mar- 
kets for industrial producer goods to supplement the state's allo- 
cation system. 

Under guidance planning, enterprises try to meet the state's 
planned goals but make their own arrangements for production 
and sales based on the orientation of the state's plans, the avail- 
ability of raw and unfinished materials and energy supplies, and 
the demands on the market. Prices of products under guidance plan- 
ning either are unified prices or floating prices set by the state or 
prices negotiated between buyers and suppliers. Production and 
distribution of products not included in the state's plans are regu- 
lated by market conditions. 

Lateral Economic Cooperation 

China also undertook measures to develop "lateral economic 
ties," that is, economic cooperation across regional and institu- 
tional boundaries. Until the late 1970s, China's planned economy 
had encouraged regional and organizational autarky, whereby 
enterprises controlled by a local authority found it almost impos- 
sible to do business with other enterprises not controlled by the 
same institution, a practice that resulted in economic waste and 
inefficiency. Lateral economic cooperation broke down some bar- 
riers in the sectors of personnel, resources, capital, technical 
expertise, and procurement and marketing of commodities. -In order 
to promote increased and more efficient production and distribu- 
tion of goods among regions and across institutional divisions, ties 
were encouraged among producers of raw and semifinished materi- 
als and processing enterprises, production enterprises and research 
units (including colleges and universities), civilian and military 
enterprises, various transportation entities, and industrial, agricul- 
tural, commercial, and foreign trade enterprises. 

A multitiered network of transregional economic cooperation 
associations also was established. The Seventh Five-Year Plan 
(1986-90) divided China into three regions — eastern, central, and 
western, each with its own economic development plans. In addi- 
tion to the three major regions, three echelons of economic coopera- 
tion zones were created. The first echelon — national-level economic 
development zones — cut across several provincial-level boundaries 
and linked major economic areas. Among these were the Shang- 
hai Economic Zone, the Northeastern Economic Zone, the energy 
production bases centering on Shanxi Province, the Beijing-Tianjin- 
Tangshan Economic Zone, and the Southwestern Economic Zone. 
The second-echelon network linked provincial-level capitals with 
designated ports and cities along vital communication lines and 



342 



Trade and Transportation 



included the Huaihai Economic Zone (consisting of fifteen coastal 
prefectures and cities in Jiangsu, Anhui, Henan, and Shandong 
provinces) and the Zhu Jiang Delta Economic Zone centered on 
the southern city of Guangzhou. The third tier of zones centered 
on provincial-level capitals and included the Nanjing Regional Eco- 
nomic Cooperation Association. Smaller-scale lateral economic ties 
below the provincial level, among prefectures, counties, and cities, 
also were formed. 

Retail Sales 

Retail sales in China changed dramatically in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s as economic reforms increased the supply of food items 
and consumer goods, allowed state retail stores the freedom to pur- 
chase goods on their own, and permitted individuals and collec- 
tives greater freedom to engage in retail, service, and catering trades 
in rural and urban areas. Retail sales increased 300 percent from 
1977 to 1985, rising at an average yearly rate of 13.9 percent — 10.5 
percent when adjusted for inflation. In the 1980s retail sales to rural 
areas increased at an annual rate of 15.6 percent, outpacing the 
9.7-percent increase in retail sales to urban areas and reflecting 
the more rapid rise in rural incomes. In 1977 sales to rural areas 
comprised 52 percent of total retail sales; in 1984 rural sales 
accounted for 59.2 percent of the total. Consumer goods comprised 
approximately 88 percent of retail sales in 1985, the remaining 
12 percent consisting of farming materials and equipment. 

The number of retail sales enterprises also expanded rapidly in 
the 1980s. In 1985 there were 10.7 million retail, catering, and 
service establishments, a rise of 850 percent over 1976. Most 
remarkable in the expansion of retail sales was the rapid rise of 
collective and individually owned retail establishments. Individu- 
als engaged in businesses numbered 12.2 million in 1985, more 
than 40 times the 1976 figure. Furthermore, as state-owned busi- 
nesses either were leased or turned over to collective ownership or 
were leased to individuals, the share of state-owned commerce in 
total retail sales dropped from 90.3 percent in 1976 to 40.5 per- 
cent in 1985. 

In 1987 most urban retail and service establishments, including 
state, collective, and private businesses or vendors, were located 
either in major downtown commercial districts or in small neigh- 
borhood shopping areas. The neighborhood shopping areas were 
numerous and were situated so that at least one was within easy 
walking distance of almost every household. They were able to sup- 
ply nearly all the daily needs of their customers. A typical neigh- 
borhood shopping area in Beijing would contain a one-story 



343 



China: A Country Study 



department store, bookstore, hardware store, bicycle repair shop, 
combined tea shop and bakery, restaurant, theater, laundry, bank, 
post office, barbershop, photography studio, and electrical appli- 
ance repair shop. The department stores had small pharmacies and 
carried a substantial range of housewares, appliances, bicycles, toys, 
sporting goods, fabrics, and clothing. Major shopping districts in 
big cities contained larger versions of the neighborhood stores as 
well as numerous specialty shops, selling such items as musical 
instruments, sporting goods, hats, stationery, handicrafts, cameras, 
and clocks. 

Supplementing these retail establishments were free markets in 
which private and collective businesses provided services, hawked 
wares, or sold food and drinks. Peasants from surrounding rural 
areas marketed their surplus produce or sideline production in these 
markets. In the 1980s urban areas also saw a revival of "night mar- 
kets," free markets that operated in the evening and offered 
extended service hours that more formal establishments could not 
match. 

In rural areas, supply and marketing cooperatives operated 
general stores and small shopping complexes near village and town- 
ship administrative headquarters. These businesses were supple- 
mented by collective and individual businesses and by the free 
markets that appeared across the countryside in the 1980s as a result 
of rural reforms. Generally speaking, a smaller variety of consumer 
goods was available in the countryside than in the cities. But the 
lack was partially offset by the increased access of some peasants 
to urban areas where they could purchase consumer goods and mar- 
ket agricultural items. 

A number of important consumer goods, including grain, cot- 
ton cloth, meat, eggs, edible oil, sugar, and bicycles, were rationed 
during the 1960s and 1970s. To purchase these items, workers had 
to use coupons they received from their work units. By the 
mid-1980s rationing of over seventy items had been eliminated; 
production of consumer goods had increased, and most items were 
in good supply. Grain, edible oil, and a few other items still required 
coupons. In 1985 pork rationing was reinstated in twenty-one cities 
as supplies ran low. Pork was available at higher prices in super- 
markets and free markets. 

Foreign Trade 

History of Chinese Foreign Trade 

Chinese foreign trade began as early as the Western Han dynasty 
(206 B.C.-A.D. 9), when the famous "silk route" through Central 



344 



Urban market in Qingdao, Shandong Province 
Courtesy Xinhua News Agency 

Asia was pioneered by Chinese envoys (see The Imperial Era, 
ch. 1). During later dynasties, Chinese ships traded throughout 
maritime Asia, reaching as far as the African coast, while caravans 
extended trade contacts in Central Asia and into the Middle East. 
Foreign trade was never a major economic activity, however, and 
Chinese emperors considered the country to be entirely self- 
sufficient. During parts of the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing 
(1644-1911) dynasties, trade was officially discouraged. 

In the nineteenth century, European nations used military force 
to initiate sustained trade with China. From the time of the Opium 
War (1839-42) until the founding of the People's Republic in 1949, 
various Western countries and, starting in the 1890s, Japan com- 
pelled China to agree to a series of unequal treaties that enabled 
foreigners to establish essentially autonomous economic bases and 
operate with privileged status in China. Foreign privileges were 
abolished when the People's Republic came into being (see Emer- 
gence of Modern China, ch. 1). 

Foreign trade did not account for a large part of the Chinese 
economy for the first thirty years of the People's Republic. As in 
most large, continental countries, the amount of commerce with 
other nations was small relative to domestic economic activity. Dur- 
ing the 1950s and 1960s, the total value of foreign trade was only 
about 2 percent of the gross national product (GNP). In the 1970s 



345 



China: A Country Study 



trade grew rapidly but in 1979 still amounted to only about 6 per- 
cent of GNP. 

The importance of foreign trade in this period, however, far 
exceeded its volume. Foreign imports alleviated temporary but criti- 
cal shortages of food, cotton, and other agricultural products as 
well as long-term deficiencies in a number of essential items, 
including raw materials such as chrome and manufactured goods 
such as chemical fertilizer and finished steel products. The acqui- 
sition of foreign plants and equipment enabled China to utilize the 
more advanced technology of developed countries to speed its own 
technological growth and economic development. 

During the 1950s China imported Soviet plants and equipment 
for the development program of the First Five-Year Plan (1953-57). 
At the same time, the Chinese government expanded exports of 
agricultural products to repay loans that financed the imports (see 
The First Five-Year Plan, ch. 5). Total trade peaked at the equiva- 
lent of US$4.3 billion in 1959, but a sudden decline in agricultural 
production in 1959-61 required China's leaders to suspend fur- 
ther imports of machinery to purchase foreign grain. Under a policy 
of "self-reliance," in 1962 total trade declined to US$2.7 billion. 
As the economy revived in the mid-1960s, plants and equipment 
again were ordered from foreign suppliers, and substantial growth 
in foreign trade was planned. But in the late 1960s, the chaos and 
antiforeign activities of the Cultural Revolution (1966-76; see Glos- 
sary) caused trade again to decline. 

The pragmatic modernization drive led by party leaders Zhou 
Enlai and Deng Xiaoping and China's growing contacts with 
Western nations resulted in a sharp acceleration of trade in the early 
1970s. Imports of modern plants and equipment were particularly 
emphasized, and after 1973 oil became an increasingly important 
export. Trade more than doubled between 1970 and 1975, reach- 
ing US$13.9 billion. Growth in this period was about 9 percent 
a year. As a proportion of GNP, trade grew from 1.7 percent in 
1970 to 3.9 percent in 1975. In 1976 the atmosphere of uncertainty 
resulting from the death of Mao and pressure from the Gang of 
Four (see Glossary), whose members opposed reliance on foreign 
technology, brought another decline in trade. 

Beginning in the late 1970s, China reversed the Maoist economic 
development strategy and, by the early 1980s, had committed itself 
to a policy of being more open to the outside world and widening 
foreign economic relations and trade. The opening up policy led 
to the reorganization and decentralization of foreign trade institu- 
tions, the adoption of a legal framework to facilitate foreign eco- 
nomic relations and trade, direct foreign investment, the creation 



346 



Trade and Transportation 



of special economic zones (see Glossary) and "open cities," the 
rapid expansion of foreign trade, the importation of foreign tech- 
nology and management methods, involvement in international 
financial markets, and participation in international foreign eco- 
nomic organizations. These changes not only benefited the Chinese 
economy but also integrated China into the world economy. In 
1979 Chinese trade totaled US$27.7 billion — 6 percent of China's 
GNP but only 0.7 percent of total world trade. In 1985 Chinese 
foreign trade rose to US$70.8 billion, representing 20 percent of 
China's GNP and 2 percent of total world trade and putting China 
sixteenth in world trade rankings. 

Trade Policy in the 1980s 

Under the policy of opening up to the outside world, exports, 
imports, and foreign capital were all assigned a role in promoting 
economic development. Exports earned foreign currency, which was 
used to fund domestic development projects and to purchase ad- 
vanced foreign technology and management expertise. Imports of 
capital goods and industrial supplies and foreign loans and investment 
were used to improve the infrastructure in the priority areas of 
energy, transportation, and telecommunications and to modernize 
the machine-building and electronics industries. To earn more for- 
eign currency and to conserve foreign exchange reserves, foreign 
capital was also used to expand production of export commodities, 
such as textiles, and of import substitutes, such as consumer goods. 

China has adopted a variety of measures to promote its foreign 
economic relations, maximizing the role of imports, exports, and 
foreign capital in economic development. Foreign trade organiza- 
tions were reorganized, and control of imports and exports was 
relaxed or strengthened depending on the balance of trade and the 
level of foreign exchange reserves. Heavy purchases of foreign plants 
and equipment resulted in import restraint from 1980 to 1983. 
Because of the expansion of exports in the mid-1980s, a large for- 
eign reserve surplus, and the decentralized management of foreign 
trade, imports surged. Huge, uncontrolled purchases of consumer 
goods led to trade deficits in 1984 and 1985, resulting in the intro- 
duction of an import and export licensing system, stricter controls 
on foreign exchange expenditures, and the devaluation of the yuan 
in order to reduce the trade deficit and ensure that machinery, 
equipment, and semifinished goods, rather than consumer goods, 
were imported. In 1985 China had foreign exchange reserves of 
US$11.9 billion. 

China joined a number of international economic organizations, 
becoming a member of the World Bank, the International Monetary 



347 



China: A Country Study 

Fund, the Asian Development Bank, the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the Multi-Fiber Agreement. Ghina 
became an observer of GATT in 1982 and formally applied to par- 
ticipate as a full member in July 1986. China also reversed its aver- 
sion to foreign capital, borrowing money from international lending 
organizations, foreign governments, and foreign commercial banks 
and consortia and permitting foreign banks to open branches in 
China. The Chinese government maintained a good credit rating 
internationally and did not pile up huge foreign debts like many 
other communist and developing countries. Between 1979 and 1985, 
China signed loans totaling US$20.3 billion, US$15.6 billion of 
which it already had used. Most loans went into infrastructure 
projects, such as energy and transportation, and funded raw- 
materials imports. The Bank of China, the principal foreign 
exchange bank, established branches overseas and participated in 
international financial markets in Eurobonds and loan syndica- 
tion. 

Legal and institutional frameworks to facilitate foreign invest- 
ment and trade also were created. Laws on taxation, joint ven- 
tures, foreign investments, and related areas were promulgated to 
encourage foreign investment. In 1979 China created four special 
economic zones in Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou (in Guangdong 
Province), and Xiamen (in Fujian Province). The special economic 
zones essentially were export-processing zones designed to attract 
foreign investment, expand exports, and import technology and 
expertise. In 1984 fourteen coastal cities were designated "open 
cities." These too were intended to attract foreign funds and tech- 
nology. But in 1985 the government decided to concentrate 
resources on only four of the cities: Dalian, Guangzhou, Shanghai, 
and Tianjin. Although the special economic zones and open cities 
had the power to grant investment incentives, problems with the 
red tape, bureaucratic interference, and lack of basic infrastruc- 
ture resulted in less foreign investment and fewer high-technology 
projects than initially envisioned. 

From 1979 to 1985, China received US$16.2 billion in foreign 
investment and used US$4.6 billion of that amount. By 1986 China 
had over 6,200 foreign-funded businesses, including 2,741 joint 
ventures, 3,381 cooperatively managed businesses, and 151 enter- 
prises with sole foreign investment. Of the joint ventures, 70 per- 
cent were in production enterprises (manufacturing or processing) 
and 30 percent were service industries (primarily hotels or tourism). 
Hong Kong provided 80 percent of the joint-venture partners, the 
United States 7 percent, and Japan 6 percent. 



348 



A 2 2 -million- ton berth at the Baoshan iron 
and steel works, Shanghai 
Courtesy Xinhua News Agency 

Organization of Foreign Trade 

The increasingly complex foreign trade system underwent 
expansion and decentralization in the late 1970s and 1980s. In 1979 
the Ministry of Foreign Trade's nine foreign trade corporations 
lost their monopoly on import and export transactions as the indus- 
trial ministries were permitted to establish their own foreign trade 
enterprises. The provincial branch corporations of the state for- 
eign trade corporations were granted more autonomy, and some 
provinces, notably Fujian, Guangdong, and the special munici- 
palities of Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai were permitted to set 
up independent, provincial-level import-export companies. Some 
selected provincial enterprises were granted autonomy in foreign 
trade decisions. In 1982 the State Council's Import-Export Con- 
trol Commission, Foreign Investment and Control Commission, 
Ministry of Foreign Trade, and Ministry of Foreign Economic 
Relations were merged to form the Ministry of Foreign Economic 
Relations and Trade. In 1984 the foreign trade system underwent 
further decentralization. Foreign trade corporations under this and 
other ministries and under provincial-level units became indepen- 
dent of their parent organizations and were responsible for their 
own profits and losses. An agency system for foreign trade also was 



349 



China: A Country Study 



established, in which imports and exports were handled by special- 
ized enterprises and corporations acting as agents on a commis- 
sion basis. 

Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade 

The main functions of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Rela- 
tions and Trade were to establish and supervise foreign trade poli- 
cies; to work with the State Planning Commission in setting 
long-term foreign trade plans and annual quotas for imports and 
exports; to control imports and exports through licenses and quo- 
tas; to supervise the management of foreign trade corporations and 
enterprises; and to coordinate economic and trade relations with 
foreign governments and international economic organizations. The 
ministry also undertook international market research, led insti- 
tutes of foreign economic relations and trade, and directed the 
General Administration of Customs. 

Foreign Trade Corporations and Enterprises 

In the late 1980s China had numerous specialized national cor- 
porations handling import and export transactions in such areas 
as arts and crafts, textiles, "native produce" and animal by- 
products, foodstuffs of various kinds, chemicals, light industrial 
products, metals and minerals technology, industrial machinery 
and equipment, petrochemical and petroleum products, scientific 
instruments, aerospace technology and services, ships, and weapons 
(see table 2, Appendix B). Although nominally supervised by the 
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade each of these 
corporations was responsible for its own profits and losses. Included 
among these enterprises, for example, was the Great Wall Indus- 
trial Corporation, which imported and exported transportation 
vehicles, satellites and other products associated with aerospace pro- 
grams, mechanical equipment, electrical products, hardware and 
tools, medical apparatus, and chemicals. China Northern Indus- 
trial Corporation, subordinate to the Ministry of Ordnance Indus- 
try, used military production facilities to manufacture civilian 
products for export. The business activities of China Northern 
Industrial Corporation included the sale of heavy machinery, hard- 
ware and tools, and heavy-duty vehicles; light chemical industry 
products, such as plastic, paints, and coatings; and high-precision 
machinery and optical and optical-electronic equipment. Other cor- 
porations offered a variety of professional consulting services. One 
of these, the China International Economic Consultants Corpora- 
tion, provided economic and legal expertise on investment and other 
economic activities. 



350 



Trade and Transportation 



Financial Transactions and Investment 

Foreign exchange and reserves were controlled in the mid-1980s 
by the State Administration of Exchange Control under the Peo- 
ple's Bank of China, the central bank. Foreign exchange alloca- 
tions to banks, ministries, and enterprises were all approved by 
the State Administration of Exchange Control. The Bank of China, 
the foreign exchange arm of the People's Bank of China, lost its 
monopoly on all foreign exchange transactions in 1984 when the 
Agricultural Bank, People's Construction Bank, China Industrial 
and Commercial Bank, and China International Trust and Invest- 
ment Corporation (CITIC) were permitted to deal in foreign cur- 
rency. The Bank of China remained China's principal foreign 
exchange bank and provided loans for production and commer- 
cial transactions related to exports, set up branches overseas, main- 
tained correspondent relations with foreign banks, and did research 
on international monetary trends. The Bank of China also was 
active in international financial markets through such activities as 
loan syndication and issuing of foreign bonds. CITIC, formed in 
1979 to facilitate foreign investment in China, also borrowed and 
lent internationally and issued foreign bonds in addition to encour- 
aging and participating in joint ventures, importing foreign tech- 
nology and equipment, and making overseas investments. In 1986 
CITIC was renamed CITIC Group and shifted its emphasis to 
power, metallurgical, and raw materials industries, which had trou- 
ble attracting investments. In late 1986 the CITIC Group had set 
up 47 joint ventures, invested in 114 domestic companies, and 
issued US$550 million in foreign bonds. The China Investment 
Bank was established in 1981 as a channel for medium- and long- 
term loans from international financial institutions such as the 
World Bank. 

Other Organizations Involved in Trade 

The State Council's State Planning Commission and State Eco- 
nomic Commission were involved in long-term planning for the 
development of foreign trade, and they developed national priori- 
ties for imports and exports. Several other organizations under the 
State Council were also involved in foreign trade matters: the Spe- 
cial Economic Zones Office, State Import and Export Commodi- 
ties Inspection Administration, General Administration of Customs, 
and China Travel and Tourism Bureau. The China Council for 
the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) assisted the Ministry 
of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade in foreign trade relations. 
CCPIT handled trade delegations to and from China, organized 



351 



China: A Country Study 



foreign trade exhibitions in China and Chinese exhibitions in other 
countries, and published periodicals promoting Chinese trade. The 
People's Insurance Company of China expanded its operations in 
1980 for the purpose of encouraging foreign trade. New categories 
of coverage offered to foreign firms included compensatory trade, 
satellite launching, nuclear power plant safety, offshore oil develop- 
ment insurance, insurance against contract failure, and insurance 
against political risk. 

Composition of Foreign Trade 

The dominant pattern of foreign trade after 1949 was to import 
industrial producer goods from developed countries and to pay for 
them with exports of food, crude materials, and light manufactures, 
especially textiles. The pattern was altered as circumstances 
demanded; in the period of economic collapse following the Great 
Leap Forward (1958-60; see Glossary), food imports increased from 
a negligible amount in 1959 to 39 percent of all imports in 1962. 
At the same time, imports of machinery and equipment dropped 
from 41 percent to 5 percent of the total. From this time on, food 
and live animals remained a significant, although declining, share 
of imports, amounting to 14.8 percent of the total in 1980 but drop- 
ping to 4.1 percent in 1985. The pattern also shifted over time as 
China's industrial sector expanded, gradually increasing the share 
of exports accounted for by manufactured goods. Manufactures 
provided only 30 percent of all exports in 1959, 37.9 percent in 
1975, and grew to 44.9 percent in 1985. 

Important changes occurred in several specific trade categories 
in the 1970s and 1980s (see table 17, Appendix A). Imports of tex- 
tile fibers rose from 5.8 percent in 1975 to 10.7 percent in 1980 
as the Chinese textile industry grew faster than domestic cotton 
supplies but then fell to 4 percent in 1985 as domestic cotton produc- 
tion increased. Imports of unfinished textile products also increased 
from 1.3 percent in 1975 to 5.3 percent in 1985 as a result of tex- 
tile industry growth. Iron and steel accounted for approximately 
20 percent of imports in the 1970s, fell to 11.6 percent in 1980, 
then rose to 14.9 percent in 1985. Imports of manufactured goods, 
machinery, and transportation equipment represented 62.6 per- 
cent of total import value in 1975, fell to 53.9 percent in 1980 as 
imports were cut back during the "period of readjustment" of the 
economy (1979-81), and rose again to 75.2 percent in 1985. On 
the export side, the share of foodstuffs fell to 12.5 percent in 1985. 
The fastest growing export item in the 1970s was petroleum, which 
was first exported in 1973. Petroleum rocketed to 12.1 percent of 
all exports in 1975, 22 percent in 1980, and 21.2 percent in 1985. 



352 



Trade and Transportation 



In the 1980s textile exports grew rapidly. Although exports of 
unfinished textiles remained about 14 percent of total exports, all 
categories of textile exports rose from 5 percent in 1975 to 18.7 per- 
cent in 1984. In 1986 textiles replaced petroleum as China's larg- 
est single export item. 

Trading Partners 

During the 1950s China's primary foreign trading partner was 
the Soviet Union. In 1959 trade with the Soviet Union accounted 
for nearly 48 percent of China's total. As relations between the 
two countries deteriorated in the early 1960s, the volume of trade 
fell, decreasing to only just over 7 percent of Chinese trade by 1966. 
During the 1970s trade with the Soviet Union averaged about 
2 percent of China's total, while trade with all communist coun- 
tries made up about 15 percent. In 1986, despite a trade pact with 
the Soviet Union, Chinese-Soviet trade, according to Chinese cus- 
toms statistics, amounted to only 3.4 percent of China's total trade, 
while trade with all communist countries fell to 9 percent of the 
total (see table 18, Appendix A). 

By the mid-1960s Japan had become China's leading trading 
partner, accounting for 15 percent of trade in 1966. Japan was 
China's most natural trading partner; it was closer to China than 
any other industrial country and had the best transportation links 
to it. The Japanese economy was highly advanced in those areas 
where China was weakest, especially heavy industry and modern 
technology, while China was well endowed with some of the impor- 
tant natural resources that Japan lacked, notably coal and oil. In 
the 1980s Japan accounted for over 20 percent of China's foreign 
trade and in 1986 provided 28.9 percent of China's imports and 
15.2 percent of its exports. Starting in the late 1970s, China ran 
a trade deficit with Japan. 

Beginning in the 1960s, Hong Kong was consistently the lead- 
ing market for China's exports and its second largest partner in 
overall trade. In 1986 Hong Kong received 31.6 percent of Chinese 
goods sold abroad and supplied about 13 percent of China's imports. 
Hong Kong was a major market for Chinese foodstuffs and served 
as a transshipment port for Chinese goods reexported to other 
countries. 

The United States banned trade with China until the early 1970s. 
Thereafter trade grew rapidly, and after the full normalization of 
diplomatic and commercial relations in 1979, the United States 
became the second largest importer to China and in 1986 was 
China's third largest partner in overall trade. Most American goods 
imported by China were either high-technology industrial products, 



353 



China: A Country Study 



such as aircraft, or agricultural products, primarily grain and cotton. 

Western Europe has been important in Chinese foreign trade 
since the mid-1960s. The Federal Republic of Germany, in par- 
ticular, was second only to Japan in supplying industrial goods to 
China during most of this period. China followed a policy of shop- 
ping widely for its industrial purchases, and it concluded deals of 
various sizes with nearly all of the West European nations. In 1986 
Western Europe accounted for nearly 18 percent of China's for- 
eign trade, with imports exceeding exports. 

Third World countries have long served as a market for Chinese 
agricultural and light industrial products. In 1986 developing coun- 
tries purchased about 15 percent of Chinese exports and supplied 
about 8 percent of China's imports. 

Tourism 

Between 1949 and 1974, the People's Republic was closed to all 
but selected foreign visitors. Beginning in the late 1970s, when the 
leadership decided to promote tourism vigorously as a means of 
earning foreign exchange, China quickly developed its own tourist 
industry. Major hotel construction programs greatly increased the 
number of hotels and guest houses, more historic and scenic spots 
were renovated and opened to tourists, and professional guides and 
other service personnel were trained. The expansion of domestic 
and international airline traffic and other tourist transportation 
facilities made travel more convenient. Over 250 cities and coun- 
ties were opened to foreign visitors by the mid-1980s. Travelers 
needed only valid visas or residence permits to visit 100 locations; 
the remaining locales required travel permits from public security 
departments. In 1985 approximately 1 .4 million foreigners visited 
China, and nearly US$1.3 billion was earned from tourism. 

Transportation 

Transportation is a major factor in China's national economy. 
For most of the period since 1949, however, transportation occupied 
a relatively low priority in China's national development. Inade- 
quate transportation systems hindered the movement of coal from 
mine to user, the transportation of agricultural and light industrial 
products from rural to urban areas, and the delivery of imports 
and exports. As a result, the underdeveloped transportation sys- 
tem constrained the pace of economic development throughout the 
country. In the 1980s the updating of transportation systems was 
given priority, and improvements were made throughout the trans- 
portation sector (see fig. 15). 

In 1986 China's transportation system consisted of long-distance 



354 



Trade and Transportation 




Figure 15. Railroads and Major Air and Sea Ports, 1987 



hauling by railroads and inland waterways and medium-distance 
and rural transportation by trucks and buses on national and 
provincial-level highways. Waterborne transportation dominated 
freight traffic in east, central, and southwest China, along the Chang 
Jiang (Yangtze River) and its tributaries, and in Guangdong 
Province and Guangxi-Zhuang Autonomous Region, served by the 
Zhu Jiang (Pearl River) system. All provinces, autonomous regions, 
and special municipalities, with the exception of Xizang Autono- 
mous Region (Tibet), were linked by railroads. Many double-track 
lines, electrified lines, special lines, and bridges were added to the 
system. Subways were operating in Beijing and Tianjin, and con- 
struction was being planned in other large cities. National high- 
ways linked provincial-level capitals with Beijing and major ports. 
Roads were built between large, medium, and small towns as well 



355 



China: A Country Study 



as between towns and railroad eonnections. The maritime fleet 
made hundreds of port calls in virtually all parts of the world, but 
the inadequate port and harbor facilities at home still caused major 
problems. Civil aviation underwent tremendous development dur- 
ing the 1980s. Domestic and international air service was greatly 
increased. In 1985 the transportation system handled 2.7 billion 
tons of goods. Of this, the railroads handled 1.3 billion tons; high- 
ways handled 762 million tons; inland waterways handled 434 mil- 
lion tons; ocean shipping handled 65 million tons; and civil airlines 
handled 195,000 tons. The 1985 volume of passenger traffic was 
428 billion passenger-kilometers. Of this, railroad traffic accounted 
for 241.6 billion passenger-kilometers; road traffic, for 157.3 bil- 
lion passenger-kilometers; waterway traffic, for 17.4 billion 
passenger-kilometers; and air traffic, for 11.7 billion passenger- 
kilometers. 

Ownership and control of the different elements of the trans- 
portation system varied according to their roles and their impor- 
tance in the national economy. The railroads were owned by the 
state and controlled by the Ministry of Railways. In 1986 a con- 
tract system for the management of railroad lines was introduced 
in China. Five-year contracts were signed between the ministry 
and individual railroad bureaus that were given responsibility for 
their profits and losses. The merchant fleet was operated by the 
China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO), a state-owned enter- 
prise. The national airline was run by the General Administra- 
tion of Civil Aviation of China (CAAC). Regional airlines were 
run by provincial-level and municipal authorities. Highways and 
inland waterways were the responsibilities of the Ministry of Com- 
munications. Trucking and inland navigation were handled by 
government-operated transportation departments as well as by pri- 
vate enterprises. 

Transportation was designated a top priority in the Seventh Five- 
Year Plan (1986-90). Under the plan, transportation-related 
projects accounted for 39 of 190 priority projects. Because most 
were long-term development projects, a large number were car- 
ried over from 1985, and only a few new ones were added. The 
plan called for an increase of approximately 30 percent in the volume 
of various kinds of cargo transportation by 1990 over 1985 levels. 
So each mode of transportation would have to increase its volume 
by approximately 5.4 percent annually during the 5-year period. 
The plan also called for updating passenger and freight transpor- 
tation and improving railroad, waterways, and air transportation. 
To achieve these goals, the government planned to increase state 
and local investments as well as to use private funds. 



356 



Trade and Transportation 



The Seventh Five-Year Plan gave top priority to increasing the 
capacity of existing rail lines and, in particular, to improving the 
coal transportation lines between Shanxi Province and other 
provincial-level units and ports and to boosting total transporta- 
tion capacity to 230 million tons by 1990. Other targets were the 
construction of 3,600 kilometers of new rail lines, the double- 
tracking of 3,300 kilometers of existing lines, and the electrifica- 
tion of 4,000 kilometers of existing lines. 

Port construction also was listed as a priority project in the plan. 
The combined accommodation capacity of ports was to be increased 
by 200 million tons, as compared with 100 million tons under the 
Sixth Five-Year Plan (1981-85). Priority also was given to high- 
way construction. China planned to build new highways and rebuild 
existing highways to a total length of 140,000 kilometers. At the 
end of the Seventh Five- Year Plan, the total length of highways 
was to be increased to 1 million kilometers from the existing 940,000 
kilometers. Air passenger traffic was to be increased by an aver- 
age of 14.5 percent annually over the 5-year period, and air trans- 
portation operations were to be decentralized. Existing airports were 
to be upgraded and new ones built. 

Railroads 

China's first railroad line was built in 1876. In the 73 years that 
followed, 22,000 kilometers of track were laid, but only half were 
operable in 1949. Between 1949 and 1985, more than 30,000 kilo- 
meters of lines were added to the existing network, mostly in the 
southwest or coastal areas where previous rail development had 
been concentrated. By 1984 China had 52,000 kilometers of operat- 
ing track, 4,000 kilometers of which had been electrified. All 
provinces, autonomous regions, and special municipalities, with 
the exception of Xizang Autonomous Region, were linked by rail. 
Many double-track lines, electric lines, special lines, and railroad 
bridges were added to the system. Railroad technology also was 
upgraded to improve the performance of the existing rail network. 
There still were shortcomings, however. Most of the trunk lines 
were old, there was a general shortage of double-track lines, and 
Chinese officials admitted that antiquated management techniques 
still were being practiced. There were plans in the late 1980s to 
upgrade the rail system, particularly in east China, in the hope 
of improving performance. 

China's railroads are heavily used. In 1986, the latest year for 
which statistics were available, railroads carried 1 billion passengers 
and 1.3 billion tons of cargo. The average freight traffic density 
was 15 million tons per route-kilometer, double that of the United 



357 



China: A Country Study 



States and three times that of India. Turnaround time between 
freight car loadings averaged less than four days. 

Between 1980 and 1985, China built about 3,270 kilometers of 
new track, converted 1,581 kilometers to double track, and elec- 
trified 2,500 kilometers of track. The total investment in this period 
amounted to over ¥21.4 billion (for value of the yuan — see Glos- 
sary). Railroads accounted for over two-thirds of the total 
ton-kilometers and over half the passenger-kilometers in China's 
transportation systems. China's longest electrified double-track rail- 
road, running from Beijing to Datong, Shanxi Province, was opened 
for operation in 1984. One of the world's highest railroads, at 3,000 
meters above sea level in Qinghai Province, also went into service 
in the same year, and improved doubletrack railroads, some of them 
electrified, offered a fast way to transport coal from Shanxi Province 
to the highly industrialized eastern part of the country and the port 
of Qinhuangdao for export. 

Production and maintenance of modern locomotives also made 
an important contribution to increased rail capacity. Manufactur- 
ing output in the mid-1980s increased significantly when produc- 
tion of electric and diesel locomotives for the first time exceeded 
that of steam-powered ones. China hoped, in the long-run, to phase 
out its steam-powered locomotives. In the mid-1980s China had 
more than 280,000 freight cars and about 20,000 passenger cars. 
The country still was unable, however, to meet the transportation 
needs brought about by rapid economic expansion. 

Subways 

China's first subways opened to traffic in Beijing in 1970, and 
Tianjin in 1980, respectively, and subway systems were planned 
for construction in Harbin, Shanghai, and Guangzhou beginning 
in the 1980s. In its first phase, the Beijing subway system had 23.6 
kilometers of track and 17 stations. In 1984 the second phase of 
construction added 16.1 kilometers of track and 12 stations, and 
in 1987 additional track and another station were added to close 
the loop on a now circular system. In 1987 there were plans to up- 
grade the signaling system and railcar equipment on seventeen 
kilometers of the first segment built. The subway carried more than 
100 million passengers in 1985, or about 280,000 on an average 
day and 450,000 on a peak day. In 1987 this accounted for only 
4 percent of Beijing's 9 million commuters. The Beijing subway 
authorities estimated that passenger traffic would increase 20 per- 
cent yearly. To accommodate the increase in riders, Beijing planned 
to construct an extension of a seven-kilometer subway line under 
Chang'an Boulevard, from Fuxing Gate in the east to Jianguo Gate 



358 




359 



China: A Country Study 

in the west. The Tianjin subway opened a five-kilometer line in 
1980. The Shanghai subway was planned to have 14.4 kilometers 
of track in its first phase. 

Highways and Roads 

In 1986 China had approximately 962,800 kilometers of high- 
ways, 52,000 kilometers of which were completed between 1980 
and 1985. During this period China also rebuilt 22,000 kilometers 
of highways in cities and rural areas. Nearly 110,000 kilometers 
of roads were designated part of a network of national highways, 
including roads linking provincial-level capitals with Beijing and 
China's major ports. 

Provincial-level and local governments were responsible for their 
own transportation and road construction, some with foreign exper- 
tise and financing to hasten the process. Most financing and main- 
tenance funds came from the provincial level, supplemented in the 
case of rural roads by local labor. In line with the increased empha- 
sis on developing light industry and decentralizing agriculture, roads 
were built in large, medium-sized, and small towns and to railroad 
connections, making it possible for products to move rapidly between 
cities and across provincial-level boundaries. In 1986 approximately 
780,000 kilometers of the roads, or 81 percent, were surfaced. The 
remaining 19 percent (fair-weather roads) were in poor condition, 
hardly passable on rainy days. Only 20 percent of the roads were 
paved with asphalt; about 80 percent had gravel surfaces. In addi- 
tion, 60 percent of the major highways needed repair. 

China's highways carried 660 million tons of freight and 410 
million passengers in 1985. In 1984 the authorities began assign- 
ing medium-distance traffic (certain goods and sundries traveling 
less than 100 kilometers and passengers less than 200 kilometers) 
to highways to relieve the pressure on railroads. Almost 800 national 
highways were used for transporting cargo. Joint provincial-level 
transportation centers were designated to take care of cross-country 
cargo transportation between provinces, autonomous regions, and 
special municipalities. A total of about 15,000 scheduled rural buses 
carried 4.3 million passengers daily, and more than 2,300 national 
bus services handled a daily average of 450,000 passengers. The 
number of trucks and buses operated by individuals, collectives, 
and families reached 130,000 in 1984, about half the number of 
state-owned vehicles. In 1986 there were 290,000 private motor 
vehicles in China, 95 percent of which were trucks. Most trucks 
had a four- to five-ton capacity. 

The automobile was becoming an increasingly important mode 
of transportation in China. The automotive industry gave priority 



360 



Trade and Transportation 



to improving quality and developing new models rather than 
increasing production. Nevertheless, as a result of the introduc- 
tion of modern technology through joint ventures with advanced 
industrialized countries, Chinese automobile production for 1985 
surpassed 400,000 units. 

Although cars and trucks were the primary means of highway 
transportation, in the mid-1980s carts pulled by horses, mules, don- 
keys, cows, oxen, and camels still were common in rural areas. 
Motor vehicles often were unable to reach efficient travel speeds 
near towns and cities in rural areas because of the large number 
of slow-moving tractors, bicycles, hand- and animal-drawn carts, 
and pedestrians. Strict adherence to relatively low speed limits in 
some areas also kept travel speeds at inefficient levels. 

Bridges 

In the late 1980s, China had more than 140,000 highway bridges. 
Their length totaled almost 4,000 kilometers. Among the best 
known were the Huang He (Yellow River) Bridge in Nei Mong- 
gol Autonomous Region (Inner Mongolia), the Liu Jiang Bridge 
in Guangxi-Zhuang Autonomous Region, the Ou Jiang Bridge in 
Zhejiang Province, the Quanzhou Bridge in Fujian Province, and 
four large bridges along the Guangzhou-Shenzhen highway. Five 
major bridges — including China's longest highway bridge, the 
5,560-meter-long Huang He Bridge at Zhengzhou — were under 
construction during the mid-1980s, and a 10,282-meter-long rail- 
road bridge across the Huang He on the Shandong-Henan border 
was completed in 1985. 

Inland Waterways 

Inland navigation is China's oldest form of transportation (see 
fig. 16). Despite the potential advantages of water transportation, 
it was often mismanaged or neglected in the past. Beginning in 
1960 the network of navigable inland waterways decreased further 
because of the construction of dams and irrigation works and the 
increasing sedimentation. But by the early 1980s, as the railroads 
became increasingly congested, the authorities came to see water 
transportation as a much less expensive alternative to new road 
and railroad construction. The central government set out to over- 
haul the inefficient inland waterway system and called upon localities 
to play major roles in managing and financing most of the projects. 
By 1984 China's longest river, the Chang Jiang, with a total of 
70,000 kilometers of waterways open to shipping on its main stream 
and 3,600 kilometers on its tributaries, became the nation's busi- 
est shipping lane, carrying 72 percent of China's total waterborne 



361 



China: A Country Study 



traffic. An estimated 340,000 people and 170,000 boats were 
engaged in the water transportation business. More than 800 ship- 
ping enterprises and 60 shipping companies transported over 259 
million tons of cargo on the Chang Jiang and its tributaries in 1984. 
Nationally, in 1985 the inland waterways carried some 434 mil- 
lion tons of cargo. In 1986 there were approximately 138,600 kilo- 
meters of inland waterways, 79 percent of which were navigable. 

The Cihuai Canal in northern Anhui Province opened to navi- 
gation in 1984. This 134-kilometer canal linking the Ying He, a 
major tributary of the Huai He, with the Huai He's main course, 
had an annual capacity of 600,000 tons of cargo. The canal pro- 
moted the flow of goods between Anhui and neighboring provinces 
and helped to develop the Huai He Plain, one of China's major 
grain-producing areas. 

Maritime Shipping 

During the early 1960s, China's merchant marine had fewer than 
thirty ships. By the 1970s and 1980s, maritime shipping capabili- 
ties had greatly increased. In 1985 China established eleven ship- 
ping offices and jointly operated shipping companies in foreign 
countries. In 1986 China ranked ninth in world shipping with more 
than 600 ships and a total tonnage of 16 million, including modern 
roll-on and roll-off ships, container ships, large bulk carriers, 
refrigerator ships, oil tankers, and multipurpose ships. The fleet 
called at more than 400 ports in more than 100 countries. 

The container ship fleet also was expanding rapidly. In 1984 
China had only fifteen container ships. Seven more were added 
in 1985, and an additional twenty-two were on order. By the early 
1980s, Chinese shipyards had begun to manufacture a large num- 
ber of ships for their own maritime fleet. The China Shipping 
Inspection Bureau became a member of the Suez Canal Authority 
in 1984, empowering China to sign and issue seaworthiness cer- 
tificates for ships on the Suez Canal and confirming the good repu- 
tation and maturity of its shipbuilding industry. In 1986 China 
had 523 shipyards of various sizes, 160 specialized factories, 540,000 
employees, and more than 80 scientific research institutes. The main 
shipbuilding and repairing bases of Shanghai, Dalian, Tianjin, 
Guangzhou, and Wuhan had 14 berths for 10,000-ton-class ships 
and 13 docks. 

The inadequacy of port and harbor facilities has been a long- 
standing problem for China but has become a more serious obsta- 
cle because of increased foreign trade. Beginning in the 1970s, the 
authorities gave priority to port construction. From 1972 to 1982, 
port traffic increased sixfold, largely because of the foreign trade 



362 



Trade and Transportation 




Figure 16. Principal Improved Inland Waterways, 1987 



boom. The imbalance between supply and demand continued to 
grow. Poor management and limited port facilities created such 
backups that by 1985 an average of 400 to 500 ships were waiting 
to enter major Chinese ports on any given day. The July 1985 delay 
of more than 500 ships, for instance, caused huge losses. All of 
China's major ports are undergoing some construction. To speed 
economic development, the Seventh Five- Year Plan called for the 
construction by 1990 of 200 new berths — 120 deep-water berths 
for ships above 10,000 tons and 80 medium-sized berths for ships 
below 10,000 tons — bringing the total number of berths to 1,200. 
Major port facilities were developed all along China's coast. 

Civil Aviation 

In 1987 China's civil aviation system was operated by the General 



363 



China: A Country Study 

Administration of Civil Aviation of China (CAAC). By 1987 China 
had more than 229,000 kilometers of domestic air routes and more 
than 94,000 kilometers of international air routes. The more than 
9 million passengers and 102,000 tons of freight traffic represented 
a 40 percent growth over the previous year. The air fleet consisted 
of about 175 aircraft and smaller turboprop transports. CAAC had 
274 air routes, including 33 international flights to 28 cities in 
23 countries, such as Tokyo, Osaka, Nagasaki, New York, San 
Francisco, Los Angeles, London, Paris, Frankfurt, East Berlin, 
Zurich, Moscow, Istanbul, Manila, Bangkok, Singapore, Sydney, 
and Hong Kong. Almost 200 domestic air routes connected such 
major cities as Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Guangzhou, Hangzhou. 
Kunming, Chengdu, and Xi'an, as well as a number of smaller 
cities. The government had bilateral air service agreements with 
more than 40 countries and working relations with approximately 
386 foreign airline companies. CAAC also provided air service for 
agriculture, forestry, communications, and scientific research. 

The staff of CAAC was estimated at approximately 50,000 in 
the 1980s. The administration operated three training colleges to 
educate future airline personnel. In a bid to improve CAAC's ser- 
vices, more ticket offices were opened in major cities for domestic 
and international flights. 

In the mid-1980s regional airlines began operations under the 
general aegis of CAAC. Wuhan Airlines, run by the Wuhan 
municipal authorities, started scheduled passenger flights to Hubei. 
Hunan, Guangdong, and Sichuan provinces in May 1986. Xizang 
also planned to set up its own airline to fly to Kathmandu and Hong 
Kong. 

In the 1980s the central government increased its investment in 
airport construction, and some local governments also granted spe- 
cial funds for such projects. Lhasa Airport in Xizang, Jiamusi Air- 
port in Heilongjiang Province, and Kashi and Yining airports in 
Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region were expanded, and new air- 
ports were under construction in Xi'an, Luoyang, and Shenzhen. 
An investment ofY500 million was planned for expanding run- 
ways and building new terminals and other airport facilities. In 
1986 China had more than ninety civilian airports, of which eight 
could accommodate Boeing 747s and thirty-two could accommo- 
date Boeing 737s and Tridents. 

Postal Services 

Postal service is administered by the Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications, which was established in 1949 and reestab- 
lished in 1973 after a two-year period during which the postal and 



364 



Trade and Transportation 



telecommunications functions had been separated and the minis- 
try downgraded to a subministerial level. Although postal service 
in China goes back some 2,500 years, modern postal services were 
not established until 1877 by the Qing government. Development 
was slow; by 1949 there was only 1 post office for every 370 square 
kilometers. 

Since then the postal service has grown rapidly. In 1984 China 
had 53,000 post and telecommunications offices and 5 million kilo- 
meters of postal routes, including 240,000 kilometers of railroad 
postal routes, 624,000 kilometers of highway postal routes, and 
230,000 kilometers of airmail routes. By 1985 post offices were han- 
dling 4.7 billion first-class letters and 25 billion newspapers and 
periodicals. In 1987, after a six-year hiatus, six-digit postal codes 
were ordered to be put into use. 

Telecommunications 

In 1987 China possessed a diversified telecommunications sys- 
tem that linked all parts of the country by telephone, telegraph, 
radio, and television. None of the telecommunications forms were 
as prevalent or as advanced as those in modern Western countries, 
but the system included some of the most sophisticated technology 
in the world and constituted a foundation for further development 
of a modern network. 

Historical Development 

When the People's Republic was founded in 1949, the telecom- 
munications facilities in China were outdated, and many had been 
damaged or destroyed during the war years. In the 1950s existing 
facilities were repaired, and, with Soviet assistance, considerable 
progress was made toward establishing a long-distance telephone 
wire network connecting Beijing to provincial-level capitals. In 
addition, conference telephone service was initiated, radio com- 
munications were improved, and the production of telecommuni- 
cations equipment was accelerated. Growth in telecommunications 
halted with the general economic collapse after the Great Leap For- 
ward (1958-60) but revived in the 1960s after the telephone net- 
work was expanded and improved equipment was introduced, 
including imports of Western plants. An important component of 
the Fourth Five- Year Plan (1971-75) was a major development pro- 
gram for the telecommunications system. The program allotted top 
priority to scarce electronics and construction resources and dra- 
matically improved all aspects of China's telecommunications capa- 
bilities. Microwave radio relay lines and buried cable lines were 
constructed to create a network of wideband carrier trunk lines, 



365 



China: A Country Study 



which covered the entire country. China was linked to the inter- 
national telecommunications network by the installation of com- 
munications satellite ground stations and the construction of coaxial 
cables linking Guangdong Province with Hong Kong and Macao. 
Provincial-level units and municipalities rapidly expanded local tele- 
phone and wire broadcasting networks. Expansion and moderni- 
zation of the telecommunications system continued throughout the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, giving particular emphasis to the pro- 
duction of radio and television sets and expanded broadcasting capa- 
bilities. 

Telecommunications Services 

In 1987 the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications admin- 
istered China's telecommunications systems and related research 
and production facilities. Besides postal services, some of which 
were handled by electronic means, the ministry was involved in 
a wide spectrum of telephone, wire, telegraph, and international 
communications (see Postal Services, this ch.). The Ministry of 
Radio and Television was established as a separate entity in 1982 
to administer and upgrade the status of television and radio broad- 
casting. Subordinate to this ministry were the Central People's 
Broadcasting Station, Radio Beijing, and China Central Televi- 
sion. Additionally, the various broadcasting training, talent-search, 
research, publishing, and manufacturing organizations were 
brought under the control of the Ministry of Radio and Televi- 
sion. In 1986 responsibility for the movie industry was transferred 
from the Ministry of Culture to the new Ministry of Radio, Cinema, 
and Television (see Contemporary Performing Arts, ch. 4). The 
Chinese Communist Party's Propaganda Department coordinates 
the work of both telecommunications-related ministries. 

As of 1987 the quality of telecommunications services in China 
had improved markedly over earlier years. A considerable influx 
of foreign technology and increased domestic production capabili- 
ties had a major impact in the post-Mao period. 

The primary form of telecommunications in the 1980s was local 
and long-distance telephone service administered by six regional 
bureaus: Beijing (north region), Shanghai (east region), Xi'an 
(northwest region), Chengdu (southwest region), Wuhan (central- 
south region), and Shenyang (northeast region). These regional 
headquarters served as switching centers for provincial-level sub- 
systems. By 1986 China had nearly 3 million telephone exchange 
lines, including 34,000 long-distance exchange lines with direct, 
automatic service to 24 cities. By late 1986 fiber optic communi- 
cations technology was being employed to relieve the strain on 



366 



Chengdu Airport in 
Sichuan Province, a major air traffic center 
Courtesy Sichuan People's Publishing House 

existing telephone circuits. International service was routed through 
overseas exchanges located in Beijing and Shanghai. Guangdong 
Province had coaxial cable and microwave lines linking it to Hong 
Kong and Macao. 

The large, continuously upgraded satellite ground stations, origi- 
nally installed in 1972 to provide live coverage of the visits to China 
by U.S. president Richard M. Nixon and Japanese prime minister 
Kakuei Tanaka, still served as the base for China's international 
satellite communications network in the mid-1980s. By 1977 China 
had joined Intelsat and, using ground stations in Beijing and Shang- 
hai, had linked up with satellites over the Indian and Pacific oceans. 

In April 1984 China launched an experimental communications 
satellite for trial transmission of broadcasts, telegrams, telephone 
calls, and facsimile, probably to remote areas of the country. In 
February 1986 China launched its first fully operational telecom- 
munications and broadcast satellite. The quality and communica- 
tions capacity of the second satellite reportedly was much greater 
than the first. In mid-1987 both satellites were still functioning. 
With these satellites in place China's domestic satellite communi- 
cation network went into operation, facilitating television and radio 
transmissions and providing direct-dial long-distance telephone, 
telegraph, and facsimile service. The network had ground stations 
in Beijing, Uriimqi, Hohhot, Lhasa, and Guangzhou, which also 
were linked to an Intelsat satellite over the Indian Ocean. 

Telegraph development received lower priority than the telephone 
network largely because of the difficulties involved in transmitting 
the written Chinese language. Computer technology gradually 
alleviated these problems and facilitated further growth in this area. 
By 1983 China had nearly 10,000 telegraph cables and telex lines 



367 



China: A Country Study 



transmitting over 170 million messages annually. Most telegrams 
were transmitted by cables or by shortwave radio. Cut-microwave 
transmission also was used. Teletype transmission was used lor mes- 
sages at the international level, but some 40 percent of county and 
municipal telegrams still were transmitted by Morse code. 

Apart from traditional telegraph and telephone services, China 
also had facsimile, low-speed data-transmission, and computer- 
controlled telecommunications services. These included on-line 
information retrieval terminals in Beijing, Changsha, and Baotou 
that enabled international telecommunications networks to retrieve 
news and scientific, technical, economic, and cultural information 
from international sources. 

High-speed newspaper-page-facsimile equipment and Chinese- 
character-code translation equipment were used on a large scale. 
Sixty-four-channel program-controlled automatic message retrans- 
mission equipment and low-or medium-speed data transmission 
and exchange equipment also received extensive use. International 
telex service was available in coastal cities and special economic 
zones. 

The Central People's Broadcasting Station controlled China's 
national radio network. Programming was administered by the 
provincial-level units. The station produced general news and cul- 
tural and educational programs. It also provided programs for 
minority groups in the Korean, Manchurian, Zang (Tibetan), 
Uygur, and Kazak languages, as well as programs directed toward 
Taiwan and overseas Chinese (see Glossary) listeners. Radio Beijing 
broadcast to the world in thirty-eight foreign languages, putonghua 
(see Glossary), and various dialects, including Amoy, Cantonese, 
and Hakka. It also provided English-language news programs aimed 
at foreign residents in Beijing. Medium-wave, shortwave, and FM 
stations reached 80 percent of the country — over 160 radio stations 
and 500 relay and transmission stations — with some 240 radio 
programs. 

The nationwide network of wire lines and loudspeakers trans- 
mitted radio programs into virtually all rural communities and 
many urban areas. By 1984 there were over 2,600 wired broad- 
casting stations, extending radio transmissions to rural areas outside 
the range of regular broadcasting stations. 

In 1987 China Central Television (CCTV), the state network, 
managed China's television programs. In 1985 consumers pur- 
chased 15 million new sets, including approximately 4 million color 
sets. Production fell far short of demand. Because Chinese view- 
ers often gathered in large groups to watch publicly owned sets, 
authorities estimated that two-thirds of the nation had access to 



368 




i 



television. In 1987 there were about 70 million television sets, an 
average of 29 sets per 100 families. CCTV had four channels that 
supplied programs to the over ninety television stations through- 
out the country. Construction began on a major new CCTV stu- 
dio in Beijing in 1985. CCTV produced its own programs, a large 
portion of which were educational, and the Television University 
in Beijing produced three educational programs weekly. The 
English-language lesson was the most popular program and had 
an estimated 5 to 6 million viewers. Other programs included daily 
news, entertainment, teleplays, and special programs. Foreign pro- 
grams included films and cartoons. Chinese viewers were particu- 
larly interested in watching international news, sports, and drama 
(see Contemporary Performing Arts, ch. 4; The Media, ch. 10). 



Descriptions of the evolving domestic and foreign trade systems 
are found in a variety of periodicals, including China Daily, Far East- 
ern Economic Review, Asiaweek, China Trade Report, China Business 
Review, and Beijing Review. Jean C. Oi's "Peasant Grain Market- 
ing and State Procurement: China's Grain Contracting System" 
provides a good description of grain procurement and marketing. 
Useful articles on foreign trade are "China's International Trade: 
Policy and Organizational Change and Their Place in the 



369 



China: A Country Study 



'Economic Readjustment' " by Y.Y. Kueh and Christopher Howe 
and "Understanding Chinese Trade" by John Frankenstein. Valu- 
able analyses of China's economic reforms and their impact on 
domestic and foreign trade appear in both volumes of the 1986 
United States Congress Joint Economic Committee's China's Econ- 
omy Looks Toward the Year 2000 and in China 's Economy and Foreign 
Trade, 1981-85 by Nai-Ruenn Chen and Jeffrey Lee. 

Transportation and telecommunications developments are 
described in the periodicals China Transport and China Business Review. 
(For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



370 



This glazed earthenware funerary object from the Eastern Han dynasty 
(A.D. 25-220) shows some of the intricacies of Chinese architecture of the era. 



IN A SPEECH to the National Science Conference in March 1978, 
then- Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping declared: "The crux of the Four 
Modernizations is the mastery of modern science and technology. 
Without the high-speed development of science and technology, 
it is impossible to develop the national economy at a high speed." 
For more than a century China's leaders have called for rapid 
development of science and technology, and science policy has 
played a greater role in national politics in China than in many 
other countries. China's scientific and technical achievements are 
impressive in many fields. Although the World Bank classified it 
in the 1980s as a low-income, developing country, China has by 
its own efforts developed nuclear weapons, the ability to launch 
and recover satellites, a supercomputer, and high-yield hybrid rice. 
But the development of science and technology has been uneven, 
and significant achievements in some fields are matched by low 
levels in others. 

The evolving structure of science and technology and frequent 
reversals of policy under the People's Republic have combined to 
give Chinese science a distinctive character. The variation in quality 
and achievements stems in part from a large and poorly educated 
rural populace and limited opportunities for secondary and col- 
lege education — conditions common to all developing countries. 
The character of Chinese science also reflects concentration of 
resources in a few key fields and institutions, often with military 
applications. In more politically radical periods — such as the Great 
Leap Forward (1958-60) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) — 
efforts were made to expand the ranks of scientists and technicians 
by sharply reducing education and certification standards. 

China's leaders have involved themselves in the formulation of 
science policy to a greater extent than have the leaders of most coun- 
tries. Science policy also has played a significant part in the strug- 
gles between contending leaders, who have often acted as patrons 
to different sectors of the scientific establishment. Party leaders, 
not themselves scientifically trained, have taken science and scien- 
tists quite seriously, seeing them as keys to economic development 
and national strength. Party efforts to control science to "serve 
production" and generate economic and military payoffs, however, 
have met with repeated frustrations. The frustration in turn has 
contributed to frequent reversals of policy and has exacerbated the 
inherent tension between the scientific and political elites over the 



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goals and control of the nation's science and technology. In any 
economic system there are likely to be tensions and divergences 
of interest between managers and scientists, but in China such ten- 
sions have been extreme and have led to repeated episodes of perse- 
cution of scientists and intellectuals. Science in China has been 
marked by uneven development, wide variation in quality of work, 
high level of involvement with politics, and high degree of policy 
discontinuity. 

In the post-Mao era, the anti-intellectual policies of the Cultural 
Revolution have been reversed, and such top leaders as Deng 
Xiaoping have encouraged the development of science. But China's 
leaders in the 1980s remained, like their predecessors over the past 
100 years, interested in science primarily as a means to national 
strength and economic growth. The policy makers' goal was the 
creation of a vigorous scientific and technical establishment that 
operates at the level of developed countries while contributing in 
a fairly direct way to agriculture, industry, and defense. The 
mid-1980s saw a major effort to reform the scientific and technical 
system through a range of institutional changes intended to pro- 
mote the application of scientific knowledge to production. As in 
the past 100 years, policy makers and scientists grappled with such 
issues as the proportion of basic to applied research, the priorities 
of various fields of research, the limits of professional and academic 
freedom, and the best mechanisms for promoting industrial inno- 
vation and widespread assimilation of up-to-date technology. 

Historical Development of Science and Technology Policy 

Pre-1949 Patterns 

Until the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), China was a world leader 
in technology and scientific discovery. Many Chinese inventions — 
paper and printing, gunpowder, porcelain, the magnetic compass, 
the sternpost rudder, and the lift lock for canals — made major con- 
tributions to economic growth in the Middle East and Europe. The 
outside world remained uninformed about Chinese work in agron- 
omy, pharmacology, mathematics, and optics. Scientific and tech- 
nological activity in China dwindled, however, after the fourteenth 
century. It became increasingly confined to little-known and mar- 
ginal individuals who differed from Western scientists such as 
Galileo or Newton in two primary ways: they did not attempt to 
reduce the regularities of nature to mathematical form, and they 
did not constitute a community of scholars, criticizing each others' 
work and contributing to an ongoing program of research. Under 
the last two dynasties, the Ming (1368-1644) and the Qmg 



374 



Science and Technology 



(1644-1911), China's ruling elite intensified its humanistic con- 
centration on literature, the arts, and public administration and 
regarded science and technology as either trivial or narrowly utilitar- 
ian (see The Confucian Legacy, ch. 3). 

Foreign Learning and Chinese Learning 

Western mathematics and science were introduced to China in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by Jesuit missionaries but 
had little impact. In the nineteenth century, the trauma of repeated 
defeat at the hands of Western invaders (in 1840-41 and 1860) 
finally convinced some Chinese leaders of the need to master for- 
eign military technology. As part of the Self-Strengthening Move- 
ment in the 1860s, a number of foreign-style arsenals, shipyards, 
and associated training schools were established (see The Self- 
Strengthening Movement, ch. 1). The initial effort to produce 
steamships and artillery led, step-by-step, to recognition of the need 
to master metallurgy, chemistry, mathematics, physics, and for- 
eign languages. The last decades of the century saw the establish- 
ment, under the auspices either of the imperial government or of 
foreign missionaries, of secondary schools and colleges teaching 
science, as well as the movement of Chinese students to advanced 
studies in Japan, the United States, and Europe. 

Individual Chinese students had no great difficulty mastering 
Western science, but the growth in their numbers and potential 
influence posed a challenge to the Confucian scholar-officials who 
dominated the imperial government and Chinese society. Such offi- 
cials were reluctant to grant foreign-trained scientists and engineers 
a status equal to that of Confucian scholars, and they were suspi- 
cious of foreign ideas about politics and social organization, such 
as professional autonomy, freedom of speech and assembly, and 
experiments rather than written texts as validation of propositions. 
Nineteenth-century officials attempted to control the influx of for- 
eign knowledge and values, distinguishing militarily useful tech- 
nology, which was to be imported and assimilated, from foreign 
philosophy, religion, or political and social values, which were to 
be rejected. The slogan "Chinese learning for the essence, Western 
learning for utility" expressed this attitude. Although the terms 
were no longer used, the fundamental issue remained significant 
in the 1980s, as the Chinese Communist Party attempted to dis- 
tinguish between beneficial foreign technology and harmful and 
"polluting" foreign ideas and practices. Throughout the twentieth 
century, China's political leaders have had a deeply ambivalent 
attitude toward science and technology, promoting it as necessary 



375 



China: A Country Study 



for national defense and national strength but fearing it as a carrier 
of threatening alien ideas and practices. 

By 1900 China's science and technology establishment, minimal 
though it was, already manifested several features that would 
characterize it throughout the twentieth century. Although China's 
early scientific achievements were a source of national pride, they 
had no direct influence on the practice and teaching of science in 
China, which was based on foreign models and foreign training. 
As a group, China's scientists, with their foreign education, foreign- 
language competence, and exposure to foreign ideas of science as 
an autonomous, international, and professional activity, formed 
the most cosmopolitan element of the population. China's scien- 
tists, more than their foreign counterparts, were motivated by 
patriotism and the desire to help their country through their work, 
and many deliberately chose applied over basic scientific work. 
Chinese intellectuals were influenced by the Confucian teachings 
that intellectuals had special responsibilities toward their society 
and should play a role in public affairs. Much scientific work was 
done under government patronage, direction, and funding. The 
government, whether imperial or republican, was interested in 
science for what it could contribute to national development and 
military power, and it saw science as a means rather than as an 
end in itself. The first major publisher of translations of scientific 
works was the Jiangnan Arsenal, founded in Shanghai in 1866, 
which published nearly 200 basic and applied scientific texts origi- 
nally written in English, French, or German. 

In the first two decades of the twentieth century an increasing 
number of colleges and universities were founded, and growing 
numbers of Chinese students were educated abroad. The Science 
Society of China, whose membership included most of the coun- 
try's leading scientists and engineers, was founded by Chinese stu- 
dents at Cornell University in 1914. In 1915 it began publication 
in China of a major journal, Kexue (Science), which was patterned 
on the journal of the American Association for the Advancement 
of Science. In 1922 the Society established a major biological 
research laboratory in Nanjing. The Society devoted itself to the 
popularization of science through an active and diverse publica- 
tion program, the improvement of science education, and partici- 
pation in international scientific meetings. 

The establishment of the Guomindang government at Nanjing 
in 1927 was followed by the creation of several government research 
and training institutions (see Republican China, ch. 1). The Acade- 
mia Sinica, founded in 1928, had a dozen research institutes, whose 
personnel did research and advised the government. The late 1920s 



376 



Science and Technology 



and early 1930s saw the establishment of many research institutes, 
such as the Fan Memorial Biological Institute in Beijing and the 
Beijing Research Laboratory, which eventually formed departments 
in physics, biology, pharmacology, and other fields. Most of the 
research institutes were characterized both by very limited funds 
and personnel and by productive, high-quality scientific work. By 
the 1930s China possessed a number of foreign-trained scientists 
who did research of high quality, which they published in both 
Chinese and foreign scientific journals. These scientists worked in 
the major universities or in research institutes funded by the govern- 
ment or foreign organizations (such as missionary groups and the 
Rockefeller Foundation) and were concentrated in Beijing, Nan- 
jing, and Shanghai. 

Between 1937 and 1949, China's scientists and scientific work 
suffered the ravages of invasion, civil war, and runaway inflation. 
Funds to support research, never ample, almost totally disappeared, 
and most scientists were forced to devote most of their energies 
to teaching, administration, or a government job. In a change from 
the earlier pattern, many students opted not to return to China 
after foreign education, choosing instead to seek careers abroad. 

Soviet Influence in the 1950s 

After the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949, China 
reorganized its science establishment along Soviet lines — a system 
that remained in force until the late 1970s, when China's leaders 
called for major reforms. The Soviet model is characterized by a 
bureaucratic rather than a professional principle of organization, 
the separation of research from production, the establishment of 
a set of specialized research institutes, and a high priority on applied 
science and technology, which includes military technology. 

The government's view of the purpose of scientific work was set 
forth in the September 1949 Common Program of the Chinese Peo- 
ple's Political Consultative Conference (see Glossary), which stated, 
"Efforts should be made to develop the natural sciences in order 
to serve the construction of industry, agriculture, and the national 
defense." On November 1, 1949, the Chinese Academy of Sciences 
was founded, amalgamating research institutes under the former 
Academia Sinica and Beijing Research Academy (the former Bei- 
jing Research Laboratory). In March 1951 the government directed 
the academy to determine the requirements of the production sec- 
tor of the economy and to adjust scientific research to meet those 
requirements. Scientists were to engage in research with signifi- 
cant and fairly immediate benefits to society and to work as 



377 



China: A Country Study 



members of collectives rather than as individuals seeking personal 
fame and recognition. 

The Chinese Academy of Sciences was explicitly modeled on the 
Soviet Academy of Sciences, whose director, Sergei I. Vavilov, was 
consulted on the proper way to reorganize Chinese science. His 
book Thirty Years of Soviet Science was translated into Chinese to serve 
as a guide. Soviet influence also was realized through large-scale 
personnel exchanges. During the 1950s China sent about 38,000 
people to the Soviet Union for training and study. Most of these 
(28,000) were technicians from key industries, but the total cohort 
included 7,500 students and 2,500 college and university teachers 
and postgraduate scientists. The Soviet Union dispatched some 
1 1 ,000 scientific and technical aid personnel to China. An estimated 
850 of these worked in the scientific research sector, about 1,000 
in education and public health, and the rest in heavy industry. In 
1954 China and the Soviet Union set up the Joint Commission 
for Cooperation in Science and Technology, which met annually 
until 1963 and arranged cooperation on over 100 major scientific 
projects, including those in nuclear science. When the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences completed a draft twelve-year plan for scien- 
tific development in 1956, it was referred to the Soviet Academy 
of Sciences for review. In October 1957 a high-level delegation of 
Chinese scientists accompanied Mao Zedong to Moscow to negoti- 
ate an agreement for Soviet cooperation on 100 of the 582 research 
projects outlined in the twelve-year plan. 

The Soviet aid program of the 1950s was intended to develop 
China's economy and to organize it along Soviet lines. As part of 
its First Five-Year Plan (1953-57), China was the recipient of the 
most comprehensive technology transfer in modern industrial his- 
tory. The Soviet Union provided aid for 156 major industrial 
projects concentrated in mining, power generation, and heavy 
industry. Following the Soviet model of economic development, 
these were large-scale, capital-intensive projects. By the late 1950s, 
China had made substantial progress in such fields as electric pow r er, 
steel production, basic chemicals, and machine tools, as well as 
in production of military equipment such as artillery, tanks, and 
jet aircraft. The purpose of the program was to increase China's 
production of such basic commodities as coal and steel and to teach 
Chinese workers to operate imported or duplicated Soviet facto- 
ries. These goals were met and, as a side effect, Soviet standards 
for materials, engineering practice, and factory management were 
adopted. In a move whose full costs would not become apparent 
for twenty-five years, Chinese industry also adopted the Soviet sepa- 
ration of research from production. 



378 



Science and Technology 



The adoption of the Soviet model meant that the organization 
of Chinese science was based on bureaucratic rather than profes- 
sional principles. Under the bureaucratic model, leadership is in 
the hands of nonscientists, who assign research tasks in accordance 
with a centrally determined plan. The administrators, not the scien- 
tists, control recruitment and personnel mobility. The primary 
rewards are administratively controlled salary increases, bonuses, 
and prizes. Individual scientists, seen as skilled workers and as 
employees of their institutions, are expected to work as components 
of collective units. Information is controlled, is expected to flow 
only through authorized channels, and is often considered propri- 
etary or secret. Scientific achievements are regarded as the result 
primarily of "external" factors such as the overall economic and 
political structure of trie society, the sheer numbers of personnel, 
and adequate levels of funding. Under professional principles, which 
predominate in Western countries, scientists regard themselves as 
members of an international professional community that recruits 
and rewards its members according to its own standards of profes- 
sional excellence. The primary reward is recognition by professional 
peers, and scientists participate in an elaborate network of com- 
munication, which includes published articles, grant proposals, con- 
ferences, and news of current and planned research carried by 
scientists who circulate from one research center to another. 

"Reds" Versus "Experts" in the 1950s and 1960s 

Tensions between scientists and China's communist rulers existed 
from the earliest days of the People's Republic and reached their 
height during the Cultural Revolution (see The Cultural Revolu- 
tion Decade, 1966-76, ch. 1). In the early 1950s, Chinese scien- 
tists, like other intellectuals, were subjected to regular indoctrination 
intended to replace bourgeois attitudes with those more suitable 
to the new society. Many attributes of the professional organiza- 
tion of science, such as its assumption of autonomy in choice of 
research topics, its internationalism, and its orientation toward 
professional peer groups rather than administrative authorities, were 
condemned as bourgeois. Those scientists who used the brief period 
of free expression in the Hundred Flowers Campaign of 1956-57 
(see Glossary) — to air complaints of excessive time taken from scien- 
tific work by political meetings and rallies or of the harmful effects 
of attempts by poorly educated party cadres to direct scientific 
work — were criticized for their "antiparty" stance, labeled as 
"rightists," and sometimes dismissed from administrative or aca- 
demic positions (see The Transition to Socialism, 1953-57, ch. 1). 



379 



China: A Country Study 



The terminology of the period distinguished between "red" and 
"expert" (see Glossary). Although party leaders spoke of the need 
to combine "redness" with expertise, they more often acted as if 
political rectitude and professional skill were mutually exclusive quali- 
ties. The period of the Great Leap Forward saw efforts to reassign 
scientists to immediately useful projects, to involve the uneducated 
masses in such research work as plant breeding or pest control, and 
to expand rapidly the ranks of scientific and technical personnel by 
lowering professional standards. The economic depression and 
famine following the Great Leap Forward, and the need to com- 
pensate for the sudden withdrawal of Soviet advisers and technical 
personnel in 1960, brought a renewed but short-lived emphasis on 
expertise and professional standards in the early 1960s. The scien- 
tific establishment was attacked during the Cultural Revolution, caus- 
ing major damage to China's science and technology. Most scientific 
research ceased. In extreme cases, individual scientists were singled 
out as "counterrevolutionaries" and made the objects of public criti- 
cism and persecution, and the research work of whole institutes was 
brought to a halt for years on end. The entire staffs of research 
institutes commonly were dispatched to the countryside for months 
or years to learn political virtue by laboring with the poor and lower- 
middle peasants. Work in the military research units devoted to 
nuclear weapons and missiles presumably continued, although the 
secrecy surrounding strategic weapons research makes it difficult 
to assess the impact of the Cultural Revolution in that sector. 

In the most general sense, the Cultural Revolution represented 
the triumph of anti-intellectualism and the consistent, decade-long 
deprecation of scholarship, formal education, and all the qualities 
associated with professionalism in science. Intellectuals were 
assumed to be inherently counterrevolutionary, and it was asserted 
that their characteristic attitudes and practices were necessarily 
opposed to the interests of the masses. Universities were closed from 
the summer of 1966 through 1970. when they reopened for under- 
graduate training with very reduced enrollments and a heavy 
emphasis on political training and manual labor. Students were 
selected for political rectitude rather than academic talent. Primary 
and secondary schools were closed in 1966 and 1967. and when 
reopened were repeatedly disrupted by political struggle. All scien- 
tific journals ceased publication in 1966, and subscriptions to for- 
eign journals lapsed or were canceled. For most of a decade China 
trained no new scientists or engineers and was cut off from foreign 
scientific developments. 

During the decade between 1966 and 1976, China's leaders 
attempted to create a new structure for science and technology 



380 



China's HL-1 controlled- nuclear fusion experimental device 

Courtesy Xinhua News Agency 



381 



China: A Country Study 



characterized by mass participation, concentration on immediate 
practical problems in agriculture and industry, and eradication of 
distinctions between scientists and workers. Ideologues saw research 
as an inherently political activity and interpreted all aspects of scien- 
tific work, from choice of topic to methods of investigation, as evi- 
dence of an underlying political line. According to this view, 
research served the interests of one social class or another and 
required the guidance of the party to ensure that it served the 
interest of the masses. 

The early 1970s were characterized by mass experimentation, 
in which large numbers of peasants were mobilized to collect data 
and encouraged to view themselves as doing scientific research. 
Typical projects included collecting information on new crop varie- 
ties, studying the effectiveness of locally produced insecticides, and 
making extensive geological surveys aimed at finding useful miner- 
als or fossil fuels. Mao Zedong took a personal interest in earth- 
quake prediction, which became a showcase of Cultural 
Revolution-style science. Geologists went to the countryside to col- 
lect folk wisdom on precursors of earthquakes, and networks of thou- 
sands of observers were established to monitor such signs as the 
level of water in wells or the unusual behavior of domestic animals. 
The emphasis in this activity, as in acupuncture anesthesia, was 
on immediate practical benefits, and little effort was made to inte- 
grate the phenomena observed into larger theoretical frameworks. 

The effects of the extreme emphasis on short-term problems and 
the deprecation of theory were noted by Western scientists who 
visited China in the mid- and late 1970s. For example, work in 
research institutes affiliated with the petrochemical industry was 
described as excessively characterized by trial and error. In one 
case, large numbers of substances were tried as catalysts or modi- 
fiers of the wax crystals in crude oil, and little attention was given 
to the underlying chemical properties of the catalytic or modify- 
ing agents. 

Rehabilitation and Rethinking, 1977-84 

The Cultural Revolution's attacks on science and its deprecation 
of expertise were opposed by those within the government and party 
who were more concerned with economic development than with 
revolutionary purity. In the early 1970s, Premier Zhou Enlai and 
his associate Deng Xiaoping attempted to improve the working con- 
ditions of scientists and to promote research. At the January 1975 
session of the Fourth National People's Congress, Zhou Enlai defined 
China's goal for the rest of the century as the Four Modernizations 
(see Glossary), that is, modernization of agriculture, industry, science 



382 



Science and Technology 



and technology, and national defense. Although the policies pro- 
posed in the speech had little immediate effect, they were to become 
the basic guide for the post-Mao period. In 1975 Deng Xiaoping, 
then vice chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, vice premier 
of the government, and Zhou Enlai's political heir, acted as patron 
and spokesman for China's scientists (see Constitutional Frame- 
work, ch. 10). Under Deng's direction, three major policy docu- 
ments — on science and technology, industry, and foreign trade — 
were drafted. Intended to promote economic growth, they called 
for rehabilitating scientists and experts, reimposing strict academic 
standards in education, and importing foreign technology. The 
proposals for reversing most of the Cultural Revolution policies 
toward scientists and intellectuals were denounced by the ideologues 
and followers of the Gang of Four (see Glossary) as "poisonous 
weeds." Zhou died in January 1976, and Deng was dismissed from 
all his posts in April. Deng's stress on the priority of scientific and 
technical development was condemned by the radicals as "taking 
the capitalist road." This dispute demonstrated the central place 
of science policy in modern Chinese politics and the link between 
science policies and the political fortunes of individual leaders. 

Some of the immediate consequences of Mao's death and the 
subsequent overthrow of the Gang of Four in October 1976 were 
the reversals of science and education policies (see The Post-Mao 
Period, 1976-78, ch. 1). During 1977 the more vocal supporters 
of the Gang of Four were removed from positions of authority in 
research institutes and universities and replaced with profession- 
ally qualified scientists and intellectuals. Academic and research 
institutions that had been closed were reopened, and scientists were 
summoned back to their laboratories from manual labor in the coun- 
tryside. Scientific journals resumed publication, often carrying 
reports of research completed before everything stopped in the sum- 
mer of 1966. The media devoted much attention to the value of 
science and the admirable qualities of scientists. It denounced the 
repressive and anti-intellectual policies of the deposed Gang of Four, 
who were blamed for the failure of China's science and technology 
to match advanced international levels. The news media now 
characterized scientists and technicians as part of society's "produc- 
tive forces" and as "workers" rather than as potential counter- 
revolutionaries or bourgeois experts divorced from the masses. 
Considerable publicity went to the admission or readmission of 
scientists to party membership. 

The March 1978 National Science Conference in Beijing was 
a milestone in science policy. The conference, called by the party 
Central Committee, was attended by many of China's top leaders, 



383 



China: A Country Study 



as well as by 6,000 scientists and science administrators. Its main 
purpose was to announce publicly the government and party policy 
of encouragement and support of science and technology. Science 
and technology were assigned a key role in China's "New Long 
March" toward the creation of a modern socialist society by the 
year 2000. A major speech by Deng Xiaoping reiterated the con- 
cept of science as a productive force and scientists as workers, an 
ideological formulation intended to remove the grounds for the 
political victimization of scientists. Speeches by then-Premier Hua 
Guofeng and Vice Premier Fang Yi, the top government figure 
involved in science and technology, urged that scientists be given 
free rein in carrying out research as long as the work was in line 
with broad national priorities. Basic research was to be supported, 
although stress would continue to be placed on applied work, and 
China's scientists would be given wide access to foreign knowledge 
through greatly expanded international scientific and technical 
exchanges. 

By 1978 substantial progress had been made toward restoring 
the science and technology establishment to its pre-Cultural Revo- 
lution state. Leaders with special responsibility for science and tech- 
nology joined recently rehabilitated senior scientists in looking ahead 
and framing sweeping and very ambitious plans for further develop- 
ment. The draft Eight- Year Plan for the Development of Science 
and Technology, discussed at the 1978 National Science Confer- 
ence, called for a rapid increase in the number of research work- 
ers, for catching up to advanced international levels by the 
mid-1980s, and for substantial work in such fields as lasers, manned 
space flight, and high-energy physics. For some scientists, and 
perhaps for their political sponsors as well, mastering technologies 
and developing Chinese capabilities in the most advanced areas 
of science were goals in themselves, regardless of the costs or of 
the likely benefits to the peasants and workers. 

Both political leaders and media personnel seemed captivated 
by the vision of rapid economic growth and social transformation 
made possible by the wonders of science. Further, many leaders, 
not themselves scientifically trained, tended toward unrealistic 
expectations of the immediate benefits from research. This atti- 
tude, while different from the hostility to science exhibited during 
the Cultural Revolution, was based on a misunderstanding of the 
nature of scientific work and was therefore a poor foundation for 
science policy. 

The plans for rapid advance in many scientific areas were 
associated with equally ambitious calls for economic growth and 
the large-scale import of complete factories. During 1979 it became 



384 



Physicists at the Chinese Academy of Sciences 
work on superconducting materials. 
Courtesy China Reconstructs 

increasingly clear that China could not pay for all the imports or 
scientific projects wanted by all the ministries, regional authori- 
ties, and research institutes. It also became increasingly evident 
that those promoting the projects had overlooked financial con- 
straints and severe shortages of scientific and technical manpower 
and that they lacked a comprehensive plan. In February 1981 a 
report of the State Science and Technology Commission reversed 
the overly ambitious 1978 eight-year scientific development plan 
and called for renewed emphasis on the application of science to 
practical problems and on training more scientists and engineers. 

As scientists and administrators confronted the problems of 
applying and linking research with development, they became aware 
of the constraints of the existing system and of the extent to which 
the endemic difficulties in applying scientific knowledge were con- 
sequences of the Soviet-style structure for science and industry that 
China had uncritically adopted in the 1950s. Attention shifted to 
reforming the existing system and promoting greater efficiency and 
better use of scarce resources, such as trained manpower. Between 
1981 and 1985, a number of new journals discussed China's scien- 
tific system and suggested improvements, while national and local 
administrators sponsored a wide range of experimental reforms and 
reorganizations of research bodies. The extensive discussion and 



385 



China: A Country Study 



experimentation culminated in a March 1985 decision of the party 
Central Committee calling for thorough reform of China's science 
system (see The Reform Program, this ch.). 

Science and Technology in the 1980s 
The Supply of Skilled Manpower 

Research and development is a labor-intensive endeavor, in 
which the critical resource is the size and quality of the pool of 
trained manpower. China suffers both from an absolute shortage 
of scientists, engineers, and technicians and from maldistribution 
and misuse of those it has. Chinese statistics on the number and 
distribution of scientific personnel are neither complete nor con- 
sistent. According to the State Statistical Bureau, at the end of 1986 
there were some 8.2 million personnel (out of 127.7 million work- 
ers) in the natural sciences working in state-owned enterprises, 
research institutes, and government offices. These numbers prob- 
ably excluded military personnel and scientists in military research 
bodies, but they included support personnel in research institutes. 
"Scientific and technical personnel" comprised about 1.5 percent 
of all employed persons, but only about 350,000 of them were 
"research personnel." Their number had increased markedly from 
the 1970s as well-trained students began graduating from Chinese 
colleges and universities in substantial numbers and as postgradu- 
ates began returning from advanced training in foreign countries. 
Between 1979 and 1986, China sent over 35,000 students abroad, 
23,000 of whom went to the United States. 

More significant than sheer numbers of scientific personnel were 
their quality and distribution. The total numbers masked wide 
variations in educational background and quality, lumping together 
graduates of two-year institutions or those who had attended second- 
ary or postsecondary schools during periods of low standards with 
those who had graduated from major institutions in the early 1960s 
or the 1980s, that is, before or after the period of the Cultural Revo- 
lution. The Cultural Revolution had removed an entire genera- 
tion from access to university and professional training, creating 
a gap in the age distribution of the scientific work force. The scien- 
tific community included a small number of elderly senior scien- 
tists, often trained abroad before 1949, a relatively small group 
of middle-aged personnel, and a large number of junior scientists 
who had graduated from Chinese universities after 1980 or returned 
from study abroad. In the mid-1980s many of the middle-aged, 
middle-rank scientists had low educational and professional attain- 
ments, but generally they could be neither dismissed nor retired 



386 



Science and Technology 



(because of China's practice of secure lifetime employment); nor 
could they be retrained, as colleges and universities allocated scarce 
places to younger people with much better qualifications. Scien- 
tists and engineers were concentrated in specialized research insti- 
tutes, in heavy industry, and in the state's military research and 
military industrial facilities, which had the highest standards and 
the best-trained people. A very small proportion of scientists and 
engineers worked in light industry, consumer industry, small-scale 
collective enterprises, and small towns and rural areas. 

Research Institutes 

In the late 1980s, most Chinese researchers worked in special- 
ized research institutes rather than in academic or industrial enter- 
prises. The research institutes, of which there were about 10,000 
in 1985, were, like their Soviet exemplars, directed and funded 
by various central and regional government bodies. Their research 
tasks were, in theory, assigned by higher administrative levels as 
part of an overall research plan; the research plan was, in theory, 
coordinated with an overall economic plan. Research institutes were 
the basic units for the conduct of research and the employment 
of scientists, who were assigned to institutes by government per- 
sonnel bureaus. Scientists usually spent their entire working careers 
within the same institute. Research institutes functioned as ordi- 
nary Chinese work units, with the usual features of lifetime 
employment, unit control of rewards and scarce goods, and limited 
contact with other units not in the same chain of command (see 
Work Units, ch. 3). Each research institute attempted to provide 
its own staff housing, transportation, laboratory space, and instru- 
ments and to stockpile equipment and personnel. The limited chan- 
nels for exchanges of information with other institutes often led 
to duplication or repetition of research. 

National Organization and Administration 

The research institutes belonged to larger systems or hierarchies, 
defined by the administrative bodies that directed and funded their 
subordinate institutes. Research institutes were grouped into five 
major subsystems, known in China as the "five main forces" (see 
fig. 17). The five subsystems were administratively distinct and 
had little contact or communication. 

Chinese Academy of Sciences 

In the late 1980s, the Chinese Academy of Sciences remained 
the most prestigious research agency in the natural sciences. It 
administered about 120 research institutes in various parts of China, 



387 



China: A Country Study 



with major concentrations in Beijing and Shanghai. In 1986 the 
academy employed 80,000 persons, over 40,000 of whom were 
scientific personnel. It also operated the elite Chinese University 
of Science and Technology, located in Hefei, Anhui Province, as 
well as its own printing plant and scientific instrument factory. Its 
institutes concentrated on basic research in many fields and did 
research (such as that on superconductor materials) that met inter- 
national standards. The Chinese Academy of Sciences institutes 
employed China's best-qualified civilian scientists and had better 
laboratories, equipment, and libraries than institutes in the other 
four research systems. The academy's concentration on basic 
research was intended to be complemented by the work of the more 
numerous institutes affiliated with industrial ministries or local 
governments, which focused on applied research. 

Although nominally subordinate to the State Science and Tech- 
nology Commission, the Chinese Academy of Sciences in practice 
reported directly to the State Council (see The State Council, 
ch. 10). Before 1956 the academy was directly responsible for overall 
science planning, and in 1987 it retained a fairly high degree of 
institutional autonomy and influence on national science policy. 
The academy provided expert advice, when asked, to the State 
Council and its ministries, commissions, and agencies. Its special- 
ized research institutes also did work for the military research and 
development program. Additionally, it had responsibility for multi- 
disciplinary research, monitoring the level of technology in Chinese 
industries and suggesting areas where foreign technology should 
be purchased. During the 1980s the academy repeatedly was asked 
to pay more attention to the needs of production and the applica- 
tion of knowledge. 

The membership of the Chinese Academy of Sciences included 
the nation's most senior and best-known scientists, some of whom 
had long-standing personal ties with senior political leaders. Such 
ties and the prestige of the academy helped it win favorable treat- 
ment in the state budgetary process and operate with relatively lit- 
tle outside interference. Its relatively privileged position generated 
resentment among those working in less well-funded institutes under 
the industrial ministries, whose workers — as well as some planners 
in the state administration — reportedly considered the academy both 
overfunded and overstaffed with theoreticians who contributed little 
to the national economy. 

State Science and Technology Commission 

The State Science and Technology Commission, a ministerial- 
level organ of the State Council, had responsibility for overseeing 



388 



Science and Technology 




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389 



China: A Country Study 

the work of civilian research institutes subordinate to the various 
industrial ministries, such as the Ministry of Electronics Industry 
and the Ministry of Coal Industry, or to provincial-level, prefec- 
tural, or municipal bureaus. More than 80 percent of China's 
10,000 research institutes fell in this category, and their range of 
quality was considerable. Central planners and administrators con- 
sidered the proliferation of low-quality research institutes a waste 
of scarce research funds, but as of mid- 1987 they had not been able 
to overrule powerful ministries or local governments. Such insti- 
tutes, which employed the majority of China's scientists and engi- 
neers, were expected to devote themselves to the application of 
science and to useful innovations and improvements to industrial 
processes and products. They had little direct contact with facto- 
ries, and they reported their research results up the chain of com- 
mand of their department or ministry, which was responsible for 
passing them on to factories. The scientists and engineers had lit- 
tle opportunity for interchanges with research institutes that were 
doing similar work but that were subordinate to a different minis- 
try or commission. 

The State Science and Technology Commission also has primary 
responsibility for coordinating science policy with the state's plan- 
ning and budgeting operations, working in coordination with the 
State Planning Commission, the State Economic Commission, and 
the Ministry of Finance. The importance of science and science 
policy was indicated by the high state and party rank of the ministers 
and vice ministers placed in charge of the State Science and 
Technology Commission. Provincial-level units, responsible for 
budgeting, planning, and coordinating across administrative hier- 
archies, had their own science and technology commissions. The 
demarcation between the responsibilities of the Chinese Academy 
of Sciences and the State Science and Technology Commission in 
policy formulation and consultation was not entirely clear, and there 
was probably a certain degree of ambiguity and contention in their 
dealings with each other. The commission was apprised of the 
research being done at the academy institutes and approved the 
academy budget as a whole, but it could not direct the allocation 
of funds within the academy. 

National Defense Science, Technology, and Industry Commission 

Since the 1950s much of China's research and development effort 
has been channeled into military work. Military research facilities 
and factories are reported to have China's best-trained person- 
nel, highest level of technology, and first priority for funding. 
Although the military sector has been shrouded in secrecy, its work 



390 



Science and Technology 



has resulted in the largely independent development of nuclear and 
thermonuclear weapons, intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear 
submarines and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and the suc- 
cessful launch and recovery of communications and reconnaissance 
satellites. Little information on the military research sector has been 
made public, and secrecy has been reinforced by isolation of many 
military research centers in the remote deserts and mountains of 
China's western regions. The overall level of China's military tech- 
nology is not high by international standards, and the achievements 
in nuclear weapons and missiles have apparently resulted from 
projects featuring concentrated resources, effective coordination of 
distinct specialties and industries, and firm leadership directed at 
the achievement of -a single, well-defined goal. The style recalls the 
1940s Manhattan Project in the United States, and the accomplish- 
ments demonstrate the effectiveness of the Soviet-style "big push" 
mode of organizing research and development. 

The military sector has developed in comparative isolation from 
the civilian economy, and until the 1980s its higher level of skills 
made little contribution to the national economy. Throughout the 
1980s efforts have been made to break down some of the adminis- 
trative barriers separating the military and civilian research and 
development systems. The military sector has been relatively privi- 
leged, and the spirit of self-reliance has been strong. Nevertheless, 
the rapid development of electronics and computer applications in 
the 1970s and 1980s rendered much of China's military industry 
obsolete. Consequently, pressure for more contact between the mili- 
tary research units and civilian institutes (which, with foreign con- 
tact and up-to-date foreign technology, may surpass the technical 
level of the military institutes) may be generated. 

In 1987 the work of the military research institutes continued 
to be directed by the State Council's National Defense Science, 
Technology, and Industry Commission (NDSTIC). The NDSTIC 
was created in 1982 with the merger of the National Defense Science 
and Technology Commission, National Defense Industries Office, 
and Office of the Science, Technology, and Armament Commis- 
sion of the party Central Military Commission. The NDSTIC func- 
tioned in a manner similar to the State Science and Technology 
Commission, concentrating on high-level planning and coordina- 
tion across the vertical chains of command in which military 
research institutes and factories are organized. 

Research in Colleges, Universities, and Enterprises 

As a consequence of China's adopting the Soviet model for the 
organization of science and industry — featuring strict separation 



391 



China: A Country Study 



of research, production, and training — little research has been done 
in Chinese universities. The State Education Commission has 
provided only limited funding to support research, and through 
the 1980s the scale of research at most colleges and universities has 
been very modest. Since 1980 a few academic research institutes 
have been established in such areas as computer science. The World 
Bank has supported a major effort to increase research in Chinese 
universities and to make better use of the scarce skills of faculty 
members. On the whole, though, universities have continued to 
play only a minor role in scientific research. 

Research institutes associated with or organized as constituent 
parts of productive enterprises have been quite rare and represent 
the smallest of the five systems of research institutes. Only the larg- 
est mines, oil fields, or factories, such as the Anshan iron and steel 
complex in Liaoning Province or the Yanshan petrochemical com- 
plex in Beijing, had their own research units, dedicated to solving 
immediate problems in production in the late 1980s. Enterprises 
concentrated on production, and their managers had little incen- 
tive to take the risks associated with innovation. 

Planning Scientific Research 

Since 1949 China has attempted, with mixed success, to organize 
research and development according to a centralized national plan. 
The various plans for scientific development that China has adopted 
since 1957 have been broad — listing topics and areas of priority 
without going into much detail or attempting to issue targets or 
dates to specific research institutes. From the 1950s through the 
mid-1980s, the "iron rice bowl" (see Glossary) of guaranteed 
employment and funding applied to research institutes and research- 
ers as much as to any other enterprises or state-sector workers (see 
Economic Policies, 1949-80, ch. 5). No institute ever had its budget 
cut for failing to make a planned discovery, and no scientist was 
dismissed for failing to publish or to make progress in research. 

Much of the initiative in research seems to have come from below, 
with institutes submitting proposals for projects and funding to the 
State Science and Technology Commission. The commission's 
plans were drawn up after conferences in which scientists and direc- 
tors of institutes suggested work that seemed feasible and worth- 
while. The Beijing headquarters of the commission had a staff of 
between 500 and 1 ,000, not all of whom had scientific or economic 
backgrounds. Some of their energies were devoted to communica- 
tion and coordination with other elements of the central adminis- 
tration, such as the State Planning Commission and the State 
Economic Commission. The core of the responsibility and power 



392 



The Long March-3 
satellite-carrier rocket 
ready for launch 
Courtesy Xinhua News Agency 




of the State Science and Technology Commission was in its allo- 
cation of funds for research and approval of projects. It possessed 
neither the manpower nor the expertise to monitor the work of the 
several thousand research institutes it oversaw, and of necessity 
it concentrated on major projects and relied on the advice of expert 
scientists and the regional scientific and technological commissions, 
which processed reports and applications for new projects. Much 
of its work consisted of "balancing" the competing requests for 
limited funds, and its decisions often were made on grounds other 
than scientific merit. Although China's leaders have addressed the 
rhetoric of centralized planning to scientific research, research 
activities have been more decentralized and more subject to pres- 
sures from powerful ministries and provincial-level governments. 

Integration of Administrative Systems 

In the late 1980s, two of the five research subsystems — the 
Chinese Academy of Sciences and the military system — were rela- 
tively privileged in receiving government financing and being sup- 
plied with scarce resources and historically had tended to form 
closed, self-sufficient domains. The system under the State Science 
and Technology Commission, which included the largest number 
of research institutes, was marked by wide variations in quality 
and a vertical, bureaucratic mode of organization that inhibited 
collaboration and exchange of information. Both the universities 



393 



China: A Country Study 



and the research institutes attached to large industrial complexes 
were short of funds and out of the mainstream of research. Over- 
all, China's science and technology structure was marked by lop- 
sided distribution of skilled manpower, pervasive fragmentation, 
compartmentalization, and duplication of research — an outcome 
of the 1950s decision to adopt a bureaucratic mode of organiza- 
tion for science and technology. Chinese policy makers were well 
aware of these problems and, over the years, had responded with 
two forms of organizational remedies: high-level coordinating bodies 
and mass scientific associations that cut across administrative 
boundaries. 

Leading Group for Science and Technology 

The growth of China's scientific system and the tendencies toward 
compartmentalization inherent in the Soviet mode of scientific and 
industrial organization, which it emulated, were matched by the 
creation of administrative bodies intended to coordinate the activities 
of vertically organized administrative hierarchies. Both the State 
Science and Technology Commission and the NDSTIC, which were 
formed by the amalgamation of earlier coordinating bodies founded 
as long ago as the mid-1950s, had this primary function. Efforts 
to fill the need for progressively more authoritative and compre- 
hensive coordination culminated in the establishment of the State 
Council's Leading Group for Science and Technology in January 
1983. The leading group, a special-purpose task force formed by 
the State Council to address problems that cut across administra- 
tive boundaries, was China's highest-level policy-making organ for 
science and technology. In 1987 its chairman was Premier Zhao 
Ziyang, and its membership included Fang Yi, state councillor and 
former head of the State Science and Technology Commission and 
the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and leading members of the State 
Science and Technology Commission, NDSTIC, State Planning 
Commission, State Economic Commission, State Education Com- 
mission, Chinese Academy of Sciences, and Ministry of Labor and 
Personnel. That the leading group was headed by the premier 
indicated both the significance China's leaders attached to science 
policy and the level of authority necessary to settle disputes and 
encourage cooperation. 

China Association of Science and Technology 

At the lower end of the administrative hierarchy, communica- 
tion and cooperation were intended to be promoted by professional 
organizations, whose membership cut across administrative bound- 
aries. The primary organization was the China Association of 



394 



Science and Technology 



Science and Technology, a nongovernment mass organization. 
Because it was funded by the government and, like all organiza- 
tions in China, directed by party cadres, its autonomy had strict 
limits. The China Association of Science and Technology was an 
umbrella organization: as of 1986 it comprised 139 national scien- 
tific societies organized by discipline and 1.9 million individual 
members. It succeeded earlier scientific associations that had been 
founded in 1910-20. The China Association of Science and Tech- 
nology served three major purposes. First, like professional associa- 
tions in most countries, it brought individual scientists and 
administrators together with their professional peers from other 
work units at conferences, lectures, and joint projects, and it pro- 
moted communication across administrative boundaries. Second, 
the China Association of Science and Technology had a major role 
in the popularization of science and dissemination of scientific 
knowledge to the general public. This latter function was accom- 
plished through the publication of popular-science journals and 
books aimed at an audience with a high-school education and 
through lecture series, refresher training for technicians and engi- 
neers, and consultation for farmers and rural and small-scale 
industries. Throughout the 1980s, the China Association of Science 
and Technology and its constituent associations served increasingly 
as consultants to government officials. Third, the China Associa- 
tion of Science and Technology played a major role in China's 
international scientific exchanges and hosted delegations of foreign 
scientists, sponsored international scientific conferences in China, 
participated in many joint research projects with foreign associa- 
tions and scientific bodies, and represented China in many inter- 
national science societies. 

International Ties 

Since emerging from the self-imposed isolation and self-reliance 
of the Cultural Revolution, China has expanded its international 
scientific exchanges to an unprecedented degree. The 1980s policy 
of opening up to the outside world, a basic element of Deng Xiao- 
ping's prescription for modernization, was nowhere better exem- 
plified than in science and technology policy (see China and the 
Four Modernizations, 1979-82, ch. 1). The goal was to help China's 
science and technology reach international standards as quickly as 
possible and to remedy the damage done by the Cultural Revolu- 
tion. This was achieved by participating in international confer- 
ences, cooperating in projects with foreign scientists, and sending 
thousands of Chinese graduate students and senior researchers to 
foreign universities for training and joint research. 



395 



China: A Country Study 

Scientific cooperation has come to play a significant part in 
China's foreign relations and diplomatic repertoire. Visits of Chi- 
nese leaders to foreign countries are often marked by the signing 
of an agreement for scientific cooperation. In mid-1987 China had 
diplomatic relations with 133 countries and formal, government- 
to-government agreements on scientific cooperation with 54 of them 
(see An Overview of China's Foreign Relations, ch. 12). When 
diplomatic relations were established between China and the United 
States in January 1979, the Joint Commission in Scientific and 
Technological Cooperation was founded. Since then, the two gov- 
ernments have signed twenty-eight agreements on scientific and 
technical cooperation in fields ranging from earthquake prediction 
to industrial management. China has mutually beneficial scientific 
exchange programs with both technically advanced nations and 
those having only a minimal scientific capability. Although China 
tended to receive aid from more scientifically advanced nations and 
to render aid to the less developed, the equality implied in scientific 
exchange made it a useful diplomatic form. 

In 1987 China had scientific-exchange relations with 106 coun- 
tries — usually in the form of agreements between the China Asso- 
ciation of Science and Technology and a foreign equivalent. 
Incomplete statistics indicated that by 1986 Chinese scientists had 
completed over 500 joint projects with scientists in the United States 
and were working on 1,500 projects with counterparts in various 
West European countries, 300 with those in Eastern Europe, and 
at least 30 with Japanese researchers. In June 1986 the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences signed an agreement with the Soviet Academy 
of Sciences for scientific cooperation in unspecified fields. Many 
exchanges with the United States involved Chinese-American scien- 
tists and engineers, who collaborated with visiting Chinese research- 
ers in the United States and visited China to lecture on their 
specialties and to advise scientific bodies. 

By 1986 the China Association of Science and Technology or 
its constituent associations were full members of 96 international 
scientific societies and committees, and over 300 Chinese scien- 
tists held office in international scientific bodies. China also was 
an active participant in United Nations scientific activities in the 
1980s. Luoyang, Henan Province, is the site of the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization's International 
Silt Research and Training Center, which specializes in problems 
of river silts. Apart from the 35,000 students China sent abroad 
for training between 1979 and 1986, approximately 41,000 Chinese 
scientists took part in various international exchanges. Between 1980 
and 1986, China hosted 155 international academic conferences, 



396 



Science and Technology 



which were attended by 10,000 foreign scholars and 30,000 Chinese 
participants. China also has employed substantial numbers of for- 
eign experts, often retired scientists or engineers, as short-term con- 
sultants. 

International exchanges represent one of the most successful 
aspects of the Chinese government's efforts to raise the level of 
science and demonstrate the strength of the centralized direction 
and funding possible under China's bureaucratic organization of 
science. The weaknesses of that mode of organization are evident 
in the less successful efforts to improve the internal functioning and 
productivity of the domestic science and technology establishment 
and have generated a major effort to reform that establishment. 

The Reform Program 

Shortcomings of the Science and Technology System 

From the perspective of China's leaders, the entire science and 
technology system of the late 1980s, with its 8 million personnel 
and 10,000 research institutes, represented an expensive, under- 
utilized and not very productive capital investment. Dissatisfac- 
tion with the system had become pervasive by the early 1980s, and 
both scientists and political leaders agreed on the necessity for fun- 
damental reform. The primary complaint of the leadership was that, 
despite thirty years of policy statements, central plans, and politi- 
cal campaigns directed at the attitudes of scientists and engineers, 
science still was not serving the needs of the economy. Reformist 
political leaders and senior scientists identified a number of orga- 
nizational problems that were inherent in the system adopted from 
the Soviet Union and that had been compounded by Chinese work- 
unit and lifetime job assignment practices (see Differentiation; Com- 
mon Patterns, ch. 3). 

In an October 1982 speech to the National Science Awards Con- 
ference, Premier Zhao Ziyang identified the following as primary 
problems: uneven development and lack of coordination among 
scientific fields; lack of communication between research and 
production units; duplication of research and facilities; rivalry 
among institutes, administrative bodies, and hierarchies; and mal- 
distribution of personnel, with some units and fields overstaffed 
and others very short of skilled personnel. Zhao's speech drew upon 
and was followed by extensive discussions of management and orga- 
nization by scientists and administrators. These discussions empha- 
sized the prevalence of departmentalism, compartmentalism, and 
fragmentation of efforts. These problems, when combined with poor 
management, poorly educated managers, absence of incentives for 



397 



China: A Country Study 



good work or of penalties for poor performance, and absence of 
direct communication between research units and productive enter- 
prises, resulted in the failure of the science and technology estab- 
lishment to serve production and economic growth. 

In the 1980s research institutes, like all Chinese work units, 
responded to an economic system in which supplies were uncer- 
tain by attempting to be as self-sufficient as possible. Exchanges 
of information, services, or personnel across the very strictly defined 
administrative boundaries were difficult, resulting in failure to share 
expensive imported equipment and in widespread duplication of 
facilities. The absence of information on work being done in other 
research institutes, even in the same city, frequently led to dupli- 
cation and repetition of research. 

Like all other workers in China, scientists were assigned to 
research institutes or universities by government labor bureaus. 
Such assignments frequently did not reflect specialized skills or train- 
ing. Assignments were meant to be permanent, and it was very 
difficult for scientists or engineers to transfer to another work unit. 
In many cases, talents or specialized training were wasted. Insti- 
tutes that may have had the funds to purchase advanced foreign 
equipment often had no way to hire a Chinese chemist or mathe- 
matician. Not only were China's scientists and engineers in short 
supply, many were underemployed or misemployed. 

The Program 

In March 1985, after extensive discussion, consultation, and 
experimentation, the party Central Committee called for sweeping 
reforms of science management. The reforms proposed in the "Deci- 
sion on the Reform of the Science and Technology Management 
System" represented a major break with past practices, and they 
assumed corresponding reforms in the nation's industrial and eco- 
nomic systems. By changing the method of funding research insti- 
tutes, encouraging the commercialization of technology and the 
development of a technology market, and rewarding individual scien- 
tists, the reforms of the mid-1980s were meant to encourage the appli- 
cation of science to the needs of industry. It was envisaged that most 
research institutes would support themselves through consulting and 
contract work and would cooperate with factories through partner- 
ships, mergers, joint ventures, or other appropriate and mutually 
agreeable means. The ultimate goal was to encourage exchange and 
cooperation and to break down the compartmentalization charac- 
terizing China's research and development structure. 

The principal means for accomplishing the reforms was chang- 
ing the funding system to force research institutes to establish contact 



398 



Science and Technology 



with productive enterprises and to do work directly supporting those 
enterprises. Direct allocation of funds to research institutes was to 
be phased out and replaced by a system under which institutes sold 
their services in the marketplace. The distinctions among institutes 
subordinate to the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the industrial 
ministries, provincial-level governments, colleges and universities, 
and even the NDSTIC were to be minimized, and all were to com- 
pete and collaborate in a single market-oriented system. Institutes 
doing basic research were to compete for grants from a National 
Natural Science Foundation (which was subsequently established). 
The reforms were not intended as a budget-cutting measure, and 
total state funding for science and technology was to be increased. 

A technology market and the commercialization of technology 
in the late 1980s were to be developed to encourage the transfer 
of technology and the transformation of research results into 
products and services. Direct centralized administration and super- 
vision of research were to decline, and institutes were to be headed 
by younger, technically qualified directors, who were to be given 
broad powers to select their own research topics and to seek out 
partners for cooperation and consultation. Scientific personnel were 
to receive better pay and benefits, recognition of their achievements, 
and the right to do supplementary consulting work and to transfer 
to units where their talents could be better utilized. 

The Relation with Economic Reform 

Implementing the reforms of the science and technology system, 
however, presupposed reforms of the economic, industrial, and local 
administrative systems (see Reform of the Economic System, Begin- 
ning in 1979, ch. 5). In general, science and technology reforms 
represented the application to that sector of the principles under- 
lying the sweeping reforms of the economy proposed in the Octo- 
ber 1984 "Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party on Reform of the Economic Structure." Both 
reform "decisions" emphasized greater autonomy for institutions, 
a greater role for the market, more competition, and rewards for 
the successful introduction of improved products and processes. 
In every case, the goal was increased productivity and economic 
benefit. 

The central provisions of the 1980s reform related to funding, 
the technology market and cooperative ventures, and the rights and 
potential job mobility of individual researchers. The intent of the 
reformers was to change the basic conditions of the economic sys- 
tem, so that the self-interest that had pushed managers of factories 
and research institutes toward compartmentalization, duplication, 



399 



China: A Country Study 

and hoarding of resources would henceforth push them toward 
cooperation, division of labor, and orientation toward the needs 
of the market. Because these reforms represented a radical depar- 
ture from the procedures developed since the 1950s, the leader- 
ship anticipated that their implementation would be slow, and it 
planned to phase them in over a number of years. 

Perhaps because of the centrality of funding to the whole reform 
scheme and because the administrative machinery for handling 
budgets was already in place, many concrete provisions for fund- 
ing research were adopted following the March 1985 Central Com- 
mittee decision. In February 1986 the State Council promulgated 
provisional regulations under which science and technology projects 
listed in the annual state economic plan were to be completed as 
contract research, in which there would be nationwide open bid- 
ding on the contracts. Banks were to monitor expenditures under 
the contract. Institutes conducting basic research were to have their 
regular operating expenses guaranteed by the state, but all other 
income would come from competitive research grants. The govern- 
ment was to continue to fund completely the institutes working in 
public health and medicine, family planning, environmental science, 
technical information, meteorology, and agriculture. In 1986 the 
newly established National Natural Science Foundation, explicitly 
modeled on the United States National Science Foundation, dis- 
bursed its first competitive awards, totaling¥95 million (for value 
of the yuan — see Glossary), to 3,432 research projects selected from 
12,000 applications. The amount of money awarded to individual 
projects was not large, but the precedent of competition, disregard 
of administrative boundaries, and expert appraisal of individual 
or small-group proposals was established and widely publicized. 
And, early in 1987, the NDSTIC announced that henceforth 
weapons procurement and military research and development would 
be managed through contracts and competitive bidding. 

Technology Markets and Joint Ventures 

Commercializing technology requires markets, and China in the 
late 1980s had to develop market institutions to handle patents, 
the sale of technology, and consulting contracts. This was a major 
endeavor and one that promised to take many years. Deciding how 
to set prices for technology and how to write and enforce contracts 
for technical consulting proved difficult, largely because of the com- 
plexity of technology markets. Further, China lacked the legal and 
commercial frameworks to support such markets. Nevertheless, 
institutes and factories participated in "technology fairs" and estab- 
lished contractual relations in great numbers, with the total 



400 



The control center at the 
Baoshan iron and steel complex in Shanghai 
Courtesy Xinhua News Agency 

technology trade volume in 1986 reaching an estimated ¥2.3 bil- 
lion. Research institutes and universities formed companies to sell 
technical services and develop products. Even the formerly self- 
contained Chinese Academy of Sciences set up companies to export 
specialty magnets and to develop optical products. 

In the late 1980s, China's technology markets and efforts to com- 
mercialize scientific and technical knowledge were growing rapidly 
amid considerable confusion, ferment, and turmoil. Although pro- 
gressing, the commercialization of technology was proving difficult 
to implement, and, perhaps for this reason, the State Council 
announced in February 1987 that most applied scientific research 
institutes were to be incorporated into large and medium-sized 
productive enterprises to coordinate research with the needs of 
production. The precise form the technology market would even- 
tually take was not clear, but its development had wide support 
and was not likely to be halted or reversed. 

Personnel and Job Mobility 

From one perspective the most important element of China's 
science and technology system is its human capital — its trained 
scientists and engineers. By the 1980s it was widely recognized in 
the Chinese press that scientists, like all intellectuals, had been 



401 



China: A Country Study 

poorly treated, underpaid, and burdened with difficult living con- 
ditions that reduced their productivity. In many cases scientists' 
abilities were wasted because they were assigned to jobs outside 
their expertise or because their institute already had all the profes- 
sionals in their field it needed and there was no way for them to 
change jobs (see Educational Investment, ch. 4). Many Chinese 
science policy writers were familiar with the conclusion of Western 
specialists that scientific progress and the effective application of 
science to practical problems are facilitated by personnel mobility. 
Accordingly, the March 1985 party Central Committee decision 
called for reform of the personnel system to promote a "rational 
flow" of scientific and technical personnel. 

Throughout the late 1980s, however, job mobility and attempts 
to place scientists where their talents could have the greatest effect 
were the aspect of reform in which least was achieved. Transfer 
of scientists from one unit to another remained a major step, and 
a relatively infrequent one. According to the State Science and 
Technology Commission, 2 percent of scientists and engineers 
changed work units in 1983, and only 4 percent in 1985. Person- 
nel still required the permission of their work unit heads to trans- 
fer, and that permission often was withheld. Many directors of 
institutes were accused of having a "feudal mentality," that is, 
regarding personnel as part of their unit's property. 

The State Council reiterated in the mid-1980s that scientists and 
engineers had the right to do consulting work in their spare time. 
In practice, however, such spare-time consulting often created 
problems within the work unit as some institute directors attempted 
to confiscate payments for consulting or even to charge their per- 
sonnel in the local courts with corruption and theft of state property. 
Although the press gave considerable publicity to scientists who 
had left the "iron rice bowl" of a Chinese Academy of Sciences 
institute to start their own business or to join a growing collective 
or rural factory, such resignations remained relatively rare. Possi- 
bly more common were practices whereby institutes detailed their 
personnel on temporary consulting contracts to productive enter- 
prises. 

The difficulties in transferring scientific personnel even when 
the Central Committee and the State Council made it official policy 
demonstrated the significance of China's unique work-unit system 
of employment and economic organization and the obstacles it 
presented to reform. Allowing personnel to decide for themselves 
to move out of the work units to which the state and the party 
assigned them would be a major break with the practices that have 
become institutionalized in China since 1949. Some observers 



402 



Science and Technology 



believe that because of its potential challenge to the authority of 
the party, which controls personnel matters in all work units, job 
mobility for scientists, even though it would promote scientific 
productivity and the growth of the economy, may be too extreme 
a reform to be feasible (see Differentiation, ch. 3). 

Technology Transfer 
Policy 

In the late 1980s, China's goals of modernization and rapid eco- 
nomic growth depended on the large-scale introduction of foreign 
technology. The task was to import technology to renovate and 
upgrade several thousand factories, mines, and power stations whose 
levels of productivity and energy efficiency were far below prevailing 
international standards. Since 1980 Chinese policy statements have 
stressed the need to improve existing facilities, to import technology 
rather than finished goods, and to renovate factories through selec- 
tive purchase of key technology rather than through purchase of 
whole plants. This was an unprecedented problem, since China's 
previous experience with technology transfer, both in the massive 
Soviet technical-aid program of the 1950s and in the more modest 
purchases of fertilizer and petrochemical plants in the 1960s and 
early 1970s, featured large projects that brought in complete plants. 
In the 1980s much of the technology to be imported was produc- 
tion or process technology, representing better ways of producing 
items China already manufactured, such as truck transmissions or 
telephone cables. Such technology was usually the proprietary 
knowledge of foreign corporations, and China demonstrated an 
unprecedented willingness to cooperate with such firms. With the 
explicit aim of promoting technology imports, China made great 
efforts to attract foreign businesses and foreign capital and per- 
mitted joint ventures and even foreign-owned subsidiaries to operate 
in China. 

China's economic planners gave priority in technology imports 
to electronics, telecommunications, electric-power generation and 
transmission, transportation equipment, and energy-saving devices. 
The degree of central control over technology imports fluctuated 
in the 1980s, reflecting changing foreign trade policies and foreign 
exchange balances, but the overall trend was toward devolution 
of decision making to those who use the technology or equipment. 
Bank loans and other means were made available to encourage end 
users to select appropriate technology. 

Modes of Transfer 

The transfer of proprietary technology from a foreign corporation 



403 



China: A Country Study 



is, among other things, a commercial transaction, and such trans- 
actions take many forms. Chinese authorities have selected joint- 
equity ventures as their preferred mode of technology transfer. In 
such ventures, both the foreign and the Chinese partner contrib- 
ute capital, each provides what it has the advantage in (usually tech- 
nology and access to world market for the foreign partner and labor 
and a factory for the Chinese partner), and management and profits 
are split. Many major foreign corporations with technology that 
China desires have been reluctant to risk their capital in such ven- 
tures. But enough have agreed to produce such items as jet airliners, 
computers, and machine tools that Chinese authorities can claim 
success for their policy. 

Linking Technology and Economics 

As they have accumulated experience in dealing with foreign cor- 
porations, Chinese economic administrators and enterprise 
managers have become better able to negotiate contracts that, while 
not full joint ventures, still permit the necessary training and con- 
sultation in the use of foreign technology. By the late 1980s, the 
transfer of foreign technology had become a normal commercial 
transaction. To an increasing extent, policy and practices for tech- 
nology transfer were becoming part of general economic and for- 
eign trade policies. China faced problems in assimilating technology 
in the factories that imported it and in deciding which foreign tech- 
nologies to import. It was becoming clear to Chinese planners and 
foreign suppliers of technology that these problems reflected over- 
all deficiencies in technical and management skills and that they 
were general economic and management problems. The solution 
to these problems was increasingly seen by Chinese administra- 
tors as lying in reforms of the economy and industrial manage- 
ment. The effort to import and assimilate foreign technology thus 
served to help unify technology policy and economic policy and 
to overcome the problems of the separation of science, technology, 
and the economy, which China's leaders had been trying to solve 
since the early 1950s. 

* * * 

Because of the continuity of the issues affecting China's science 
and technology, many of the studies carried out in the early 1960s 
are still useful. Among these are Leo A. Orleans' Professional Man- 
power and Education in Communist China, Wu Yuan-li and Robert 
B. Sheeks' The Organization and Support of Scientific Research and Devel- 
opment in Mainland China, and Cheng Chu-yuan's Scientific and 



404 



Science and Technology 



Engineering Manpower in Communist China, 1949-1963 . Richard P. 
Suttmeier's 1974 Research and Revolution: Science Policy and Societal 
Change in China sets out most of the basic policy choices for science 
in China. Articles by Suttmeier and Denis Fred Simon cover most 
aspects of current science policy. Science in Contemporary China, edited 
by Orleans, assesses the state of science in China as of 1980. Rudi 
Volti's Technology, Politics, and Society in China and K.C. Yeh's 
Industrial Innovation in China with Special Reference to the Metallurgical 
Industry provide good overviews of China's science and technology 
system. Current news of policies and achievements in science and 
technology is available in such Chinese sources as Beijing Review, 
China Daily, and China Exchange News. Chinese reports and discus- 
sions of science and technology policy are translated and published 
in the Joint Publications Research Service's China Report: Science 
and Technology . (For further information and complete citations, see 
Bibliography.) 



405 



Chapter 10. Party and Government 



Representation of a terra-cotta figure of a Qin dynasty (221-207 B. C.) general. 
The figure near the tomb of the first Qin emperor, Shi Huangdi, near present- 
day Xi 'an, Shaanxi Province. 



THE THIRD PLENUM of the Central Committee of the Eleventh 
National Party Congress, held in December 1978, marked a major 
turning point in China's development. The course was laid for the 
party to move the world's most populous nation toward the ambi- 
tious targets of the Four Modernizations. After a decade of tur- 
moil brought about by the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), the new 
direction set at this meeting was toward economic development and 
away from class struggle. The plenum endorsed major changes in 
the political, economic, and social system. It also instituted sweeping 
personnel changes, culminating in the elevation of two key sup- 
porters of Deng Xiaoping and the reform program, Hu Yaobang 
and Zhao Ziyang, to the posts of general secretary of the party (Sep- 
tember 1982) and premier of the State Council (September 1980), 
respectively. In January 1987 Hu Yaobang lost the position of 
general secretary when he failed to control violent student demon- 
strations. Zhao Ziyang became acting general secretary, in addi- 
tion to serving as premier, pending confirmation by the Thirteenth 
National Party Congress, scheduled for October 1987. 

Under the new and pragmatic leadership, the modernization pro- 
gram, slated to be well established by the year 2000, was to engage 
the energies and talents of the entire population in reaching the 
reform goals. But unlike in the past, acceptable class background 
was not to play a role in selecting and promoting participants for 
the national program. Intellectuals or those with advanced educa- 
tion were no longer negatively categorized. Class consciousness was 
being replaced by one that fostered initiative and encouraged each 
person to contribute according to his or her ability. 

An initial challenge facing the reform leadership was to provide 
for a rational and efficient governing system to support economic 
development. In pursuit of that goal, the cult of personality sur- 
rounding Mao Zedong was unequivocally condemned and replaced 
by a strong emphasis on collective leadership. An example of this 
new emphasis was the party's restoration in February 1980 of its 
Secretariat, which had been suspended since 1966. The new party 
and state constitutions, both adopted in 1982, provided the institu- 
tional framework for the Four Modernizations program. These 
documents abolished the post of party chairman and restored the 
post of president of the People's Republic of China, thereby giv- 
ing additional weight to government functions and providing a 
degree of balance to the authoritative party structure. Also, the 



409 



China: A Country Study 



government's role was broadened by the addition of standing com- 
mittees and direct elections at subnational levels of the government's 
presiding body, the National People's Congress. 

The political structure in 1987 seemed to represent consensus 
and continuity, but it continued to undergo the test of accommo- 
dation and a process of trial and error. The experimental approach 
was rooted in official recognition that the party and the govern- 
ment had to remain self-critical and responsive if they were to ful- 
fill the expectations that the reform leaders had raised since 1978 
of solving old problems and meeting new challenges. Some of the 
most sweeping changes concerned the party and government cadre 
system that was essential to the implementation and performance 
of the reform program. Manned by about 14 million cadres, the 
system was acknowledged officially to be overstaffed and sluggish. 
The drive to weed out tens of thousands of aged, inactive, and 
incompetent cadres was intensified. Even more revolutionary, the 
life tenure system for state and party cadres was abolished, and 
age limits for various offices were established. While removing 
superfluous personnel, the reform leaders stressed the importance 
of creating a "third echelon" of younger leadership to enter respon- 
sible positions and be trained for future authority. Between 1978 
and 1987, some 470,000 younger officials reportedly were promoted 
to responsible positions. 

The theoretical basis of the political system continued to be 
Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought (which combined bor- 
rowings from Soviet ideology with Mao's theoretical writings), but 
with an unmistakable emphasis on the application of this doctrine 
to achieve desired results. The test of a reform was no longer how 
closely it reflected hallowed quotations or ideas — although reforms 
continued to be couched in proper doctrinal arguments — but 
whether or not it produced demonstrable benefits to the reform 
program. The banner slogan of the reform agenda was "socialism 
with Chinese characteristics." This slogan implied that consider- 
able leeway would be allowed in doctrinal matters in order to achieve 
the overriding goal of rapid modernization. But reform leaders real- 
ized that successful implementation of the broad-ranging reform 
program required a stable, professional bureaucracy to direct the 
course of events. The course chosen included a more rational divi- 
sion of powers and functions for th. party and government, and 
it provided a body of regulations and procedures to support the 
separation. Institutions were set up to maintain discipline and to 
audit bureaucratic records. In December 1986 the Standing Com- 
mittee of the National People's Congress established the Ministry 
of Supervision to oversee the work of the government cadre. Of 



410 



Party and Government 



course, the primacy of the party over all other sociopolitical insti- 
tutions was an unchanging fact of political life. 

Another recognized requirement for a successful reform program 
was the decentralization of authority, including a greater voice and 
degree of accountability for local bodies in the formulation and 
implementation of programs and policies. In the 1980s government 
leaders instituted experimental programs at all levels to achieve 
this end. The party, wielding poetical power and having close access 
to reform leaders, appeared to act increasingly in an advisory role, 
guiding events in accordance with its own general policy and serving 
as an intermediary between government officials and front-line 
producers, for example, departmental administrators and enterprise 
managers. The role of the party was still being defined, but it 
appeared less focused on dictating the specific course of events. 

Chinese Communist Party 
Party Constitution 

The party constitution adopted in September 1982 at the Twelfth 
National Party Congress clearly defines the powers and functions 
of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and it assigns the party 
a pivotal role in guiding national efforts toward a communist social 
system. Although the party constitution sets legal limits on CCP 
activities, the party's role in areas of political, ideological, and 
organizational leadership is authoritative and unquestioned. 

The organizational principle that drives the Chinese political sys- 
tem is democratic centralism. Within the system, the democratic 
feature demands participation and expression of opinion on key 
policy issues from members at all levels of party organization. It 
depends on a constant process of consultation and investigation. 
At the same time, the centralist feature requires that subordinate 
organizational levels follow the dictates of superior levels. Once 
the debate has reached the highest level and decisions concerning 
policy have been made, all party members are obliged to support 
the Central Committee. 

In the party constitution, and in other major policy statements, 
the CCP diminished the role of centralism by abolishing the post 
of party chairman, by prohibiting any future cult of personality, 
and by emphasizing the importance of collective leadership. Most 
of the aged revolutionary veterans who had worked for years under 
the highly centralized party organization dominated by Mao Zedong 
were made honorary advisers, elected to the Central Advisory Com- 
mission initiated at the Twelfth Congress. Although their prestige 
remained intact, these leaders were effectively removed from direct 



411 



China: A Country Study 



participation in the policy-making process. This development per- 
mitted their replacement by younger leaders more supportive of 
the Four Modernizations (see Glossary). In addition, the new party 
constitution emphasized the party's role in promoting socialist 
democracy, in developing and strengthening a socialist legal sys- 
tem, and in consolidating public resolve to carry out the moderni- 
zation program. 

The priorities expounded at the Twelfth National Party Con- 
gress were designed not only to improve the organizational cohe- 
sion and morale of the party and government but also to hasten 
prosperity and foster national power. The congress endorsed 
programs from the Eleventh National Party Congress that stressed 
stability and unity, balance between ideology and technical skill, 
collective rather than individual leadership, party discipline, training 
of successors at all levels of party organization, and a more relaxed 
climate for intraparty debate on major national and local issues. 
The economic policies of the Twelfth National Party Congress con- 
tinued to be oriented toward growth, but the party's subsequent 
direction emphasized a more controlled growth program. 

National Party Congresses 

The National Party Congress is in theory the highest body of 
the CCP. (It should be distinguished from the National People's 
Congress, China's highest legislative body — see The National Peo- 
ple's Congress, this ch.) After its ascent to power in 1949, the party 
held no congress until 1956. This was the eighth congress since 
the party's founding in 1921 ; (see table 1 , Appendix B). The Ninth 
National Party Congress convened in April 1969, the tenth in 
August 1973, the eleventh in August 1977, and the twelfth in Sep- 
tember 1982. The Thirteenth National Party Congress was sched- 
uled for October 1987. The National Party Congress reviews reports 
on party activities since the last session, revises the party constitu- 
tion, ratifies the party program for a specific period, and elects the 
Central Committee, which serves as the highest organ of the CCP 
when the National Party Congress is not in session. The congress 
has, however, neither the independence to generate legislative bills 
nor the effective power to check and balance the party and govern- 
ment bureaucracies. Although limited in its role — in effect it is a 
pro forma approval body — the National Party Congress performs 
a useful function as a forum for rising party cadres who represent 
all regions, ethnic groups, and functional groups. The delegates 
(there were 1,545 for the Twelfth National Party Congress) can 
observe firsthand the working of the party machine at the national 
level, gain a better perspective on the direction of political 



412 



Party and Government 



transformation planned by the leadership, and serve as communi- 
cators of party policies to the grass roots. Further, delegates can 
provide the top party leadership a sense of the response and progress 
made concerning key party programs in their home districts. 

Central Committee and Political Bureau 

Political power is formally vested in the much smaller CCP Cen- 
tral Committee and the other central organs answerable directly 
to this committee. The Central Committee is elected by the National 
Party Congress and is identified by the number of the National 
Party Congress that elected it. Central Committee meetings are 
known as plenums (or plenary sessions), and each plenum of a new 
Central Committee is numbered sequentially. Plenums are to be 
held at least annually. In addition, there are partial, informal, and 
enlarged meetings of Central Committee members where often key 
policies are formulated and then confirmed by a plenum. For 
example, the "Communique of the Third Plenum of the Eleventh 
Central Committee" (December 1978), which established the 
party's commitment to economic modernization, resulted from a 
month-long working meeting that preceded the Third Plenum. 

The Central Committee's large size and infrequent meetings 
make it necessary for the Central Committee to direct its work 
through its smaller elite bodies — the Political Bureau and the even 
more select Political Bureau's Standing Committee — both of which 
the Central Committee elects. The Twelfth Central Committee con- 
sisted of 210 full members and 138 alternate members. The Politi- 
cal Bureau had twenty-three members and three alternate members. 
The Standing Committee — the innermost circle of power — had six 
members who were placed in the most important party and govern- 
ment posts. These six leaders were Hu Yaobang (who was demoted 
from party general secretary in January 1987), Ye Jianying (who 
died in October 1986, a year after resigning his Standing Com- 
mittee post), Deng Xiaoping, Zhao Ziyang (who was named act- 
ing general secretary in January 1987), Li Xiannian, and Chen 
Yun. 

The leadership was altered significantly at a special conference 
of delegates called the National Conference 6f Party Delegates, held 
September 18-23, 1985. The conference was convened on the 
authority of Article 12 of the 1982 party constitution, which pro- 
vides for holding conferences of delegates between full congresses. 
These national conferences of delegates appear to be more authorita- 
tive than regular plenums. The conference was attended by 992 
delegates, and it elected 56 new full members and 35 new alter- 
nate members to the Central Committee, while accepting the 



413 



China: A Country Study 



NATIONAL PARTY 
CONGRESS 



CENTRAL ADVISORY 
COMMISSION 



CENTRAL COMMISSION FOR 
DISCIPLINE INSPECTION 



CENTRAL COMMITTEE 



MEMBERS 
ALTERNATE MEMBERS 



CENTRAL MILITARY 
COMMISSION 



POLITICAL BUREAU 



STANDING COMMITTEE 

MEMBERS 
ALTERNATE MEMBERS 



PEOPLE'S LIBERATION 

ARMY GENERAL 
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT 



POLICY DIRECTION 



POLICY RESEARCH 
OFFICE 



SECRETARIAT 



GENERAL SECRETARY 
SECRETARIES 



RURAL POLICY 
RESEARCH CENTER 



DAY TO DAY SUPERVISION 



BUREAU FOR TRANSLATING 

THE WORKS OF MARX, 
ENGELS, LENIN, AND STALIN 



CENTRAL COMMISSION 

FOR GUIDING 
PARTY CONSOLIDATION 



CENTRAL FIVE STRESSES, 

FOUR BEAUTIES, AND 
THREE LOVES COMMISSION 

CENTRAL PATRIOTIC 
PUBLIC HEALTH 
CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE 

COMMISSION FOR 
COLLECTING PARTY 
HISTORICAL DATA 



COMPILATION AND 
TRANSLATION BUREAU 



GENERAL OFFICE 



INFORMATION AND 
MEDIA AGENCIES 
GUANGMING DAILY 
PEOPLE'S DAILY 
(RENMIN RIBAO) 
RED FLAG (HONGQI) 



INTERNATIONAL 
LIAISON DEPARTMENT 



LEADING GROUP FOR 
EDUCATION OF CADRES 



LEADING GROUP FOR 
EDUCATIONAL REFORM 



ORGANIZATION 
DEPARTMENT 



PARTY COMMITTEE FOR 
CENTRAL ORGANS 



PARTY HISTORY 
RESEARCH CENTER 



PARTY SCHOOL 



POLITICAL AND LEGAL 
COMMISSION 



PROPAGANDA 
DEPARTMENT 



UNITED FRONT WORK 
DEPARTMENT 



PROVINCIAL, MUNICIPAL, 
AND LOCAL PARTY 
COMMITTEES 



Figure 18. Organization of the Chinese Communist Party, 1987 



414 



Party and Government 



resignations of 65 full and alternate members, including Ye Jianying 
and nine other senior Political Bureau members. The Fifth Ple- 
num, which immediately followed the conference, elected six new 
members to the Political Bureau, dropped three from the party 
Secretariat, and added five new members to the latter body. The 
conference thus produced a sizable turnover in the senior party 
leadership and in a direction very favorable to Deng's reform pro- 
gram. Younger and better educated leaders who supported Deng's 
reforms replaced aging and long-inactive leaders. The other major 
accomplishment of the conference was its adoption of the "Proposal 
on the Seventh Five-Year Plan" (1986-90), the framework for 
developing the actual plan adopted at the Sixth National People's 
Congress in 1986 (see Reform of the Economic System, Beginning 
in 1979, ch. 5). 

Secretariat 

The day-to-day work of the CCP is carried out by the Secre- 
tariat and its various departments — all placed under the direction 
of the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee (see fig. 18). 
Headed by Hu Yaobang until January 1987, the Secretariat (sus- 
pended in 1966) was reestablished in February 1980 as the adminis- 
trative center of the party apparatus, or, more aptly, as the party's 
inner cabinet. The Secretariat and its general secretary are elected 
by the CCP Central Committee. In early 1987 seven of the eleven 
members of the Secretariat held concurrent positions on the Politi- 
cal Bureau. This overlap in responsibilities permitted reform leaders 
to exercise greater control than in the past over policy implemen- 
tation. In the same way, Secretariat members sitting on the Politi- 
cal Bureau have acquired a role in party policy making. The 
Secretariat evidently is used as a proving ground for successors to 
senior party leaders. 

Central Military Commission 

The CCP's Central Military Commission is also elected by the 
Central Committee and exercises authority over the military 
through the General Political Department of the People's Libera- 
tion Army (PLA). Since 1982 the party Central Military Commis- 
sion has had a counterpart organization in the state Central Military 
Commission (see The National People's Congress, this ch.). In fact, 
the leadership of both bodies is identical. Nevertheless, because 
the party Central Military Commission reports directly to the 
powerful Central Committee, it is the authoritative body in mat- 
ters of military policy (see Military Organization, ch. 14). 



415 



China: A Country Study 



Other Party Organs 

Another body, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspec- 
tion, is chartered to monitor the implementation of party policy 
and to handle disciplinary matters regarding party organizations 
and members. The Central Advisory Commission was established 
by the 1982 Party Constitution to facilitate the transfer of power 
from the Long March (see Glossary) generation to younger and 
better educated successors. This body has consultative rather than 
decision-making powers. Its chairman is an ex-officio member of 
the Political Bureau's Standing Committee. Deng Xiaoping was 
made the first chairman of this body, both to lend it prestige and 
to encourage older leaders to retire. 

Below the central level, party committees and congresses were 
formed in the twenty-one provinces, five autonomous regions, and 
three special municipalities directly under the central government. 
Taiwan was listed as a province but, of course, was not under 
China's administration. The party also was represented in vari- 
ous county subdivisions (which included the prefectures) and within 
the PLA from regional headquarters down to regimental level (see 
Military Organization, ch. 14). At the bottom of the party hierarchy 
were three kinds of basic organizations: general party branches, 
primary party committees, and party branches. These were set up 
in factories, shops, schools, offices, neighborhoods, PLA compa- 
nies, and other places, depending on local circumstances and sub- 
ject to approval by the appropriate party committees. 

Party committees at the provincial level are elected by the 
provincial-level congresses that convene every five years and have 
as additional functions the election of a discipline inspection com- 
mission, advisory commissions, and delegates to the National Party 
Congress. The county-level party congress convenes every three 
years and elects a committee, standing committee, and secretary. 
Below the county and PLA regimental levels, the general branch 
committee meets twice a year and is elected for a two-year term. 
The party branch, or lowest level of party organization, meets four 
times a year and elects a branch committee for a two-year term. 
Every party member must be a member of a branch committee. 
Party branch committees and their members at the grass-roots level 
are the backbone of the party organization. This is also the level 
where admission and expulsion of party members takes place. 
Branch members exchange views on issues, become thoroughly 
informed concerning party goals and policies, and learn to accept 
party discipline. 



416 



Party and Government 



Membership 

In 1987 the CCP had 46 million members (4.3 percent of the 
national population). To qualify as party members, applicants must 
be at least eighteen years of age and must go through a one-year 
probationary period. Emphasis is placed on the applicant's tech- 
nical and educational qualifications rather than on ideological 
criteria. Members are expected, however, to be both "red" and 
"expert" (see Glossary), and the need to make the party appara- 
tus more responsive to the demands and wishes of the masses of 
the people is stressed. 

A major corollary of the self-improvement and self-cleansing 
activities is an ongoing campaign to weed out corrupt and dishonest 
party officials from all levels of the party organizations. Ideally this 
is accomplished by persuasion, but if necessary by punishment. 
The party's seriousness concerning this campaign was underlined 
with its September 1986 expulsion of the governor and party deputy 
secretary of Jiangxi Province for "violations of law and discipline" 
and "unhealthy tendencies" that purportedly included corruption, 
moral degeneration, abuse of official power, intercession in favor 
of relatives and friends, leaking of secret information, and many 
other charges. 

Significantly, the party also experimented with the direct elec- 
tion of its party committee members. In late 1984 Hu Yaobang 
prescribed election procedures for direct election under a limited 
franchise of the Shaanxi Province party secretary. This election 
process included involvement of a large number of cadres down 
to the county level, open nominations, and a series of runoff elec- 
tions, reportedly with no interference from either the central party 
Secretariat or the provincial party committee. In addition, party 
election procedures required that the number of candidates be 
greater than the number of persons to be elected. 

In 1987 efforts to upgrade organizational effectiveness, unity, 
and discipline were proceeding in accordance with a document 
adopted in September 1986 by the Sixth Plenum of the Twelfth 
Central Committee. The "Resolution of the Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of China on the Guiding Principles for 
Building a Socialist Society with an Advanced Culture and Ideol- 
ogy" shifted attention away from the controversial issue of 
"unhealthy tendencies" in the party to focus on the need for aca- 
demic freedom, mass supervision of the party, and other aspects 
of political reform. The stated goal was to build a truly communist 
society, but one defined authoritatively as "socialism with Chinese 
characteristics." Party energies and discipline were to be directed 



417 



China: A Country Study 



at achieving this goal and removing all obstructions and obstruc- 
tionists. Thus, while earlier the party had identified corruption as 
a prime target, this concern was replaced with attention to "indige- 
nous feudal tendencies" that might hinder success in economic 
modernization (see The Third Wave of Reform, Beginning in 1986, 
ch. 11). The plenum endorsed the party's commitment to politi- 
cal reform and the extension of "socialist democracy and improv- 
ing the socialist legal system, all for the purpose of facilitating 
socialist modernization." 

Mass Organizations 

In its efforts toward enlisting broad popular support and involve- 
ment, the CCP in 1987 continued to rely on mass organizations, 
"democratic parties" (see Glossary), and professional organiza- 
tions. These organizations, affiliated directly and indirectly with 
the CCP, were without exception headed by and permeated with 
party cadres. As secondary or auxiliary vehicles for the party's 
"mass line," the organizations constituted a united front of sup- 
port for the party line and policies and conveyed the impression 
desired by the party that the broad strata of the population endorsed 
and was unified behind the communist leadership. Moreover, mass 
organizations were used as a means to penetrate the society at large, 
encourage popular participation, mobilize the masses, and inte- 
grate them into party-directed political life. 

Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference 

The activities of the mass organizations in theory are represented 
by the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) 
but in actuality are directed by the United Front Work Depart- 
ment of the Central Committee. The CPPCC has national and 
local committees and is composed of a variety of groups and indi- 
viduals: the Chinese Communist Party, the "eight democratic par- 
ties"; mass organizations, including the All-China Federation of 
Trade Unions, Communist Youth League, All-China Women's 
Federation, and All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce; 
minorities; compatriots from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan; 
overseas Chinese (see Glossary); and outstanding scientists, edu- 
cators, cultural figures, journalists, and medical professionals. In 
June 1983 the Sixth CPPCC held its first session, which was 
attended by 2,039 delegates, including representatives from the 
Chinese Communist Party (technically a member of the united front 
associated with the CPPCC). CPPCC national sessions usually are 
held in conjunction with the session of the National People's Con- 
gress. The CPPCC has as its basic functions providing political 



418 



China's party and state leaders in 1985: from left to right, 
Hu Yaobang, Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian, Zhao Ziyang, 

Deng Yingchao, and Peng Zhen 
Courtesy Xinhua News Agency 

consultancy on major state policies and encouraging a united front 
of patriotic intellectuals to contribute to modernization. The 
CPPCC is an important symbol of multiparty cooperation in Chi- 
na's modernization programs, and reform leaders have increas- 
ingly emphasized its role. 

Democratic Parties 

The eight "democratic parties" have existed since before 1950. 
They include the Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Guo- 
mindang, founded in 1948 by dissident members of the mainstream 
Guomindang then under control of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek; 
China Democratic League, begun in 1941 by intellectuals in edu- 
cation and the arts; China Democratic National Construction 
Association, formed in 1945 by educators and national capitalists 
(industrialists and business people); China Association for Promot- 
ing Democracy, started in 1945 by intellectuals in cultural, educa- 
tion (primary and secondary schools), and publishing circles; 
Chinese Peasants' and Workers' Democratic Party, originated in 
1930 by intellectuals in medicine, the arts, and education; China 
Zhi Gong Dang (Party for Public Interest), founded in 1925 to 
attract the support of overseas Chinese; Jiusan (September Third) 



419 



China: A Country Study 

Society, founded in 1945 by a group of college professors and scien- 
tists to commemorate the victory of the "international war against 
fascism"; and Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League, cre- 
ated in 1947 by "patriotic supporters of democracy who originated 
in Taiwan and now reside on the mainland." 

Trade Unions 

The most prominent mass organizations were given key respon- 
sibility for supporting and implementing the reform program. CCP 
Secretariat member Hao Jianxiu, speaking to an executive meet- 
ing of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, said that "as 
mass organizations of the working class, trade unions should stand 
at the forefront of the ongoing economic reform in China. They 
should blaze a new trail with distinct Chinese characteristics for 
conducting trade union activities." Specifically, Federation organi- 
zations were to aid members in acquiring modern scientific 
knowledge and technological skill. Within the membership and its 
affiliated organizations, intellectuals were to be protected and con- 
sidered as members of the working class. Workers acquired the 
right to examine and discuss their factory director's principles, 
management plans, reform programs, budgets, and accounts. They 
also had the right to vote and to supervise and appraise leaders 
at all organizational levels. The workers' congress, held twice a 
year, was the organization empowered to exercise those rights. The 
regular organization that managed the daily affairs was the trade 
union body. These liberalizing changes were designed to improve 
workers' morale and thereby their productivity. 

Communist Youth League 

The Communist Youth League, the other primary communist 
organization, functioned as an all-purpose school for party mem- 
bers. Except for its top-ranking officials, the league's members, 
from fifteen to twenty-five years of age, were indoctrinated, trained, 
and prepared to serve as future party regulars. The league was 
organized on the party pattern. Its leader (in 1987 Song Defu) was 
identified as first secretary and member of the party's Central Com- 
mittee. The Communist Youth League's eleventh congress, held 
in December 1982, was attended by about 2,000 delegates. The 
congress elected a central committee of 263 members and 51 alter- 
nate members. In 1987 the league included 52 million members 
attached to 2.3 million branches. They were required to carry out 
party policies, respect party discipline, and act as a "shock force 
and as a bridge linking the party with the broad masses of young 
people." Since 1984 the league's leadership has increased ties with 



420 



Party and Government 



youth organizations worldwide through friendly exehanges and 
cooperation. The Communist Youth League was responsible also 
for guiding the activities of the Young Pioneers (for children below 
the age of fifteen). 

Women, Artists, Students, and Others 

Among the other CPPCC groups, the All-China Women's Fed- 
eration enlisted women in the party's effort to spread ideological 
awareness and to raise educational and technical levels. It also pro- 
tected women's rights, promoted their welfare, and assisted them 
in family planning. The All-China Federation of Literary and Art 
Circles was guided by the principle "Let a hundred flowers bloom, 
let the hundred schools of thought contend," but with the strin- 
gent official qualification that all works must conform to the four 
cardinal principles (socialism, dictatorship of the proletariat, sup- 
porting the party leadership, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong 
Thought). The All-China Federation of Youth was designed as a 
patriotic united front, with the Communist Youth League as its 
"nucleus." An affiliated youth organization was the All-China Stu- 
dents' Federation for university and college students. The All-China 
Federation of Industry and Commerce took part in modernization 
efforts, offering consultant services in sciences and economics, train- 
ing teachers and business managers, and running schools. The 
Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Coun- 
tries was responsible for promoting friendly relations and mutual 
understanding on nongovernmental levels through foreign contacts 
and cultural exchanges. In 1985 the association had connections 
with more than 150 foreign countries. There were also several 
politically active groups among Chinese adherents of Buddhism, 
Islam, Taoism, and Christianity. 

The Government 

Constitutional Framework 

The formal structure of government in 1987 was based on the 
State Constitution adopted on December 4, 1982, by the National 
People's Congress (NPC), China's highest legislative body. Three 
previous state constitutions — those of 1954, 1975, and 1978 — had 
been superseded in turn. The 1982 document reflects Deng Xiao- 
ping's determination to lay a lasting institutional foundation for 
domestic stability and modernization. The new State Constitution 
provides a legal basis for the broad changes in China's social and 
economic institutions and significantly revises government struc- 
ture and procedures. 



421 



China: A Country Study 



The 1982 State Constitution is a lengthy, hybrid document with 
138 articles. Large sections were adapted directly from the 1978 
constitution, but many of its changes derive from the 1954 consti- 
tution. Specifically, the new Constitution deemphasizes class strug- 
gle and places top priority on development and on incorporating 
the contributions and interests of nonparty groups that can play 
a central role in modernization. Accordingly, Article 1 of the State 
Constitution describes China as a "people's democratic dictator- 
ship," meaning that the system is based on an alliance of the work- 
ing classes — in communist terminology, the workers and 
peasants — and is led by the Communist Party, the vanguard of 
the working class. Elsewhere, the Constitution provides for a 
renewed and vital role for the groups that make up that basic 
alliance — the CPPCC, democratic parties, and mass organizations. 
The 1982 Constitution expunges almost all of the rhetoric associated 
with the Cultural Revolution (see Glossary) incorporated in the 
1978 version. In fact, the Constitution omits all references to the 
Cultural Revolution and restates Mao Zedong's contributions in 
accordance with a major historical reassessment produced in June 
1981 at the Sixth Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee, the 
"Resolution on Some Historical Issues of the Party since the Found- 
ing of the People's Republic." 

There also is emphasis throughout the 1982 State Constitution 
on socialist law as a regulator of political behavior. Thus, the rights 
and obligations of citizens are set out in detail far exceeding that 
provided in the 1978 constitution. Probably because of the excesses 
that filled the years of the Cultural Revolution, the 1982 Consti- 
tution gives even greater attention to clarifying citizens' "fundamen- 
tal rights and duties" than the 1954 constitution did. The right 
to vote and to run for election begins at the age of eighteen except 
for those disenfranchised by law. The Constitution guarantees the 
freedom of religious worship as well as the "freedom not to believe 
in an\^ religion" and affirms that "religious bodies and religious 
affairs are not subject to any foreign domination." 

Article 35 of the 1982 State Constitution proclaims that "citizens 
of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the 
press, of assembly, of association, of procession, and of demon- 
stration." In the 1978 constitution, these rights were guaranteed, 
but so were the right to strike and the "four big rights, ' " often called 
the "four bigs": to speak out freely, air views fully, hold great 
debates, and write big-character posters. In February 1980. fol- 
lowing the Democracy Wall period (see Glossary), the four bigs 
were abolished in response to a party decision ratified bv the 
National People's Congress. The right to strike was also dropped 



422 



Gate to Zhongnanhai, seat of the 
Chinese Communist Party and the State Council, Beijing 

Courtesy Robert L. Worden 

from the 1982 Constitution. The widespread expression of the four 
big rights during the student protests of late 1986 elicited the 
regime's strong censure because of their illegality. The official 
response cited Article 53 of the 1982 Constitution, which states that 
citizens must abide by the law and observe labor discipline and 
public order. Besides being illegal, practicing the four big rights 
offered the possibility of straying into criticism of the CCP, which 
was in fact what appeared in student wall posters. In a new era 
that strove for political stability and economic development, party 
leaders considered the four big rights politically destabilizing. 

The new State Constitution is also more specific about the respon- 
sibilities and functions of offices and organs in the state structure. 
There are clear admonitions against familiar Chinese practices that 
the reformers have labeled abuses, such as concentrating power 
in the hands of a few leaders and permitting lifelong tenure in leader- 
ship positions. In addition, the 1982 Constitution provides an 
extensive legal framework for the liberalizing economic policies of 
the 1980s. It allows the collective economic sector not owned by 
the state a broader role and provides for limited private economic 
activity. Members of the expanded rural collectives have the right 
"to farm private plots, engage in household sideline production, 
and raise privately owned livestock." The primary emphasis is 



423 



China: A Country Study 



given to expanding the national economy, which is to be accom- 
plished by balancing centralized economic planning with sup- 
plementary regulation by the market. 

Another key difference between the 1978 and 1982 state constitu- 
tions is the latter' s approach to outside help for the modernization 
program. Whereas the 1978 constitution stressed "self-reliance" 
in modernization efforts, the 1982 document provides the constitu- 
tional basis for the considerable body of laws passed by the NPC 
in subsequent years permitting and encouraging extensive foreign 
participation in all aspects of the economy. In addition, the 1982 
document reflects the more flexible and less ideological orienta- 
tion of foreign policy since 1978. Such phrases as "proletarian 
internationalism" and "social imperialism" have been dropped. 

The National People's Congress 

In the mid-1980s the NPC acquired heightened prominence. The 
NPC is defined in the 1982 Constitution as "the highest organ of 
state power" without being identified, as it was in the 1975 state 
constitution, as "under the leadership of the Communist Party of 
China." In addition, the Constitution states that "all power in the 
People's Republic of China belongs to the people." Although the 
preamble makes clear that the nation operates "under the leader- 
ship of the Communist Party of China and the guidance of 
Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought," the trend has been 
to enhance the role of the NPC. 

The major functions of the NPC are to amend the state consti- 
tution and enact laws; to supervise the enforcement of the state 
constitution and the law; to elect the president and the vice presi- 
dent of the republic; to decide on the choice of premier of the State 
Council upon nomination by the president; to elect the major offi- 
cials of government; to elect the chairman and other members of 
the state Central Military Commission; to elect the president of 
the Supreme People's Court and the procurator-general of the 
Supreme People's Procuratorate; to examine and approve the 
national economic plan, the state budget, and the final state 
accounts; to decide on questions of war and peace; and to approve 
the establishment of special administrative regions and the "sys- 
tems to be instituted there." 

The NPC may also remove key government leaders, including 
the president and vice president and members of the State Coun- 
cil and state Central Military Commission. The 1982 State Con- 
stitution established the state Central Military Commission as the 
key governmental body charged with "directing the armed forces." 
While the party Central Military Commission provided the political 



424 



Party and Government 



direction for military policy making, the state Central Military 
Commission oversaw key military personnel appointments, man- 
aged PLA financial and material resources, developed regulations, 
and implemented statutes to provide a more rational and profes- 
sional organizational basis for the PLA. The chairman of the state 
Central Military Commission — in a departure from earlier prac- 
tices that put either the state president or the party chairman in 
command — was designated as the commander-in-chief of the armed 
forces. 

The 3,000 members of the NPC meet once a year and serve 
5-year terms. Delegates are elected by the people's congresses at 
the provincial level as well as by the PLA. Provincial delegations 
meet before each NPC session to discuss agenda items. There were 
2,977 deputies at the First Session of the Sixth National People's 
Congress held from June 6 to 21, 1983. Because of the infrequent 
meetings, the NPC functions through a permanent body, the Stand- 
ing Committee, whose members it elects (155 members in 1983). 
The Standing Committee's powers were enhanced in 1987 when 
it was given the ability to "enact and amend laws with the excep- 
tion of those which should be enacted by the NPC," thus giving 
this body legislative powers. The Standing Committee presides over 
sessions of the NPC and determines the agenda, the routing of legis- 
lation, and nominations for offices. The NPC also has six perma- 
nent committees: one each for minorities, law, finance, foreign 
affairs, and overseas Chinese and one for education, science, cul- 
ture, and health. Leaders of the NPC Standing Committee are 
invariably influential members of the CCP and leaders of major 
mass organizations. The Standing Committee has within it a smaller 
group that is led by the chairman of the Standing Committee (in 
1987 Peng Zhen) and in 1987 included the vice chairmen and the 
secretary of the Standing Committee, comprising a total of twenty- 
one members. 

In addition to the NPC's formal function, the Standing Com- 
mittee is responsible, among other things, for conducting the elec- 
tion of NPC delegates; interpreting the State Constitution and laws; 
supervising the work of the executive, the state Central Military 
Commission, and judicial organs; deciding on the appointment and 
removal of State Council members on the recommendation of the 
premier; approving and removing senior judicial and diplomatic 
officials; ruling on the ratification and abrogation of treaties; and 
deciding on the proclamation of a state of war when the NPC is 
not in session. 

Although in 1987 the NPC played a greater role than in earlier 
years, it did not determine the political course of the country. This 



425 



China: A Country Study 

remained the function of the CCP. Rather, the NPC played a con- 
sultative role. Another of its major funetions was to serve as a sym- 
bol of the Communist regime's legitimacy and popular base. But 
with the emphasis in the mid-1980s on strengthening the democratic 
aspects of democratic centralism, the NPC may assume even more 
importance in decision making. 

The State Council 

In 1987 the top executive apparatus of the government was the 
State Council, the equivalent of the cabinet or council of ministers 
in many other countries (see fig. 19). Although formally responsi- 
ble to the NPC and its Standing Committee in conducting a wide 
range of government functions both at the national and at the local 
levels, the State Council was responsive mainly to the CCP Secre- 
tariat, under the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee. This 
orientation was dictated by the fact that the senior members of the 
State Council were concurrently influential party leaders — a tie that 
has facilitated the party's centralized control over the state appara- 
tus. It also tended to obscure distinctions between the party and 
the government, resulting in overcentralization of power in the 
hands of a few, and arbitrary behavior by, key leaders. Both excesses 
were condemned by reform leaders. Deng's intention was to intro- 
duce some checks and balances into the party and government sec- 
tors by clarifying their separate functions with administrative codes 
and regulations and by developing a legal base from which to enforce 
them. 

The State Council met once a month and had a standing com- 
mittee meeting twice a week that included the premier, vice pre- 
miers, a secretary, and state councillors. It was headed by the 
premier, Zhao Ziyang, who was re-elected to a five-year term in 
1983. The membership of the State Council as of November 1986 
included, in addition to the premier, five vice premiers (versus thir- 
teen in 1980), the secretary, and eleven state councillors. As the 
chief administrative organ of government, its main functions were 
to formulate administrative measures, issue decisions and orders, 
and monitor their implementation; draft legislative bills for sub- 
mission to the NPC or its Standing Committee; and prepare the 
economic plan and the state budget for deliberation and approval 
by the NPC. The State Council was the functional center of state 
power and clearinghouse for government initiatives at all levels. 
With the government's emphasis on economic modernization, the 
State Council clearly acquired additional importance and influence. 

The State Council was supported by leading groups, which 
resembled institutionalized task forces and dealt with problems in 



426 



Party and Government 



the modernization program. For example, a leading group estab- 
lished in September 1986 was directed to investigate and suggest 
ways to eliminate the obstacles to foreign investment in China. In 
addition to the leading groups were offices that dealt with matters 
of ongoing concern. These included the Hong Kong and Macao 
Affairs Office and the Special Economic Zones Office. In 1987 the 
State Council structure also included thirty-two ministers in charge 
of ministries, nine ministers in charge of commissions, twenty-nine 
agencies for carrying out specialized functions, and eight major 
banking institutions (see table 3, Appendix B). (In 1980 there had 
been thirty-eight ministers presiding over ministries and eleven 
ministers in charge of commissions. The NPC Standing Commit- 
tee established the new Ministry of Supervision in December 1986.) 
In a bureaucratic reorganization carried out mainly in 1982, thou- 
sands of elderly officials had been retired and replaced by younger 
and better educated officials. Reductions in leadership personnel 
in the bodies under the State Council were accompanied by reduc- 
tions in the staff of these bodies from 49,000 to 32,000 members. 

The Judiciary 

The State Constitution of 1982 and the Organic Law of the Peo- 
ple's Courts that went into effect on January 1, 1980, provide for 
a four-level court system. At the highest level is the Supreme Peo- 
ple's Court, the premier appellate forum of the land, which 
supervises the administration of justice by all subordinate "local" 
and "special" people's courts. Local people's courts — the courts 
of the first instance — handle criminal and civil cases. These peo- 
ple's courts make up the remaining three levels of the court sys- 
tem and consist of "higher people's courts" at the level of the 
provinces, autonomous regions, and special municipalities; "inter- 
mediate people's courts" at the level of prefectures, autonomous 
prefectures, and municipalities; and "basic people's courts" at the 
level of autonomous counties, towns, and municipal districts (see 
Court Structure and Process, ch. 13). 

In April 1986, at the Fourth Session of the Sixth National Peo- 
ple's Congress, the General Principles of the Civil Code was 
approved as "one of China's basic laws." Consisting of more than 
150 articles, the code is intended to regulate China's internal and 
external economic relations to establish a stable base conducive to 
trade and attractive to foreign investors. Many of its provisions 
define the legal status of economic entities and the property rights 
they exercise. The code clearly stipulates that private ownership 
of the means of production is protected by law and may not be 
seized or interfered with by any person or organization. It also 



427 



China: A Country Study 



NATIONAL PEOPLE'S 
CONGRESS 



PRESIDENT 
VICE PRESIDENT 



CENTRAL MILITARY 
COMMISSION 



LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS 
COMMISSION 



LEADING GROUPS 



SUPREME PEOPLE'S 
COURT 



SUPREME PEOPLE'S 
PROCURATORATE 



STATE COUNCIL 



COMMISSIONS 




MINISTRIES 











OFFICES 



AGENCIES 



BANKS 



PROVINCIAL, COUNTY, MUNICIPAL, 
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 



NOTE: For a complete list of commissions, ministries, agencies, and other government 
organizations, see table 3, List of Government Organizations, Appendix B. 



Figure 19. The Structure of the Government, 1987 



recognizes partnerships and wholly foreign-owned or joint-venture 
enterprises (see Reform of the Economic System, Beginning in 
1979, ch. 5). 

Local Administration 

Governmental institutions below the central level are regulated 
by the provisions of the State Constitution of 1982. These provi- 
sions are intended to streamline the local state institutions and make 
them more efficient and more responsive to grass-roots needs; to 
stimulate local initiative and creativity; to restore prestige to the 
local authorities that had been seriously diminished during the Cul- 
tural Revolution; and to aid local officials in their efforts to organize 
and mobilize the masses. As with other major reforms undertaken 
after 1978, the principal motivation for the provisions was to pro- 
vide better support for the ongoing modernization program. 



428 



Party and Government 



The state institutions below the national level were local peo- 
ple's congresses — the NPC's local counterparts — whose functions 
and powers were exercised by their standing committees at and 
above the county level when the congresses were not in session. 
The standing committee was composed of a chairman, vice chair- 
men, and members. The people's congresses also had permanent 
committees that became involved in governmental policy affect- 
ing their areas and their standing committees, and the people's con- 
gresses held meetings every other month to supervise provincial-level 
government activities. In May 1984 Peng Zhen described the rela- 
tionship between the NPC Standing Committee and the standing 
committees at lower levels as "one of liaison, not of leadership. " 
Further, he stressed that the institution of standing committees was 
aimed at transferring power to lower levels so as to tap the initia- 
tive of the localities for the modernization drive. 

The administrative arm of these people's congresses was the local 
people's government. Its local organs were established at three lev- 
els: the provinces, autonomous regions, and special municipali- 
ties; autonomous prefectures, counties, autonomous counties (called 
banners in Nei Monggol Autonomous Region (Inner Mongolia)), 
cities, and municipal districts; and, at the base of the administra- 
tive hierarchy, administrative towns (xiang). The administrative 
towns replaced people's communes as the basic level of adminis- 
tration. 

Reform programs have brought the devolution of considerable 
decision-making authority to the provincial and lower levels. 
Nevertheless, because of the continued predominance of the fun- 
damental principle of democratic centralism, which is at the base 
of China's State Constitution, these lower levels are always vul- 
nerable to changes in direction and decisions originated at the cen- 
tral level of government. In this respect, all local organs are 
essentially extensions of central government authorities and thus 
are responsible to the "unified leadership" of the central organs. 

The people's congresses at the provincial, city, and county lev- 
els each elected the heads of their respective government organi- 
zations. These included governors and deputy governors, mayors 
and deputy mayors, and heads and deputy heads of counties, dis- 
tricts, and towns. The people's congresses also had the right to recall 
these officials and to demand explanations for official actions. Spe- 
cifically, any motion raised by a delegate and supported by three 
others obligated the corresponding government authorities to 
respond. Congresses at each level examined and approved bud- 
gets and the plans for the economic and social development of their 
respective administrative areas. They also maintained public order, 



429 



China: A Country Study 



protected public property, and safeguarded the rights of citizens 
of all nationalities. (About 7 percent of the total population was 
composed of minority nationalities concentrated mainly in sensi- 
tive border areas.) All deputies were to maintain close and respon- 
sive contacts with their various constituents. 

Before 1980 people's congresses at and above the county level did 
not have standing committees. These had been considered super- 
fluous because the local congresses did not have a heavy workload 
and in any case could serve adequately as executive bodies for the 
local organs of power. The CCP's decision in 1978 to adopt the Four 
Modernizations as its official party line, however, produced a criti- 
cal need for broad mass support and the means to mobilize that sup- 
port for the varied activities of both party and state organs. In short, 
the new programs revealed the importance of responsive govern- 
ment. The CCP view was that the standing committees were better 
equipped than the local people's governments to address such func- 
tions as convening the people's congresses; keeping in touch with 
the grass roots and their deputies; supervising, inspecting, appoint- 
ing, and removing local administrative and judicial personnel; and 
preparing for the election of local deputies to the next higher peo- 
ple's congresses. The use of standing committees was seen as a more 
effective and rational way to supervise the activities of the local peo- 
ple's governments than requiring that local administrative authori- 
ties check and balance themselves. The proclaimed purpose of the 
standing committee system was to make local governments more 
responsible and more responsive to constituents. 

The establishment of the standing committees in effect also meant 
restoring the formal division of responsibilities between party and 
state authorities that had existed before 1966. The 1979 reform man- 
dated that the party should not interfere with the administrative 
activities of local government organs and that its function should 
be confined to "political leadership" to ensure that the party's line 
was correctly followed and implemented. Provincial-level party 
secretaries, for instance, were no longer allowed to serve concur- 
rently as provincial-level governors or deputy governors (chairmen 
or vice chairmen in autonomous regions, and mayors or deputy 
mayors in special municipalities), as they had been allowed to do 
during the Cultural Revolution. In this connection most officials 
who had held positions in the former provincial-level revolutionary 
committees were excluded from the new local people's governments. 
Some provincial-level officials who were purged during the Cul- 
tural Revolution were rehabilitated and returned to power. 

The local people's congresses and their standing committees were 
given the authority to pass local legislation and regulations under 



430 



Party and Government 



the Organic Law of the People's Courts of 1980. This authority 
was granted only at the level of provinces, autonomous regions, 
and special municipalities. Its purpose was to allow local congresses 
to accommodate the special circumstances and actual needs of their 
jurisdictions. This measure was billed as a "major reform" insti- 
tuted because "a unified constitution and a set of uniform laws 
for the whole country have proved increasingly inadequate" in cop- 
ing with differing "local features or cultural and economic condi- 
tions." On July 17, 1979, Renmin Ribao (People's Daily) observed: 
"To better enforce the constitution and state laws, we must bring 
them more in line with the concrete realities in various areas and 
empower these areas to approve local laws and regulations so that 
they can decide certain major issues with local conditions in mind." 
The law explicitly stated, however, that the scope of legislation must 
be within the limits of the State Constitution and policies of the 
state, and that locally enacted bills must be submitted "for the 
record" to the Standing Committee of the NPC and to the State 
Council, which, according to the 1982 State Constitution, can annul 
them if they are found to "contravene the Constitution, the stat- 
utes, or the administrative rules and regulations." 

In 1987 the party and the government continued to stress the 
importance of bringing about popular "supervision" over, for 
instance, the pivotal county-level administration. The importance 
of maintaining close ties with the masses, listening to their opin- 
ions, being concerned with their welfare, and serving their interests 
was emphasized. Such concern was ensured with the adoption of 
electoral procedures as part of the 1979 reform package that called 
for instituting direct elections of deputies to the local people's con- 
gresses at the county level. Under the old procedure, the electorate's 
only choice had been to vote for a slate of candidates equal in num- 
ber to the number of deputies to be elected. Additional reforms 
provided for a more open process of nomination, a secret ballot with 
a choice of candidates, and the possibility of primary elections. The 
new election procedures were also extended to the election of govern- 
ment officials and of delegates to high-level people's congresses. (All 
of these reforms taken together offered the potential, in those areas 
where they were adopted, for significant change.) Experiments 
reportedly also were taking place in certain medium-sized cities, 
beginning in 1986, to increase participation by citizens in political 
activities and decision making. In December 1986 Beijing municipal 
authorities announced that the mid- 1987 municipal elections would 
allow more than one candidate to run for election for each seat avail- 
able. This announcement came as extensive student demonstrations 
in key urban centers were demanding broader democratic freedoms. 



431 



CCP general secretary 
and member of the 
Standing Committee of the 
Political Bureau of the Chinese 
Communist Party, Zhao Ziyang 
Courtesy 
Xinhua News Agency 

Official efforts to improve government performance at the grass- 
roots level continued in 1987. They had as a precedent a set of 
regulations, first enacted in 1952 and 1954, covering the activities 
of what are officially referred to as "basic-level mass autonomous 
organizations." Such organizations included the urban neighbor- 
hood committees, subdistrict offices, people's mediation commit- 
tees, and public security committees. These regulations had been 
reissued in January 1980 by the NPC Standing Committee in an 
attempt to strengthen the grass-roots organizations. In addition, 
the 1982 State Constitution had proclaimed the establishment of 
residents' and villagers' committees to ensure public security and 
preserve social order; to provide public health services and medi- 
ate civil disputes; and, most important, to carry information to and 
from government organs. Another significant reform at the basic 
level was the establishment of the administrative town (xiang) 



China's paramount leader 
Deng Xiaoping 
Courtesy 
Xinhua News Agency 



432 



Li Peng, member of the 
Standing Committee of the 
Political Bureau of the Chinese 
Communist Party and future 
premier of the State Council 
Courtesy 



President of the People 's 
Republic of China, 
Yang Shangkun 
Courtesy 
Xinhua News Agency 



Xinhua News Agency 

government to replace the commune. This reform freed the com- 
mune to function solely as an economic unit. 

Another administrative reform directly related to economic 
modernization was the establishment in 1979 of the special economic 
zones, which included Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou, all in 
Guangdong Province, and Xiamen in Fujian Province. Supervis- 
ing China's special economic zones were the Guangdong provincial 
committee in charge of the special economic zones, headquartered 
in Shenzhen, and the Xiamen Construction and Development Cor- 
poration. The Guangdong provincial committee controlled Zhuhai, 
Shenzhen, and Shantou and shared its authority over Shekou (a small 
port zone within Shenzhen) with the China Merchant Steam Navi- 
gation Company. The latter was a Hong Kong subsidiary of China's 
Ministry of Communications that had been empowered in 1979 to 
negotiate all foreign ventures in Shekou. 



433 



China: A Country Study 



The special administrative region, another administrative unit, 
was developed to serve foreign policy goals. Article 31 of the State 
Constitution of 1982 empowers the NPC to enact laws to establish 
special administrative regions to accommodate local conditions. 
Hong Kong will come under this rule when Britain transfers its 
sovereignty over its former colony to China on July 1, 1997, as 
delineated in the Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, 
signed on September 26, 1984. Macao is slated to become a spe- 
cial administrative region on December 20, 1999, when Portugal 
is to transfer governmental authority over Macao to China, as stipu- 
lated in the Joint Declaration on the Question of Macao, initialed 
on March 26, 1987 (see Nationalism, ch. 12). In 1986 and 1987 
the State Council's Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office was draft- 
ing the Basic Law for the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region, which would define Hong Kong's system of government. 
The new law was due for completion in 1988. 

The Cadre System 

In 1987 the party and government cadre (ganbu) system, the rough 
equivalent of the civil service system in many other countries, was 
entering the final stages of a massive overhaul aimed at transforming 
the bureaucracy into an effective instrument of national policy. The 
term cadre refers to a public official holding a responsible or 
managerial position, usually full time, in party and government. 
A cadre may or may not be a member of the CCP, although a 
person in a sensitive position would almost certainly be a party 
member. 

In an August 1980 speech, "On the Reform of the Party and 
State Leadership System," Deng Xiaoping declared that power 
was overcentralized and concentrated in the hands of individuals 
who acted arbitrarily, following patriarchal methods in carrying 
out their duties. Deng meant that the bureaucracy operated without 
the benefit of regularized and institutionalized procedures, and he 
recommended corrective measures such as abolishing the bureau- 
cratic practice of life tenure for leading positions. In 1981 Deng 
proposed that a younger, better educated leadership corps be 
recruited from among cadres in their forties and fifties who had 
trained at colleges or technical secondary schools. 

The theme of "streamlining and rejuvenating" the bureaucracy 
was taken up by Zhao Ziyang in early 1980 when he announced 
a major overhaul of the government. The number of vice premiers 
was reduced from 13 to 2, State Council agencies were cut by almost 
half, and the number of ministers and vice ministers was reduced 
from 505 to 167. The new appointees were younger and better 



434 



Wan Li was to 
become chairman of the 
Standing Committee of 
the National People's 
Congress in 1988 
Courtesy 
Xinhua News Agency 



educated than their predecessors. In January 1982 Deng called for 
a "revolution" in the bureaucracy, starting with its top levels. At 
that time, Deng envisioned reducing the size of the government 
bureaucracy by one-quarter over a two-year period. By retiring 
veteran cadres, the way could be opened for promoting younger, 
professionally competent cadres to positions of authority and thereby 
providing the effective leadership needed for China's moderniza- 
tion. In May 1982 the Central Committee reorganized and stream- 
lined its internal structure by cutting staff in its 30 component 
departments by 17.3 percent. Subordinate bureaus were reduced 
by 1 1 percent. Almost half of the CCP Central Committee elected 
in September 1982 were new members, and 83 percent of the 
alternate members were newly elected. 

Reorganization of the provincial-level party and government 
structures took place between late 1982 and May 1983. During this 
period, almost one-third of the provincial-level party first secre- 
taries and all but three of the governors were replaced, most of 
them moving into advisory positions. Almost two-thirds of 
provincial-level leaders in 1986 were college or university educated. 
During 1983 and 1984, these reforms reached the prefectural, 
county, municipal, and town levels, reportedly resulting in a reduc- 
tion in staff of 36 percent and an elevation in the percentage of 
college educated leaders to 44 percent. 



435 



China: A Country Study 



Simultaneous with restructuring and rejuvenating the bureau- 
cracy, a drive was begun to improve the party's working style and 
consolidate party organizations. The Second Plenum of the Twelfth 
Central Committee, held in October 1983, initiated such a program 
for the years 1984-86. Some 388,000 party members participated 
in the first stage of party rectification. These included high- and 
middle-ranking cadres in 159 leading organs in the central depart- 
ments, provinces, autonomous regions, special municipalities, and 
PL A. This phase of the campaign lasted over a year and was accom- 
panied by the recruitment of 340,000 technicians and 32,000 col- 
lege and university graduates and postgraduates into the CCP. In 
addition, a campaign was launched to ferret out residual leftist 
influence from the Cultural Revolution period, factionalism, and 
corruption. Discipline inspection committees were reinstituted. 
Three kinds of party members were singled out as special targets: 
followers of the Gang of Four (see Glossary) or of Lin Biao, fac- 
tionalists, and persons who "beat, smashed, and looted" during 
the Cultural Revolution. These members were to be expelled from 
the party. Lesser offenders requiring correction included party 
members with bureaucratic or patriarchal attitudes, those seeking 
personal power and position, and those inept or lazy in their work. 

The principal objective of the reform leadership was to establish 
a system of steady, predictable rule through the creation of a profes- 
sional bureaucracy. An important aspect of the program was per- 
sonnel reform. Guidelines were issued that set age limits for key 
offices. A limit of sixty-five years of age was imposed for govern- 
ment ministers, sixty for vice ministers and department chiefs, and, 
for all other officials, sixty for men and fifty-five for women. The 
effect of this key reform was to bring to an end the lifetime tenure 
system that had been fundamental to China's bureaucracy since 
1949. There was the additional stipulation that officeholders in the 
reconstructed bureaucracy be qualified both politically and profes- 
sionally, that is, be both "red" and "expert." The reorganization 
and streamlining of provincial-level party and government 
bureaucracies followed the same procedures, including reducing the 
staff sizes and number of offices, lowering the average age, and rais- 
ing the educational requirements for candidates for provincial-level 
leadership. These changes were considered essential to providing 
for a "third echelon" of leaders. This group could serve in posi- 
tions of some authority, where they could be trained, observed, and 
evaluated as to their suitability for increased responsibility. Below 
the central level, the chosen age for leaders at the level of provinces, 
autonomous regions, and special municipalities was fifty-five; at the 
county level, between thirty and fifty years. 



436 



Party and Government 



The second stage of party rectification, having the same goals 
as the first stage, began in the fall of 1984 and encompassed prefec- 
tural and county-level units. This stage involved some 13.5 million 
cadres, or about one-third of the party's membership. The third 
and final stage of the three-year party rectification campaign was 
launched in November 1985 and targeted party units "below the 
county level." This stage encompassed almost 20 million party 
members, about half the total membership of the party. These mem- 
bers belonged to the more than 1 million party branches through- 
out the rural areas. The campaign worked from the higher to the 
lower level organizations and proceeded methodically "in stages 
and groups." But while party pronouncements at previous stages 
of the rectification had complained about the perfunctory manner 
in which the campaigns were being managed, at this final stage 
the central authorities displayed notable leniency and caution. They 
feared that extensive restructuring and rebuilding of the local leader- 
ship had the potential to disrupt both production and social order. 
Even in cases of embezzlement, graft, and other "unhealthy prac- 
tices," the party counseled circumspection and the employment 
of moderate measures. Subjecting local leaders to condemnation 
at mass meetings, a practice prevalent during the Cultural Revo- 
lution, was strictly forbidden. 

In sum, the "revolution" being carried out in the bureaucratic 
structures of power was meant to reorient the system away from 
the style, procedures, and excesses of the Cultural Revolution and 
toward the most efficient and potentially successful methods for Chi- 
na's modernization. This reorientation required the massive retire- 
ment of veteran cadres and the recruitment of those knowledgeable 
in modern economics and technology to be trained in leadership 
positions. It was an enormous task and one that obviously met sig- 
nificant resistance from those who either did not understand the new 
requirements or saw them as a substantial threat to their position 
and livelihood. Nevertheless, in early 1987 the reform leadership 
appeared to be making very credible strides at fulfilling these goals. 

The Media 

Since 1978 the media had been one focus of the CCP's efforts 
to modernize key sectors of Chinese society, and it operated on 
the premise that more responsible and factual reporting would help 
to narrow the distance between the elite and the masses. The party 
hoped in this way to enlist mass support for its nation-building pro- 
gram. In 1987 the official media continued to play its assigned role 
as a vehicle through which to inform, educate, indoctrinate, con- 
trol, and mobilize the masses. 



437 



China: A Country Study 

Before 1978 the CCP used the mass media as a tool to "serve 
the interest of proletarian politics" or the party's "class struggle" 
and "mass line." Having these priorities, the party was concerned 
neither with openness nor accuracy. What the CCP considered infor- 
mation was more often than not the interpretation of events or data 
that would support the government's political, social, and economic 
programs. Timeliness of content was far less important than political 
or ideological utility. Before 1976 the party allowed no dissenting 
view to appear in print. The result was reporting and commentary 
that made information and propaganda all but synonymous. 

With the ascendancy of the Deng Xiaoping reformers in 1978, 
the mass media began to display a different orientation and focus. 
It began to play a significant part in the CCP drive to popularize, 
first within the party, the notion of "practice being the only criterion 
of truth" and of "seeking truth from facts," rather than from petri- 
fied formulations. After March 1978 the party press no longer printed 
Mao's quotations in bold type. Moreover, it began to report more 
shortcomings and expose more criticism of the central authorities. 
In 1987 there still were considerable limits on criticism in the offi- 
cial media, however. Party general secretary Hu Yaobang, in a 1986 
speech published in the party's daily organ Renmin Ribao, instructed 
editors that 80 percent of reporting should focus on achievements 
in modernization and only 20 percent on shortcomings. 

China's extensive communication system includes both official 
and unofficial channels. Official means of communication include 
government directives and state documents, newspapers, periodi- 
cals, books, and other publications; radio and television; and drama, 
art, motion pictures, and exhibitions. Unofficial channels include 
handwritten wall newspapers, handbills, posters, street-corner skits, 
and theater (see Culture and the Arts, ch. 4). Of all these chan- 
nels, the newspapers, periodicals, and electronic media continued 
in 1987 to play the most important part in communications. 

Among the principal national newspapers in 1987, Renmin Ribao 
contained party and government directives, unsigned editorials, 
commentaries, and letters to the editor. The latter were often criti- 
cal of local implementation of central policies. The PLA organ was 
Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily). Gongren Ribao (Workers' 
Daily) dealt with labor matters, and Guangming Ribao (Enlighten- 
ment Daily) provided coverage of science, culture, and education. 
There were numerous other newspapers published both at the 
provincial-level and at the mass organization-level, but none of these 
had the prestige and authoritativeness associated with the party 
and army newspapers. Starting in 1978, party authorities permit- 
ted newspapers from south China provinces to circulate outside 



438 



Party and Government 



China; in 1983 north China newspapers were given foreign circu- 
lation. There were also many speeialty newspapers focusing on the 
economy, trade and finance, agriculture, the arts, youth affairs, 
and so on. By the end of 1984, post offices in China reportedly 
were distributing 734 different newspapers with a total circulation 
of 112.9 million, or a newspaper for every eighth person in China. 

Hongqi (Red Flag), a journal published by the CCP Central Com- 
mittee, provides guidance on questions of current political theory, 
explaining the direction of the party's Marxist analysis, setting forth 
the party line, and suggesting the proper methods for implement- 
ing it. A monthly until December 1979, Hongqi since has been pub- 
lished twice a month. The government also publishes its major 
reports and documents. For example, Guowuyuan Gongbao (State 
Council Bulletin), appearing three times a month, provides a sum- 
mary of directives, prints notices, presents agreements signed with 
foreign countries, and registers central approval given to local 
government actions. 

In addition to open official and unofficial documents, there is 
another large category of materials that is classified for internal 
use (neibu), as opposed to for public use (gongkai). These materials 
are published by party, government, academic, and professional 
organizations. Some publications have additional restrictions, such 
as for distribution only within the publishing unit. The most pro- 
tected publication is entitled Cankao Ziliao (Reference Information) 
and is distributed to around 1,000 high officials daily. A similar 
internal use publication, but with a much wider readership, is the 
Cankao Xiaoxi "(Reference News). This publication contains trans- 
lations of selected foreign news articles, many of which are critical 
of China. These internally circulated materials generally are more 
reliable and detailed than those found in the open press. 

The principal source of domestic news and the sole source of 
international news for the mass domestic newspapers and radio is 
the Xinhua (New China) News Agency. This government agency 
has departments dealing with domestic news, international news, 
domestic news for foreign news services, and foreign affairs. It main- 
tains an extensive network of correspondents in ninety overseas 
bureaus. Xinhua also releases the News Bulletin in English, French, 
Spanish, Arabic, and Russian, totaling about 30,000 words per 
day, and provides special features to newspapers and magazines 
in more than 100 countries. Domestic branches of Xinhua can com- 
municate with the head office over microwave communications. 
Internationally, a telecommunications network has been established 
linking Beijing with Paris, London, New York, Tokyo and Hong 
Kong. Further, Xinhua has rented an international communications 



439 



China: A Country Study 



satellite to file news to foreign countries and exchange news with 
foreign news agencies. It mails special features to newspapers and 
magazines in more than 100 countries. Another news agency, China 
News Service (Zhongguo Xinwenshe), provides news stories and 
photographs to Chinese newspapers and some radio and television 
stations in Hong Kong, Macao, and several foreign countries. 

By 1984 electronic media included over 160 radio stations and 
90 television stations (see Telecommunications, ch. 8). The Cen- 
tral People's Broadcasting Station, headquartered in Beijing and 
subordinate to the Ministry of Radio, Cinema, and Television, 
provided domestic service to every area of the country. Radio Bei- 
jing, China's overseas radio service, continued to expand its 
programming, initiating a news program in English for foreign resi- 
dents in Beijing in January 1985. Television service was available 
in the major urban areas and was increasing its reach outside urban 
centers. China's television broadcasting was under the control of 
China Central Television (CCTV). In 1979 the network began an 
"open university" program. By 1984 China reported having "radio 
and television universities" in 326 cities and 1,168 counties through- 
out 28 provinces, autonomous regions, and special municipalities, 
making the use of television an important aspect of higher educa- 
tion in China (see Education Policy, ch. 4). 

* * * 

The dynamic nature and pace of political and social change in 
China have inspired a number of new works by China specialists. 
For discussion of the concepts basic to the cadre system, A. Doak 
Barnett's Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China 
is useful. Also useful is Franz Schurmann's Ideology and Organiza- 
tion in Communist China. Of specific relevance to this chapter is the 
State Constitution of 1982, which appears in Beijing Review, 
December 27, 1982, and the Party Constitution of 1982, which 
appears in Beijing Review, September 20, 1982. These two docu- 
ments, as well as extensive summary material on other subjects, 
also appear in People's Republic of China Year Book, 1985. China 
Quarterly publishes in each issue a useful section entitled "Chroni- 
cle and Documentation" that contains factual information and 
analysis of key official meetings, events, foreign relations, and so 
on. In addition, two useful articles appearing in this publication 
are Melanie Manion's "The Cadre Management System Post- 
Mao: The Appointment, Promotion, Transfer and Removal of 
Party and State Leaders," and David S.G. Goodman's "The 
National CCP Conference of September 1985 and China's 



440 



Party and Government 



Leadership Changes." Of particular use is James R. Townsend 
and Brantly Womack's Politics in China, which explains China's 
political and institutional framework and the governmental process. 
A similar and detailed work is Alan P.L. Liu's How China Is Ruled. 
Political and structural reforms are dealt with in the first volume 
of China's Economy Looks Toward the Year 2000, published by the 
United States Congress Joint Economic Committee. Another work 
that summarizes these subjects and includes a wide variety of 
selected documents covering key topics is Policy Conflicts in Po - 
Mao China, edited by John P. Burns and Stanley Rosen. (For fur- 
ther information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



441 



Chapter 11. The Political Process 



An Eastern Han dynasty (A.D. 25-220) cavalryman awaits battle armed 
with a halberd. The bronze figure, about fifty-three centimeters high, was 
part of a group of mounted soldiers discovered in Gansu Province. 



CHINA'S "SECOND REVOLUTION," a far-reaching program 
of reform designed by Deng Xiaoping, was initiated at the Third 
Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978. 
It marked a major turning point in China's modern political his- 
tory, as it was intended to make China's institutions and political 
process supportive of the Four Modernizations, a national program 
of social and economic development. The first step was to recruit 
intellectuals and mobilize the population on a course of moderni- 
zation. Ultimately, it was hoped, these efforts would produce what 
became identified as "socialism with Chinese characteristics." 

To realize this lofty goal, several obstacles had to be overcome. 
The Cultural Revolution, under Mao Zedong's direction between 
1966 and 1976, had divided Chinese society into competing fac- 
tions. The deaths of Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong in 1976 left the 
country without strong leadership and contributed further to social 
and political divisiveness. The need became obvious to replace 
Mao's premise of "class struggle as the key link" — which empha- 
sized class conflict and disruptive mass campaigns — with a prag- 
matic style that stressed stability and a problem-solving approach 
to difficulties encountered in carrying out developmental programs. 
The overly centralized political system, patterned after the Soviet 
Union's Stalinist model, had to be revised to decentralize decision- 
making authority. 

Probably the greatest impediment to the success of moderniza- 
tion was the unwieldy Chinese bureaucracy. Steeped in revolu- 
tionary tradition but advanced in age and largely untrained in 
modern administrative procedures, party and government cadres 
operated through personal connections and patriarchal attitudes. 
For the party and government to exercise effective control over 
modernization programs, these cadres would have to be replaced 
by younger and better trained administrators, a development that 
not surprisingly would provoke considerable resistance from within 
the bureaucracy. Finally, the means had to be found to engage 
urban workers, peasants, and intellectuals in China's moderniza- 
tion process by separating them from their traditional and often 
backward viewpoints and providing them with a more practical 
and scientific basis for their actions. 

The substantial revisions to China's social, political, and ideo- 
logical system, required for the success of the "second revolution," 
caused serious tensions within the political system. The introduction 



445 



China: A Country Study 

of major economic reforms also caused considerable strains. But 
the economic reform measures, first introduced in China's rural 
areas, provoked an enthusiastic response and a substantial follow- 
ing. With this success as a base, additional reform measures were 
prepared in October 1984 for introduction into China's more 
diverse and complicated urban sector. Concomitant with measures 
to promote rural and urban development, plans were made for sub- 
stantial revision and reorganization of the political and adminis- 
trative structure in China, particularly the party and government 
cadre system. 

Because of the innovative nature of the political and economic 
reform programs, each wave of reform stimulated a constituency 
supporting its development. Beneficiaries of the new measures car- 
ried them out with enthusiasm, sometimes even taking them beyond 
their originally intended scope. At the same time, a substantial seg- 
ment of the affected population found itself undercut and showed 
varying degrees of opposition to the reform initiatives. The reform 
measures, initially designed by China's top party leaders, took on 
a dimension of spontaneity as they were implemented. The dynam- 
ics of the reform process, generating degrees of support and oppo- 
sition, played a substantial role in shaping the political process in 
China after 1978. 

Operating within this context, China's top party leaders had a 
twofold task. First, they had to preserve a consensus among the 
senior party leadership (the Political Bureau) concerning the nature 
and content of reform measures and the pace at which they would 
be introduced. Second, that consensus had to survive the continual 
dislocations and permutations that accompanied the implementa- 
tion process. Some reforms provoked instability by being zealously 
pursued; others bogged down in resistance. By 1987 it appeared 
that the resolution of these emerging issues and problems was 
accomplished mainly by internal bargaining among key leaders, 
who often represented major institutional interests, and by discipli- 
nary measures. The latter case was exemplified by the forced resig- 
nation of party general secretary Hu Yaobang early in that year. 
In a more general sense, the major function of reform leadership 
was to maintain stability in the political system while preserving 
the momentum necessary for perpetuating the overall reform pro- 
gram. In short, as in other developing societies, China's leaders 
have had to manage the tensions inherent in a society undergoing 
rapid and thoroughgoing change. 

Finally, Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought — the official 
state ideology — needed continual substantive revision and changes 
in emphasis by China's political leadership. Under Mao Zedong's 



446 



The Political Process 



leadership, China's recognized ideal had been to create the true 
"socialist man." In the 1980s Deng Xiaoping set for his govern- 
ment the perhaps equally idealistic goal of leading the enormous 
population of this developing country, still imbued with "feudal- 
istic" traditions, toward the achievement of a modern, developed 
state by the year 2000. It was a goal that seemed to require fre- 
quent revision if it were ever to be achieved. 

Political Realignments at the Party Center 

Chairman Hua Guofeng presided over the historic Third Ple- 
num of the Eleventh Central Committee on December 18-22, 1978, 
his authority rooted in his generally acknowledged claim to be Mao 
Zedong's chosen successor. Viewed in historical context, Hua's 
role was that of a relatively minor figure temporarily bridging the 
gap between the radical leadership associated with Mao and the 
Cultural Revolution and the emergence of new political leaders who 
could consolidate national policy and assert credible authority (see 
The Post-Mao Period, 1976-78, ch. 1). Hua's political weakness 
was most graphically illustrated by the rehabilitation — for the second 
time — of Deng Xiaoping, in July 1977, and Deng's subsequent 
successful elevation of his proteges and initiation of a comprehen- 
sive reform program to realize the Four Modernizations. 

This transitional period moved toward far-reaching reform and 
even a reassessment of Mao Zedong Thought. Economic develop- 
ment and material rewards to motivate producers replaced the 
Maoist emphasis on ideological goals and incentives. A stress on 
political stability supplanted the call to "continuing revolution." 
In Chinese academic circles, efforts were made to restore and raise 
academic standards, and party leaders stressed the importance of 
science and technology and the contribution of intellectuals in realiz- 
ing modernization. The liberalization of expression in intellectual 
and cultural circles led to further questioning of the Cultural Revo- 
lution, Mao's role, and Mao Zedong Thought. 

Between 1979 and 1981 it became necessary to "readjust" some 
of the reform programs and initiatives to effect a balance between 
reformist and conservative forces. The major issues dividing these 
forces were China's capacity to sustain rapid economic develop- 
ment and the political and cultural consequences of opening up 
to the world and allowing liberalization of expression and behavior. 
The retrenchment that followed was a readjustment and not an 
end to Deng Xiaoping' s reform agenda. 

Deng Xiaoping Consolidates Power 

Deng's second rehabilitation marked another milestone in the 



447 



China: A Country Study 

career of one of the party's most remarkable leaders. Born in 
Sichuan Province in 1904, Deng was the son of a wealthy land- 
lord. A bright student, he went to France on a work-study pro- 
gram in 1920. There Deng, like many other Chinese students, was 
radicalized and joined the nascent Chinese Communist Party. He 
had returned to China by 1926 and, after the party was forced 
underground in 1927, became involved in guerrilla activities (see 
Republican China, ch. 1). Eventually he joined the main body of 
the party and Red Army in Jiangxi Province. Deng participated 
in the Long March (see Glossary) and rose through the ranks of 
the Red Army to become a senior political commissar during the 
war against Japan (1937-45) and the Chinese civil war (1945-49). 
After the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, 
he was assigned his home province of Sichuan, where he was made 
first secretary of the Southwest Regional Party Bureau. In 1952 
Deng was transferred to Beijing and given several key positions, 
the highest of which was vice premier of the State Council — a 
remarkable development that he probably owed to Mao's favor. 

In 1956 Deng was promoted over several more-senior party lead- 
ers to the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and became 
secretary general of the party, that is, head of the party Secretariat. 
As secretary general, Deng became involved in the day-to-day 
implementation of party policies and had immediate access to the 
resources of the entire party bureaucracy. Consequently, Deng's 
power grew immensely. Because he perceived Mao's radical eco- 
nomic policies to have been harmful to China's development after 
1958, Deng began to work more closely with State Chairman Liu 
Shaoqi. Deng's behavior irritated Mao, and his stress on results 
over ideological orthodoxy struck Mao as "revisionism" (see Glos- 
sary). During the Cultural Revolution, Deng was branded the 
"number-two capitalist roader in the party" (Liu Shaoqi was the 
"number-one capitalist roader," having allegedly abandoned social- 
ism, see The Cultural Revolution Decade, 1966-76, ch. 1). In 1967 
Deng was driven from power and sent to work in a tractor factory 
in Jiangxi Province. 

After the excesses of the Cultural Revolution and the shock of 
an attempted military coup in 1971 by Lin Biao, Premier Zhou 
Enlai apparently recommended that Deng be brought back to aid 
in dealing with increasingly complex domestic and international 
issues. Mao agreed, and Deng returned in April 1973 as a vice 
premier. He rejoined the Political Bureau in December, becom- 
ing more active in national affairs as Zhou Enlai 's health weakened. 
By early 1975 he was in charge of the work of the Central Com- 
mittee as one of its vice chairmen. From this powerful vantage point, 



448 



The Political Process 



Deng concentrated on moderating the effects of the more radical 
aspects of the policies introduced during the Cultural Revolution 
and on focusing national attention on economic development. He 
also continued to build his own political influence through restor- 
ing to high office many old cadres who had been purged during 
the Cultural Revolution. Mao again began to distrust Deng and, 
after Zhou's death, decided that Deng should once again be 
removed from his positions. 

Deng has been described as aggressive, brash, impatient, and 
self-confident. He inspired respect among Chinese officials as a 
capable administrator and a brilliant intellect. He did not, however, 
inspire loyalty and devotion, and he admitted that his hard-driving 
personality often alienated others. In contrast to Mao, Deng offered 
no expansive socialist vision. Rather, Deng's message was a prac- 
tical one: to make the Chinese people more prosperous and China 
a modern socialist state. Deng's pragmatic style arose primarily 
from his dedication to placing China among the world's great 
powers. 

Deng consolidated his power and influence by removing his 
opponents from their power bases, elevating his proteges to key 
positions, revising the political institutional structure, retiring elderly 
party leaders who either were hesitant about his reform programs 
or too weak and incompetent to implement them, and raising up 
a replacement generation of leaders beholden to him and appar- 
ently enthusiastic about the reform program. As a first step toward 
achieving these goals, Deng set out to remove Hua Guofeng, 
apparently a firm believer in Mao's ideals, from the three pivotal 
positions of chairman of the party and of its powerful Central Mili- 
tary Commission and premier of the State Council. At that time, 
Deng was on the Political Bureau Standing Committee, vice chair- 
man of the party Central Military Commission, and vice premier 
of the State Council. 

At the Third Plenum, four new members were elected to the 
Political Bureau, all to varying degrees supporters of the reform 
program. Hu Yaobang, an energetic protege of Deng Xiaoping, 
was elected, as was Wang Zhen, a Deng stalwart. Also elected were 
Deng Yingchao, widow of Zhou Enlai, and Chen Yun, architect 
of China's 1950s economic policy. Chen also became head of the 
newly established Central Commission for Discipline Inspection 
(see Other Party Organs, ch. 10). Following the plenum, Hu Yao- 
bang was appointed secretary general of the party and head of its 
Propaganda Department. Further personnel changes beneficial to 
Deng occurred at the Fifth Plenum, held February 23-29, 1980. 
Hu Yaobang was elevated to the Standing Committee of the 



449 



China: A Country Study 



Political Bureau, as was another Deng protege, Zhao Ziyang. With 
these promotions, accompanied by the forced resignations of mem- 
bers associated with the Cultural Revolution, the Standing Com- 
mittee was comprised of seven members, four of whom were 
strongly committed to party and economic reform. 

Hua Guofeng's position was eroded further in mid- 1980, when 
he was replaced as premier by Zhao Ziyang. A fast-rising provin- 
cial party official, Zhao spent his early career in Guangdong 
Province, where he gained expertise in managing agricultural 
affairs. Unlike Hua, whose political status had improved during 
the Cultural Revolution, Zhao Ziyang was purged in 1967 for sup- 
porting the policies of Mao's opponents. After his rehabilitation 
in 1972, Zhao worked briefly in Nei Monggol Autonomous Region 
(Inner Mongolia) and then returned to Guangdong Province. In 
1975, a peak period in Deng's influence, Zhao was sent to trou- 
bled Sichuan Province as party first secretary. Under Zhao's leader- 
ship Sichuan Province returned to political and economic health. 
Zhao believed firmly in material incentives, and he promoted 
experiments in returning decision-making authority to the local 
work units, rather than centralizing it exclusively in provincial- 
level or central administrative bureaus. 

Hua Guofeng's political isolation deepened when at the Cen- 
tral Committee's Sixth Plenum, in June 1981, he was replaced as 
party chairman by General Secretary Hu Yaobang. This key meet- 
ing reevaluated party history, including the Cultural Revolution, 
and charged Mao with major errors in his later years. Hua, hav- 
ing been identified with the "two whatevers" group ("support 
whatever policy decisions Chairman Mao made and follow whatever 
instructions Chairman Mao gave"), was marked for political 
oblivion. At this same meeting, Deng Xiaoping assumed Hua's 
former position as chairman of the party's Central Military Com- 
mission, advancing his goal of ridding the top military ranks of 
reform opponents. With these developments, Deng was poised for 
an even more thorough consolidation of the reform leadership at 
the upcoming Twelfth National Party Congress. 

Institutionalizing Collective Leadership 

Following the Third Plenum, one of Deng Xiaoping's major 
reform goals had been to produce an institutionalized and stable 
political system that could promote economic development. Eco- 
nomic reform was to be accompanied by political reform that would 
permit a greater range of personal and intellectual choices and 
include the opening up of debate on key issues of local and national 
concern. 



450 



The Political Process 



A major part of this political reform had to do with implement- 
ing the concept of collective leadership. The cult of personality cul- 
tivated by Mao and those associated with him had made Chinese 
society subject to the whims of an aging and increasingly irrational 
revolutionary personality. To counter this style and project an image 
of political maturity and regularity, Deng declined to assume the 
party chairmanship. Even Hua Guofeng's demotion from senior 
leadership positions was done gradually and was cushioned by 
allowing Hua to retain his membership on the Central Commit- 
tee. Overall, Deng's objective was to invert the practice of having 
power vested more in individuals than in institutions and to modify 
a decision-making process that operated by fiat, without regular 
procedures or an adequate information base. 

A major step toward institutionalizing collective leadership was 
taken with the re-establishment of the party Secretariat in 1980 
(see Secretariat, ch. 10). Its formation permitted the emplacement 
of promising younger leaders to manage and master day-to-day 
party affairs. Having supervisory authority over the various Cen- 
tral Committee departments, the Secretariat could provide the 
Political Bureau and its presiding Standing Committee with addi- 
tional expertise in making decisions. By 1987 the Secretariat 
included eleven members, six of whom also served on the Political 
Bureau. The broad experience of its membership covered all major 
substantive areas, including party, government, and military affairs, 
agriculture, the national economy and planning, culture and 
propaganda, and industry and trade. In addition to drafting the 
major policy resolutions for Political Bureau deliberation and then 
supervising the implementation of party policy, the Secretariat used 
its expertise and organizational standing to exert pressure on the 
cumbersome Chinese bureaucracy to achieve the desired results. 

The 1982 Party Constitution abolished the post of party chair- 
man and expanded the base of political authority to include the 
Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, party general secre- 
tary, chairman of the party's Central Military Commission, first 
secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, and 
chairman of the Central Advisory Commission. The premier also 
served on the Standing Committee, which thus included in its 
policy-making ranks representatives of the three major institu- 
tions — party, government, and military. 

Another measure that promoted a more balanced distribution 
of power was the strengthening of senior governmental bodies. As 
premier, Zhao Ziyang presided over the State Council, a body cru- 
cial to the implementation of economic reform measures and, like 
the party Secretariat, supported by an abundance of research 



451 



China: A Country Study 



institutions to aid in decision making (see The State Council, 
ch. 10). By 1987 the State Council, the chief administrative 
organization of government and clearinghouse for government 
actions, was composed of twenty-two members, including Premier 
Zhao and five vice premiers who also served on the Political Bureau. 
Its Standing Committee of seventeen included senior members with 
long and recognized experience in all aspects of government. The 
State Council directed the work of the various government minis- 
tries, commissions, and agencies and verified that relevant party 
policies were being implemented. 

The process of easing out unwanted leaders was institutional- 
ized at the Twelfth National Party Congress in September 1982. 
Deng Xiaoping developed and headed the new central body, the 
party's Central Advisory Commission. Qualified members with 
at least forty years of party service were honored by being named 
to this body as consultants to the party and the government. This 
institutional innovation was intended to remove the superannuated 
veterans from real power positions while allowing them to remain 
at least at the fringes of power. 

Besides providing for the graceful retirement of old revolution- 
ary heroes and elderly leaders, at the Twelfth National Party Con- 
gress the reform leadership successfully consolidated its control of 
the party. Sixty percent of the members and alternate members 
on the newly elected Central Committee were newcomers and prob- 
able supporters of the reform program. Most of those elected had 
professional and technical qualifications, fulfilling another reform 
goal of infusing the bureaucracy with competent and talented 
officials. 

A Successor Generation 

An even more remarkable shift in the composition of party leader- 
ship occurred at the National Conference of Party Delegates in Sep- 
tember 1985. Over 100 senior party leaders submitted their 
resignations, including 10 members of the Political Bureau and 64 
members of the Central Committee. The officials reportedly gave 
their reason for retiring as a desire to make way for younger and 
better-educated leaders who were more equipped to lead China and 
guide the reform program. In fact, these retiring leaders were a 
mixed group, some of whom lacked the vigor and skills necessary 
to handle the complexities of reform, while others had reservations 
concerning the direction and pace of the reform program. Some 
even may have believed that it was best to turn over responsibili- 
ties to a younger leadership. In spite of this trend, Deng, who was 
himself eighty-two years old, and several other senior leaders 



452 



The Twelfth National Party Congress of the 
Chinese Communist Party, September 1982 
Courtesy Xinhua News Agency 

continued in office. Officially, he maintained that his requests to 
retire had all been turned down. In fact, the progress of the reform 
program was heavily dependent on Deng's continued central role. 

Hu Yaobang's demotion in 1987 also raised questions about the 
quality of the selection process for top positions and even about 
the stability of the reforming Chinese political system. Hu had been 
viewed as Deng's successor as party leader, but he came under 
attack from within the Political Bureau for what was described as 
indirectly encouraging questioning of the communist system, for 
pushing the economic reforms beyond their intended limits, and 
for speaking out abruptly in international circles. Although Deng 
reportedly apprised Hu of his errors, Hu was said to have failed 
to change and thus was demoted in accordance with party disciplin- 
ary rules. Obvious attempts were made to ease the general shock 
of Hu's demotion, including allowing him to retain his seat on the 
Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and having him shown 
in the press in attendance at key meetings. It seemed likely that 
Hu would be demoted further, at the Thirteenth National Party 
Congress scheduled for October 1987. This would correspond to 
the treatment a few years before of Hua Guofeng and preserve the 
appearance that the party was handling leadership affairs rationally, 
in clear contrast to the era of Maoist purges. 

The First Wave of Reform, 1979-84 

In the process of introducing reforms, China's leaders for the 
most part have acted cautiously and introduced new programs 
incrementally. In the period of the Four Modernizations, they began 
a broad search of foreign sources for ideas to introduce and test 
in the Chinese environment. Their pragmatic approach entailed 



453 



China: A Country Study 

following the progress of newly introduced concepts closely in order 
to make any necessary mid-course corrections or deletions. Main- 
taining the momentum of the reform program required the lead- 
ers to interact constantly to meet the challenges, failures, and 
setbacks inherent in their experiment. 

The major changes introduced by key reforms inevitably pro- 
voked tensions in the political system. Strains developed between 
those who would not benefit or could not adjust to the new condi- 
tions and those who saw the new opportunities afforded. The result- 
ing pressures on the system required constant attention of and 
mediation by the top party leaders. The goals, contents, and 
progress of the reform program reportedly were reviewed and dis- 
cussed regularly at the highest-level party meetings. Leaders on 
the Political Bureau Standing Committee strove for consensus on 
the contents of the reform program and its agenda and participated 
in an ongoing process of bargaining to reconcile different policy 
orientations and institutional interests. The competing interests that 
emerged throughout the country when a new wave of reform was 
introduced appeared to have spokesmen or advocates in the highest 
party circles. The issues that emerged were debated in authorita- 
tive party meetings with the aim of arriving at a consensus and 
preserving harmony on the reform agenda. If this became impos- 
sible, personnel changes tended to follow, as was the case when 
Hu Yaobang apparently broke the consensus, moving ahead of what 
the cautious and stability-minded leadership could accept as a safe 
and reasonable course. 

In this way China, under Deng Xiaoping' s leadership, appeared 
to follow the tenets of democratic centralism (see Glossary). Poli- 
cies that originated at the authoritative party center were tested 
and evaluated in practice, and reports of their results, including 
problems and setbacks, were then channeled back to the system's 
center for debate. In the 1980s it became something of a leader- 
ship art to keep the reform program going, balance the tensions 
it provoked, and maintain the political system intact. Seen in this 
context, a key question became whether or not political leaders other 
than Deng Xiaoping would have the prestige and political skill 
needed to direct and preserve this delicate balance, especially after 
Deng passed from the scene. 

The Opening Up Policy and Reform in the Countryside 

The first reforms to affect China's economy were instituted 
between 1979 and 1984. The programs were systemic economic 
reforms aimed at revising China's foreign economic relations and 
refocusing the country's agricultural system. The desire to purchase 



454 



The Political Process 



foreign equipment and technology needed for China's moderni- 
zation led to a policy of opening up to the outside world that would 
earn foreign exchange through tourism, exports, and arms sales 
(see Reform of the Economic System, Beginning in 1979, ch. 5). 
The opening up policy included sending large numbers of students 
abroad to acquire special training and needed skills. The effect was 
to make China more dependent on major sectors of the world econ- 
omy and reverse the Maoist commitment to the ideal of self-reliance. 
Not everyone was satisfied with this radical departure. The conser- 
vative reformers were especially apprehensive about the corrupting 
cultural and ideological influences that they believed accompanied 
foreign exposure and imports. 

In China's rural areas, the economic reform program decollec- 
tivized agriculture through a contract responsibility system (see 
Glossary) based on individual households (see Rural Society, ch. 3; 
Agricultural Policies, ch. 6). The people's communes (see Glos- 
sary) established under Mao were largely replaced with a system 
of family-based farming. The rural reforms successfully increased 
productivity, the amount of available arable land, and peasant per 
capita income. All of these were major reform achievements. Their 
success stimulated substantial support in the countryside for the 
expansion and deepening of the reform agenda. 

While the opening up policy and rural reform produced signifi- 
cant benefits to the Chinese economy and won enthusiastic sup- 
port for the Deng reformers, they also generated substantial 
problems and brought political opposition from conservative lead- 
ers. The Maoist ideal of self-reliance still had proponents among 
the leadership in the 1980s, and many were openly critical of the 
expanding foreign influences, especially in such areas as the spe- 
cial economic zones (see Glossary). 

In rural areas, economic reform led to inequalities among eco- 
nomic regions and appeared in some instances to produce a new, 
potentially exploitative class of rich peasants. The official press con- 
tained accounts of peasants who carried the profit motive far beyond 
the intent of the reform program, engaging in smuggling, embez- 
zlement, and blatant displays of newly acquired wealth. Thus, on 
the one hand, top leaders fully supporting the reform agenda could 
show major successes as they promoted further reform. On the other 
hand, those more concerned with ideological continuity and social 
stability could identify problems and areas of risk. The differing 
perceptions and responses of these reformist and conservative groups 
produced considerable tension in the political system. 



455 



China: A Country Study 



Rectification and Reform 

These results of the opening up policy and rural reform programs 
had important political repercussions at the national level. The ques- 
tion of borrowing from the West has been debated vigorously since 
the early nineteenth century. The concern has always been the 
impact of Western social, political, and cultural traditions, some- 
times referred to derisively as the "'flies and insects" that blow in 
along with culturally neutral scientific and technical information. 
This concern was especially prevalent among conservatives in the 
highest leadership circles and extended to the possiblv corrosive 
effect of Western traditions on the party's Marxist-Leninist ideo- 
logical foundation. To meet this challenge, in October 1983 the 
party launched a national program to improve '"party style." 
organization, and ideology. 

According to Chen Yun, a leading conservative and major figure 
in party rectification, the question of party style was crucial for 
the organization's very survival, especially because of the party's 
tarnished image and the perceived crisis of confidence and loss of 
prestige during the Cultural Revolution period. Improving party 
style required that organizational norms be restored, which entailed 
ridding the party of factionalism. It also demanded that measures 
be taken to counter corruption and the exercise of privilege. These 
frequently had taken the form of abuses by cadres who used per- 
sonal relations and ""back-door" benefits to further their own 
interests. Finally, improved party style required that political dis- 
cipline be enforced in implementing party programs. 

These goals were accomplished over the next three years, 
accompanied by thorough ideological education. The Second Ple- 
num of the Twelfth Central Committee (October 11-12. 1983) 
affirmed that the policy of opening up to the outside world was 
entirely correct but condemned the "corrosive influence of deca- 
dent bourgeois ideology" that accompanied it and the ""remnant 
feudal ideas" still pervasive within the party system, which required 
thorough rectification. In effect, linking the attempt to '"clear away 
cultural contamination" with improving party style meant reject- 
ing both the radical left, or those who still carried the taint of 
associations with the Cultural Revolution, and those on the right, 
who were considered by some party leaders to have become too 
invok ed in the trappings of Western ideas and practices. 

At the same time that the party was attempting to discipline its 
own ranks, a drive was initiated within Chinese society to crack 
down on crime. Beginning in August 1983. the drive focused on 
the increase in serious crimes against social order: murder, robbery. 



456 



The Political Process 



burglary, rape, and arson. Explanations for the crime wave included 
the breakdown of law and order that had begun in the Cultural 
Revolution period and corrupting influences that had slipped in 
with the opening up policy (see Return to Socialist Legality, ch. 13). 

A campaign against "spiritual pollution" was initiated by a 
speech given at the Second Plenum by Deng Xiaoping (see Policy 
Toward Intellectuals, ch. 4). The campaign targeted "decadent, 
moribund ideas of the bourgeoisie" that questioned the suitability 
of the socialist system or the legitimacy of the party's leading role. 
It also sought to establish a basis for ideological continuity between 
the emerging younger generation and the older, civil-war-era veter- 
ans. Conservative Political Bureau members attempted to use the 
campaign to rectify what they considered decadent behavior and 
corrosive liberal thought. Following this example, some lower-level 
party cadres began to exhibit behavior similar to that of the mass 
campaigns of the Cultural Revolution. Young men and women 
with long hair or Western-style clothing were subjected to ridicule 
and abuse. Peasants who had prospered were accused of selfish- 
ness; in response, some ceased to participate in rural reform. 
Intellectuals were again under suspicion, and party and govern- 
ment cadres adopted a "wait-and-see" attitude to avoid making 
political errors. 

To avert potential instability and stagnation of the reform pro- 
gram, the authorities began to place limits on the spiritual pollu- 
tion campaign: it was not to be pursued in the countryside, it was 
not to impede scientific research aimed at promoting moderniza- 
tion, and, most important, it was not to be implemented in the 
mass-campaign style of the Cultural Revolution. 

By the spring of 1984 the full-scale media treatment of spiritual 
pollution had subsided, indicating that party leaders were able to 
confront the problems and build a consensus on how to contain 
the excesses and return to the reform program. In May, in a bow 
to the conservatives, Zhao Ziyang reported that although mistakes 
had been made in implementing the spiritual pollution campaign, 
the issue of spiritual pollution remained on the party agenda. The 
reform leadership thus eased the tensions within the system by 
acknowledging that reactions to the reform program would occur 
and by checking any obstructions, disruptions, or violence that 
emerged. This essentially conciliatory approach was necessary at 
least until opponents could be removed or reformed through a series 
of new appointments or through the continuing party rectification 
program. 



457 



China: A Country Study 



The Second Wave of Reform, 1984-86 

Reform of the urban industrial and commercial economy was 
formally initiated with the landmark "Decision of the Central Com- 
mittee of the Chinese Communist Party on Reform of the Eco- 
nomic Structure" issued in October 1984. The radical changes 
contained in the urban program were revealed as it unfolded, and 
they heralded additional tensions. The urban program was accom- 
panied by a less publicized but apparently spectacularly successful 
program for developing rural industry. These programs presented 
considerable challenges for the political system. The strain was 
intensified by the fact that the urban reform system was being 
implemented at a time when the party rectification program was 
extending below the central level, into all areas of society. 

The Repercussions of Urban Reform 

The party leadership benefited from the success of the rural 
reform program and the generally enthusiastic public response it 
generated. The leadership sought to use this success as a basis for 
tackling reform of the much more complicated and diverse urban 
sector. The overall goal of the highly experimental urban reform 
program has been to create a mixed economy in which the market 
plays a significant role and in which state planning is concerned 
more with regulating than with directing the economy. This 
approach, however, has led to tensions both in conceptualization 
and in the effects of reforms on people. 

At the conceptual level, the reform's emphasis on leasing indus- 
trial and commercial enterprises to individuals and collectives raised 
the issue of diversification of ownership and challenged the ortho- 
dox concept of state ownership. The introduction of securities mar- 
kets and stock exchanges raised the question of how many 
Western-style reforms China could absorb and still call itself a 
socialist country. The same question applied to the adoption of a 
controversial bankruptcy law. These emerging problems were 
bound to be troublesome to party leaders like Chen Yun, who 
adhered to more orthodox socialist concepts. 

At the level of implementation, questions emerged concerning 
the speculation and exploitation that was believed to accompany 
the operation of stock exchanges. The introduction of bankruptcy 
provisions was viewed as contributing to unemployment and hard- 
ships for the workers. Also, the introduction of a labor contract 
system, while providing opportunities to motivated and competent 
workers, might well threaten the livelihood of the less skilled. Even 
the new value being placed on entrepreneurship challenged the 



458 



The Gate of Heavenly Peace (Tiananmen) in Beijing, 
entrance to the Forbidden City 
Courtesy Robert L. W or den 

previous way of life, in which the state made all decisions and 
provided the means of sustaining life. 

Although these challenges were serious, the most important 
dimension of the reform program was its distribution of power and 
authority. This function can be viewed as the dominant political 
role of the urban reform program, affecting the structure and 
organization of the party itself. 

The Decentralization of Power 

To produce the desired "socialist planned commodity economy," 
China's reform leadership began to recognize the necessity of trans- 
ferring more authority over economic decision making to urban 
factory managers. A "factory director responsibility system" was 
developed to encourage more local initiative, more efficient use of 
resources, and more skillful and judicious leadership by the front- 
line producers. The reform immediately met serious resistance from 
party secretaries attached to the factories, who until then had been 
responsible for factory management and especially for personnel 
decisions. In their view, the reform threatened party perquisites 
and usurped local party decision-making authority. 

This major issue in industrial reform was introduced in the con- 
text of the party's ongoing efforts to redefine the proper party role, 
especially vis-a-vis the government. In the mid-1980s it appeared 
that party leaders would have to share power even further, this 
time with enterprise managers or economic reform managers. Mid- 
level party cadres, many of whom had become party members 
during the Cultural Revolution decade, were particularly prone 
to negative feelings, especially concerning the urban reform pro- 
gram. Their resistance and resentment found sympathy among 



459 



China: A Country Study 



national-level party and government conservatives like Peng Zhen, 
Deng Liqun, and others and provided a substantial base of sup- 
port for these leaders when they presented their own, similar views 
in policy-making circles. At least the leaders at the top who advo- 
cated more gradual reform could point to this disgruntled mid-level 
party group as a reason for revising the pace and content of the 
reform agenda. 

The Third Wave of Reform, Beginning in 1986 

The reform program seems to have followed a logical sequence, 
building a base of support in the countryside, where issues and 
institutions were more clear-cut, and then moving on to the more 
diverse and politically complex urban areas. As the reform pro- 
gram began to confront major obstacles in this setting, the reform 
leaders, led by Deng Xiaoping, began to emphasize the need to 
extend reform to political structures in order to make political 
institutions and processes more supportive of the modernization 
program. 

The need for further political reform was underlined by the con- 
tinuing difficulty in implementing the factory-director responsibility 
system, a major goal of the reform program for 1986. Party cadres 
had already lost the privilege of life tenure and been subjected to 
the rigors and requirements of the party rectification programs. 
They would not easily forfeit operational control of economic 
enterprises. 

Political Reform 

The August 1980 address on reform made by Deng to the Politi- 
cal Bureau became the basis in 1987 for changes in the party and 
state leadership systems. In the 1980 speech, Deng had called for 
strengthening the people's congresses, separating party and govern- 
ment organizations, reforming the cadre system, and establishing 
an independent judiciary. By 1986 the leadership's apparently over- 
riding interest in Deng's plan was to curtail excessive party inter- 
ference in governmental and economic decision making, and it was 
therefore bound eventually to provoke apprehension and resistance. 
In early 1986, with responsibility for political reform resting in the 
party Secretariat, several reports were aired concerning party secre- 
taries at lower levels who had refused to relinquish decision-making 
power to benefit local economic reform management. Many local 
unit secretaries had succeeded in reclaiming authority previously 
given up. While Deng and the central reform leaders emphasized 
that party interference in government affairs actually weakened 
party leadership, conservative leaders such as Peng Zhen continued 



460 



The Political Process 



to speak about party unity and spirit and about the more gradual 
means to political change. Gradual means included additional legis- 
lation and the proper functioning of democratic centralism. 

In addition to the new emphasis on power sharing in economic 
management, pressures increased to realize the goals of "socialist 
democracy" by increasing participation in public affairs through 
direct elections from a field of candidates. In fact, it was a student 
protest over the local slate of officials for a people's congress elec- 
tion in Anhui Province that sparked the student demonstrations 
that spread throughout the country in late 1986. In extending the 
argument for increased freedoms and democratic practices, demon- 
strators began even to question the presiding role of the party in 
the political system. Demonstrations in at least seventeen cities, 
with participants in the tens of thousands, also threatened to dis- 
rupt the urban economy and the continuation of the economic 
reform program. The drive to decentralize power and to separate 
party from government authority created political strains already 
apparent from the fact that no authoritative statement on these key 
issues ensued from the Sixth Plenum of the Twelfth Central Com- 
mittee held in September 1986. The student demonstrations that 
followed lent credibility to conservative ideologues in the Secretariat, 
such as Deng Liqun, who argued that continued political relaxa- 
tion and reform would inevitably lead to social chaos. 

Resistance and the Campaign Against Bourgeois Liberalization 

In late 1986, during the critical period when the Chinese politi- 
cal system appeared threatened by student demonstrators burn- 
ing copies of party official newspapers, General Secretary Hu 
Yaobang failed to act to restore order. Hu refused to denounce 
the demonstrators or their intellectual mentors or to retreat from 
the political reform agenda. Instead, Hu favored the introduction 
of more "democratization" or pluralism into the political system. 
He called for more movement on political reform than the system 
could bear. In effect, Hu had outstripped the consensus concern- 
ing the pace and content of the reform agenda. In response, Deng 
Xiaoping had to make the difficult decision to remove his protege 
from the post of party general secretary, a step taken by unani- 
mous decision at an extraordinary expanded Political Bureau meet- 
ing in January 1987. Hu was replaced by Zhao Ziyang, one of the 
chief architects of the economic reform program, who explained 
that democratic reforms in China required a "protracted" process 
for their implementation. 

At the same time that Hu Yaobang was removed from office, 
a campaign was initiated against "bourgeois liberalization." Given 



461 



China: A Country Study 



heavy play in the official media, this campaign sought to discredit 
Western political concepts and emphasize the importance of 
adhering to the four cardinal principles (see Glossary). The cam- 
paign against bourgeois liberalization became the means for con- 
servatives led by Political Bureau members Chen Yun, Peng Zhen, 
and Hu Qjaomu to express their opposition to some of the reforms, 
especially the pace of the reform agenda, and to the increased 
democratization advocated by Hu Yaobang. Having responded to 
major conservative concerns, Zhao then emphasized the limits that 
had been placed on the campaign against bourgeois liberalization. 
The ideological campaign was to be limited to the party, and it 
was neither to reach the rural areas nor to affect economic reform 
policies. In addition, experimentation in the arts and sciences was 
not to be discouraged by this campaign. The imposition of these 
limits was inspired no doubt in large part by the need to avoid dis- 
ruptions such as those that had accompanied the spiritual pollu- 
tion campaign in 1983 and 1984. Besides affirming his support for 
the ongoing campaign against bourgeois liberalization, within speci- 
fied limits, Zhao stressed that the economic reform program — 
including opening up to the outside world — would continue. 

In March 1987 Deng Xiaoping made it clear that political reform 
also was to continue and that a "tentative plan" for political reform 
would be included on the agenda of the Thirteenth National Party 
Congress in October 1987. Deng's revelation suggested that with 
Hu Yaobang removed, China's senior leadership had reached a 
consensus on the sensitive issue of political reform, which had been 
discussed by many of them in general and cautious terms for some 
time. Even conservative senior leaders such as Li Xiannian and 
Peng Zhen made statements supporting political reform. This 
development did not limit the likelihood of very intense debate 
before and during the next National Party Congress on the specific 
implementation of this most sensitive program. But it did suggest 
that, with Hu Yaobang's demotion, China's top leaders could dis- 
cuss key details of the future role of the party in China's reformed 
political system at the upcoming congress. 

The Politics of Modernization 

In the years following the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Com- 
mittee Central in 1978, certain key reforms set in motion a process 
of systemic change in society. Successful continuation of the reform 
program depended on the ability of China's senior leaders to 
respond to the constant challenges encountered in implementing 
these changes. Although a significant portion of the political sys- 
tem underwent major reform, a central question remaining in the 



462 



The Political Process 



late 1980s was whether or not the party could maintain stable cen- 
tral leadership. There was reason to question whether a consensus 
could be built within China's top leadership circles without the 
presence of a leader of the stature of Deng Xiaoping. With major 
bureaucratic interests to contend with and satisfy, and differing 
ideological orientations within the top leadership, strong central 
direction seemed to be the basic requirement for continuing reform. 

The Components of Reform 

The major components of 1980s political reform emphasized col- 
lective leadership, the re-establishment of the party Secretariat to 
implement party policy and to train a group of senior-level suc- 
cessors, the strengthening of the government apparatus to enable 
it to share more power and responsibility for the development of 
the reform program, and the removal of the military from a major 
and sustained role in politics. The introduction of direct elections 
and multiple candidates for people's congresses up to the county 
level broadened public participation in China's governmental and 
political processes. Also, the electoral process provided an expanded 
forum for assessing both the potential and the shortcomings of party 
reform policies. The intent to involve the public in the process of 
identifying and resolving problems that emerged in implementing 
the reform program also was extended to vocational groups. For 
example, workers' congresses were given increased leeway to exam- 
ine, debate, and discuss the policies being carried out in factories 
and even to evaluate the performance of factory managers. Even 
though the governmental and vocational groups had no direct 
political power, their new public voice on reform elevated the 
political process at least one step above the secret, closed channels 
of the Maoist era. In institutionalizing the reform debate, the party 
also developed a more efficient means for shaping and channeling 
public debate. 

Competing Bureaucratic Interests 

The implementation of these components of political reform con- 
tributed to internal tensions and competition among the major 
bureaucracies — the party, government, and military. The party's 
status remained paramount within the system, but the delineation 
of its role became increasingly vague. Theoretically, the party was 
to act as the unifying force that would guide the society on the 
difficult path to modernization. In practice, especially at the mid- 
dle levels of the structure, it appeared in the mid-1980s that imple- 
mentation of the reform program was greatly diluting the power 
of party cadres. Many party members were retired to advisory 



463 



China: A Country Study 



capacities, increased emphasis was placed on separating the func- 
tions of the party and government, and much of the decision-making 
authority in the economic sphere was transferred to enterprise 
managers. All these factors eroded the party's once pervasive 
authority. Although the party continued to articulate the central 
policy for all levels of society, it offered fewer opportunities for mem- 
bers to achieve recognition and rewards after 1978, when concrete 
results became more important. All this brought widespread bureau- 
cratic resistance to reform policies and their implementation. 

Retirements, elevated entrance qualifications, and power shar- 
ing with enterprise managers also brought traumatic changes in 
government bureaucracy. Direct elections to people's congresses 
added a new element of uncertainty about the cadre selection process 
for government service. Wider public discussion of issues and more 
extensive press coverage subjected state cadres to additional 
demands and criticisms and sometimes to abuse. The new account- 
ability offered opportunities for government cadres, but often they 
perceived it as a threat or a burden. It soon became another major 
source of the complaints conveyed to top leadership circles. 

In the late 1980s, the People's Liberation Army continued as 
a major player in political circles and had representatives on the 
Political Bureau (see Civil-Military Relations, ch. 14). Its presence 
within senior party bodies significantly declined in the 1980s, 
however, as was apparent from the percentage of party Central 
Committee memberships held by military personnel. Military 
influence had reached a high point in 1969, when its representa- 
tives gained roughly half the seats on the party's Ninth Central 
Committee, but declined at the Tenth Central Committee (1973) 
and Eleventh Central Committee (1978). In 1982 full membership 
on the Twelfth Central Committee held by People's Liberation 
Army personnel dropped to around 20 percent. At the National 
Conference of Party Delegates held in September 1985, about half 
of those retired from the Central Committee were from the armed 
forces, and civilians replaced seven members of the Political Bureau 
who had military connections. 

These trends reflected Deng Xiaoping' s military reform goals 
of placing the People's Liberation Army under firm civilian leader- 
ship and transforming its ranks and organization into a modern, 
professional military establishment. Owing partly to its size and 
largely to its heavily Maoist revolutionary traditions, the military 
was essentially conservative and in 1987 continued to resist many 
of the reformers' policies. It seemed possible that Deng's succes- 
sors might experience strong pressure from a revitalized People's 
Liberation Army to restore some of its lost political influence. 



464 



The Political Process 



Deng Xiaoping's Seminal Role 

Although post-Mao pronouncements by the Chinese Communist 
Party officially emphasized collective leadership, Deng Xiaoping 
clearly occupied center stage and acquired unique political stature 
in the party hierarchy (without even holding the titular number- 
one position). Following the consolidation of Deng's power at the 
Twelfth National Party Congress in 1982, the party issued The 
Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping. The book was intended to provide 
authoritative ideological backing for the reform program in progress 
and became required reading for party members. Another volume, 
entitled Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, issued in 1985, 
contained speeches and writings on economic policy, ideological 
questions, and foreign policy written by Deng after the Twelfth 
National Party Congress. A major purpose of the later work was 
to support the dramatic reforms introduced at the Third Plenum 
of that congress's Central Committee in October 1984. This book 
was re-released in March 1987 with additional speeches and remarks 
on intervening events, purportedly with the intention of provid- 
ing extensive guidance for reform. Given the volume and frequency 
of publication, it became difficult for the reform leadership to avoid 
the appearance of creating a cult of personality around Deng. 

Deng was an effective bridge between China's legendary revolu- 
tionary generation and the generation engaged in carrying out the 
Four Modernizations. At the same time, Deng's preeminence called 
attention to the succession issue. The resolution of problems emerg- 
ing in the course of reform depended heavily on Deng's political 
backing and on his authoritative reform pronouncements. In large 
measure, Deng's published works would support later leaders by 
providing them an authoritative source with which to bolster their 
own reform measures. Like any body of writing, however, Deng's 
thoughts are open to interpretation and thus might as easily be used 
by an opposition group for its own ends. 

Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought Re-Thought 

Continuous development of the means of production is a major 
goal of all Marxist governments. Under Mao, however, that goal 
was pursued in a manner that subordinated economic policy to the 
dictates of massive class struggle and, in the end, to political struggle 
carried up to the Political Bureau level. Mao, who admitted his 
own ignorance of economics, resented efforts to correct the problems 
caused by hasty agricultural collectivization and the Great Leap 
Forward (1958-60; see Glossary), and he initiated a political and 
ideological "struggle" against the 1950s reformers. This political 



465 



China: A Country Study 

campaign reached massive proportions during the Cultural Revo- 
lution, doing extensive damage to the economic, political, and social 
fabric of Chinese society. 

In contrast, the post-Mao leadership so emphasized the issue of 
economic modernization that modernization began to shape the 
political process itself. Economic modernization became the basis 
of Deng Xiaoping's pragmatic reform policies. Despite disagree- 
ments over the content and pace of the reform program, Deng won 
solid support from other senior Chinese leaders who recognized 
the great danger of neglecting economic development and the well- 
being of the people. 

The difference in political style between Mao and Deng was evi- 
dent in their approach to opposition. When Mao perceived that 
party bureaucrats were blocking the full implementation of his radi- 
cal programs, he set out in the early 1960s to purify the party. In 
contrast, faced with similar opposition in the 1980s, Deng sought 
points of agreement and built a coalition around an eclectic eco- 
nomic program. 

The Role of Ideology 

In the early 1950s, Mao borrowed Stalinist social and economic 
principles in promoting development. When these methods failed 
to produce immediate and spectacular results, Mao adopted a mass- 
campaign style of development derived from his experiences as a 
guerrilla leader. When applied to post- 1949 problems, however, 
the style produced chaos. Mao's writings and speeches degenerated 
into rigid dogma that his followers insisted be followed to the let- 
ter. Deng, conversely, advocated a flexible and creative applica- 
tion of Marxist principles, even claiming that Marxism, as the 
product of an earlier age, did not provide all the means for address- 
ing contemporary issues. Rather, he advocated taking a highly 
empirical approach known as "seeking truth from facts" in order 
to find the most effective means of dealing with problems. In Deng's 
approach, ideology itself was not the source of truth but merely 
an instrument for arriving at truth by experimentation, observa- 
tion, and generalization. 

To effect such a basic revision of Maoist ideology, Deng had 
to de-mystify Mao and reduce the towering image of the "Great 
Helmsman" to more human proportions. This was largely accom- 
plished in June 1981, when the party's Sixth Plenum of the Eleventh 
Central Committee reassessed Mao's place in the history of the 
Chinese revolution. In the years after 1981, the leadership neverthe- 
less continued to revere Mao's image as a revolutionary, nation- 
alist, and modernizing symbol, especially when that image aided 



466 



The Chairman Mao Memorial 
Hall in Tiananmen Square 
with the Monument to the 
People's Heroes in the 
foreground, Beijing 
Courtesy Robert L. Wo r den 



Billboard- sized pictures 
and heroic statues of 
Mao Zedong once prev- 
alent throughout China 
became less common in 
the 1980s. This one was 
prominently located at 
the front gates of the 
Beijing Iron and Steel 
College, Beijing, in 1986. 
Courtesy Robert L. Wo r den 















SB 






1 



















467 



China: A Country Study 



development of Deng's reform program (see China and the Four 
Modernizations, 1979-82, ch. 1). 

Ideology and the Socialist Man 

An important goal of Maoist ideology was the inculcation of cer- 
tain prescribed values in party members and, by extension, in 
society as a whole. These included selfless dedication to the com- 
mon good; an egalitarian concern with the uncomplicated expres- 
sion of ideas in maxims or brief phrases understandable to all; and 
fervent commitment to ideal social behavior. In contrast, state ideol- 
ogy in the hands of Deng Xiaoping had a different purpose. The 
orientation was practical and less doctrinaire, aimed at fulfilling 
the goals of modernization. The official ideology was to be used 
to channel the individual's attempts to understand and practice 
modern concepts and methods. For example, in early 1987 the con- 
cept of village committees was introduced to give the massive rural 
population direct experience in self-management. It did not appear 
that these new bodies were meant to have substantive power but 
rather that they were intended to indoctrinate the population with 
modern approaches to social and political relations. 

Paralleling this use of ideology as a cognitive tool was the party's 
policy of "emancipating the mind' ' and allowing debate to extend 
into subjects once considered "forbidden zones." China's schol- 
ars have argued publicly over issues such as the value of the com- 
mune system, the need for market concepts in a socialist economy, 
the historical impact of humanism, and even the current relevance 
of Marxism-Leninism. Student demonstrators in the mid-1980s 
went too far, however, by questioning the preeminent role of the 
party. At that point, the immediate official response was to subor- 
dinate creativity and experimentation to public recognition of the 
presiding role of the party and its ideology. 

Ideology and Social Change 

Since the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in 
December 1978, party reformers have been committed to chan- 
neling the increased political awareness and energies of the popu- 
lation into a strengthened movement for change. The tensions that 
have emerged during each successive wave of reform have required 
intervention and policy decisions at senior party levels. These some- 
times have taken the form of new initiatives. At other times, ten- 
sions have precipitated a conservative response. Overall, this 
political process has seemed to support a gradual but forward move- 
ment of the reform program. 

Modernization, by its very nature, is a socially disruptive process. 



468 



The Political Process 



In 1987. with many of the functions of the party apparatus still 
unclear even to party members and the question of Deng Xiao- 
ping's successor still unsettled, the success of China's reform pro- 
gram was by no means assured. 

* * * 

Relatively few book-length studies of post-Mao politics are avail- 
able. One of the more notable is John Gardner's Chinese Politics 
and the Succession to Mao, the major points of which are summarized 
and updated in his lengthy article "China under Deng." Key offi- 
cial documents for much of the post-Mao period can be found in 
The People's Republic of China, 1979-1984, edited by Harold Hin- 
ton. A valuable survey of the period is provided by A. Doak 
Barnett's "Ten Years after Mao." 

Harry Harding's "Political Development in Post-Mao China," 
in Barnett and Ralph Clough's Modernizing China: Post-Mao Reform 
and Development, contains useful information on the post- 1978 
political scene. Articles by Harding, Carol Hamrin, and Chris- 
topher Clarke in the United States Congress Joint Economic Com- 
mittee's China 's Economy Looks Toward the Year 2000 also are helpful 
in understanding the post-Mao era. 

Andrew J. Nathan's Chinese Democracy skillfully analyzes the evo- 
lution of the Chinese conception of "democracy." Michel Oksenberg 
and Richard Bush, in "China's Political Evolution, 1972-1982," 
give extensive descriptions of the Chinese bureaucracy. Melanie 
Manion's "The Cadre Management System, Post-Mao: The 
Appointment, Promotion, Transfer, and Removal of Party and State 
Leaders" is a good examination of the cadre management system. 
David S. G. Goodman's "The National CCP Conference of Sep- 
tember 1985 and China's Leadership Changes" presents extensive 
data on leadership developments in the mid-1980s. 

Mao 's China and After by Maurice Meisner and Politics in China 
by James R. Townsend and Brandy Womack provide general back- 
ground on the post- 1978 political history of China. Barnett's older 
Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China and Richard 
H. Solomon's Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture give 
excellent background on contemporary Chinese politics. Also, Franz 
Schurmann's seminal work, Ideology and Organization in Communist 
China, provides clear and extensive discussion on the basic elements 
of the Chinese political system. 

Biographies of key Chinese leaders can be found in works by 
David Chang, Jerome Chen, Stuart Schram, and Dick Wilson. 
(For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



469 



Chapter 12. Foreign Relations 



Waiting in eternity for battle, this terra-cotta archer was entombed with tens 
of thousands of similar figures toward the end of the Qin dynasty (221- 
207 B.C.) near XV an, Shaanxi Province. 



IN THE 1980s CHINA pursued an independent foreign policy, 
formally disavowing too close a relationship with either the United 
States or the Soviet Union. The stated goals of this policy were 
safeguarding world peace, opposing all forms of hegemony, and 
achieving economic modernization at home. Chinese statements 
repeatedly emphasized the interrelation among these goals. In other 
words, China needed a peaceful international environment so that 
adequate resources could be devoted to its ambitious development 
plans for the rest of the twentieth century. The goal of economic 
modernization was a driving force behind China's increasingly 
active participation in world affairs, exemplified by its policy of 
opening up to the outside world, which greatly expanded Chinese 
economic relations with foreign countries. As part of what it called 
an "independent foreign policy of peace," Beijing had joined 
numerous international organizations, and it maintained diplomatic 
relations with more nations than at any time since the founding 
of the People's Republic of China in 1949. By mid-1987, China 
had diplomatic relations with 133 nations, and — in contrast with 
earlier periods — was willing to interact with governments of different 
social systems or ideologies on a basis of peaceful coexistence and 
mutual respect. 

Although Chinese foreign policy since 1949 has had distinctive 
characteristics, the forces that shape Beijing's foreign policy and 
many of its overall goals have been similar to those of other nations. 
China has sought to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity 
and to achieve independence of action, while interacting with both 
more powerful and less powerful countries. As with most other 
nations, Beijing's foreign relations have been conditioned by its 
historical experiences, nationalism and ideology, and the world- 
view of its leaders, as well as by the governmental structure and 
decision-making process. At times China's domestic policies have 
had wide-ranging ramifications for its foreign policy formulation. 

Another characteristic Chinese foreign policy has had in com- 
mon with that of many other countries is that the actual conduct 
of foreign relations sometimes has been at odds with official policy. 
Beijing's stress on ideology and principles in its official statements 
at times makes the contrast between statements and actions par- 
ticularly noticeable. In addition, a nation's leaders must often make 
decisions in reaction to events and circumstances, rather than simply 
formulating a rational foreign policy based on their goals. The need 



473 



China: A Country Study 



to react to what has happened or what may happen adds an ele- 
ment of unpredictability to foreign policy decision making, as has 
been the case at several crucial junctures in Chinese foreign rela- 
tions since 1949. 

In addition to the aspects of foreign policy formulation and imple- 
mentation that China has in common with other countries, Chi- 
na's foreign policy from 1949 to the late 1980s has had these 
characteristics: contrast between practicality and adherence to prin- 
ciples; fluctuation between militancy and peacefulness; tension 
between self-reliance and dependence on others; and contrast 
between China's actual and potential capabilities. These contradic- 
tory characteristics have created a confusing picture of Chinese for- 
eign policy: is Chinese foreign policy basically pragmatic or 
primarily based on principles and ideology? Is China peace-loving 
or intent on fomenting world revolution? Is China's ultimate goal 
to be self-sufficient or economically interdependent with the rest 
of the world? And is China basically a poor, developing country 
that is at most a regional power or actually a nascent economic 
and military giant deserving of superpower status? 

The response to these questions is that since 1949 Chinese for- 
eign policy has reflected all of these contrasting features. Beijing 
has emphasized principles and ideology above everything else in 
foreign relations, especially during the 1950s and 1960s, but Chinese 
leaders have also shown a practical side that gave them the flexi- 
bility to change policies, sometimes drastically, when they deemed 
it in China's best interest. One of the most dramatic changes was 
the shift from an alliance with the Soviet Union against the United 
States and Japan in the 1950s to an explicitly anti-Soviet policy 
and rapprochement with Japan and the United States in the 1970s. 
Since 1949 Chinese foreign policy has fluctuated between periods 
of militancy, for example during the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), 
when China called for worldwide revolution, and periods when Bei- 
jing has been a chief proponent of peaceful coexistence among 
nations, such as during the mid-1950s and again during the 1980s. 
How self-reliant or dependent on others China should become in 
order to modernize has been a constant dilemma in Chinese policy 
since the nineteenth century. As this policy fluctuated, Chinese for- 
eign relations have alternated between a tendency toward isola- 
tion and periods of openness to foreign assistance and influence. 
Finally, the contradiction between China's actual capabilities since 
1949 and its perceived potential has been another salient and dis- 
tinctive feature of its foreign relations. China's tremendous size, 
population, natural resources, military strength, and sense of his- 
tory have placed it in the unusual position of being a poor, 



474 



Foreign Relations 



developing country that has often been treated as a major global 
power having a special relationship with the United States and the 
Soviet Union. 

Evolution of Foreign Policy 

Understanding the origins and forces shaping China's foreign 
policy provides a framework in which to view both the changes 
and the continuities in Chinese foreign policy from 1949 to the late 
1980s. The origins of China's foreign policy can be found in its 
size and population, historical legacy, worldview, nationalism, and 
Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. These factors have com- 
bined with China's economic and military capabilities, governmen- 
tal structure, and decision-making processes to make certain foreign 
policy goals prominent: security, sovereignty and independence, 
territorial integrity and reunification, and economic development. 

Historical Legacy and Worldview 

China's long and rich history as the world's oldest continuous 
civilization has affected Chinese foreign relations in various ways. 
For centuries the Chinese empire enjoyed basically unchallenged 
greatness and self-sufficiency (see The Imperial Era, ch. 1). China 
saw itself as the cultural center of the universe, a view reflected 
in the concept of the Middle Kingdom (Zhongguo, the Chinese 
word for China). For the most part, it viewed non-Chinese peo- 
ples as uncivilized barbarians. Although China was occasionally 
overrun and ruled by these "barbarians," as during the Yuan 
(1279-1368) and Qing (1644-1911) dynasties, the non-Chinese 
usually retained enough Chinese institutions to maintain a con- 
tinuity of tradition. Because the Chinese emperor was considered 
the ruler of all mankind by virtue of his innate superiority, rela- 
tions with other states or entities were tributary, rather than state- 
to-state relations between equals. Traditionally, there was no 
equivalent of a foreign ministry; foreign relations included such 
activities as tributary missions to the emperor made by countries 
seeking trade with China and Chinese military expeditions against 
neighboring barbarians to keep them outside China's borders. The 
first Europeans who sought trade with China, beginning in the six- 
teenth century, were received as tributary missions and had to con- 
form to the formalities and rituals of the tribute system at the 
Chinese court. China's view of itself as the undisputed center of 
civilization — a phenomenon called sinocentrism — remained basi- 
cally unchanged until the nineteenth century, when the Qing 
dynasty began to deteriorate under Western pressure. 



475 



China: A Country Study 



A traditional concept related to China's view of itself as the Mid- 
dle Kingdom that continues to have relevance is the idea of "using 
barbarians to control barbarians." In modern times, this practice 
has taken the form of using relations with one foreign power as 
a counterweight to relations with another. Two examples are Chi- 
na's policy of "leaning to one side" in the Sino-Soviet alliance of 
the 1950s for support against the United States and Beijing's rap- 
prochement with the United States in the 1970s to counteract the 
Soviet threat China perceived at the time. China's strong desire 
for sovereignty and independence of action, however, seems to have 
made Chinese alliances or quasi-alliances short-lived. 

Another effect of China's historical legacy is its tendency toward 
isolationism and an ambivalence about opening up to the outside 
world. In imperial times, China's foreign relations varied from 
dynasty to dynasty — from cosmopolitan periods like the Tang 
dynasty (A.D. 618-907) to isolationist periods such as the Ming 
dynasty (1368-1644), when few foreigners were allowed in the coun- 
try. Overall, the sinocentric worldview and China's history of cen- 
turies of self-sufficiency favored isolation, which contributed to 
China's difficulty when confronted by expansionist Western pow- 
ers in the nineteenth century. The debate over self-reliance and 
possible corruption by foreign influences or opening up to the out- 
side world in order to modernize more quickly has continued for 
over a century and was still an issue in the late 1980s. 

Nationalism 

The importance of sovereignty and independence of action in 
Chinese foreign policy since 1949 has been closely related to Chinese 
nationalism. Just as Chinese national pride has been a natural out- 
growth of China's long and rich historical tradition, the national- 
ism of Chinese leaders also has derived from the injustices China 
suffered in more recent history, in particular, China's domination 
by foreign powers from the nineteenth century until the end of 
World War II (see Emergence of Modern China, ch. 1). During 
this time, which China refers to as "the century of shame and 
humiliation," the formerly powerful imperial government devolved 
to what China calls "semicolonial" status, as it was forced to sign 
unequal treaties and grant foreigners special privileges of extrater- 
ritoriality. Foreign powers divided China into spheres of influence. 
Most debilitating and humiliating was the foreign military threat 
that overpowered China, culminating in Japan's invasion and 
occupation of parts of China in the late 1930s. The bitter recollec- 
tion of China's suffering at the hands of foreign powers has con- 
tinued to be a source of Chinese nationalistic sentiment since 1949. 



476 



Foreign Relations 



The suspicion of foreign powers, opposition to any implication of 
inferior status, and desire to reassert sovereignty and independence 
have strongly influenced Chinese foreign policy. Examples of this 
attitude are Mao Zedong's statement in 1949 that "the Chinese 
people have stood up" and Deng Xiaoping' s 1982 pronouncement 
that "no foreign country can expect China to be its vassal or expect 
it to swallow any bitter fruit detrimental to its interests." 

A foreign policy goal closely related to nationalism has been the 
desire to achieve territorial integrity and to restore to Chinese 
sovereignty areas previously considered a part of China. Although 
China as of 1987 had not resolved border disputes with several of 
its neighbors, including India, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam 
(including islands in the South China Sea), Beijing had concluded 
boundary settlements with other nations, including Pakistan, 
Burma, Nepal, Afghanistan, the Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea (North Korea), and the Mongolian People's Republic (Mon- 
golia). Negotiations on border issues, held intermittently with the 
Soviet Union since 1949 and with India since the early 1980s, con- 
tinued to be held in 1987. The difficulty of resolving these issues 
seemed to reflect their relation to sensitive questions of national 
pride both in China and in neighboring countries and sometimes 
to questions of China's perceived national security interests (see 
Physical Environment, ch. 2). For example, Qing control over 
Outer Mongolia (present-day Mongolia) had lapsed long before 
1949 and had been supplanted by Russian and then Soviet influ- 
ence. Although it was most likely with reluctance and regret, China 
recognized Mongolia as a separate nation in 1949. By contrast, 
asserting sovereignty over another outlying area, Xizang (Tibet), 
was considered such an important strategic goal that military force 
was used to gain control there in 1950 and to reassert it in 1959. 

Two other Chinese areas under the control of foreign powers 
are Hong Kong and Macao. According to Chinese statements, these 
"problems left over from history" were the result of imperialist 
aggression and the incompetence of Chinese rulers. Macao, the 
first European enclave on the Chinese coast, was occupied by Por- 
tugal in 1557 and ceded to Portugal under an 1887 treaty. Britain 
gained control of Hong Kong island and adjacent territory through 
three treaties with China in the nineteenth century. In the mid-1980s 
China concluded formal arrangements with Britain and Portugal 
for the return of these areas to Chinese sovereignty in 1997 (Hong 
Kong) and 1999 (Macao). Both agreements were made under a 
policy of "one country, two systems" (see Glossary), giving the 
areas a high degree of autonomy as "special administrative regions" 
of China. From the perspective of Chinese nationalism, negotiating 



477 



China: A Country Study 



the return of both Hong Kong and Macao to Chinese sovereignty 
before the end of the twentieth century was undoubtedly one of 
the major foreign policy accomplishments of Chinese leaders in the 
1980s. 

The most crucial of the issues of national reunification, however, 
remained unresolved in the late 1980s: the issue of Taiwan. Chiang 
Kai-shek and his forces lied to Taiwan after the founding of the 
People's Republic of China in 1949. The government they estab- 
lished there, the "Republic of China," continued to claim authority 
as the government of the Chinese nation almost four decades after 
the founding of the People's Republic. Although China's goal of 
reunifying Taiwan with the mainland remained unchanged, the 
previous, more militant Chinese policy of "liberating Taiwan" was 
replaced in the 1980s by the concept of reunification under the "one 
country, two systems" policy. The agreements on Hong Kong and 
Macao were considered by many observers as possible precedents 
for reunifying Taiwan with the mainland. Because of the legacy 
of mistrust between the leaders of the two sides and other complex 
factors, however, this difficult and long-standing problem did not 
appear close to resolution in the late 1980s. 

The Influence of Ideology 

An important influence on Chinese foreign policy that has 
especially affected China's interpretations of world events has been 
ideology, both Marxist-Leninist and Maoist. The ideological com- 
ponents of China's foreign policy, whose influence has varied over 
time, have included a belief that conflict and struggle are inevita- 
ble; a focus on opposing imperialism; the determination to advance 
communism throughout the world, especially through the Chinese 
model; and the Maoist concept of responding with flexibility while 
adhering to fundamental principles. 

One of the most basic aspects of China's ideological worldview 
has been the assumption that conflict, though not necessarily mili- 
tary conflict, is omnipresent in the world. According to Marxist- 
Leninist analysis, all historical development is the result of a process 
of struggle, between classes within a nation, between nations them- 
selves, or between broader forces such as socialism and imperial- 
ism. A basic tenet of Chinese leaders holds that the international 
situation is best understood in terms of the "principal contradic- 
tions" of the time. Once these contradictions are understood, they 
can be exploited in order to, as Mao said, "win over the many, 
oppose the few, and crush our enemies one by one." China has 
amplified the Leninist policy of uniting with some forces in order 
to oppose others more effectively in a united front (see Glossary). 



478 



Foreign Relations 



Chinese leaders have urged the formation of various united fronts 
as they have perceived the contradictions in the world to change 
over time. 

Perhaps because of the belief in struggle as necessary for progress, 
for most of its history after 1949 China considered world war 
inevitable. This changed in the 1980s, when Chinese leaders began 
to say that the forces for peace in the world had become greater 
than the forces for war. One reason for growing world stability was 
seen in "multipolarization," that is, the growth of additional forces, 
such as the Third World and Europe, to counterbalance the ten- 
sion between the United States and the Soviet Union. China's 
description of world events as a struggle between opposing forces, 
however, remained unchanged. 

Opposition to imperialism — domination by foreign powers — is 
another major ideological component of Chinese foreign policy. 
The Leninist emphasis on the struggle against imperialism made 
sense to Chinese leaders, whose nationalism had evolved in part 
in reaction to China's exploitation by foreign powers during the 
nineteenth century. Although opposition to imperialism and hege- 
mony has remained a constant, the specific target of the opposi- 
tion has changed since 1949. In somewhat oversimplified terms, 
China focused on opposing United States imperialism in the 1950s; 
on opposing collusion between United States imperialism and Soviet 
revisionism in the 1960s; on combating Soviet social-imperialism 
or hegemony in the 1970s; and on opposing hegemony by either 
superpower in the 1980s. 

The extent of China's determination to advance communism 
throughout the world is another component of its foreign policy 
that has fluctuated since 1949. In the early 1950s and during the 
1960s, Chinese leaders called for worldwide armed struggle against 
colonialism and "reactionary" governments. China supplied revo- 
lutionary groups with rhetorical and, in some cases, material sup- 
port. Central to support for leftist movements was the idea that 
they should take China as a model in their struggle for national 
liberation. Chinese leaders expressed the belief that China's experi- 
ence was directly applicable to the circumstances in many other 
countries, but they also stressed the importance of each country's 
suiting its revolution to its own conditions — creating ambiguity 
about China's position on "exporting" revolution. For most of 
the time since 1949, China's dedication to encouraging revolution 
abroad has appeared to receive a lower priority than other foreign 
policy goals. 

Militancy and support for worldwide revolution peaked during 
the Cultural Revolution, when China's outlook on liberation 



479 



China: A Country Study 



struggles seemed to take its cue from Lin Biao's famous 1965 essay 
"Long Live the Victory of People's War!" This essay predicted 
that the underdeveloped countries of the world would surround and 
overpower the industrial nations and create a new communist world 
order. As a result of alleged Chinese involvement in subversive 
activities in Indonesia and several African countries in the late 
1960s, those nations broke off diplomatic relations with Beijing (see 
table 4, Appendix B). 

By the 1980s China had lessened or discontinued its support for 
most of the revolutionary and liberation movements around the 
world, prominent exceptions being the Palestine Liberation Organi- 
zation and resistance fighters in Cambodia and Afghanistan. 
Despite its shift toward cultivating state-to-state relations with 
established governments, many other countries continued to be sus- 
picious of China's intentions. Especially in Asia, where Beijing 
previously supported many local communist parties, China's image 
as a radical power intent on fomenting world revolution continued 
to affect the conduct of its foreign relations into the late 1980s. 

One of the major characteristics of Chinese foreign policy since 
1949 has been its claim of consistently adhering to principles while 
particular interpretations and policies have changed dramatically. 
A statement by Mao Zedong seems to summarize this apparent 
contradiction: "We should be firm in principle; we should also have 
all flexibility permissible and necessary for carrying out our prin- 
ciples." Although claiming that, on the whole, China has never 
deviated from such underlying principles as independence and 
safeguarding peace, Chinese leaders have made major shifts in for- 
eign policy based on their pragmatic assessment of goals and the 
international situation. Aiding this interpretation of the primacy 
of principles in Chinese foreign policy has been the emphasis on 
long-term goals. According to Chinese leaders, China has pursued 
a long-term strategy and is "definitely not swayed by expediency 
or anybody's instigation or provocation. " In keeping with the view 
of Chinese foreign policy as constant and unvarying, Chinese 
pronouncements often describe their policy with words such as 
"always" and "never." 

An example of how certain principles have provided a frame- 
work of continuity for Chinese foreign policy since 1949 is found 
in the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (see Glossary) embod- 
ied in an agreement signed by China and India in 1954. The five 
principles played an important role in the mid-1950s, when China 
began to cultivate the friendship of newly independent nations of 
Asia and Africa. By the time of the Cultural Revolution, however, 
China was involved in acrimonious disputes with many of these 



480 



Foreign Relations 



same nations, and their relations could have been described as any- 
thing but "peacefully coexistent." The Five Principles of Peace- 
ful Coexistence were reemphasized in the 1980s, were considered 
the basis for relations with all nations regardless of their social sys- 
tems or ideology, and were made a part of the 1982 party consti- 
tution. 

Decision Making and Implementation 

Understanding the intricate workings of a government can be 
difficult, especially in a country such as China, where information 
related to leadership and decision making is often kept secret. 
Although it still was not possible to understand fully the structure 
of Chinese foreign-policy-related governmental and nongovernmen- 
tal organizations or how they made or implemented decisions, more 
was known about them by the late 1980s than at any time 
previously. 

After 1949 China's foreign relations became increasingly more 
complex as China established formal diplomatic relations with more 
nations, joined the United Nations (UN) and other international 
and regional political and economic organizations, developed ties 
between the Chinese Communist Party and foreign parties, and 
expanded trade and other economic relations with the rest of the 
world. These changes had affected foreign relations in significant 
ways by the late 1980s. The economic component of China's inter- 
national relations increased dramatically from the late 1970s to the 
late 1980s; more ministries and organizations were involved in 
foreign relations than ever before; and the Chinese foreign policy 
community was more experienced and better informed about the 
outside world than it had been previously. 

Despite the growing complexity of Chinese foreign relations, one 
fundamental aspect of foreign policy that has remained relatively 
constant since 1949 is that the decision-making power for the most 
important decisions has been concentrated in the hands of a few 
key individuals at the top of the leadership hierarchy. In the past, 
ultimate foreign policy authority rested with such figures as Mao 
Zedong and Zhou Enlai, while in the 1980s major decisions were 
understood to have depended on Deng Xiaoping. By the late 1980s, 
Deng had initiated steps to institutionalize decision making and 
make it less dependent on personal authority, but this transition 
was not yet complete. 

In examining the workings of a nation's foreign policy, at least 
three dimensions can be discerned: the structure of the organiza- 
tions involved, the nature of the decision-making process, and the 
ways in which policy is implemented. These three dimensions are 



481 



China: A Country Study 



interrelated, and the processes of formulating and carrying out 
policy are often more complex than the structure of organizations 
would indicate. 

Government and Party Organizations 

By the late 1980s, more organizations were involved in China's 
foreign relations than at any time previously. High-level party and 
government organizations such as the Central Committee, Politi- 
cal Bureau, party Secretariat, party and state Central Military Com- 
missions, National People's Congress, and State Council and such 
leaders as the premier, president, and party general secretary all 
were involved in foreign relations to varying degrees by virtue of 
their concern with major policy issues, both foreign and domestic 
(see Chinese Communist Party; The Government, ch. 10). The 
party Secretariat and the State Council together carried the major 
responsibility for foreign policy decisions. 

In the 1980s, as China's contacts with the outside world grew, 
party and government leaders at all levels increasingly were involved 
in foreign affairs. The president of the People's Republic fulfilled 
a ceremonial role as head of state and also was responsible for offi- 
cially ratifying or abrogating treaties and agreements with foreign 
nations. In addition to meeting with foreign visitors, Chinese lead- 
ers, including the president, the premier, and officials at lower lex - 
els, traveled abroad regularly. 

In the late 1980s, the Political Bureau, previously thought of as 
the major decision-making body, was no longer the primary party 
organization involved in foreign policy decision making. Instead, 
the State Council referred major decisions to the Secretariat for 
resolution and the Political Bureau for ratification. Under the party 
Secretariat, the International Liaison Department had primary 
responsibility for relations between the Chinese Communist Party 
and a growing number of foreign political parties. Other party 
organizations whose work was related to foreign relations were the 
United Front Work Department, responsible for relations with over- 
seas Chinese (see Glossary), the Propaganda Department, and the 
Foreign Affairs Small Group. 

Of the Chinese government institutions, the highest organ of state 
power, the National People's Congress, appeared to have only 
limited influence on foreign policy. In the 1980s the National Peo- 
ple's Congress was becoming more active on the international scene 
by increasing its contacts with counterpart organizations in for- 
eign countries. Through its Standing Committee and its Foreign 
Affairs Committee, the National People's Congress had a voice 
in foreign relations matters and occasionally prepared reports on 



482 



Foreign Relations 



foreign policy-related issues for other party and government bodies. 

As the primary governmental organization under the National 
People's Congress, the State Council had a major role in foreign 
policy, particularly with regard to decisions on routine or specific 
matters, as opposed to greater questions of policy that might require 
party involvement. As in the past, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
was the most important institution involved in conducting day-to- 
day foreign relations, but by the 1980s many other ministries and 
organizations under the State Council had functions related to for- 
eign affairs as well. These included the Ministry of Foreign Eco- 
nomic Relations and Trade, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of 
National Defense, Bank of China, People's Bank of China, and 
China Council for the Promotion of International Trade. In addi- 
tion, over half of the ministries, overseeing such disparate areas 
as aeronautics, forestry, and public health, had a bureau or depart- 
ment concerned explicitly with foreign affairs. These offices pre- 
sumably handled contacts between the ministry and its foreign 
counterparts. 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs 

Since 1949 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been one of Chi- 
na's most important ministries. Each area of foreign relations, 
divided either geographically or functionally, is overseen by a vice 
minister or assistant minister. For example, one vice minister's area 
of specialty was the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, while another 
was responsible for the Americas and Australia. At the next level, 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was divided into departments, some 
geographical and some functional in responsibility. The regionally 
oriented departments included those concerned with Africa, the 
Americas and Oceania, Asia, the Middle East, the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe, Western Europe, Taiwan, and Hong Kong 
and Macao. The functional departments were responsible for 
administration, cadres, consular affairs, finance, information, inter- 
national laws and treaties, international organizations and affairs, 
personnel, protocol, training and education, and translation. Below 
the department level were divisions, such as the United States 
Affairs Division under the Department of American and Oceanian 
Affairs. 

A recurring problem for the foreign ministry and the diplomatic 
corps has been a shortage of qualified personnel. In the first years 
after the founding of the People's Republic, there were few prospec- 
tive diplomats with international experience. Premier Zhou Enlai 
relied on a group of young people who had served under him in 
various negotiations to form the core of the newly established foreign 



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ministry, and Zhou himself held the foreign ministry portfolio until 
1958. In the second half of the 1960s, China's developing foreign 
affairs sector suffered a major setback during the Cultural Revo- 
lution, when higher education was disrupted, foreign-trained schol- 
ars and diplomats were attacked, all but one Chinese ambassador 
(to Egypt) were recalled to Beijing, and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs itself practically ceased functioning. 

Since the early 1970s, the foreign affairs establishment has been 
rebuilt, and by the late 1980s, foreign affairs personnel were 
recruited from such specialized training programs as the ministry's 
Foreign Affairs College, College of International Relations, Bei- 
jing Foreign Languages Institute, and international studies depart- 
ments at major universities. Foreign language study still was 
considered an important requirement, but it was increasingly sup- 
plemented by substantive training in foreign relations. Foreign 
affairs personnel benefited from expanded opportunities for edu- 
cation, travel, and exchange of information with the rest of the 
world. In addition, specialists from other ministries served in Chi- 
na's many embassies and consulates; for example, the Ministry 
of National Defense provided military attaches, the Ministry of For- 
eign Economic Relations and Trade provided commercial officers, 
and the Ministry of Culture and the State Education Commission 
provided personnel in charge of cultural affairs. 

Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade 

Since the late 1970s, economic and financial issues have become 
an increasingly important part of China's foreign relations. In order 
to streamline foreign economic relations, the Ministry of Foreign 
Economic Relations and Trade was established in 1982 through 
the merger of two commissions and two ministries (see Organiza- 
tion of Foreign Trade, ch. 8). By the late 1980s, this ministry was 
the second most prominent ministry involved in the routine con- 
duct of foreign relations. The ministry had an extremely broad man- 
date that included foreign trade, foreign investment, foreign aid, 
and international economic cooperation. Through regular meet- 
ings with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign 
Economic Relations and Trade participated in efforts to coordinate 
China's foreign economic policy with other aspects of its foreign 
policy. It was unclear how thoroughly this was accomplished. 

Ministry of National Defense 

In any nation, the interrelation of the political and military aspects 
of strategy and national security necessitates some degree of mili- 
tary involvement in foreign policy. The military's views on defense 



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capability, deterrence, and perceptions of threat are essential com- 
ponents of a country's global strategy. As of the late 1980s, however, 
little information was available on foreign policy coordination 
between the military and foreign policy establishments. The most 
important military organizations with links to the foreign policy 
community were the Ministry of National Defense and the party 
and state Central Military Commissions. The Ministry of National 
Defense provides military attaches for Chinese embassies, and, as 
of 1987, its Foreign Affairs Bureau dealt with foreign attaches and 
military visitors. Working-level coordination with the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs was maintained when, for example, high-level mili- 
tary leaders traveled abroad. In addition, the Ministry of National 
Defense's strategic research arm, the Beijing Institute for Inter- 
national Strategic Studies, carried out research on military and 
security issues with foreign policy implications. 

In the late 1980s, the most important link between the military 
and foreign policy establishments appeared to be at the highest level, 
particularly through the party and state Central Military Commis- 
sions and through Deng Xiaoping, who was concurrently chair- 
man of both commissions (see Central Military Commission, 
ch. 10; Military Organization, ch. 14). The views of the commis- 
sions' members on major foreign policy issues were almost cer- 
tainly considered in informal discussions or in meetings of other 
high-level organizations they also belonged to, such as the Politi- 
cal Bureau, the Secretariat, or the State Council. It was signifi- 
cant, though, that compared with earlier periods fewer military 
leaders served on China's top policy-making bodies during the 
1980s. 

' 'People-to-People ' 7 Diplomacy 

Since 1949 a significant forum for Chinese foreign relations has 
been cultural or "people-to-people" diplomacy. The relative iso- 
lation of the People's Republic during its first two decades increased 
the importance of cultural exchanges and informal ties with peo- 
ple of other countries through mass organizations and friendship 
societies. In some cases, activities at this level have signaled impor- 
tant diplomatic breakthroughs, as was the case with the American- 
Chinese ping-pong exchange in 1971. In addition to educational 
and cultural institutions, many other organizations, including the 
media, women's and youth organizations, and academic and profes- 
sional societies, have been involved in foreign relations. Two insti- 
tutes responsible for this aspect of Chinese diplomacy were 
associated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and staffed largely 
by former diplomats: the Chinese People's Association for 



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Friendship with Foreign Countries and the Chinese People's 
Institute of Foreign Affairs. 

The Decision-Making Process 

The most crucial foreign policy decisions in the mid-1980s were 
made by the highest-level leadership, with Deng Xiaoping as the 
final arbiter. A shift was underway, however, to strengthen the 
principles of collective and institutional decision making and, at 
the same time, to reduce party involvement in favor of increased 
state responsibility. In line with this trend, the State Council made 
foreign policy decisions regarding routine matters and referred only 
major decisions either to the party Secretariat or to informal deliber- 
ations involving Deng Xiaoping for resolution. When called upon 
to make decisions, the Secretariat relied largely on the advice of 
the State Council and members of China's foreign affairs commu- 
nity. The importance of the Political Bureau appeared to have les- 
sened. Although individual members of the Political Bureau exerted 
influence on the shaping of foreign policy, the Political Bureau's 
role as an institution seemed to have become one of ratifying deci- 
sions, rather than formulating them. The division between party 
and government functions in foreign affairs as of the mid-1980s 
could therefore be summarized as party supremacy in overall policy 
making and supervision, with the government's State Council and 
ministries under it responsible for the daily conduct of foreign 
relations. 

These high-level decision-making bodies comprised the apex of 
an elaborate network of party and government organizations and 
research institutes concerned with foreign policy. To support the 
formulation and implementation of policy, especially in a bureau- 
cracy as complex and hierarchical as China's, there existed a net- 
work of small advisory and coordination groups. These groups 
functioned to channel research, provide expert advice, and act as 
a liaison between organizations. Perhaps the most important of these 
groups was the party Secretariat's Foreign Affairs Small Group. 
This group comprised key party and government officials, includ- 
ing the president, the premier, state councillors, the ministers of 
foreign affairs and foreign economic relations and trade, and various 
foreign affairs specialists, depending on the agenda of the meet- 
ing. The group possibly met weekly, or as required by circum- 
stances. Liaison and advisory functions were provided by other 
groups, including the State Council's Foreign Affairs Coordina- 
tion Point, the staff of the premier's and State Council's offices, 
and bilateral policy groups, such as one composed of ministers and 
vice ministers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry 



486 



Chinese leader 
Deng Xiaoping 
meets American guest 
Courtesy Liaowang 



CPPCC chairman 
Deng Yingchao engages in a 
' 'people-to-people ' ' 
exchange with a Japanese 
visitor to China. 
Courtesy Liaowang 




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China: A Country Study 



of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, which met at least every 
few months. 

In the late 1980s, the decision-making process for foreign policy 
matters followed a fairly hierarchical pattern. If a particular ministry 
was unable to make a decision because the purview of other minis- 
tries was involved, it would attempt to resolve the issue through 
informal discussion or through an interagency group. If that was 
not successful or if higher-level consideration was needed, the 
problem might be referred to the Foreign Affairs Coordination Point 
or to select members of the State Council for review. Certain major 
decisions would then be discussed by the Foreign Affairs Small 
Group before consideration by the party Secretariat itself. If the 
issue was extremely controversial or important, the final decision 
would be directed to the highest-level leadership, particularly Deng 
Xiaoping. 

An Overview of China's Foreign Relations 

Affected by the confluence of a myriad of factors, including its 
historical legacy, worldview, nationalism, ideology, the decision- 
making process in Beijing, and the international situation, Chi- 
na's foreign relations have had a rich and varied development in 
the years since 1949. Two aspects of Chinese foreign policy that 
have led to wide fluctuations over time are the degree of militancy 
or peacefulness Beijing has espoused and its ambivalence in choosing 
between self-reliance and openness to the outside world. Although 
dividing something as complex as foreign policy into time periods 
necessarily obscures certain details, Chinese foreign relations can 
be examined roughly by decades: the Sino-Soviet alliance of the 
1950s, isolation and radicalism in the 1960s, increased international 
involvement in the 1970s, and the independent foreign policy of 
the 1980s. During each of these periods, China's relations with the 
rest of the world underwent significant changes. 

Sino-Soviet Relations 

After the founding of the People's Republic, the Chinese leader- 
ship was concerned above all with ensuring national security, con- 
solidating power, and developing the economy. The foreign policy 
course China chose in order to translate these goals into reality was 
to form an international united front with the Soviet Union and 
other socialist nations against the United States and Japan. 
Although for a time Chinese leaders may have considered trying 
to balance Sino-Soviet relations with ties with Washington, by 
mid- 1949 Mao Zedong declared that China had no choice but 
"leaning to one side" — meaning the Soviet side. 



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Soon after the establishment of the People's Republie, Mao 
traveled to Moscow to negotiate the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of 
Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance. Under this agree- 
ment, China gave the Soviet Union certain rights, such as the con- 
tinued use of a naval base at Liida, Liaoning Province, in return 
for military support, weapons, and large amounts of economic and 
technological assistance, including technical advisers and machin- 
ery. China acceded, at least initially, to Soviet leadership of the 
world communist movement and took the Soviet Union as the 
model for development. China's participation in the Korean War 
(1950-53) seemed to strengthen Sino-Soviet relations, especially 
after the UN-sponsored trade embargo against China. The Sino- 
Soviet alliance appeared to unite Moscow and Beijing, and China 
became more closely associated with and dependent on a foreign 
power than ever before. 

During the second half of the 1950s, strains in the Sino-Soviet 
alliance gradually began to emerge over questions of ideology, secu- 
rity, and economic development. Chinese leaders were disturbed 
by the Soviet Union's moves under Nikita Khrushchev toward 
de-Stalinization and peaceful coexistence with the West. Moscow's 
successful earth satellite launch in 1957 strengthened Mao's belief 
that the world balance was in the communists' favor — or, in his 
words, "the east wind prevails over the west wind" — leading him 
to call for a more militant policy toward the noncommunist world 
in contrast to the more conciliatory policy of the Soviet Union. 

In addition to ideological disagreements, Beijing was dissatis- 
fied with several aspects of the Sino-Soviet security relationship: 
the insufficient degree of support Moscow showed for China's recov- 
ery of Taiwan, a Soviet proposal in 1958 for a joint naval arrange- 
ment that would have put China in a subordinate position, Soviet 
neutrality during the 1959 tension on the Sino-Indian border, and 
Soviet reluctance to honor its agreement to provide nuclear weapons 
technology to China. And, in an attempt to break away from the 
Soviet model of economic development, China launched the radi- 
cal policies of the Great Leap Forward (1958-60; see Glossary), 
leading Moscow to withdraw all Soviet advisers from China in 1960. 
In retrospect, the major ideological, military, and economic rea- 
sons behind the Sino-Soviet split were essentially the same: for the 
Chinese leadership, the strong desire to achieve self-reliance and 
independence of action outweighed the benefits Beijing received 
as Moscow's junior partner. 

During the 1960s the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute deepened 
and spread to include territorial issues, culminating in 1969 in 
bloody armed clashes on their border. In 1963 the boundary dispute 



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China: A Country Study 

had come into the open when China explicitly raised the issue of 
territory lost through "unequal treaties" with tsarist Russia. After 
unsuccessful border consultations in 1964, Moscow began the 
process of a military buildup along the border with China and in 
Mongolia, which continued into the 1970s. 

The Sino-Soviet dispute also was intensified by increasing com- 
petition between Beijing and Moscow for influence in the Third 
World and the international communist movement. China accused 
the Soviet Union of colluding with imperialism, for example by 
signing the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty with the United States 
in 1963. Beijing's support for worldwide revolution became increas- 
ingly militant, although in most cases it lacked the resources to pro- 
vide large amounts of economic or military aid. The Chinese 
Communist Party broke off ties with the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union in 1966, and these had not been restored by mid- 198 7. 

During the Cultural Revolution, China's growing radicalism and 
xenophobia had severe repercussions for Sino-Soviet relations. In 
1967 Red Guards besieged the Soviet embassy in Beijing and 
harassed Soviet diplomats. Beijing viewed the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 as an ominous development and accused 
the Soviet Union of "social imperialism." The Sino-Soviet dis- 
pute reached its nadir in 1969 when serious armed clashes broke 
out at Zhenbao (or Damanskiy) Island on the northeast border (see 
fig. 3). Both sides drew back from the brink of war, however, and 
tension was defused when Zhou Enlai met with Aleksey Kosygin, 
the Soviet premier, later in 1969. 

In the 1970s Beijing shifted to a more moderate course and began 
a rapprochement with Washington as a counterweight to the per- 
ceived threat from Moscow. Sino-Soviet border talks were held 
intermittently, and Moscow issued conciliatory messages after 
Mao's death in 1976, all without substantive progress. Officially, 
Chinese statements called for a struggle against the hegemony of 
both superpowers, but especially against the Soviet Union, which 
Beijing called "the most dangerous source of war." In the late 
1970s, the increased Soviet military buildup in East Asia and Soviet 
treaties with Vietnam and Afghanistan heightened China's aware- 
ness of the threat of Soviet encirclement. In 1979 Beijing notified 
Moscow it would formally abrogate the long-dormant Sino-Soviet 
Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance but pro- 
posed bilateral talks. China suspended the talks after only one 
round, however, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 
1979. 

In the 1980s China's approach toward the Soviet Union shifted 
once more, albeit gradually, in line with China's adoption of an 



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independent foreign policy and the opening up economic policy. 
Another factor behind the shift was the perception that, although 
the Soviet Union still posed the greatest threat to China's security, 
the threat was long-term rather than immediate. Sino-Soviet con- 
sultations on normalizing relations were resumed in 1982 and held 
twice yearly, despite the fact that the cause of their suspension, 
the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, remained unchanged. Beijing 
raised three primary preconditions for the normalization of rela- 
tions, which it referred to as "three obstacles" that Moscow had 
to remove: the Soviet presence in of Afghanistan, Soviet support 
for Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, and the presence of Soviet 
forces along the Sino-Soviet border and in Mongolia. For the first 
half of the 1980s, Moscow called these preconditions "third-country 
issues" not suitable for bilateral discussion, and neither side reported 
substantial progress in the talks. 

Soviet leadership changes between 1982 and 1985 provided open- 
ings for renewed diplomacy, as high-level Chinese delegations 
attended the funerals of Soviet leaders Leonid Brezhnev, Yuriy 
Andropov, and Konstantin Chernenko. During this time, Sino- 
Soviet relations improved gradually in many areas: trade expanded, 
economic and technical exchanges were resumed (including the 
renovation of projects originally built with Soviet assistance in the 
1950s), border points were opened, and delegations were exchanged 
regularly. 

The Soviet position on Sino-Soviet relations showed greater flexi- 
bility in 1986 with General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev's July 
speech at Vladivostok. Among Gorbachev's proposals for the Asia- 
Pacific region were several directed at China, including the 
announcement of partial troop withdrawals from Afghanistan and 
Mongolia, the renewal of a concession pertaining to the border dis- 
pute, and proposals for agreements on a border railroad, space 
cooperation, and joint hydropower development. Further, Gor- 
bachev offered to hold discussions with China "at any time and 
at any level." Although these overtures did not lead to an immediate 
high-level breakthrough in Sino-Soviet relations, bilateral consul- 
tations appeared to gain momentum, and border talks were resumed 
in 1987. In the late 1980s, it seemed unlikely that China and the 
Soviet Union would resume a formal alliance, but Sino-Soviet 
relations had improved remarkably when compared with the previ- 
ous two decades. Whether or not full normalization would include 
renewed relations between the Chinese and Soviet communist par- 
ties, as China had established with the East European communist 
parties, was uncertain as of mid- 1987. 



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China: A Country Study 

Sino-American Relations 

China's relations with the other superpower, the United States, 
also have followed an uneven course. Chinese leaders expressed 
an interest in possible economic assistance from the United States 
during the 1940s, but by 1950 Sino-American relations could only 
be described as hostile. During its first two decades the People's 
Republic considered the United States "imperialist" and "the com- 
mon enemy of people throughout the world." 

The Korean War was a major factor responsible for setting 
relations between China and the United States in a state of enmity 
and mistrust, as it contributed to the United States policy of "con- 
taining" the Chinese threat through a trade embargo and travel 
restrictions, as well as through military alliances with other Asian 
nations. An important side effect of the Korean War was that 
Washington resumed military aid to Taiwan and throughout the 
1950s became increasingly committed to Taiwan's defense, mak- 
ing the possibility of Chinese reunification more remote. After the 
United States-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty was signed in 1954, 
Taiwan became the most contentious issue between the United 
States and China, and remained so in the late 1980s, despite the 
abrogation of the treaty and the subsequent normalization of rela- 
tions between Beijing and Washington in 1979. 

In 1955 Premier Zhou Enlai made a conciliatory opening toward 
the United States in which he said the Chinese people did not want 
war with the American people. His statement led to a series of offi- 
cial ambassadorial-level talks in Geneva and Warsaw that continued 
fairly regularly for the next decade and a half. Although the talks 
failed to resolve fundamental conflicts between the two countries, 
they served as an important line of communication. 

Sino-American relations remained at a stalemate during most 
of the 1960s. Political considerations in both countries made a shift 
toward closer relations difficult, especially as the United States 
became increasingly involved in the war in Vietnam, in which 
Washington and Beijing supported opposite sides. China's isola- 
tionist posture and militancy during the Cultural Revolution 
precluded effective diplomacy, and Sino-American relations reached 
a low point with seemingly little hope of improvement. 

Several events in the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, led 
Beijing and Washington to reexamine their basic policies toward 
each other. After the Soviet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakia 
in 1968 and the Sino-Soviet border clashes in 1969, China saw its 
major threat as clearly coming from the Soviet Union rather than 
the United States and sought a closer relationship with Washington 



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as a counterweight to Moscow. When President Richard M. Nixon 
assumed office in 1969, he explored rapprochement with China 
as part of his doctrine of reduced United States military involve- 
ment in Asia. Moves in this direction resulted in an American ping- 
pong team's trip to China and Henry A. Kissinger's secret visit, 
both in 1971, followed by Nixon's dramatic trip to China in 1972. 
The Shanghai Communique, a milestone document describing the 
new state of relations between the two countries, and signed by 
Nixon and Zhou Enlai, included a certain degree of ambiguity that 
allowed China and the United States to set aside differences, espe- 
cially on the Taiwan issue, and begin the process of normalizing 
relations. 

After the signing of the Shanghai Communique, however, move- 
ment toward United States-China normalization during the 1970s 
saw only limited progress. The United States and China set up 
liaison offices in each other's capitals in 1973, and bilateral trade 
grew unevenly throughout the decade. "People's diplomacy" 
played an important role, as most exchanges of delegations were 
sponsored by friendship associations. Chinese statements continued 
to express the view that both superpowers were theoretically adver- 
saries of China, but they usually singled out the Soviet Union as 
the more "dangerous" of the two. 

In the second half of the 1970s, China perceived an increasing 
Soviet threat and called more explicitly for an international united 
front against Soviet hegemony. In addition, rather than strictly 
adhering to the principle of self-reliance, China adopted an eco- 
nomic and technological modernization program that greatly 
increased commercial links with foreign countries. These trends 
toward strategic and economic cooperation with the West gave 
momentum to Sino-United States normalization, which had been 
at an impasse for most of the decade. Ties between China and the 
United States began to strengthen in 1978, culminating in the 
December announcement that diplomatic relations would be estab- 
lished as of January 1, 1979. In establishing relations, Washing- 
ton reaffirmed its agreement that the People's Republic was the 
sole legal government of China and that Taiwan was an inalien- 
able part of China. Deng Xiaoping's visit to the United States the 
following month was symbolic of the optimism felt in Beijing and 
Washington concerning their strategic alignment and their bur- 
geoning commercial, technical, and cultural relations. 

In the 1980s United States-China relations went through several 
twists and turns. By late 1981 China appeared to pull back some- 
what from the United States as it asserted its independent foreign 
policy. Beijing began to express increasing impatience with the lack 



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China: A Country Study 



of resolution on the Taiwan issue. One of the main issues of con- 
tention was the Taiwan Relations Act, passed by the United States 
Congress in 1979, which provided for continuing unofficial rela- 
tions between Washington and Taipei. In late 1981 China began 
to make serious demands that the United States set a firm time- 
table for terminating American arms sales to Taiwan, even threaten- 
ing to retaliate with the possible downgrading of diplomatic 
relations. In early 1982 Washington announced it would not sell 
Taiwan more advanced aircraft than it had already provided, and 
in August, after several months of intense negotiations, China and 
the United States concluded a joint communique that afforded at 
least a partial resolution of the problem. Washington pledged to 
increase neither the quality nor the quantity of arms supplied to 
Taiwan, while Beijing affirmed that peaceful reunification was Chi- 
na's fundamental policy. Although the communique forestalled fur- 
ther deterioration in relations, Beijing and Washington differed 
in their interpretations of it. The Taiwan issue continued to be a 
"dark cloud" (to use the Chinese phrase) affecting United States- 
China relations to varying degrees into the late 1980s. 

In addition to the question of Taiwan, other aspects of United 
States-China relations created controversy at times during the 
1980s: Sino-American trade relations, the limits of American 
technology transfer to China, the nature and extent of United States- 
China security relations, and occasional friction caused by defec- 
tions or lawsuits. Difficulties over trade relations have included 
Chinese displeasure with United States efforts to limit imports such 
as textiles and a degree of disappointment and frustration within 
the American business community over the difficulties of doing busi- 
ness in China. The issue of technology transfer came to the fore 
several times during the 1980s, most often with Chinese complaints 
about the level of technology allowed or the slow rate of transfer. 
China's dissatisfaction appeared to be somewhat abated by the 
United States 1983 decision to place China in the "friendly, non- 
aligned" category for technology transfer and the conclusion of a 
bilateral nuclear energy cooperation agreement in 1985. 

Determining the nature and limits of security relations between 
China and the United States has been a central aspect of their 
relations in the 1980s. After a period of discord during the first 
years of the decade, Beijing and Washington renewed their interest 
in security-related ties, including military visits, discussions of 
international issues such as arms control, and limited arms and 
weapons technology sales. 

Beginning in 1983, Chinese and United States defense ministers 
and other high-level military delegations exchanged visits, and in 



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1986 United States Navy ships made their first Chinese port call 
since 1949. The United States approved certain items, such as avia- 
tion electronics, for sale to China, restricting transfers to items that 
would contribute only to China's defensive capability. As of the 
late 1980s, it appeared that American assistance in modernizing 
China's arms would also be limited by China's financial constraints 
and the underlying principle of self-reliance. 

Despite the issues that have divided them, relations between the 
United States and China continued to develop during the 1980s 
through a complex network of trade ties, technology-transfer 
arrangements, cultural exchanges, educational exchanges (including 
thousands of Chinese students studying in the United States), mili- 
tary links, joint commissions and other meetings, and exchanges 
of high-level leaders. By the second half of the 1980s, China had 
become the sixteenth largest trading partner of the United States, 
and the United States was China's third largest; in addition, over 
140 American firms had invested in China. High-level exchanges, 
such as Premier Zhao Ziyang's visit to the United States and Presi- 
dent Ronald Reagan's trip to China, both in 1984, and President 
Li Xiannian's 1985 tour of the United States demonstrated the 
importance both sides accorded their relations. 

Relations with the Third World 

Next in importance to its relations with the superpowers have 
been China's relations with the Third World. Chinese leaders have 
tended to view the developing nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America as a major force in international affairs, and they have 
considered China an integral part of this major Third World force. 
As has been the case with China's foreign relations in general, policy 
toward the countries of the developing world has fluctuated over 
time. It has been affected by China's alternating involvement in 
and isolation from world affairs and by the militancy or peaceful- 
ness of Beijing's views. In addition, China's relations with the Third 
World have been affected by China's ambiguous position as a 
developing country that nevertheless has certain attributes more 
befitting a major power. China has been variously viewed by the 
Third World as a friend and ally, a competitor for markets and 
loans, a source of economic and military assistance, a regional power 
intent on dominating Asia, and a "candidate superpower" with 
such privileges as a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. 

China's relations with the Third World have developed through 
several phases: the Bandung Line of the mid-1950s (named for a 
1955 conference of Asian and African nations held in Bandung, 
Indonesia), support for liberation and world revolution in the 1960s, 



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China: A Country Study 



the pronouncement of the Theory of the Three Worlds and sup- 
port for a "new international economic order" in the 1970s, and 
a renewed emphasis on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence 
in the 1980s. 

In the first years after the founding of the People's Republic, 
Chinese statements echoed the Soviet view that the world was 
divided into two camps, the forces of socialism and those of imperi- 
alism, with "no third road" possible. By 1953 China began reas- 
serting its belief that the newly independent developing countries 
could play an important intermediary role in world affairs. In 1954 
Zhou Enlai and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India agreed 
on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence as the underlying 
basis for conducting foreign relations. China's success in promot- 
ing these principles at the 1955 Bandung Conference helped China 
emerge from diplomatic isolation. By the end of the 1950s, however, 
China's foreign policy stance had become more militant. Statements 
promoting the Chinese revolution as a model and Beijing's actions 
in the Taiwan Strait (1958) and in border conflicts with India (1962) 
and Vietnam (1979), for example, alarmed many Third World 
nations. 

During the 1960s China cultivated ties with Third World coun- 
tries and insurgent groups in an attempt to encourage "wars of 
national liberation" and revolution and to forge an international 
united front against both superpowers. China offered economic, 
technical, and sometimes military assistance to other countries and 
liberation movements, which, although small in comparison with 
Soviet and United States aid, was significant considering China's 
own needs. Third World appreciation for Chinese assistance 
coexisted, however, with growing suspicions of China's militancy. 
Such suspicions were fed, for example, by Zhou Enlai' s statement 
in the early 1960s that the potential for revolution in Africa was 
"excellent" and by the publication of Lin Biao's essay "Long Live 
the Victory of People's War!" in 1965. Discord between China 
and many Third World countries continued to grow. In some cases, 
as with Indonesia's charge of Chinese complicity in the 1965 coup 
attempt in Jakarta and claims by several African nations of Chinese 
subversion during the Cultural Revolution, bilateral disputes led 
to the breaking off of diplomatic relations. Although the Third 
World was not a primary focus of the Cultural Revolution, it was 
not immune to the chaos this period wrought upon Chinese for- 
eign relations. 

In the 1970s China began to redefine its foreign policy after the 
isolation and militancy of the late 1960s. China reestablished those 
of its diplomatic missions that had been recalled during the Cultural 



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Revolution and began the process of rapprochement with the United 
States. The People's Republic was admitted into the UN in 1971 
and was recognized diplomatically by an increasing number of 
nations. China's major foreign policy statement during this time 
was Mao's Theory of the Three Worlds, which was presented pub- 
licly by Deng Xiaoping at the UN in 1974. According to this the- 
ory, the First World consisted of the two superpowers — the Soviet 
Union and the United States — both "imperialist aggressors" whose 
rivalry was the greatest cause of impending world war. The Third 
World was the main force in international affairs. Its growing 
opposition to superpower hegemony was exemplified by such world 
events as the Arab nations' control of oil prices, Egypt's expulsion 
of Soviet aid personnel in 1972, and the United States withdrawal 
from Vietnam. The Second World, comprising the developed coun- 
tries of Europe plus Japan, could either oppress the Third World 
or join in opposing the superpowers. By the second half of the 1970s, 
China perceived an increased threat from the Soviet Union, and 
the theory was modified to emphasize that the Soviet Union was 
the more dangerous of the two superpowers. 

The other primary component of China's Third World policy 
in the early 1970s was a call for radical change in the world power 
structure and particularly a call for a "new international economic 
order." Until the late 1970s, the Chinese principles of sovereignty, 
opposition to hegemony, and self-reliance coincided with the goals 
of the movement for a new international economic order. Chinese 
statements in support of the new order diminished as China began 
to implement the opening up policy, allow foreign investment, and 
seek technical assistance and foreign loans. China's critical opin- 
ion of international financial institutions appeared to change 
abruptly as Beijing prepared to join the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank in 1980. Chinese support for changes 
in the economic order stressed the role of collective self-reliance 
among the countries of the Third World, or "South-South coopera- 
tion," in the 1980s. 

Also in the 1980s, China reasserted its Third World credentials 
and placed a renewed emphasis on its relations with Third World 
countries as part of its independent foreign policy. China stressed 
that it would develop friendly relations with other nations regard- 
less of their social systems or ideologies and would conduct its 
relations on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. 
Beijing exchanged delegations with Third World countries regu- 
larly, and it made diplomatic use of cultural ties, for example, by 
promoting friendly links between Chinese Muslims and Islamic 
countries. Officially, China denied that it sought a leadership role 



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in the Third World, although some foreign observers argued to 
the contrary. Beijing increasingly based its foreign economic rela- 
tions with the Third World on equality and mutual benefit, 
expressed by a shift toward trade and joint ventures and away from 
grants and interest-free loans. 

By the second half of the 1980s, China's relations with Third 
World nations covered the spectrum from friendly to inimical. 
Bilateral relations ranged from a formal alliance with North Korea, 
to a near-alliance with Pakistan, to hostile relations with Vietnam 
marked by sporadic border conflict. Many relationships have 
changed dramatically over time: for example, China previously had 
close relations with Vietnam; its ties with India were friendly dur- 
ing the 1950s but were strained thereafter by border tensions. Par- 
ticularly in Southeast Asia, a legacy of suspicion concerning China's 
ultimate intentions affected Chinese relations with many countries. 

As of 1987 only a few countries in the world lacked diplomatic 
ties with Beijing; among them were Honduras, Indonesia, Israel, 
Paraguay, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, the Republic of Korea, and 
Uruguay. Some of these had formal ties with Taiwan instead. Chi- 
na's growing interest in trade and technical exchanges, however, 
meant that in some cases substantial unofficial relations existed 
despite the absence of diplomatic recognition. 

Relations with the Developed World 

Since 1949 China's overriding concerns have been security and 
economic development. In working toward both of these goals, 
China has focused on its relations with the superpowers. Because 
most of the developed world, with the exception of Japan, is fairly 
distant from China and is aligned formally or informally with either 
the Soviet Union or the United States, China's relations with the 
developed world often have been subordinate to its relations with 
the superpowers. In the 1950s China considered most West Euro- 
pean countries "lackeys" of United States imperialism, while it 
sided with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. As China's rela- 
tions with the superpowers have changed, so have its ties with other 
developed nations. An example of this is that more than a dozen 
developed countries, including the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Spain, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, all established diplo- 
matic relations with China after the Sino-American rapprochement 
in the early 1970s. 

The developed nations have been important to China for several 
reasons: as sources of diplomatic recognition, as alternative sources 
of trade and technology to reduce reliance on one or the other 
superpower, and as part of China's security calculations. In the 



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1980s China stressed the role of developed nations in ensuring peace 
in an increasingly multipolar world. Australia and Canada were 
important trading partners for China, but Beijing's most impor- 
tant relations with the developed world were with Japan and 
Europe. 

Japan 

Japan is by far the most important to China of the nonsuper- 
power developed nations. Among the reasons for this are geographi- 
cal proximity and historical and cultural ties, China's perception 
of Japan as a possible resurgent threat, Japan's close relations with 
the United States since the end of World War II, and Japan's role 
as the third-ranking industrialized power in the world. Japan's 
invasion and occupation of parts of China in the 1930s was a major 
component of the devastation China underwent during the "cen- 
tury of shame and humiliation." After 1949 Chinese relations with 
Japan changed several times, from hostility and an absence of con- 
tact to cordiality and extremely close cooperation in many fields. 
One recurring Chinese concern in Sino-Japanese relations has been 
the potential remilitarization of Japan. 

At the time of the founding of the People's Republic, Japan was 
defeated and Japanese military power dismantled, but China con- 
tinued to view Japan as a potential threat because of the United 
States presence there. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alli- 
ance, and Mutual Assistance included the provision that each side 
would protect the other from an attack by "Japan or any state allied 
with it," and China undoubtedly viewed with alarm Japan's role 
as the principal United States base during the Korean War. At 
the same time, however, China in the 1950s began a policy of 
attempting to influence Japan through trade, "people's diplomacy," 
contacts with Japanese opposition political parties, and through 
applying pressure on Tokyo to sever ties with Taipei. Relations 
deteriorated in the late 1950s when Chinese pressure tactics esca- 
lated. After the Sino-Soviet break, economic necessity caused China 
to reconsider and revitalize trade ties with Japan. 

Sino-Japanese ties declined again during the Cultural Revolu- 
tion, and the decline was further exacerbated by Japan's growing 
strength and independence from the United States in the late 1960s. 
China was especially concerned that Japan might remilitarize to 
compensate for the reduced United States military presence in Asia 
brought about under President Nixon. After the beginning of Sino- 
American rapprochement in 1971, however, China's policy toward 
Japan immediately became more flexible. By 1972 Japan and China 
had established diplomatic relations and agreed to conclude a 



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separate peace treaty. The negotiations for the peace treaty were 
protracted and, by the time it was concluded in 1978, China's pre- 
occupation with the Soviet threat led to the inclusion of an "anti- 
hegemony" statement. In fewer than three decades, China had 
signed an explicitly anti-Japanese treaty with the Soviet Union and 
a treaty having an anti-Soviet component with Japan. 

From the 1970s into the 1980s, economic relations were the cen- 
terpiece of relations between China and Japan. Japan has been Chi- 
na's top trading partner since the 1960s. Despite concern in the 
late 1980s over a trade imbalance, the volume of Sino-Japanese 
trade showed no sign of declining. Relations suffered a setback in 
1979 and 1980, when China canceled or modified overly ambitious 
plans made in the late 1970s to import large quantities of Japanese 
technology, the best-known example involving the Baoshan iron 
and steel complex in Shanghai. Lower expectations on both sides 
seemed to have created a more realistic economic and technologi- 
cal partnership by the late 1980s. 

Chinese relations with Japan during the 1980s were generally 
close and cordial. Tension erupted periodically, however, over trade 
and technology issues, Chinese concern over potential Japanese 
military resurgence, and controversy regarding Japan's relations 
with Taiwan, especially Beijing's concern that Tokyo was pursu- 
ing a "two Chinas" policy. China joined other Asian nations in 
criticizing Japanese history textbooks that deemphasized past 
Japanese aggression, claiming that the distortion was evidence of 
the rise of militarism in Japan. By the late 1980s, despite occa- 
sional outbreaks of tension, the two governments held regular con- 
sultations, high-level leaders frequently exchanged visits, Chinese 
and Japanese military leaders had begun contacts, and many 
Chinese and Japanese students and tourists traveled back and forth. 

Europe 

Although it had been the European powers that precipitated the 
opening of China to the West in the nineteenth century, by 1949 
the European presence was limited to Hong Kong and Macao. 
Europe exerted a strong intellectual influence on modern Chinese 
leaders (Marxism and Leninism of course originated in Europe), 
and some leaders, including Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping, 
studied in Europe early in their careers. Nevertheless, China's 
geographic distance from Europe, its preoccupation with the super- 
powers, and the division of Europe after World War II have meant 
that China's relations with European nations usually have been 
subordinate to its relations with the Soviet Union and the United 
States. 



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East European nations were the first countries to establish diplo- 
matic relations with China in 1949, following the Soviet Union's 
lead. In the early 1950s, through the Sino-Soviet alliance, China 
became an observer in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(Comecon), and Chinese relations with Eastern Europe included 
trade and receipt of limited amounts of economic and technical aid. 
The Sino-Soviet dispute was manifested in China's relations with 
certain East European countries, especially China's support for 
Albania's break with the Soviet Union in the late 1950s. After the 
Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s, the only East European nations main- 
taining significant ties with China until the late 1970s were Alba- 
nia, Romania, and Yugoslavia. By the late 1980s, however, as 
Beijing's relations with Moscow improved and relations with 
governments and parties on the basis of "mutual respect and peace- 
ful coexistence" were renewed, China's ties with the other nations 
of Eastern Europe also had improved noticeably, to include com- 
munist party ties. 

China's ties with Western Europe were minimal for the first two 
decades of the People's Republic. Several West European nations, 
mostly in Scandinavia, established diplomatic relations with China 
in the early 1950s, and Britain and the Netherlands established 
ties with China at the charge d'affaires level in 1954. In the late 
1950s, Britain became the first Western nation to relax the trade 
embargo against China imposed during the Korean War. The 
establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France 
in 1964 also provided an opening for trade and other limited Chinese 
contacts with Western Europe until the 1970s. 

China's relations with Western Europe grew rapidly in the 1970s, 
as more nations recognized China and diplomatic relations were 
established with the European Economic Community in 1975. In 
the second half of the 1970s, China's emphasis on an international 
united front against Soviet hegemony led to increased Chinese sup- 
port for West European unity and for the role of the North Atlan- 
tic Treaty Organization. Ties with Western Europe also were 
featured prominently in Beijing's independent foreign policy of the 
1980s. Furthermore, China's opening up to foreign trade, invest- 
ment, and technology beginning in the late 1970s greatly improved 
Sino-European ties. One of the few major problems in China's 
relations with Western Europe in the post-Mao era was the down- 
grading of diplomatic ties with the Netherlands from 1981 to 1984 
over the latter' s sale of submarines to Taiwan. 

China's Role in International Organizations 

Participation in international organizations is perceived as an 



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important measure of a nation's prestige as well as a forum through 
which a nation can influence others and gain access to aid pro- 
grams and sources of technology and information. The People's 
Republic was precluded from participating actively in most main- 
stream international organizations for the first two decades of its 
existence because of its subordinate position in the Sino-Soviet 
alliance in the 1950s and the opposition of the United States after 
China's involvement in the Korean War. China repeatedly failed 
to gain admission to the UN. In 1971 Beijing finally gained Chi- 
na's seat when relations with the United States changed for the 
better. Taipei's representatives were expelled from the UN and 
replaced by Beijing's. 

After becoming a member of the UN, China also joined most 
UN-affiliated agencies, including, by the 1980s, the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund. China's willingness, under 
the policy of opening up to the outside world beginning in the late 
1970s, to receive economic and technical assistance from such agen- 
cies as the UN Development Program was a significant departure 
from its previous stress on self-reliance. In 1986 China renewed 
its application to regain its seat as one of the founding members 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 

By the late 1980s, China had become a member of several 
hundred international and regional organizations, both those of 
major significance to world affairs, including the International 
Atomic Energy Agency, the World Intellectual Property Organi- 
zation, and the International Olympic Committee, and associa- 
tions or societies focused on such narrow subjects as acrobatics or 
the study of seaweed. Besides providing China a forum from which 
to express its views on various issues, membership in the 1970s 
and 1980s in increasing numbers of international groups gave 
Chinese foreign-affairs personnel wider knowledge and valuable 
international experience. 

It is notable that by the late 1980s Beijing had not sought formal 
membership in several important international organizations 
representative of Third World interests: the Group of 77, the 
Nonaligned Movement, and the Organization of Petroleum Export- 
ing Countries. Despite the emphasis China placed on Third World 
relations, China's independent foreign policy and special position 
as a somewhat atypical Third World nation made it seem unlikely 
in the late 1980s that China would seek more than observer status 
in these groups. 

By the second half of the 1980s, China's participation in inter- 
national organizations reflected the two primary goals of its indepen- 
dent foreign policy: furthering domestic economic development 



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through cooperation with the outside world and promoting peace 
and stability by cultivating ties with other nations on an equal basis. 
As expressed by Zhao Ziyang in a 1986 report to the National Peo- 
ple's Congress, "China is a developing socialist country with a 
population of over 1 billion. We are well aware of our obligations 
and responsibilities in the world. We will therefore continue to work 
hard on both fronts, domestic and international, to push forward 
the socialist modernization of our country and to make greater con- 
tributions to world peace and human progress." 

* * * 

In the 1970s and 1980s, Chinese foreign policy was the subject 
of numerous books and articles reflecting diverse perspectives and 
disciplinary approaches. Excellent coverage includes A. Doak Bar- 
nett's China and the Major Powers in East Asia, King C. Chen's China 
and the Three Worlds (which includes many relevant documents), 
Wang Gungwu's China and the World since 1949, Melvin Gurtov 
and Byong-Moo Hwang's China under Threat, Michael B. Yahuda's 
China's Role in World Affairs, and Robert C. North's The Foreign 
Relations of China. Richard H. Solomon's chapter in The China Fac- 
tor covers China's relations with many countries in addition to its 
primary focus on United States-China relations. China and the World, 
edited by Samuel S. Kim, provides a comprehensive view of many 
facets of Chinese foreign relations. Barnett's The Making of Foreign 
Policy in China is a pathbreaking study of a subject previously little 
understood outside China. 

The following periodicals often contain informative or analyti- 
cal articles on Chinese foreign policy and relations with specific 
countries or regions: Asian Survey, Asia Pacific Community, Asiaweek, 
China Quarterly, Current History, Far Eastern Economic Review, Foreign 
Affairs, Issues & Studies, Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Pacific Affairs , 
Problems of Communism, Washington Quarterly, and World Today. (For 
further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



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Chapter 13. Criminal Justice and Public Security 




This crossbowman is one of tens of thousands of warriors buried to guard 
Shi Huangdi, founder of the Qin dynasty (221-207 B. C), in his afterlife. 
The figure's weapon did not survive the two millennia underground. 



SWEEPING REFORMS IN CHINA'S legal system were an- 
nounced at the Second Session of the Fifth National People's 
Congress held in June and July 1979. New laws on courts, 
procuratorates, crime, and trials were promulgated. The changes, 
effective as of January 1, 1980, reflected the leadership's convic- 
tion that if economic modernization was to succeed, the people — 
who had suffered through the humiliations, capricious arrests, and 
massive civil disorders of the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) — had 
to be assured that they no longer would be abused or incarcerated 
on the basis of hearsay or arbitrary political pronouncements. 

From the perspective of the leaders of the Chinese Communist 
Party, moreover, codified laws and a strengthened legal system were 
seen as important means of preventing a possible return of radical 
policies and a repetition of the era when the Gang of Four ruled 
by fiat and inconsistent party regulations. Aside from establishing 
a legal code that would be more difficult for corrupt officials to 
manipulate, the new laws made the courts responsible for apply- 
ing all but minor sanctions and made the police answerable to the 
courts. Procuratorates, which had fallen into disuse during the Cul- 
tural Revolution, were reinstituted to prosecute criminal cases, 
review court decisions, and investigate the legalify of actions taken 
by the police and other government organizations. A greater role 
for the courts and independent investigations were expected to make 
it more difficult to introduce politically colored testimony into the 
courtrooms. 

Hard labor still was the most common form of punishment in 
China in the 1980s. The penal system stressed reform rather than 
retribution, and it was expected that productive labor would reduce 
the penal institutions' cost to society. Even death sentences could 
be stayed by two-year reprieve. If a prisoner was judged to have 
reformed during that period, his or her sentence could be com- 
muted to life or a fixed term at labor. 

Neighborhood committees in the 1980s continued to be heavily 
involved in law enforcement and mediation of disputes at the local 
level. Among the enforcement procedures these committees used 
to influence both thought and behavior were criticism and collec- 
tive responsibility. 

In the period between 1980 and 1987, important progress was 
made in replacing the rule of men with the rule of law. Laws origi- 
nally passed in 1979 and earlier were amended and augmented, 



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and law institutes and university law departments that had been 
closed during the Cultural Revolution were opened to train law- 
yers and court personnel. It was only a beginning, but important 
steps had been taken in developing a viable legal system and mak- 
ing the government and the courts answerable to an objective 
standard. 

The Legal System 
Imperial China 

Contemporary social control is rooted in the Confucian past. The 
teachings of Confucius have had an enduring effect on Chinese 
life and have provided the basis for the social order through much 
of the country's history. Confucians believed in the fundamental 
goodness of man and advocated rule by moral persuasion in accor- 
dance with the concept of li (propriety), a set of generally accepted 
social values or norms of behavior. Li was enforced by society rather 
than by courts. Education was considered the key ingredient for 
maintaining order, and codes of law were intended only to sup- 
plement li, not to replace it (see The Hundred Schools of Thought, 
ch. 1; Traditional Society and Culture, ch. 3). 

Confucians held that codified law was inadequate to provide 
meaningful guidance for the entire panorama of human activity, 
but they were not against using laws to control the most unruly 
elements in the society. The first criminal code was promulgated 
sometime between 455 and 395 B.C. There were also civil statutes, 
mostly concerned with land transactions. 

Legalism, a competing school of thought during the Warring 
States period (475-221 B.C.), maintained that man was by nature 
evil and had to be controlled by strict rules of law and uniform 
justice. Legalist philosophy had its greatest impact during the first 
imperial dynasty, the Qin (221-207 B.C.; see The Imperial Era, 
ch. 1). 

The Han dynasty (206 B.C.-A.D. 220) retained the basic legal 
system established under the Qin but modified some of the harsher 
aspects in line with the Confucian philosophy of social control based 
on ethical and moral persuasion. Most legal professionals were not 
lawyers but generalists trained in philosophy and literature. The 
local, classically trained, Confucian gentry played a crucial role 
as arbiters and handled all but the most serious local disputes. 

This basic legal philosophy remained in effect for most of the 
imperial era. The criminal code was not comprehensive and often 
not written down, which left magistrates great flexibility during 
trials. The accused had no rights and relied on the mercy of the 



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Criminal Justice and Public Security 

court; defendants were tortured to obtain confessions and often 
served long jail terms while awaiting trial. A court appearance, 
at minimum, resulted in loss of face, and the people were reluc- 
tant and afraid to use the courts. Rulers did little to make the courts 
more appealing, for if they stressed rule by law, they weakened 
their own moral influence. 

In the final years of the Qing dynasty (1644-191 1), reform advo- 
cates in the government implemented certain aspects of the modern- 
ized Japanese legal system, itself originally based on German judicial 
precedents (see The Hundred Days' Reform and the Aftermath, 
ch. 1). These efforts were short-lived and largely ineffective. 

The Republican Period 

Following the overthrow of the Qing dynasty in 1911, China 
came under the control of rival warlords and had no government 
strong enough to establish a legal code to replace the Qing code. 
Finally, in 1927, Chiang Kai-shek's Guomindang forces were able 
to suppress the warlords and gain control of most of the country 
(see Republican China, ch. 1). Established in Nanjing, the Guomin- 
dang government attempted to develop Western-style legal and 
penal systems. Few of the Guomindang codes, however, were imple- 
mented nationwide. Although government leaders were striving 
for a Western-inspired system of codified law, the traditional 
Chinese preference for collective social sanctions over impersonal 
legalism hindered constitutional and legal development. The spirit 
of the new laws never penetrated to the grass-roots level or provided 
hoped-for stability. Ideally, individuals were to be equal before the 
law, but this premise proved to be more rhetorical than substan- 
tive. In the end, most of the new laws were discarded as the 
Guomindang became preoccupied with fighting the Chinese Com- 
munists and the invading Japanese. 

Developments after 1949 

Ideological Basis 

According to Chinese communist ideology, the party controlled 
the state and created and used the law to regulate the masses, realize 
socialism, and suppress counterrevolutionaries. Since it was the 
party's view that the law and legal institutions existed to support 
party and state power, law often took the form of general princi- 
ples and shifting policies rather than detailed and constant rules. 
The Communists wrote laws in simple enough language that every 
individual could understand and abide by them. Technical lan- 
guage and strict legal procedures for the police and the courts were 



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China: A Country Study 



dispensed with so as to encourage greater popular appreciation of 
the legal system. 

Moreover, Mao Zedong maintained that revolution was con- 
tinuous, and he opposed any legal system that would constrain it. 
Whereas Western law stressed stability, Mao sought constant 
change, emphasized the contradictions in society, and called for 
relentless class struggle. In this milieu, the courts were instruments 
for achieving political ends, and criminal law was used by the party 
to conduct class struggle. The emphasis was shifting constantly, 
and new "enemies" were often identified. Mao believed it unwise 
to codify a criminal law that later might restrain the party. 

The Maoists wanted the administration of justice to be as decen- 
tralized as possible in order to be consistent with the "mass line" 
(see Glossary). Neighborhood committees and work units, super- 
vised by local officials, used peer pressure to handle most legal 
problems in consonance with current central policies. The police 
and courts were left to handle only the most serious cases. In both 
traditional and contemporary China, political and legal theory 
tended to support such methods. Mao was unconcerned that a per- 
son contesting the result of a group decision had nowhere to go 
for redress. 

After 1949 the party also greatly altered the character of the legal 
profession. A number of law schools were closed, and most of the 
teachers were retired. Legal work was carried on by a handful of 
Western-trained specialists and a large number of legal cadres hastily 
trained in China. From the beginning these two groups disagreed 
over legal policy, and the development of the legal system reflected 
their continuous debate over both form and substance. 

The Western-trained specialists were Guomindang-era lawyers 
who chose to cooperate with the Communists. Because they were 
considered politically unreliable, the party initially ignored most 
of their arguments for a modern legal system. As the 1950s 
progressed, however, this group was instrumental in China's adop- 
tion of a legal system based on the system of the Soviet Union. 
In general, the specialists wanted codified law, enforced by a strict 
Soviet-style legal bureaucracy. Without such procedures, they felt, 
there would be too much arbitrariness, and eventually the legal 
system would become ineffective. Many of these specialists passed 
from the scene when the Soviet model was abandoned in the late 
1950s, but some became party members and gained influential 
positions. 

In the first thirty years of the People's Republic, the new legal 
cadres — chosen more for their ideological convictions than legal 
expertise — conducted the day-to-day legal work. These cadres 



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Criminal Justice and Public Security 



favored the Maoist system of social and political control and 
regarded themselves as supervisors of the masses who subscribed 
to a common set of communist values. The new cadres saw this 
common ideology as providing better overall direction than strict 
legal controls could. They believed that China was too large to be 
governed by any single set of fixed rules or a legal bureaucracy. 
They preferred to administer justice by simplified directives tailored 
to the needs of local communities so that the people (and the new 
cadres) could participate fully in their implementation. As part of 
this plan, the cadres organized "study groups" to familiarize every 
citizen with current directives and circulars. 

Most cultures agree that the purpose of criminal law is to con- 
trol deviancy — the Chinese traditionally have sought to do so 
through peer groups rather than through the courts. This practice 
continued after 1949. Ideally, peers helped the deviant through criti- 
cism or shuofu (persuading by talking). The stress was on educa- 
tion and rehabilitation (see Glossary), a policy linked to the 
Confucian and Maoist tenet that, with patience and persuasion, 
a person can be reformed. 

Early Years of the People's Republic, 1949-53 

In 1949 the Communists abolished all Guomindang laws and 
judicial organs and established the Common Program, a statement 
of national purposes adopted by a September 1949 session of the 
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (see Glossary), 
as a provisional constitution. Under the Common Program, 148 
mainly experimental or provisional laws and regulations were 
adopted to establish the new socialist rule. The most important and 
far-reaching of these laws dealt with marriage, land reform, coun- 
terrevolutionaries, and corruption. A three-level, single-appeal court 
system was established, and the Supreme People's Procuratorate 
and local people's procuratorates were instituted. The procurator- 
ates were established to ensure that government organs at all levels, 
persons in government service, and all citizens strictly observed 
the Common Program and the policies, directives, laws, and decrees 
of the people's government. They also were to investigate and prose- 
cute counterrevolutionary and other criminal cases; to contest illegal 
or improper judgments rendered by judicial organs at every level; 
and to investigate illegal measures taken by places of detention and 
labor-reform organs anywhere in the country. They were to dis- 
pose of cases submitted by citizens who were dissatisfied with the 
decision of "no prosecution" made by the procuratorial organs 
of lower levels and to intervene in important civil cases and admin- 
istrative legal actions affecting the national interest. 



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The period 1949-52 was one of national integration, which came 
in the wake of decades of disunity, turmoil, and war, and included 
efforts to bring the diverse elements of a disrupted society into line 
with the new political direction of the state. The land reform move- 
ment of 1949-51 was accompanied, in 1950, by the movement to 
suppress counterrevolutionaries. In 1952 the san fan ("three anti") 
movement opposed corruption, waste, and bureaucratism, while 
the wu fan ("five anti") movement rallied against bribery, tax eva- 
sion, theft of state assets, cheating on government contracts, and 
theft of state economic secrets. During this period, few cases were 
brought to court (see The People's Republic of China, ch. 1). 
Instead, administrative agencies, especially the police, conducted 
mass trials during which large crowds of onlookers shouted accu- 
sations. Hundreds of thousands were executed as a result of those 
"trials" and many more were sent to prison or to labor camps. 
In the relatively few cases that were tried in formal courts, it was 
difficult to discern what laws were used as a basis for the judgment. 

In 1952 the authorities launched a nationwide judicial reform 
movement "to rectify and purify the people's judicial organs at 
every level politically, organizationally, and ideologically, and to 
strengthen the party's leadership of judicial work." Guomindang- 
era judges were purged from the courts, and those who remained, 
having been tacitly cleared of charges of "flagrant counterrevolu- 
tion" and sworn to uphold the mass line injudicial work, continued 
to press for a more regularized Soviet-style legal system. These 
judges were confident that the mass movements shortly would end 
and that the communist-run government eventually would see that 
it needed a more formal judicial structure. Indeed, at the instiga- 
tion of the legal specialists, in 1953 the state began to promulgate 
separate criminal laws. 

The Legal System under the 1954 State Constitution 

The state constitution promulgated in September 1954 attempted 
to set down in legal form the central tasks of the country in the 
transition period of the mid-1950s and to regulate China's strides 
toward socialism. The state constitution provided the framework 
of a legal system much like that in effect in the Soviet Union from 
1921 to 1928. Much of the Soviet legal code was translated into 
Chinese, and Soviet legal experts helped rewrite it to suit Chinese 
conditions. 

The 1954 state constitution gave the Standing Committee of the 
National People's Congress the power to appoint and dismiss 
judicial personnel and to enact legal codes. The state constitution 
protected individuals from arrest and detention unless approved 



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Criminal Justice and Public Security 



by the people's procuratorates, and it granted eitizens freedom of 
speech, correspondence, demonstration, and religious belief. 
Citizens could vote and could run for election. They also acquired 
the right to an education, work, rest, material assistance in old age, 
and the ability to lodge complaints with state agencies. Each citizen 
was granted the right to a public trial and to offer a defense aided 
by a "people's lawyer." Citizens were granted equality before the 
law, and women were guaranteed equal legal rights. Under the 
1954 state constitution, local procuratorates that had been respon- 
sible both to the procuratorate at the next higher level and to the 
government at the corresponding level were responsible only to the 
procuratorate at the next higher level. Technically, the judiciary 
became independent, and the Supreme People's Court became the 
highest judicial organ of the state. 

Additionally, a law codification commission was set up to draft 
the first criminal code of the People's Republic and to describe 
criminal liability in detail. A set of rules for the proper conduct 
for police and judicial personnel was established, and it became 
the "political task" of the courts to determine what was or was 
not an offense. A criminal law, a code of criminal procedure, and 
a civil code were drafted, but none of these were enacted until 
twenty-five years later. 

To cope with the anticipated need for more lawyers, law schools 
expanded and revamped their curricula. A large quantity of legal 
books and journals reappeared for use by law students. Although 
all lawyers were supposed to be conversant in the current ideology, 
many developed into "legal specialists" with more concern for the 
law then for ideology. Although this viewpoint would be condemned 
in 1957 when the Soviet-style legal system was rejected, in 1954 
it appeared that China had taken a first step toward an orderly 
administration of justice. 

Between 1954 and 1957, much effort was expended to make the 
legal system work, but the underlying conflict between the specialists 
and the cadres, who were more concerned about ideology than the 
legal system, remained. By 1956 the situation had polarized. The 
specialists argued that the period of intense class struggle was over 
and that all people should now be considered equal before the law 
and the state constitution. The cadres, on the other hand, contended 
that class struggle would never end and that separate standards 
should be applied to class enemies. They saw the specialists as 
obstructing the revolution — trying to subvert the new state and 
restore the rights of old class enemies. 

In 1956 Mao personally launched a mass movement under the 
classical slogan "Let a hundred flowers bloom, let the hundred 



513 



China: A Country Study 

schools of thought contend" (see The Transition to Socialism, 
1953-57, ch. 1; Policy Toward Intellectuals, ch. 4). His essay "On 
the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People, ' ' pub- 
lished in early 1957, encouraged people to vent their criticisms as 
long as they were "constructive" ("among the people") rather than 
"hateful and destructive" ("between the enemy and ourselves"). 
Mao was anxious to defuse the potential for a backlash against com- 
munist rule such as had occurred in Hungary and Poland. 

The legal specialists were among the most vociferous critics of 
party and government policies. They complained that there were 
too few laws and that the National People's Congress was slow in 
enacting laws already drafted. They felt that legal institutions were 
maturing too slowly and that the poorly qualified cadres were 
obstructing the work of these institutions to suit their own politi- 
cal ends. The legal experts also spoke out against those, especially 
party members, who thought themselves above the law. 

By August 1957 the criticisms of party and state policies were 
too broad and penetrating to be ignored. Mao and his supporters 
labeled the critics "rightists" and launched a campaign against 
them. Among the first victims of the Anti-Rightist Campaign were 
the specialists and their legal system. Mao objected to this system 
for several reasons — among them, his views that the Soviet model 
was too Westernized for China and that the judicial system was 
too constraining. 

The specialists' proposals for a judiciary free from party and 
political interference were denounced and ridiculed. Mao did not 
want a judiciary that stood as an impartial arbiter between the party 
and anyone else. The principle of presumption of innocence was 
spurned, as was the notion that the law always should act "in the 
interest of the state and the people" rather than the party. 

Many specialists were transferred to nonjudicial jobs and replaced 
by party cadres. All codification commissions stopped work, and 
no new laws were drafted. The number of law schools dropped 
sharply as most universities shifted their curriculum to more politi- 
cally acceptable subjects. Later, during the Cultural Revolution 
(1966-76; see Glossary), almost all the remaining law schools were 
closed. 

With the Anti-Rightist Campaign of mid-1957 and the Great 
Leap Forward (1958-60; see Glossary), a new mass line emerged. 
The Anti-Rightist Campaign halted the trend toward legal profes- 
sionalism, which was seen as a threat to party control. The party 
leadership resolutely declared its power absolute in legal matters. 
The Great Leap Forward sought to rekindle revolutionary spirit 
among the people. The mass line, as it affected public order, 



514 



Criminal Justice and Public Security 

advocated turning an increasing amount of control and judicial 
authority over to the masses. This meant greater involvement and 
authority for the neighborhood committees and grass-roots mass 
organizations. 

The Anti-Rightist Campaign put an end to efforts that would 
have brought about some degree of judicial autonomy and safe- 
guards for the accused, and the country moved toward police domi- 
nation. By 1958 the police were empowered to impose sanctions 
as they saw fit. The party gave low priority to the courts, and, as 
many judicial functions were turned over to local administrative 
officials, few qualified people chose to stay with the still-operating 
courts. The number of public trials decreased, and by the early 
1960s the court system had become mostly inactive. One unex- 
pected by-product of the shift from formal legal organs to local 
administrative control was that criminal sentences became milder. 
Persons found guilty of grand theft, rape, or manslaughter were 
sentenced to only three to five years' imprisonment, and the death 
penalty rarely was imposed. 

During the Great Leap Forward, the number of arrests, prose- 
cutions, and convictions increased as the police dispensed justice 
"on the spot" for even minor offenses. Still, the excesses of the 
Great Leap Forward were milder than those of the 1949-52 period, 
when many of those arrested were summarily executed. Persons 
found guilty during the Great Leap Forward were regarded as 
educable. After 1960, during a brief period of ascendancy of the 
political moderates, there was some emphasis on rebuilding the 
judicial sector, but the Cultural Revolution nullified most of the 
progress that had been made under the 1954 state constitution. 

The Legal System under the 1975 State Constitution 

The state constitution adopted in January 1975 overwhelmingly 
drew its inspiration from Mao Zedong Thought. It stressed party 
leadership and reduced the power of the National People's Con- 
gress. The streamlined document (30 articles compared with 106 
in 1954) reduced even further the constitutional restraints on the 
Maoists. The sole article in the new state constitution that pertained 
to judicial authority eliminated the procuratorate and transferred 
its functions and powers to the police. The marked increase in police 
power suited the radical leaders in the party hierarchy who wanted 
public security forces to have the power to arrest without having 
to go through other judicial organs. 

The National People's Congress theoretically was still empowered 
to enact laws, select and reject state officials, and direct the judiciary. 
The party, however, was the ultimate arbiter, and the Supreme 



515 



China: A Country Study 



People's Court was no longer designated the highest judicial body 
in the land but was only mentioned in passing as one of the courts 
exercising judicial authority. 

Equality before the law, a provision of the 1954 state constitu- 
tion, was eliminated. Moreover, people no longer had the right 
to engage in scientific research or literary or artistic creation nor 
the freedom to change residences. Some new rights were added, 
including the freedom to propagate atheism and to practice religion. 
Citizens also gained the "four big rights": the right to speak out 
freely, air views fully, hold great debates, and write big-character 
posters (see Glossary). These "new" forms of socialist revolution 
along with the right to strike were examples of radical political 
activism popularized during the Cultural Revolution that were 
revoked in 1979 (see The Government, ch. 10). 

"Socialist legality" under the 1975 state constitution was charac- 
terized by instant, arbitrary arrest. Impromptu trials were con- 
ducted either by a police officer on the spot, by a revolutionary 
committee (the local government body established during the Cul- 
tural Revolution decade), or by a mob. Spur-of-the-moment cir- 
culars and party regulations continued to take the place of a code 
of criminal law or judicial procedure. For example, during demon- 
strations in Beijing's Tiananmen Square in early 1976, three 
demonstrators were seized by police and accused of being coun- 
terrevolutionaries in support of Deng Xiaoping. The three were 
"tried" by the "masses" during a two-hour "struggle meeting," 
a session where thousands of onlookers shouted their accusations. 
After this "trial," during which the accused were forbidden to offer 
a defense (even if they had wished to), the three were sentenced 
to an unspecified number of years in a labor camp. In contrast 
to the milder sentences of the 1957 period, sentencing under the 
state constitution of 1975 was severe. Death sentences were handed 
down frequently for "creating mass panic," burglary, rape, and 
looting. 

Following the death of Mao in September 1976 and the arrest 
of the Gang of Four (see Glossary) less than a month later, the 
government took its first steps to set aside the 1975 state constitu- 
tion and restore the pre-Cultural Revolution legal system. In Janu- 
ary 1977 Premier Hua Guofeng directed legal experts to begin 
rebuilding judicial institutions in the spirit of the 1954 state con- 
stitution. The Chinese press began to carry stories about the vir- 
tues of the 1954 document and the Gang of Four's abuse of it. Later 
in the year, Hua announced that China had eight important tasks 
to fulfill, among them the reconstruction of formal legal institutions. 

During the fall of 1977, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) 



516 



A policeman directs rush-hour traffic in Beijing. 
The slogan reads "Pay attention to Safety. " 

Courtesy Robert L. Worden 

and militia began turning over the responsibility for public security 
to the civilian sector. Judicial and public security workers held meet- 
ings to seek ways "to strengthen the building of the legal 
forces . . . and socialist legal systems." A theoretical study group 
from the Supreme People's Court affirmed that the courts and the 
public security organs were solely responsible for maintaining public 
order, and they called on the people to accept the views of superior 
authorities. 

The government set out to reorganize completely all judicial 
procedures and establish codes of criminal law and judicial proce- 
dure as quickly as possible. Law schools were reopened, profes- 
sors were rehired to staff them, and legal books and journals 
reappeared. By the end of 1977, the legal system and the courts 
reportedly were stronger than at any time since the 1954-56 period. 

Return to Socialist Legality 

Developments under the 1978 State Constitution 

A new constitution intended to provide a structural basis for the 
return to socialist legality was adopted at the Fifth National Peo- 
ple's Congress in March 1978. Legal reform was deemed essen- 
tial not only to prevent a return to power of the radicals but also 



517 



China: A Country Study 



to provide the legal structure for the economic development of the 
country envisioned by the party leadership. 

The 1978 state constitution reaffirmed the principle — deleted in 
the 1975 state constitution — of the equality of all citizens before 
the law. It guaranteed the right to a public trial, except in cases 
involving national security, sex offenses, or minors, and reaffirmed 
a citizen's right to offer a defense — also omitted in 1975. 

The National People's Congress called for new criminal, 
procedural, civil, and economic codes as quickly as possible, using 
the new state constitution as a guide. The delegates quoted Mao 
as having said in 1962 that "we not only need a criminal code but 
also a civil code," and they invoked Mao's authority against those 
who viewed regularizing the legal system as counterrevolutionary. 

In November 1978 the Law Institute of the Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences, working in conjunction with the Legal Affairs 
Commission of the National People's Congress proposed strength- 
ening the socialist legal system, which, it explained, was based on 
democracy, socialist principles, and the worker-peasant alliance. 
The institute added that the system should be formulated, enforced, 
and used by the people for economic development and against 
groups such as the Gang of Four. The 1978 state constitution gave 
the National People's Congress sole authority to interpret, promul- 
gate, and change laws. It also reestablished the people's procurator- 
ates and made them responsible both to the procuratorate at the 
next higher level and to the people's government at the same level, 
as they had been before 1954. 

In mid- 1979 China promulgated a series of new statutes that 
included the country's first criminal law, the first criminal proce- 
dure law, and updated laws on courts and procuratorates. Exten- 
sive preparations preceded the announcements. Beginning in early 
1979, for example, the media hosted debates on subjects such as 
judicial independence, presumption of innocence, and equality of 
all citizens before the law. A national conference of procuratorates 
in January 1979 stressed the need for thorough investigations in 
all cases and respect for evidence. The participants in the confer- 
ence warned that extorted confessions would no longer be accepted 
and that the police could not make arrests without procuratorate 
approval. If circumstances did not permit prior approval, the 
approval had to be obtained after the fact or the detainee had to 
be released. 

Judicial work conferences were held throughout China to make 
recommendations to the National People's Congress concerning 
an independent judiciary. According to the recommendations, 
Chinese courts in the future would base their judgments on the 



518 



Criminal Justice and Public Security 

law, while continuing to "work under unified leadership of the local 
party committees." In short, party policy no longer would be the 
equivalent of the law, but judicial independence in China could 
still be modified by party guidance. 

Peng Zhen, director of the Legal Affairs Commission and active 
in the reform efforts of the early 1960s, announced the new laws 
in June 1979 and had them published shortly thereafter. Accord- 
ing to Peng's announcement, the laws were based on 1954 and 1963 
drafts and provided a foundation for the socialist legal system and, 
ultimately, social democracy. He affirmed that the judiciary would 
be independent and subject only to the law; that all individuals, 
no matter how senior, would be equal before the law; and that party 
members and cadres would have to forego special treatment and 
set an example for the people. In November 1979 Peng was 
appointed secretary general of the Standing Committee of the Fifth 
National People's Congress, a position from which he could con- 
trol the reconstruction of the legal system. 

Among the laws approved by the Second Session of the Fifth 
National People's Congress to take effect January 1, 1980, was the 
Organic Law of the Local People's Congresses and the Local Peo- 
ple's Governments. The revolutionary committees, which had 
assumed judicial authority in the 1967-76 period, were eliminated; 
their authority was assumed by local people's governments, and 
judicial responsibility was returned to the appropriate courts. 

The Electoral Law for the National People's Congress and Local 
People's Congresses, also to take effect January 1, 1980, provided 
for the direct election of some procurators and judges. The Organic 
Law of the People's Courts was designed to create a more orderly 
environment and to assure the people that the chaotic years of the 
Cultural Revolution, with no courts and no legal guarantees, were 
over. The law, a revised version of 1954 drafts, guaranteed the 
accused equality before the law regardless of race, nationality, sex, 
social background, or religious beliefs and gave people the right 
to a lawyer. In certain cases, the lawyer would be court-appointed. 
The law called for independence of the judiciary from political 
interference. Courts were free to establish judicial committees to 
assist them in difficult cases, and there were provisions for citizens 
to be elected as assessors to participate with judges in adjudicating 
cases. The local language was to be the medium for conducting 
court proceedings and writing court decisions. Cases involving the 
death penalty were to be reviewed by the Supreme People's Court, 
and all defendants were entitled to appeal to the next higher court. 

The Organic Law of the People's Procuratorates, an amended 
version of a 1954 law, made procurators responsible for supervising 



519 



China: A Country Study 



law enforcement by the police, courts, and administrative agen- 
cies. The procuratorate was linked to China's past in that it func- 
tioned like the censorial system of imperial China. It served as the 
eyes and ears of the government, just as the censorial system was 
the watchdog for the emperor. 

The procurators were elected by local people's congresses and 
approved by the next higher procuratorial level to handle only crimi- 
nal cases. The independence of the procuratorates was constitu- 
tionally guaranteed. Still, their responsibilities were difficult, 
especially in any case involving a high party official. According 
to the new law, procuratorates at all levels had to establish 
procuratorial committees, practice democratic centralism (see Glos- 
sary), and make decisions through discussion. Ideally, a procurator- 
ate at a lower level would be led, rather than dictated to, by one 
at the next higher level. Each procuratorate was responsible to the 
standing committee of the people's congress at the corresponding 
level. 

The 1980 Criminal Law was intended to protect state property 
as well as the personal and property rights of citizens against unlaw- 
ful infringement by any person or institution. It safeguarded the 
fundamental rights stipulated in the 1978 state constitution and 
prescribed penalties for counterrevolutionary activities (crimes 
against the state) and other criminal offenses. Prevention of crime 
and rehabilitation through education (taking into account actual 
conditions in China in 1979) were stressed. Illegal incarcerations, 
fabrications, prosecutions, and intimidation were forbidden, but 
the provisions of the law did not apply retroactively. 

The Criminal Law contained a provision prohibiting the crimi- 
nal prosecution of a person who had "reactionary," that is, anti- 
party, ideas but who had committed no "reactionary" actions. As 
Peng Zhen pointed out in late 1979, because "most contradictions 
were among the people," involving constructive criticism not 
antagonistic to the party or state, punishment was inappropriate 
(see Policy Toward Intellectuals, ch. 4). As in some other areas 
of the law, the actual judicial disposition appeared at times to be 
at variance with this particular principle. 

The law defined criminal acts and distinguished between actual 
crimes and accidents. It also established a statute of limitations both 
to demonstrate the "humanitarian spirit" of the penal code and 
to permit law enforcement officials to concentrate on crimes for 
which evidence was still available. The law retained the important 
legal principle of analogy, according to which acts not specifically 
defined might be considered crimes. Criminal charges could not 
be brought unless there was evidence that a crime had been 



520 



Criminal Justice and Public Security 



committed; the sole basis for prosecution was verifiable evidence. 
The law also defined basic understandable rules of evidence. The 
death penalty could be imposed for flagrant counterrevolutionary 
acts and for homicide, arson, criminal intent in causing explosions, 
and other offenses of this nature. The 1983 revision of the law con- 
siderably increased the number of offenses punishable by the death 
penalty. 

The Law on Criminal Procedure was promulgated to reform 
judicial procedures in enforcing the Criminal Law. It was designed 
to educate citizens, establish judicial jurisdictions, and streamline 
judicial appeal and review. The law described the relationship 
between public security organs (investigations and provisional 
apprehensions), the procuratorates (arrest approvals, possible procu- 
ratorial investigations, prosecutions, and supervision of the police 
and penal institutions), and the courts (trials and sentencing). It 
also guaranteed the accused the right to make a defense at a pub- 
lic trial with an advocate present. 

The public security organs, procuratorates, and courts had to 
base their judgments on verified evidence using the law as a mea- 
sure. There were strict time limits on court and police actions to 
prevent overly lengthy detention. 

Legal Reforms in the 1982 State Constitution 

In late 1982 the National People's Congress adopted a new state 
constitution, which was still in effect in mid- 1987 (see Constitu- 
tional Framework, ch. 10). The 1982 State Constitution incorpo- 
rates many provisions of the laws passed since 1978 and 
distinguishes between the functions of the state and of the party, 
mandating that "no organization or individual may enjoy the 
privilege of being above the Constitution and the law" (Article 5). 
This article has been interpreted by Chinese observers to include 
party leaders. The State Constitution also delineates the fundamen- 
tal rights and duties of citizens, including protection from defa- 
mation of character, illegal arrest or detention, and unlawful search. 

The National People's Congress and the local people's congresses 
continued to enact legislation to meet the juridical and other needs 
of their jurisdictions. The draft Law on Civil Procedure, in force 
from October 1982, provides guidelines for hearing civil cases. 
These cases constitute the majority of lawsuits in China, and in 
the 1980s the number was growing rapidly. In some of the lower 
courts almost all cases were civil. 

A major problem in implementing new criminal and civil laws 
was a critical lack of trained legal personnel. In August 1980 the 
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress had sought 



521 



China: A Country Study 



to remedy this shortage by passing the Provisional Act on Law- 
yers of the People's Republic of China, which took effect on Janu- 
ary 1, 1982. Before the law went into effect, there were only 1,300 
legal advisory offices and 4,800 lawyers in China. By mid-1983 
the number had increased to 2,300 legal advisory offices staffed 
by more than 12,000 lawyers (approximately 8,600 full time and 
3,500 part time). To meet the growing demand for lawyers, law 
institutes and university law departments that had been closed dur- 
ing the Cultural Revolution were reopened, and additional ones 
were established. By mid- 1985 approximately 3,000 lawyers per 
year were graduating from the 5 legal institutes and 31 university 
law departments located throughout the country. 

The law also established legal advisory offices at every level of 
government and established the duties, rights, and qualifications 
of lawyers. Any Chinese citizen with the right to vote who has passed 
a professional competency test after formal training or after two 
to three years of experience in legal work can qualify as a lawyer. 
Lawyers are expected to act as legal advisers to government and 
nongovernment organizations and as both public and private liti- 
gants in civil suits, to defend the accused in criminal cases on request 
of the defendant or upon assignment of the court, and to offer legal 
advice at a nominal charge to anyone requesting it. The 1982 law 
guarantees that in carrying out these duties lawyers will be per- 
mitted to meet and to correspond with their clients without inter- 
ference from any organization or individual. The law seems to have 
had a positive effect. Although there was a serious shortage of law- 
yers and great disparity in professional competence among those 
practicing, China in the mid-1980s was making progress in develop- 
ing a corps of lawyers to meet its legal needs. 

Court Structure and Process 

Between the Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957 and the legal 
reforms of 1979, the courts — viewed by the leftists as troublesome 
and unreliable — played only a small role in the judicial system. 
Most of their functions were handled by other party or govern- 
ment organs. In 1979, however, the National People's Congress 
began the process of restoring the judicial system. The world was 
able to see an early example of this reinstituted system in action 
in the showcase trial of the Gang of Four and six other members 
of the "Lin-Jiang clique" from November 1980 to January 1981 
(see China and the Four Modernizations, 1979-82, ch. 1). The 
trial, which was publicized to show that China had restored a legal 
system that made all citizens equal before the law, actually appeared 
to many foreign observers to be more a political than a legal exercise. 



522 



Criminal Justice and Public Security 

Nevertheless, it was intended to show that China was committed 
to restoring a judicial system. 

The Ministry of Justice, abolished in 1959, was reestablished 
under the 1979 legal reforms to administer the newly restored 
judicial system. With the support of local judicial departments and 
bureaus, the ministry was charged with supervising personnel 
management, training, and funding for the courts and associated 
organizations and was given responsibility for overseeing legal 
research and exchanges with foreign judicial bodies. 

The 1980 Organic Law of the People's Courts (revised in 1983) 
and the 1982 State Constitution established four levels of courts 
in the general administrative structure. Judges are elected or 
appointed by people's congresses at the corresponding levels to serve 
a maximum of two five-year terms. Most trials are administered 
by a collegial bench made up of one to three judges and three to 
five assessors. Assessors, according to the State Constitution, are 
elected by local residents or people's congresses from among citizens 
over twenty-three years of age with political rights or are appointed 
by the court for their expertise. Trials are conducted in an inquisi- 
torial manner, in which both judges and assessors play an active 
part in the questioning of all witnesses. (This contrasts with the 
Western adversarial system, in which the judge is meant to be an 
impartial referee between two contending attorneys.) After the judge 
and assessors rule on a case, they pass sentence. An aggrieved party 
can appeal to the next higher court. 

The Organic Law of the People's Courts requires that adjudi- 
cation committees be established for courts at every level. The com- 
mittees usually are made up of the president, vice presidents, chief 
judges, and associate chief judges of the court, who are appointed 
and removed by the standing committees of the people's congresses 
at the corresponding level. The adjudication committees are charged 
with reviewing major cases to find errors in determination of facts 
or application of law and to determine if a chief judge should with- 
draw from a case. If a case is submitted to the adjudication com- 
mittee, the court is bound by its decision. The Supreme People's 
Court stands at the apex of the judicial structure (see fig. 20). 
Located in Beijing, it has jurisdiction over all lower and special 
courts, for which it serves as the ultimate appellate court. It is 
directly responsible to the National People's Congress Standing 
Committee, which elects the court president (see The Judiciary, 
ch. 10). 

China also has special military, railroad transport, water trans- 
port, and forestry courts. These courts hear cases of counterrevolu- 
tionary activity, plundering, bribery, sabotage, or indifference to 



523 



China: A Country Study 



PEOPLE'S COURT SYSTEM 1 



PEOPLE'S PROCURATORATES 2 



CENTRAL 
GOVERNMENT 
LEVEL 



SUPREME PEOPLE'S 
COURT 



CRIMINAL 
BENCH 



CIVIL 
BENCH 



PROVINCIAL 
LEVEL 



ECONOMIC 
BENCH 



HIGHER 
PEOPLE'S COURTS 



CRIMINAL 
BENCH 



CIVIL 
BENCH 



INTERMEDIATE 
PEOPLE'S COURTS 



CRIMINAL 
BENCH 



CIVIL 
BENCH 



COUNTY 
LEVEL 



ECONOMIC 
BENCH 



BASIC 
PEOPLE'S COURTS 



CRIMINAL 
BENCH 



TOWNSHIP 
LEVEL 



CIVIL 
BENCH 



PEOPLE'S MEDIATION 
COMMITTEES 



SUPREME PEOPLE'5 
PROCURATORATE 



SPECIAL PEOPLE'S 
COURTS 



SPECIAL 
PROCURATORATES 



PEOPLE'S 
PROCURATORATES 



DIVISIONAL PEOPLE'S 
PROCURATORATES 



PEOPLE'S 
PROCURATORATES 



1 0rganization of a people's court : 
President, vice presidents, presiding judges, deputy presiding judges, judges, 
judicial committees, people's assessors, marshals, legal-medical experts, interpreters, 
and bailiffs. 

Components of a people's court in session : 

Collegial bench of judges and assessors, public prosecutor, defense lawyer 
or publicly appointed defender, and defendant. 

2 Organization of a people's procuratorate : 
Chief procurator, procurators, departments for economic cases and for 
criminal cases, and others as needed. 



Figure 20. Organization of the People's Courts and People's Procurator- 
ates, 1987 



duty that result in severe damage to military facilities, work units, 
or government property or threaten the safety of soldiers or workers. 

Military courts make up the largest group of special courts and 
try all treason and espionage cases. Although they are indepen- 
dent of civilian courts and directly subordinate to the Ministry of 
National Defense, military court decisions are reviewed by the 



524 



Criminal Justice and Public Security 

Supreme People's Court. Special military courts were first estab- 
lished in 1954 to protect the special interests of all commanders, 
political commissars, and soldiers, but they ceased to function dur- 
ing the Cultural Revolution. Military courts and procuratorates 
were reinstituted in October 1978, and open military trials resumed 
in December of that year. 

Law Enforcement 

An extensive public security system and a variety of enforce- 
ment procedures maintained order in China in 1987. Along with 
the courts and procuratorates, the country's judicial and public 
security agencies included the Ministry of Public Security and the 
Ministry of State Security, with their descending hierarchy of 
departments, bureaus, subbureaus, and stations. 

Historical Background 

Pre-Qin to 1949 

However much the public security system may have been influ- 
enced by communist ideology and practice, it remained rooted 
directly in the traditional Chinese concept of governmental con- 
trol through imposed collective responsibility. Even in the pre- 
imperial era, a system was proposed to organize the people into 
"groups of families which would be mutually responsible for each 
other's good behavior and share each other's punishments." The 
Qin (221-207 B.C.) and Han (206 B.C.-A.D. 220) dynasties made 
use of the concept, and the Song dynasty (960-1279) institutional- 
ized it on a nationwide basis in the baojia (tithing) system. It entailed 
the organization of family households into groups of ten, each unit 
being organized successively into a larger unit up to the county 
level of administration. Each family sent a representative to the 
monthly meeting of its unit, and each unit elected a leader to 
represent it at the next higher level. Since the head of each unit 
was responsible to the next higher level for the conduct of all mem- 
bers of his unit, the system served as an extension of the central 
government. Eventually, each group of families also was required 
to furnish men to serve in the militia. Bao jia, which alternately 
flourished or languished under later rulers and usually existed more 
in theory than in practice, was reinstituted during the Qing dynasty 
(1644-1911). 

During the Qing period, the people's aversion to legalistic proce- 
dures and the rulers' preferences for socially and collectively 
imposed sanctions continued. Technically, the magistrate was to 
hear even minor criminal cases; but local elders and village leaders 



525 



China: A Country Study 



were allowed to handle most disputes, freeing the magistrate for 
more important work and saving the government expense. The 
people preferred to handle matters in this way, outside the intimidat- 
ing court system. 

Other practices for maintaining public order in China during 
the imperial era included the formation of mutual aid groups of 
farm households, which over time came to assume police functions. 
In a manner similar to twentieth-century means of ideological con- 
trol, the Qing bureaucracy organized mass lectures that stressed 
the Confucian principle of obedience. Still another traditional form 
of policing was the appointment of censors to investigate corrup- 
tion and misconduct up to the highest levels of government. Doing 
that job too well cost many censors their lives. 

In 1932 Chiang Kai-shek's Guomindang government reinstituted 
the baojia system. In the Guomindang' s revised bao jia system, in 
addition to the chief, there were two officers of importance within 
each 100-family unit. The population officer maintained the records 
and reported all births, deaths, marriages, moves, and unlawful 
activities to the district office. The bao jia troop commander headed 
a self-defense unit and was responsible for maintaining law and 
order. In rural China, however, the local village was generally a 
self-contained world, and the peasants remained aloof from dis- 
tant and higher-ranking centers of authority. 

The Japanese were introduced to the baojia system on Taiwan 
when they assumed control of the island after the Sino-Japanese 
War (1894-95), and they found the system highly suitable for 
administering occupied areas. They instituted modified versions 
of it in north China after 1937. The Japanese imposed severe 
restrictions on the population, and the system aided in taking the 
census, restricting movement, and conducting spot checks. Each 
household had to affix a wooden tablet on the front door with the 
names of all inhabitants inscribed. Anyone missing or not on the 
list during an inspection by Japanese troops was assumed to be 
an insurgent. Since there were not as many Japanese troops in south 
China as in the north, the local leaders assisted the Japanese in 
administering the areas. They also disseminated propaganda at 
neighborhood meetings and established self-defense and youth 
corps. 

Developments Since 1949 

The Communists were themselves products of Chinese society, 
and when they came to power in 1949 they liberally borrowed from 
these historical examples. They extensively organized the popula- 
tion and maintained the principles of mutual surveillance and 



526 



Criminal Justice and Public Security 

mutual responsibility. They also retained the concept of self-defense 
forces. Communist control, however, exceeded that of bao jia or 
any other traditional system and extended into virtually every house- 
hold. Under communist rule, the family was not considered an 
effective control mechanism. To achieve near-total control, a large 
number of administrative agencies and social organizations were 
established or adapted. Police forces resembling the Soviet police 
in organization, power, and activities were organized with the aid 
of Soviet advisers. 

From 1949 to 1953, the newly established government of the Peo- 
ple's Republic made use of the PLA, militia units made up of 
demobilized soldiers and other civilians, the police, and loyal citizens 
to put down resistance and establish order. Remnants of the Guo- 
mindang armed forces remained in pockets on the mainland, and 
communist efforts to enforce tax laws and agricultural rules pro- 
voked disturbances and riots. Extending responsibility for public 
order to include the police, military, and citizenry proved to be 
a highly effective arrangement, and the concept was written into 
the Common Program that preceded the 1954 state constitution. 

The PLA and the militia continued to share responsibility for 
internal security and public order under the 1954 state constitu- 
tion. The PLA's involvement in internal affairs was most exten- 
sive during the more turbulent period of the Cultural Revolution 
(see The Cultural Revolution Decade, 1966-76, ch. 1). Mao 
Zedong, perceiving that the public security cadres were protect- 
ing precisely the party leaders he wished to purge, directed youth- 
ful Red Guards to crush the police, courts, and procuratorates as 
well. The minister of public security, Luo Ruiqing (who concur- 
rently served as the chief of staff of the PLA), was purged, soon 
followed by heads of the courts and procuratorates. 

Initially, the military tried to remain uninvolved. But on Mao's 
orders, the PLA, which had once been told to support (actually 
to acquiesce to) the Red Guards, moved in to quell the chaos that 
Mao had inspired. The PLA gradually took over public security 
functions by establishing military control committees to replace the 
government bureaucracy. Revolutionary committees were set up 
as provincial-level and local administrative organs, usually with 
a PLA cadre in charge, and order gradually returned. By the sum- 
mer of 1968 the Red Guards were being disbanded, and mass trials 
were used to punish and intimidate rioters. 

With nineteen of China's twenty-nine provincial-level people's 
revolutionary committees headed by PLA commanders, the mili- 
tary again was in charge of administration and security through- 
out the country, but it badly needed help from experienced police 



527 



China: A Country Study 



officers. A policy of leniency toward most former officials evolved, 
and some public security cadres returned to work. The PLA also 
recruited inexperienced people to form auxiliary police units. These 
units were mass organizations with a variety of names reflecting 
their factional orientation. Perhaps the best known unit was the 
"Attack with Reason, Defend with Force Corps" named for the 
militant slogan of Mao's wife, Jiang Qing. Public security forces 
were composed largely of nonprofessionals and lacked the disciplined 
informant networks and personnel dossiers previously used to main- 
tain order. 

Beginning in 1968, the authorities called upon the PLA to help 
remove millions of urban dwellers from the overcrowded cities and 
relocate them to the countryside and to transport cashiered offi- 
cials to special cadre schools for indoctrination and labor. The 
migration to the country mostly involved students and other youths 
for whom there were not enough jobs or places in the school sys- 
tem within the cities. Yet despite the discontent these campaigns 
caused, reported crime declined after 1970. Increased concern over 
the threat from the Soviet Union in the wake of armed clashes on 
the Sino-Soviet border in 1969 forced the PLA gradually to return 
to barracks, and control of the country reverted to the civilian 
leadership (see Civil-Military Relations, ch. 14). 

The Beijing-based Central Security Regiment, also known as 
the 8341 Unit, was an important PLA law enforcement element. 
It was responsible over the years for the personal security of Mao 
Zedong and other party and state leaders. More than a bodyguard 
force, it also operated a nationwide intelligence network to uncover 
plots against Mao or any incipient threat to the leadership. The 
unit reportedly was deeply involved in undercover activities, dis- 
covering electronic listening devices in Mao's office and perform- 
ing surveillance of his rivals. The 8341 Unit participated in the 
late 1976 arrest of the Gang of Four, but it reportedly was deacti- 
vated soon after that event. 

The militia also participated in maintaining public order in the 
1970s. Their involvement was especially evident in the 1973-76 
period. In 1973 the Gang of Four, concerned over the transfor- 
mation of the PLA into a more professional, less political, mili- 
tary force, took control of the urban militia from the PLA and placed 
it under local party committees loyal to them. For the next three 
years, the urban militia was used extensively to enforce radical 
political and social policies. It was the urban militia, along with 
the public security forces, that broke up the demonstrations in 
Tiananmen Square honoring the memory of Zhou Enlai in April 
1976 — the event that served as the pretext for the second purge 



528 



Criminal Justice and Public Security 



of Deng Xiaoping (see The Cultural Revolution Decade, 1966-76, 
ch. 1). In rural areas the militia was more under the control of 
the PLA. 

Public Security Forces 

The Public Security System 

In 1987 the Ministry of Public Security was the principal police 
authority. The ministry had functional departments for areas such 
as intelligence; police operations; prisons; and political, economic, 
and communications security. Subordinate to the ministry were 
provincial-level public security departments; public security bureaus 
and subbureaus at the county level (the bureaus located in the 
prefectures and large cities, the subbureaus in counties and munici- 
pal districts); and public security stations at the township level (see 
fig. 21). While public security considerations had a strong influence 
at all levels of administration, the police appeared to wield progres- 
sively greater influence at the lower levels of government. 

The organization of local public security stations could be inferred 
from the tasks with which the police were charged. Generally, each 
station had sections for population control, pretrial investigations, 
welfare, traffic control, a detention center, and other activities. 

In the 1980s the public security station — the police element in 
closest contact with the people — was supervised by the public secu- 
rity subbureau as well as by local governments and procuratorates. 
The procuratorate could assume direct responsibility for handling 
any case it chose, and it supervised investigations in those cases 
it allowed the public security station to conduct. A great deal of 
coordination occurred among the public security organs, the 
procuratorates, and the courts, so that a trial was unlikely to produce 
a surprise outcome. 

The public security station generally had considerably broader 
responsibilities than a police station in the West, involving itself 
in every aspect of the district people's lives. In a rural area it had 
a chief, a deputy chief, a small administrative staff, and a small 
police force. In an urban area it had a greater number of adminis- 
trative staff members and seven to eighteen patrolmen. Its criminal 
law activities included investigation, apprehension, interrogation, 
and temporary detention. The station's household section main- 
tained a registry of all persons living in the area. Births, deaths, 
marriages, and divorces were recorded and confirmed through ran- 
dom household checks. The station regulated all hotels and required 
visitors who remained beyond a certain number of days to register. 
All theaters, cinemas, radio equipment, and printing presses also 



529 



China: A Country Study 



CENTRAL 
GOVERNMENT 
LEVEL 



PROVINCIAL 
LEVEL 



COUNTY 
LEVEL 2 



LEVEL 



MINISTRY OF 
PUBLIC SECURITY 1 



PUBLIC SECURITY 
DEPARTMENT 



PUBLIC SECURITY 
BUREAU 

























TOV\ 


WSHI 


P 





PUBLIC SECURITY 
STATION 



PEOPLE'S 
MEDIATION COMMITTEE 



SECURITY DEFENSE 
COMMITTEE 



OTHER COMMITTEES 



PEOPLE'S ARMED 
POLICE FORCE 



The Ministry of State Security and other ministries within the State Council 
share public security responsibilities with the Ministry of Public Security. 

Includes prefectures, autonomous prefectures, counties, autonomous 
counties, and municipalities. 



Figure 21. Organization of the Public Security System, 1987 



were registered with the local public security station, permitting 
it to regulate gatherings and censor information effectively. It also 
regulated the possession, transportation, and use of all explosives, 
guns, ammunition, and poisons. 

Another important police function was controlling change of resi- 
dence. Without such controls, large numbers of rural residents 
undoubtedly would move to the overcrowded cities in search of 
better living standards, work, or education (see Migration, ch. 2; 
Urban Society, ch. 3). In April 1984 the State Council issued the 
Tentative Regulations Governing People's Republic of China Resi- 
dent Identity. The regulations, to be implemented over a period 
of years, required all residents over sixteen years of age, except 



530 



Criminal Justice and Public Security 

active-duty members of the PLA and the People's Armed Police 
Force and inmates serving sentences, to be issued resident identity 
cards by the Ministry of Public Security. The picture cards indi- 
cated the name, sex, nationality, date of birth, and address of the 
bearer. Cards for persons sixteen to twenty-five years of age were 
valid for ten years; those for persons between twenty-five and forty- 
five were valid for twenty years; and persons over forty-five were 
issued permanent cards. As of early 1987, only 70 million people 
had been issued identity cards, well below the national goal. Also, 
even those with resident identity cards preferred to use other forms 
of identification. 

In the 1980s secret police operations employed agents, inform- 
ers, and "roving spies." Police surveillance apparently was 
restricted to probation and parole. Plainclothes agents were posted 
at bus and railroad stations and other public places. Police informers 
denounced "bad elements" and assisted in surveillance of suspected 
political criminals. Roving spies were a special category of infor- 
mant in the factories and work units and were ever watchful for 
dissidence or sabotage. Youths aspiring to be Communist Youth 
League members, or league members aspiring to be party mem- 
bers, sometimes cooperated as informants and agents for the police. 

Public security officials also made extensive use of the authority 
granted them to impose administrative sanctions by two sets of docu- 
ments. These were the 1957 Regulations on Reeducation Through 
Labor, which were reissued in 1979 with amendments, and the 
1957 Regulations Governing Offenses Against Public Order, which 
were rescinded and replaced in 1986 by regulations of the same 
name. Offenders under the Regulations on Reeducation Through 
Labor might include "vagabonds, people who have no proper 
occupation, and people who repeatedly breach public order." The 
police could apprehend such individuals and sentence them to 
reeducation through labor with the approval of local labor-training 
administration committees. The 1957 regulations placed no limit 
on the length of sentences, but beginning in the early 1960s three 
or four years was the norm. The 1979 amended regulations, 
however, limited the length of reeducation through labor to three 
years with possible extension for extraordinary cases. The Regu- 
lations Governing Offenses Against Public Order empowered the 
police to admonish, fine, or detain people for up to fifteen days. 
Goods illegally in the possession of an offender were to be confis- 
cated, and payment was imposed for damages or hospital fees in 
the event injury had been caused. 

The criminal laws in force after January 1, 1980, restricted police 
powers regarding arrests, investigations, and searches. A public 



531 



China: A Country Study 



security official or a citizen could apprehend a suspect under emer- 
gency conditions, but a court or procuratorate was required to 
approve the arrest. The accused had to be questioned within twenty- 
four hours and his or her family or work unit notified of the deten- 
tion "except in circumstances where notification would hinder the 
investigation or there was no way to notify them." Any premedi- 
tated arrest required a court or procuratorate warrant. The time 
that an accused could be held pending investigation was limited 
to three to seven days, and incarceration without due process was 
illegal. 

Two officials were needed to conduct a criminal investigation. 
They were required to show identification and, apparently, to 
inf orm the accused of the crime allegedly committed before he or 
she was questioned. The suspect could refuse to answer only those 
questions irrelevant to the case. Torture was illegal. 

The 1980 laws also provided that in conjunction with an arrest 
the police could conduct an emergency search; otherwise, a war- 
rant was required. They had the right to search the person, 
property, and residence of an accused and the person of any injured 
party. They could intercept mail belonging to the accused and order 
an autopsy whenever cause of death was unclear. 

In July 1980 the government approved new regulations governing 
police use of weapons and force. Police personnel could use their 
batons only in self-defense or when necessary to subdue or pre- 
vent the escape of violent criminals or rioters. Lethal weapons, such 
as pistols, could be used if necessary to stop violent riots, to lessen 
the overall loss of life, or to subdue surrounded but still resisting 
criminals. The regulations even governed use of sirens, police lights, 
and whistles. 

The relationship between the police officers assigned to neigh- 
borhood patrols and the people was close. Police officers lived in 
a neighborhood on a long-term assignment and were expected to 
know all the residents personally. Their task was not only to pre- 
vent and punish crime but to promote desirable behavior by coun- 
seling and acting as role models. This positive side of the police 
officer's duties was a constant responsibility, but the bond between 
the public security units and the people was strengthened annually 
by means of "cherish-the-people" months, during which the police 
officer made a special effort to be of help, especially to the aged 
and the infirm. 

Police were drawn from every segment of the population without 
restriction as to sex or ethnic origin. Selection was based on politi- 
cal loyalty, intelligence, and health, as it was for the PLA. Most 
recruits had Communist Youth League backgrounds or were former 



532 



Criminal Justice and Public Security 



PLA personnel. There was at least one police school in every 
provincial-level unit, and others were operated by municipalities. 
Usually those police designated for leadership positions attended 
the police schools, and patrolmen were trained at the unit and on 
the job. Legal training was emphasized as a method of improving 
the quality of the police forces. In 1985 three institutions of higher 
learning for police personnel — the University of Public Security, 
the University of Police Officers, and the Institute of Criminal 
Police — offered more than twenty special courses. Students were 
recruited from senior-middle-school graduates under twenty-two 
years of age, with a waiver to twenty-five years of age for those 
having a minimum of two years' experience in public security work. 

The People's Armed Police Force 

The People's Armed Police Force (PAPF), after a trial period 
in selected jurisdictions, was officially established at the national 
level in 1983. In line with the general policy of reducing the size 
of the armed forces and transferring responsibilities to the civilian 
sector, the newly established force was formed from internal secu- 
rity units reassigned from the PLA to the Ministry of Public Secu- 
rity and from border defense (customs) and fire-fighting units (see 
Military Modernization, ch. 14). In 1985 the PAPF consisted of 
approximately 600,000 volunteers and conscripts. With a general 
headquarters at the national level and subordinate division-level 
provincial or specialized units, regimental-level detachments, and 
battalion-level brigades, it retained its military organization. 

PAPF units assigned to internal security were responsible for 
guarding party and state organizations and foreign embassies and 
consulates, as well as for responding to emergencies and maintaining 
law and order. Border defense units performed standard customs 
duties, such as inspecting vehicles and ships entering and leaving 
the country, and maintained surveillance against smugglers and 
drug traffickers. PAPF firefighting units were responsible for fire- 
prevention education as well as for fighting fires. PAPF units at 
every level worked in close cooperation with the armed forces and 
other public security organizations. 

State Security 

In June 1983 the National People's Congress, perceiving a grow- 
ing threat of subversion and sabotage, established the Ministry of 
State Security under the State Council. This new ministry was 
charged with ensuring "the security of the state through effective 
measures against enemy agents, spies, and counterrevolutionary 
activities designed to sabotage or overthrow China's socialist 



533 



China: A Country Study 



system." At its inception, the ministry pledged to abide by the state 
constitution and the law and called upon the citizenry for their 
cooperation, reminding them of their constitutional obligations to 
"keep state secrets" and "safeguard the security" of the country. 
The Ministry of State Security reportedly acted in close coordina- 
tion with the Ministry of Public Security, but as of mid- 1987 little 
had been revealed about the actual workings of this counterintelli- 
gence organization. 

Grass-Roots Organizations 

Aspects of Chinese society also have contributed to shaping the 
contemporary structure for maintaining public order (see Urban 
Society, ch. 3). Urban and rural dwellers rarely change their resi- 
dences. Amid the sprawling cities, neighborhoods remain close- 
knit communities. For the 80 percent of the population that lives 
in the countryside, home and place of work are the same. With 
little physical mobility, most villagers stay put for generations and 
know each other intimately. In such close-knit environments, where 
everyone is likely to know everyone else and notice most of what 
happens, mutual surveillance and peer pressure can be extremely 
effective (see Rural Society, ch. 3). 

The structure of the public security system remained extensive 
in the 1980s, and the authority of its forces exceeded that of most 
police forces in the West. Nevertheless, public security agencies 
required and received the assistance of a wide-ranging network of 
grass-roots organizations to mobilize residents' responses to the 
government's call for observance of laws, lead the people in main- 
taining social order and public security, and settle disputes among 
residents. 

In urban areas an average of 1 1 patrolmen were responsible for 
controlling an area containing 15,000 or more residents. A patrol- 
man could not know all the people and their particular problems; 
he needed help. The local people's governments and congresses 
shared responsibility for public order but had no special personnel 
for the task. The armed forces were available, but they had other 
primary concerns and would be called out only in the most extreme 
circumstances. 

To provide security beyond what could be provided by the police 
and to extend government control, a system of neighborhood or 
street committees had been established on a nationwide basis in 
1954. The committees were charged with the responsibility of assist- 
ing the government in maintaining order. They usually controlled 
from 10,000 to 20,000 people and consisted of 3 to 7 full-time cadres. 
In the late 1970s, the size and functions of neighborhood committees 



534 




Inspecting the People's 
Armed Police Force 
Courtesy 
Jiefangjun Huabao 



were expanded. The neighborhood committees were specifically 
responsible for maintaining public order and were accountable to 
the local people's congress. 

Residents' committees and residents' "small groups," also estab- 
lished in 1954, were subordinate to neighborhood committees. 
These were the genuine grass-roots organizations, staffed by unpaid 
local residents elected by their neighbors. They directly involved 
the people in controlling their neighborhoods, and they reduced 
the demands on formal state institutions by maintaining surveil- 
lance for the public security forces and mediating most civil dis- 
putes and minor criminal cases for the judiciary. A residents' 
committee supervised from 100 to 600 families with a staff of 7 
to 17 members, one from each subordinate residents' small group. 
A residents' small group controlled fifteen to forty households. The 
public security organization in the countryside was also pervasive. 
From the 1950s to the early 1980s, it was structured along mili- 
tary lines. The people's commune (see Glossary) was the lowest 
level of government organization, with its administrative commit- 
tee on a legal par with the local people's government in the urban 
areas. People's communes were subdivided into production brigades 
(see Glossary) and production teams (see Glossary). Each team 
elected a people's public security committee, which sent a represen- 
tative to the committee at the brigade level. Physical control was 
mostly the responsibility of the militia units organized at the team, 



535 



China: A Country Study 



brigade, and commune levels. In the winter of 1982-83 communes 
were replaced by township governments, and grass-roots commit- 
tees were patterned after urban committees (see Rural Society, 
ch. 3). These rural grass-roots committees were given legal status 
by the Draft Organic Regulations for Villagers' Committees 
approved by the National People's Congress in April 1987. 

Residents' committees and small groups were staffed originally 
by housewives and retired persons but involved others as their func- 
tions expanded. Their pervasive presence made them a primary 
means for disseminating propaganda, and their grass-roots nature 
allowed for effective use of peer pressure in mediating disputes and 
controlling troublemakers. Perhaps 4 or 5 percent of the adult popu- 
lation exercised some authority in what Western experts have 
described as "participatory democracy in an extended form." The 
functional subunits, the residents' committees and residents' small 
groups, were particularly important in controlling the people. 

People's mediation committees, guided and supervised jointly 
by the basic people's court and the public security station, performed 
an important function within the residents' committees. They set- 
tled minor disputes and disagreements using conciliation and peer 
pressure. Mediation committees were established originally in com- 
munist areas during the Chinese civil war (1945-49) as a natural 
outgrowth of traditional preferences for local mediation of disputes. 
Upon taking over the major cities of China in 1949, the Communists 
were confronted with a tremendous backlog of judicial cases. Media- 
tion committees provided a means of resolving disputes while 
actively propagandizing and involving the people in the new govern- 
ment. Beginning in 1954 mediation committees were set up in 
neighborhoods, stores, schools, enterprises, factories, and work- 
shops in the cities and in the production brigades and teams in the 
countryside. 

In the 1980s the five- to eleven-member people's mediation com- 
mittees were elected by popular vote to two-year terms with the 
option of being reelected. Members served without pay and could 
be removed at any time by the electors for dereliction of duty . They 
were responsible for settling disputes, strengthening popular unity, 
promoting production and order, and conducting propaganda activ- 
ities. Parties in dispute came voluntarily to the mediation commit- 
tee; people seemed to feel they should try mediation before 
proceeding to a lawsuit. Mediators' duties ranged from acting as 
go-betweens for parties who refused to talk to one another to defin- 
ing issues, deciding questions of fact, and issuing tentative or advi- 
sory decisions. Mediation committees also exerted strong political, 
economic, social, and moral pressures upon one or both parties 



536 



Criminal Justice and Public Security 

to gain "voluntary" compliance with the decisions. In addition 
to mediation committees, other officials, police officers, party mem- 
bers, and work supervisors were expected to serve as mediators. 
Members of the residents' committees and small groups who were 
not members of the mediation committees were also involved in 
the mediation process. 

The Penal System 

The Criminal Law that took effect on January 1, 1980, removed 
criminal punishment from the discretion of officials, whose arbitrary 
decisions were based on perceptions of the current party line, and 
established it on a legal basis. The specific provisions of that law 
listed eight categories of offenses. 

The Statute on Punishment for Counterrevolutionary Activity 
approved under the Common Program in 1951 listed a wide range 
of counterrevolutionary offenses, punishable in most cases by the 
death penalty or life imprisonment. In subsequent years, especially 
during the Cultural Revolution, any activity that the party or 
government at any level considered a challenge to its authority could 
be termed counterrevolutionary. The 1980 law narrowed the scope 
of counterrevolutionary activity considerably and defined it as "any 
act jeopardizing the People's Republic of China, aimed at over- 
throwing the political power of the dictatorship of the proletariat 
and the socialist state." Under this category it included such specific 
offenses as espionage, insurrection, conspiracy to overthrow the 
government, instigating a member of the armed forces to turn trai- 
tor, or carrying out sabotage directed against the government. 

Other offenses, in the order listed in the 1980 law, were trans- 
gressions of public security, defined as any acts which endanger peo- 
ple or public property; illegal possession of arms and ammunition; 
offenses against the socialist economic order, including smuggling 
and speculation; offenses against both the personal rights and the 
democratic rights of citizens, which range from homicide, rape, and 
kidnapping to libel; and offenses of encroachment on property, 
including robbery, theft, embezzlement, and fraud. There were also 
offenses against the public order, including obstruction of official 
business; mob disturbances; manufacture, sale, or transport of ille- 
gal drugs or pornography; vandalizing or illegally exporting cul- 
tural relics; offenses against marriage and the family, which include 
interference with the freedom of marriage and abandoning or 
maltreating children or aged or infirm relatives; and malfeasance, 
which specifically relates to state functionaries and includes such 
offenses as accepting bribes, divulging state secrets, dereliction of 
duty, and maltreatment of persons under detention or surveillance. 



537 



China: A Country Study 



Under the 1980 law, these offenses were punishable when crimi- 
nal liability could be ascribed. Criminal liability was attributed to 
intentional offenses and those acts of negligence specifically provided 
for by the law. There were principal and supplementary penalties. 
Principal penalties were public surveillance, detention, fixed-term 
imprisonment, life imprisonment, and death. Supplementary penal- 
ties were fines, deprivation of political rights, and confiscation of 
property. Supplementary penalties could be imposed exclusive of 
principal penalties. Foreigners could be deported with or without 
other penalties. 

China retained the death penalty in the 1980s for certain seri- 
ous crimes. The 1980 law required that death sentences be approved 
by the Supreme People's Court. This requirement was temporarily 
modified in 1981 to allow the higher people's courts of provinces, 
autonomous regions, and special municipalities to approve death 
sentences for murder, robbery, rape, bomb-throwing, arson, and 
sabotage. In 1983 this modification was made permanent. The death 
sentence was not imposed on anyone under eighteen years of age 
at the time of the crime nor "on a woman found to be pregnant 
during the trial." Criminals sentenced to death could be granted 
a stay of execution for two years, during which they might demon- 
strate their repentance and reform. In this case the sentence could 
be reduced. Mao was credited with having originated this idea, 
which some observers found cruel although it obviated many exe- 
cutions. 

The overwhelming majority of prisoners were sentenced to hard 
labor. There were two categories of hard labor: the criminal 
penalty — "reform through labor" — imposed by the court and the 
administrative penalty — "reeducation through labor" — imposed 
outside the court system. The former could be any fixed number 
of years, while the latter lasted three or four years. In fact, those 
with either kind of sentence ended up at the same camps, which 
were usually state farms or mines but occasionally were factory pris- 
ons in the city. 

The November 1979 supplementary regulations on "reeduca- 
tion through labor" created labor training administration commit- 
tees consisting of members of the local government, public security 
bureau, and labor department. The police, government, or a work 
unit could recommend that an individual be assigned to such reedu- 
cation, and, if the labor training administration committee agreed, 
hard labor was imposed without further due process. The police 
reportedly made heavy use of the procedure, especially with urban 
youths, and probably used it to move unemployed, youthful, poten- 
tial troublemakers out of the cities. 



538 



Criminal Justice and Public Security 



In the early 1980s, the people's procuratorates supervised the 
prisons, ensuring compliance with the law. Prisoners worked eight 
hours a day, six days a week, and had their food and clothing 
provided by the prison. They studied politics, law, state policies, 
and current events two hours daily, half of that in group discus- 
sion. They were forbidden to read anything not provided by the 
prison, to speak dialects not understood by the guards, or to keep 
cash, gold, jewelry, or other goods useful in an escape. Mail was 
censored, and generally only one visitor was allowed each month. 

Prisoners were told that their sentences could be reduced if they 
showed signs of repentance and rendered meritorious service. Any 
number of reductions could be earned totaling up to one-half the 
original sentence, but at least ten years of a life sentence had to 
be served. Probation or parole involved surveillance by the public 
security bureau or a grass-roots organization to which the convict 
periodically reported. 

Crime by youthful offenders has been a matter of grave con- 
cern to the post-Mao leadership. In common with most societies, 
nearly all those charged with violent crime have been under thirty- 
five years of age. Criminal law makes special provisions for juvenile 
offenders. Offenders between fourteen and sixteen years of age are 
to be held criminally liable only if they commit homicide, robbery, 
arson, or "other offenses which gravely jeopardize public order," 
and offenders between fourteen and eighteen years of age "shall 
be given a lighter or mitigated penalty." In most cases juvenile 
offenders charged with minor infractions are dealt with by neigh- 
borhood committees or other administrative means. In serious cases 
juvenile offenders usually are sent to one of the numerous refor- 
matories reopened in most cities under the Ministry of Education 
beginning in 1978. 

In 1987 the crime rate remained low by international standards, 
and Chinese cities were among the safest in the world. The court 
system had been reestablished, and standard criminal, procedural, 
civil, and economic codes had been developed. Law schools, closed 
since the late 1950s, had been reopened, and new ones had been 
established to meet the growing need for lawyers and judges. Law 
enforcement organizations had been reorganized, civilianized, and 
made answerable to the courts and the procuratorates. But it would 
be unrealistic to assume that the old system of rule by party fiat 
could be changed in a short period of time. Opposition to the 
changes was pervasive at every level of the party and the govern- 
ment. Even its strongest supporters insisted that the legal system 
must be developed in accordance with the four cardinal principles — 
upholding socialism, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the 



539 



China: A Country Study 



leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, and Marxism- 
Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. Given these limitations, it was 
clear that although much progress had been made in replacing the 
Mao era's arbitrary rule with a solid legal system, much still 
remained to be done. 

* * * 

Readers interested in further information on law in traditional 
China should consult Law and Society in Traditional China by Ch'ii 
T'ung-tsu and Law in Imperial China by Derk Bodde and Clarence 
Morris. Readers interested in studying traditional legal practices 
still in use in China should consult Phillip M. Chen's Law and Justice 
and Fu-shun Lin's Chinese Law Past and Present. 

Justice in Communist China by Shao-chuan Leng and The Criminal 
Process in the People's Republic of China, 1949-1963 by Jerome Alan 
Cohen are good sources on legal developments in the early years 
of the People's Republic, and Shao-chuan Leng and Hungdah 
Chiu's Criminal Justice in Post-Mao China is an indispensable source 
for Chinese legal developments in the 1980s. Other extremely useful 
articles providing information on the criminal justice and penal 
systems can be found in various issues of Beijing Review, China News 
Analysis, Faxue Yanjiu (Studies in Law), and Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service, Daily ReportiChina. (For further information 
and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



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Chapter 14. National Defense 



Two foot soldiers, one carrying a long bow, the other with a sword and shield. 
The artist's version is based on part of a decorative clay tile found in a tomb 
of the Southern and Northern Dynasties period (A.D. 420-588) at Dengxian, 
Henan Province. 



CHINA HAS A LONG and glorious military tradition, dating 
back to the earliest days of recorded history. The martial exploits 
of kings and emperors, loyal generals and peasant rebels, and 
strategists and theorists are well known in Chinese high culture 
and folk tradition. Throughout the centuries, two tendencies have 
influenced the role of the military in national life, one in peace- 
time and the other in times of upheaval. In times of peace and sta- 
bility, military forces were firmly subordinated to civilian control. 
The military was strong enough to overcome domestic rebellions 
and foreign invasion, yet it did not threaten civilian control of the 
political system. In times of disorder, however, new military lead- 
ers and organizations arose to challenge the old system, resulting 
in the militarization of political life. When one of these leaders 
became strong enough, he established a new political order ruling 
all China. After consolidating power, the new ruler or his succes- 
sors subordinated the military to civilian control once again. In 
the past 150 years, a third factor entered the Chinese military 
tradition — the introduction of modern military technology and 
organization to strengthen military capabilities against domestic 
and foreign enemies. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, 
all three tendencies have been discernable in the role of the mili- 
tary in national life. These factors have been particularly appar- 
ent in the role of the People's Liberation Army in the rise to power 
of the Chinese Communist Party, in the military's role in the politics 
of the People's Republic of China, and in the efforts of Chinese 
leaders to modernize the armed forces. 

After decades of development from a peasant guerrilla force to 
a conventional military organization capable of achieving long- 
sought national liberation, the People's Liberation Army pursued 
further technical competence and improved organization, with 
Soviet assistance, in the 1950s. Political involvement in the Great 
Leap Forward (1958-60) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) 
delayed these efforts until the late 1970s, when the People's Libera- 
tion Army embarked on a military modernization program, which 
had three major focuses. First, military modernization required 
both the strengthening of party control over the military and the 
continued disengagement of the armed forces from politics. These 
steps were necessary to ensure that a politically reliable yet profes- 
sionally competent military would concentrate on the task of mili- 
tary reform. Second, defense modernization attempted to achieve 



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China: A Country Study 



improved combat effectiveness through organizational, doctrinal, 
training, educational, and personnel reforms (including recruit- 
ment, promotion, and demobilization). These reforms emphasized 
the development of combat capabilities in waging combined arms 
warfare. Third, military modernization was aimed at the trans- 
formation of the defense establishment into a system capable of 
independently sustaining modern military forces. This transfor- 
mation necessitated the reorganization and closer integration of 
civilian and military science and industry and also the selective use 
of foreign technology. 

Since the 1960s China had considered the Soviet Union the prin- 
cipal threat to its security; lesser threats were posed by long-standing 
border disputes with Vietnam and India. Beijing's territorial claims 
and economic interests made the South China Sea an area of stra- 
tegic importance to China. Although China sought peaceful reuni- 
fication of Taiwan with the mainland, it did not rule out the use 
of force against the island if serious internal disturbances, a decla- 
ration of independence, or a threatening alliance occurred. 

The scope of foreign military cooperation has evolved gradually. 
In the 1950s China dealt only with communist nations and insur- 
gencies. In the 1960s it began to provide military assistance to Third 
World nations to counteract Soviet and United States influence. 
Beginning in the late 1970s, China shifted its arms transfer policy 
away from military assistance in favor of commercial arms sales 
and began developing military ties with Western Europe and the 
United States. Chinese military contacts with foreign countries 
expanded rapidly with the introduction of the military modern- 
ization program and the policy of opening up to the outside 
world. 

In the late 1980s, People's Liberation Army forces consisted of 
the various arms of the ground forces, and the Air Force, Navy, 
and Strategic Missile Force (also known as the Second Artillery 
Corps). The ground forces were divided into group armies and 
regional forces. Ground force equipment was largely of Soviet 
design and obsolescent, although some weaponry had been 
upgraded with foreign technology. The Air Force had serious tech- 
nological deficiencies despite incremental improvements of aircraft. 
The Navy was developing a blue-water capability and sea-based 
strategic forces. China possessed a small but relatively credible 
nuclear deterrent force with an incipient second-strike capability. 
Paramilitary forces consisted of the militia, reserve service system, 
Production and Construction Corps, and People's Armed Police 
Force. 



544 



National Defense 



Historical Development, 1927-79 

From the Founding of the People's Liberation Army to the Korean 
War 

The People's Liberation Army (PLA) was built on several millen- 
nia of tradition and a century of Western military innovations. It 
traces its origins to the August 1 , 1927, Nanchang Uprising in which 
Guomindang troops led by Chinese Communist Party leaders Zhu 
De and Zhou Enlai rebelled following the dissolution of the first 
Guomindang-Chinese Communist Party united front earlier that 
year. The survivors of that and other abortive communist insur- 
rections, including the Autumn Harvest Uprising led by Mao 
Zedong, fled to the Jinggang Mountains along the border of Hunan 
and Jiangxi provinces. Joining forces under the leadership of Mao 
and Zhu, this collection of communists, bandits, Guomindang 
deserters, and impoverished peasants became the First Workers' 
and Peasants' Army, or Red Army — the military arm of the 
Chinese Communist Party. Using the guerrilla tactics that would 
later make Mao Zedong internationally famous as a military 
strategist, the Red Army survived several encirclement and sup- 
pression campaigns by superior Guomindang forces. But party 
internal politics forced the Red Army temporarily to abandon guer- 
rilla warfare and resulted in the epic Long March of 1934-35 (see 
Nationalism and Communism, ch. 1). The Red Army's exploits 
during the Long March became legendary and remain a potent 
symbol of the spirit and prowess of the Red Army and its succes- 
sor, the PLA. During that period, Mao's political power and his 
strategy of guerrilla warfare gained ascendancy in the party and 
the Red Army. 

In 1937 the Red Army joined in a second united front with the 
Guomindang against the invading Japanese army (see Anti- 
Japanese War, ch. 1). Although nominally cooperating with the 
Guomindang, the Chinese Communist Party used the Red Army 
to expand its influence while leading the anti-Japanese resistance 
in north China. By the end of the war, the Red Army numbered 
approximately 1 million and was backed by a militia of 2 million. 
Although the Red Army fought several conventional battles against 
the Japanese (and Guomindang troops), guerrilla operations were 
the primary mode of warfare. 

Mao's military thought grew out of the Red Army's experiences 
in the late 1930s and early 1940s and formed the basis for the "peo- 
ple's war" concept, which became the doctrine of the Red Army 
and the PLA. In developing his thought, Mao drew on the works 
of the Chinese military strategist Sun Zi (fourth century B.C.) and 



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China: A Country Study 



Soviet and other theorists, as well as on the lore of peasant upris- 
ings, such as the stories found in the classical novel Shuihu Zhuan 
(Water Margin) and the stories of the Taiping Rebellion (see Emer- 
gence of Modern China, ch. 1). Synthesizing these influences with 
lessons learned from the Red Army's successes and failures, Mao 
created a comprehensive politico-military doctrine for waging 
revolutionary warfare. People's war incorporated political, eco- 
nomic, and psychological measures with protracted military struggle 
against a superior foe. As a military doctrine, people's war empha- 
sized the mobilization of the populace to support regular and guer- 
rilla forces; the primacy of men over weapons, in which superior 
motivation compensated for inferior technology; and the three 
progressive phases of protracted warfare — strategic defensive, stra- 
tegic stalemate, and strategic offensive. During the first stage, 
enemy forces were "lured in deep" into one's own territory to over- 
extend, disperse, and isolate them. The Red Army established base 
areas from which to harass the enemy, but these bases and other 
territory could be abandoned to preserve Red Army forces. In the 
second phase, superior numbers and morale were applied to wear 
down the enemy in a war of attrition in which guerrilla operations 
predominated. During the final phase, Red Army forces made the 
transition to regular warfare as the enemy was reduced to parity 
and eventually defeated. 

In the civil war following Japan's defeat in World War II, the 
Red Army, newly renamed the People's Liberation Army, again 
used the principles of people's war in following a policy of strategic 
withdrawal, waging a war of attrition, and abandoning cities and 
communication lines to the well-armed, numerically superior Guo- 
mindang forces (see Return to Civil War, ch. 1). In 1947 the PLA 
launched a counteroffensive during a brief strategic stalemate. By 
the next summer, the PLA had entered the strategic offensive stage, 
using conventional warfare as the Guomindang forces went on the 
defensive and then collapsed rapidly on the mainland in 1949. By 
1950 the PLA had seized Hainan Island and Xizang (Tibet). 

When the PLA became a national armed force in 1949, it was 
an unwieldy, 5-million-strong peasant army. In 1950 the PLA 
included 10,000 troops in the Air Force (founded in 1949) and 
60,000 in the Navy (founded in 1950). China also claimed a militia 
of 5.5 million. At that time, demobilization of ill-trained or politi- 
cally unreliable troops began, resulting in the reduction of mili- 
tary strength to 2.8 million in 1953. 

China's new leaders recognized the need to transform the PLA, 
essentially an infantry army with limited mobility, logistics, ord- 
nance, and communications, into a modern military force. The 



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signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and 
Mutual Assistance in February 1950 provided the framework for 
defense modernization in the 1950s. However, the Korean War 
was the real watershed in armed forces modernization. The Chinese 
People's Volunteers (as the military forces in Korea were called) 
achieved initial success in throwing back United Nations (UN) 
troops and, despite the PLA's first encounter with modern fire- 
power, managed to fight UN forces to a stalemate. Nevertheless, 
China's Korean War experience demonstrated PLA deficiencies 
and stimulated Soviet assistance in equipping and reorganizing the 
military. The use of "human wave tactics" (unsupported, concen- 
trated infantry attacks) against modern firepower caused serious 
manpower and materiel losses. Chinese air power also suffered 
heavy losses to superior UN forces. Finally, shortcomings in trans- 
portation and supply indicated the need to improve logistics capa- 
bilities. 

Military Modernization in the 1950s and 1960s 

Large-scale Soviet aid in modernizing the PLA, which began 
in the fall of 1951, took the form of weapons and equipment, 
assistance in building China's defense industry, and the loan of 
advisers, primarily technical ones. Mostly during the Korean War 
years, the Soviet Union supplied infantry weapons, artillery, armor, 
trucks, fighter aircraft, bombers, submarines, destroyers, and gun- 
boats. Soviet advisers assisted primarily in developing a defense 
industry set up along Soviet organizational lines. Aircraft and ord- 
nance factories and shipbuilding facilities were constructed and by 
the late 1950s were producing a wide variety of Soviet-design mili- 
tary equipment. Because the Soviet Union would not provide China 
with its most modern equipment, most of the weapons were out- 
dated and lacked an offensive capability. Both Chinese dissatis- 
faction with this defensive aid and the Soviet refusal to supply China 
with nuclear bomb blueprints contributed to the withdrawal of 
Soviet advisers in 1960 (see Perception of Threat, this ch.; Sino- 
Soviet Relations, ch. 12). 

In the early 1950s, China's leaders decided to reorganize the mili- 
tary along Soviet lines. In 1954 they established the National 
Defense Council, Ministry of National Defense, and thirteen mili- 
tary regions. The PLA was reconstituted according to Soviet tables 
of organization and equipment. It adopted the combined-arms con- 
cept of armor- and artillery-heavy mobile forces, which required 
the adoption of some Soviet strategy and tactics. PLA moderniza- 
tion according to the Soviet model also entailed creation of a profes- 
sional officer corps, complete with Soviet-style uniforms, ranks, 



547 



China: A Country Study 



and insignia; conscription; a reserve system; and new rules of dis- 
cipline. The introduction of modern weaponry necessitated rais- 
ing the education level of soldiers and intensifying formal military 
training. Political education and the role of political commissars 
lost their importance as the modernization effort progressed. 

The military's new emphasis on Soviet-style professionalism 
produced tensions between the party and the military. The party 
feared that it would lose political control over the military, that 
the PLA would become alienated from a society concentrating on 
economic construction, and that relations between officers and sol- 
diers would deteriorate. The party reemphasized Mao's thesis of 
the supremacy of men over weapons and subjected the PLA to 
several political campaigns. The military, for its part, resented party 
attempts to strengthen political education, build a mass militia sys- 
tem under local party control, and conduct economic production 
activities to the detriment of military training. These tensions cul- 
minated in September 1959, when Mao Zedong replaced Minister 
of National Defense Peng Dehuai, the chief advocate of military 
modernization, with Lin Biao, who deemphasized military profes- 
sionalism in favor of revolutionary purity (see The Great Leap For- 
ward, 1958-60, ch. 1). 

The ascension of Lin Biao and the complete withdrawal of Soviet 
assistance and advisers in 1960 marked a new stage in military 
development. The Soviet withdrawal disrupted the defense indus- 
try and weapons production, particularly crippling the aircraft 
industry. Although the military purchased some foreign technology 
in the 1960s, it was forced to stress self-reliance in weapons produc- 
tion. Lin Biao moved to restore PLA morale and discipline and 
to mold the PLA into a politically reliable fighting force. Lin reor- 
ganized the PLA high command, replaced the mass militia with 
a smaller militia under PLA control, and reformulated the Maoist 
doctrine of the supremacy of men over materiel. Lin stated that 
"men and materiel form a unity, with men as the leading factor, 
giving ideological justification to the reemphasis on military train- 
ing. Political training, however, continued to occupy 30 to 40 per- 
cent of a soldier's time. At the same time, Lin instituted stricter 
party control, restored party organization at the company level, 
and intensified political education. In 1964 the prestige of the PLA 
as an exemplary, revolutionary organization was confirmed by the 
"Learn from the PLA" campaign. This campaign, which purported 
to disseminate the military's political-work experience throughout 
society, resulted in the introduction of military personnel into party 
and government organizations, a trend that increased after the Cul- 
tural Revolution began. 



548 



China 's National Defense Science 
and Technology University in Beijing 
Courtesy Jiefangjun Huabao 

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the PLA fought one internal 
and one external campaign: in Xizang against Tibetan rebels, and 
on the Sino-Indian border against India. In the first campaign, 
PLA forces overwhelmed poorly equipped Tibetan insurgents who 
rebelled in 1958-59 against the imposition of Chinese rule. The 
Sino-Indian border war broke out in October 1962 amid the dete- 
rioration of Sino-Indian relations and mutual accusations of intru- 
sions into disputed territory. In this brief (one month) but decisive 
conflict, the PLA attacked Indian positions in the North-East 
Frontier Agency (later called Arunachal Pradesh), penetrating to 
the Himalayan foothills, and in Ladakh, particularly in the Aksai 
Chin region. After routing the Indian Army, the PLA withdrew 
behind the original "line of actual control" after China announced 
a unilateral cease-fire. Both campaigns were limited conflicts using 
conventional tactics. 

The People's Liberation Army in the Cultural Revolution 

The PLA played a complex political role during the Cultural 
Revolution (see The Cultural Revolution Decade, 1966-76, ch. 1). 
From 1966 to 1968, military training, conscription and demobili- 
zation, and political education virtually ceased as the PLA was 
ordered first to help promote the Cultural Revolution and then to 
reestablish order and authority. Although the Cultural Revolution 
initially developed separately in the PLA and in the party appara- 
tus, the PLA, under the leadership of its radical leftist leader, Lin 
Biao, soon became deeply involved in civilian affairs. In early 1967 
the military high command was purged, and regional military forces 
were instructed to maintain order, establish military control, and 
support the revolutionary left. Because many regional-force 



549 



China: A Country Study 



commanders supported conservative party and government offi- 
cials rather than radical mass organizations, many provincial-level 
military leaders were purged or transferred, and Beijing ordered 
several main-force units to take over the duties of the regional-force 
units. In the summer of 1967, regional military organizations came 
under leftist attack, Red Guard factions obtained weapons, and 
violence escalated. By September the central authorities had called 
off the attack on the PLA, but factional rivalries between regional - 
and main-force units persisted. Violence among rival mass organi- 
zations, often backed by different PLA units, continued in the first 
half of 1968 and delayed the formation of revolutionary commit- 
tees, which were to replace traditional government and party orga- 
nizations. In July 1968 Mao abolished the Red Guards and ordered 
the PLA to impose revolutionary committees wherever such bod- 
ies previously had not been established. 

Worries over military factionalism caused the leadership to curtail 
the Cultural Revolution and to initiate a policy of rotating mili- 
tary commanders and units. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, 
the enunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine, the Soviet military build- 
up in its Far Eastern theater, and Sino-Soviet border clashes in 
the spring of 1969 brought about a renewed emphasis on some of 
the PLA's traditional military roles. In 1969 Lin Biao launched 
an extensive ' 'war preparations' ' campaign; military training was 
resumed, and military procurement, which had suffered in the first 
years of the Cultural Revolution, rose dramatically. Military pre- 
paredness was further advanced along China's frontiers and par- 
ticularly the Sino-Soviet border when the thirteen military regions 
were reorganized into eleven in 1970. 

The PLA emerged from the more violent phase of the Cultural 
Revolution deeply involved in civilian politics and administration. 
It had committed 2 million troops to political activities and report- 
edly suffered hundreds of thousands of casualties. Regional mili- 
tary forces were almost completely absorbed in political work. PLA 
units did not withdraw fully from these duties until 1974. Follow- 
ing the sudden death of Lin Biao in 1971, the military began to 
disengage from politics, and civilian control over the PLA was reas- 
serted. Lin's supporters in the PLA were purged, leaving some 
high-level positions in the PLA unfilled for several years. PLA 
officers who had dominated provincial-level and local party and 
government bodies resigned from those posts in 1973 and 1974. 
Military region commanders were reshuffled, and some purged mili- 
tary leaders were rehabilitated. Military representation in the 
national-level political organizations, following an all-time high at 
the Ninth National Party Congress in 1969, declined sharply at 



550 



National Defense 



the Tenth National Party Congress in 1973 (see The Cultural Revo- 
lution Decade, 1966-76, ch. 1). 

Along with the reassertion of civilian control over the military 
and the return to military duties came a shift of resources away 
from the defense sector. Defense procurement dropped by 20 per- 
cent in 1971 and shifted from aircraft production and intercontinen- 
tal ballistic missile development to the modernization of the ground 
forces and medium-range ballistic missile and intermediate-range 
ballistic missile development. 

Military Modernization in the 1970s 

In January 1974 the PLA saw action in the South China Sea 
following a long-simmering dispute with the Republic of Vietnam 
(South Vietnam) over the Xisha (Paracel) Islands (see Vietnam, 
this ch.). South Vietnamese and PLA naval forces skirmished over 
3 islands occupied by South Vietnamese troops, and the PLA suc- 
cessfully seized control of the islands in a joint amphibious opera- 
tion involving 500 troops and air support. 

By the mid-1970s concerns among Chinese leaders about mili- 
tary weakness, especially vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, resulted in 
a decision to modernize the PLA. Two initial steps were taken to 
promote military modernization. First, in 1975 vacant key posi- 
tions in the military structure and the party Central Military Com- 
mission were filled. (The state Central Military Commission was 
not founded until 1982; see the National People's Congress, ch. 10). 
Nonetheless, to ensure party control of the PLA, civilians were 
appointed to key positions. Deng Xiaoping was appointed chief 
of general staff, while Gang of Four member Zhang Chunqiao was 
appointed director of the General Political Department. Second, 
in the summer following Premier Zhou Enlai's January 1975 procla- 
mation of the Four Modernizations (see Glossary) as national policy, 
the party Central Military Commission convened an enlarged meet- 
ing to chart the development of military modernization. The mili- 
tary modernization program, codified in Central Directive No. 18 
of 1975, instructed the military to withdraw from politics and to 
concentrate on military training and other defense matters. Fac- 
tional struggles between party moderates and radicals in 1975 and 
1976, however, led to the dismissal of Deng from all his posts and 
the delay of military modernization until after the death of Mao 
Zedong. Within a month of Mao's death, military leaders headed 
by Minister of National Defense Ye Jianying cooperated with party 
chairman Hua Guofeng to arrest the Gang of Four, thus ending 
a decade of radical politics. 



551 



China: A Country Study 



The Chinese leadership resumed the military modernization pro- 
gram in early 1977. Three crucial events in the late 1970s shaped 
the course of this program: the second rehabilitation of Deng Xiao- 
ping, the major civilian proponent of military modernization; the 
re-ordering of priorities in the Four Modernizations, relegating 
national defense modernization from third to fourth place (follow- 
ing agriculture, industry, and science and technology); and the Sino- 
Vietnamese border war of 1979. In July 1977, with the backing 
of moderate military leaders, Deng Xiaoping reassumed his posi- 
tion as PLA chief of general staff as well as his other party and 
state posts. At the same time, Deng became a vice chairman of 
the party Central Military Commission. In February 1980 Deng 
resigned his PLA position in favor of professional military com- 
mander Yang Dezhi; Deng improved his party Central Military 
Commission position, becoming chairman of it at the Sixth Plenum 
of the Eleventh Central Committee in June 1981. With enormous 
prestige in both the military and the civilian sectors, Deng vigor- 
ously promoted military modernization, the further disengagement 
of the military from politics, and the shift in national priorities to 
economic development at the expense of defense. 

In 1977-78 military and civilian leaders debated whether the mili- 
tary or the civilian economy should receive priority in allocating 
resources for the Four Modernizations. The military hoped for 
additional resources to promote its own modernization, while 
civilian leaders stressed the overall, balanced development of the 
economy, including civilian industry and science and technology. 
By arguing that a rapid military buildup would hinder the economy 
and harm the defense industrial base, civilian leaders convinced 
the PLA to accept the relegation of national defense to last place 
in the Four Modernizations. The defense budget accordingly was 
reduced. Nonetheless, the Chinese military and civilian leadership 
remained firmly committed to military modernization. 

The 1979 Sino- Vietnamese border war, although only sixteen 
days long, revealed specific shortcomings in military capabilities 
and thus provided an additional impetus to the military modern- 
ization effort. The border war, the PLA's largest military opera- 
tion since the Korean War, was essentially a limited, offensive, 
ground-force campaign. China claimed victory, but the war had 
mixed results militarily and politically. Although the numerically 
superior Chinese forces penetrated about fifty kilometers into Viet- 
nam, the PLA sustained heavy casualties. PLA performance suf- 
fered from poor mobility, weak logistics, and outdated weaponry. 
Inadequate communications, an unclear chain of command, and 



552 



National Defense 



the lack of military ranks also created confusion and adversely 
affected PLA combat effectiveness. 

Military Modernization 

The military modernization begun in the late 1970s had three 
major focuses. First, under the political leadership of Deng Xiao- 
ping, the military became disengaged from civilian politics and, 
for the most part, resumed the political quiescence that character- 
ized its pre-Cultural Revolution role. Deng reestablished civilian 
control over the military by appointing his supporters to key mili- 
tary leadership positions, by reducing the scope of the PLA's domes- 
tic nonmilitary role, and by revitalizing the party political structure 
and ideological control system within the PLA. 

Second, modernization required the reform of military organi- 
zation, doctrine, education and training, and personnel policies 
to improve combat effectiveness in combined-arms warfare. Among 
the organizational reforms that were undertaken were the creation 
of the state Central Military Commission, the streamlining and 
reduction of superfluous PLA forces, civilianization of many PLA 
units, reorganization of military regions, formation of group armies, 
and enactment of the new Military Service Law in 1984. Doctrine, 
strategy, and tactics were revised under the rubric of "people's 
war under modern conditions," which envisaged a forward defense 
at selected locations near China's borders, to prevent attack on 
Chinese cities and industrial sites, and emphasized operations using 
combined-arms tactics. Reforms in education and training empha- 
sized improving the military skills and raising the education levels 
of officers and troops and conducting combined-arms operations. 
New personnel policies required upgrading the quality of PLA 
recruits and officer candidates, improving conditions of service, 
changing promotion practices to stress professional competence, 
and providing new uniforms and insignia. 

The third focus of military modernization was the transformation 
of the defense establishment into a system capable of independently 
maintaining a modern military force. As military expenditures 
remained relatively constant, reforms concentrated on reorganiz- 
ing the defense research-and-development and industrial base to 
integrate civilian and military science and industry more closely. 
Foreign technology was used selectively to upgrade weapons. 
Defense industry reforms also resulted in China's entry into the 
international arms market and the increased production of civilian 
goods by defense industries. The scope of PLA economic activi- 
ties was reduced, but the military continued to participate in 



553 




People's Liberation Army chemical-biological-radiological warfare training 

Courtesy Jiefangjun Huabao 
A unit of the People's Liberation Army armored force 
Courtesy Xinhua News Agency 



554 



National Defense 



infrastructure development projects and initiated a program to pro- 
vide demobilized soldiers with skills useful in the civilian economy. 

Civil-Military Relations 

Lines between civilian and military leadership and institutions 
in China are indistinct. All high-ranking military leaders have high- 
level party positions, and many high-ranking party officials have 
some military experience. When military leaders participate in 
national policy making, therefore, it is not clear whether their 
positions reflect PLA corporate interests or the interests of groups 
that cut across institutional lines. In general, in times where there 
was national leadership consensus on national policy, such as in 
the 1950s, the PLA was politically quiescent. Once the PLA was 
drawn into civilian politics during the Cultural Revolution, the mili- 
tary became divided along the lines of civilian factions. As long 
as the national leadership remained divided on a number of policy 
issues, the PLA, fearing factional struggles and political instability, 
was reluctant to leave the political scene. When Deng Xiaoping 
was rehabilitated in 1977, however, the stage was set for the with- 
drawal of the military from politics and a partial return to the PLA's 
previous political passivity. 

Political Role of the People's Liberation Army 

Deng Xiaoping' s efforts in the 1980s to reduce the political role 
of the military stemmed from his desire to reassert civilian control 
over the military and to promote military modernization. To accom- 
plish his objectives, Deng revitalized the civilian party apparatus 
and leadership and built a consensus on the direction of national 
policy. He also established personal control over the military 
through personnel changes, and he reduced the scope of the PLA's 
domestic political, economic, and social roles. Finally, he strength- 
ened party control over the military through institutional reforms 
and political and ideological education. The revitalization of the 
party and the establishment of a consensus on national policy 
assured top military leaders of political stability and a vigorous party 
capable of handling national and regional affairs without exten- 
sive military participation (see China and the Four Modernizations, 
1979-82, ch. 1). 

Deng's personal political control was established over the military 
through his assumption of the position of chairman of the party 
Central Military Commission in June 1981 and through his appoint- 
ment of his supporters to key positions in the party Central Mili- 
tary Commission, Ministry of National Defense, and the PLA's 
General Staff Department, General Political Department, and 



555 



China: A Country Study 



General Logistics Department. Occasional replacement of military 
region and military district commanders also strengthened Deng's 
hand. Military leaders who objected to Deng's policies were replaced 
with more amenable personnel. 

The creation of the state Central Military Commission in 1982 
aimed to further strengthen civilian control over the military by 
stressing the PLA's role as defender of the state and by establish- 
ing another layer of supervision parallel to party supervision. The 
civilianization of several PLA corps and internal security units 
reduced the size of the PLA and the scope of its involvement in 
civilian affairs. The placement of defense industries under civilian 
control and the transfer or opening up of military facilities, such 
as airports and ports, to civilian authorities also limited the PLA's 
influence in economic and political matters. Propaganda using the 
PLA as a model for society also diminished, and emphasis was 
placed on the PLA's military rather than political role. 

Party Control 

In addition to making personnel changes, Deng revitalized party 
control over the PLA and diffused the military's political power 
by designating provincial-level, municipal, district, and county 
party committee secretaries to serve concurrently as the first politi- 
cal commissars of their equivalent-level units in the regional PLA. 
The percentage of PLA personnel permitted to join the party was 
limited by restricting party membership to military academy gradu- 
ates. Political and ideological training stressed the military rather 
than the social, ideological, or economic role of the PLA. Special 
effort was made to discredit the PLA's role in the Cultural Revo- 
lution; the PLA's support for the left was described as incorrect 
because it caused factionalism within the military. While emphasiz- 
ing the necessity and appropriateness of reforms to modernize the 
military, political education also sought to guarantee military sup- 
port for Deng's reform agenda. Beginning in 1983 a rectification 
campaign (part of the party-wide rectification campaign aimed 
primarily at leftists) reinforced this kind of political and ideologi- 
cal training (see The First Wave of Reform, 1979-84, ch. 11). 

Beginning in the late 1970s, Deng Xiaoping succeeded in decreas- 
ing military participation in national-level political bodies. Mili- 
tary representation on the Political Bureau fell from 52 percent in 
1978 to 30 percent in 1982, and military membership in the party 
Central Committee declined from 30 percent in 1978 to 22 per- 
cent in 1982. Most professional military officers shared common 
views with the Deng leadership over military modernization and 
the fundamental direction of national policy, and they willingly 



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limited their concerns to military matters. Nonetheless, some ele- 
ments in the PLA continued to voice their opinions on nondefense 
matters and criticized the Deng reform program. Dissent centered 
on prestigious military leaders, notably Ye Jianying, who feared 
that ideological de-Maoification, cultural liberalization, and cer- 
tain agricultural and industrial reforms deviated from Marxist 
values and ideals. The Deng leadership contained these criticisms 
with the help of the personnel changes, political education, and 
the rectification campaign just mentioned. In this way it was able 
to keep military dissent within bounds that did not adversely affect 
civil-military relations. 

Popular Attitudes Toward the People's Liberation Army 

Starting in the late 1970s, popular attitudes toward the PLA also 
underwent considerable changes. In the 1950s and 1960s, the mili- 
tary's prestige was very high because of its wartime exploits, because 
it was held up as a role model for society, and because of its par- 
ticipation in civilian construction projects. But the power gained 
by the PLA during the Cultural Revolution reawakened civilian 
resentment of military privileges and abuses of power. By the early 
1980s, with the circumscription of the PLA's domestic role and 
the implementation of agricultural reforms offering greater oppor- 
tunities for rural youth, the PLA's reputation as a prestigious, elite, 
Marxist-model organization and a promising channel for social 
mobility was severely tarnished. Society's perception of the mili- 
tary appeared to be returning to the traditional viewpoint that "one 
doesn't make nails out of good iron; one doesn't make soldiers out 
of good men." To restore this damaged image in the late 1980s, 
the media extolled the PLA's martial virtues and the great strides 
made in military modernization in recent years. 

Military Organization 

By 1987 changes in military organization indicated the impor- 
tance Chinese leaders attached to structural reform in building mili- 
tary forces capable of waging modern, combined-arms warfare. 
These reforms included the creation of the state Central Military 
Commission parallel to the party Central Military Commission, 
reduction in force, reorganization of military regions, formation 
of group armies, enactment of the new Military Service Law, and 
reorganization of defense industries. 

State and Party Central Military Commissions 

At the apex of Chinese military organization stood two bodies — 
the state and party Central Military Commissions (see fig. 22). 



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China: A Country Study 



CENTRAL MILITARY COMMISSION 
OF THE 

NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS 



NATIONAL DEFENSE SCIENCE, 
TECHNOLOGY, AND 
INDUSTRY COMMISSION 



CENTRAL MILITARY COMMISSION 
OF THE 

CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY 



MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE 
(STATE COUNCIL) 



PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY 



GENERAL 
LOGISTICS 
DEPARTMENT 



GENERAL 
STAFF 
DEPARTMENT 



GENERAL 
POLITICAL 
DEPARTMENT 



SERVICE ARMS 



STRATEGIC 
MISSILE FORCE 



MILITARY 



EAST 
SEA 
FLEET 




NORTH 
SEA 
FLEET 




SOUTH 
SEA 
FLEET 













GUANGZHOU 



GUI2HOU 
SICHUAN 
XIZANG 
YUNNAN 



HEBEI 
NEI MONGGOL 
SHANXI 



HENAN 
SHANDONG 



MILITARY DISTRICTS 



GUANGDONG 
GUANGXI 
HAINAN 
HUBEI 
HUNAN 



ANHUI 
FUJIAN 
JIANGSU 
JIANGXI 
ZHEJIANG 



GANSU 
NINGXIA 
QINGHAI 
SHAANXI 
XINJIANG 



HEILONGJIANG 
JILIN 
LIAONING 



COORDINATION 



Figure 22. Organization of Military Establishment, 1987 



The 1982 state Constitution created the state Central Military Com- 
mission as the state organ subordinate to the National People's 
Congress responsible for "directing the country's armed forces" 
(see Central Military Commission, ch. 10). The state Central Mili- 
tary Commission was the state's decision-making body in military 
affairs and directed and commanded the armed forces. The state 
Central Military Commission consisted of the chairman, who was 



558 



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commander in chief of the armed forces, an executive vice chair- 
man, two vice chairmen, and four other members. 

The party Central Military Commission, elected by the party 
Central Committee, exercised de facto, authoritative policy-making 
and operational control over the military. In addition to the chair- 
man, the party Central Military Commission in 1987 included a 
permanent vice chairman who was concurrently secretary general, 
two vice chairmen, and four deputy secretaries general. The leader- 
ship of the state and party Central Military Commissions was iden- 
tical, but the membership of the party Central Military Commission 
below the top leadership was thought to include regional com- 
manders and service chiefs. Because the PLA has been under party 
control since its inception, the leadership of the party over the 
military did not change with the establishment of the state Central 
Military Commission. Although parallel leadership blurred the dis- 
tinction between the two groups, the party Central Military Com- 
mission retained its traditional, preeminent position in charge of 
military affairs. 

Ministry of National Defense and National Defense Science, 
Technology, and Industry Commission 

Beneath the two Central Military Commissions were the Ministry 
of National Defense and the National Defense Science, Technology, 
and Industry Commission (NDSTIC), which separately took orders 
from the two Central Military Commissions but had no operational 
control over the PLA. The Ministry of National Defense was 
responsible for military modernization and provided administra- 
tive support for the PLA. It was responsible for planning, man- 
power, budget, foreign liaison, and training materials, but it 
possessed no policy-making or implementation authority. The 
NDSTIC — formed in August 1982 by merging the National 
Defense Science and Technology Commission, National Defense 
Industries Office, and Office of the Science, Technology, and 
Armaments Commission of the party Central Military Commis- 
sion — was responsible for military research and development, 
weapons procurement, and coordination of the defense and civilian 
economic sectors (see Defense Industry and the Economic Role of 
the People's Liberation Army, this ch.). 

Operational Control 

In 1987 operational control of the PLA ran from the two Cen- 
tral Military Commissions to the PLA's three general departments: 
General Staff Department, General Political Department, and 
General Logistics Department. Below the department level ran 



559 



China: A Country Study 



parallel chains of command for operational, political, and logisti- 
cal matters, each with its own separate communications facilities. 
Military policy originated in the party Political Bureau or the party 
Central Military Commission, became an operational order at the 
General Staff Department level, flowed through the military regions, 
and arrived at a main-force unit. Orders to regional forces also 
passed through the military district (provincial) level. 

General Staff Department 

The General Staff Department carried out staff and operational 
functions for the PLA and had major responsibility for implement- 
ing military modernization plans. Headed by the chief of general 
staff, the department served as the headquarters for the ground 
forces and contained headquarters for the three other armed ser- 
vices: Air Force, Navy, and Strategic Missile Force. The General 
Staff Department included functionally organized subdepartments 
for artillery, armored units, engineering, operations, training, intel- 
ligence, mobilization, surveying, communications, quartermaster 
services, and politics. Navy Headquarters controlled the North Sea 
Fleet, East Sea Fleet, and South Sea Fleet. Air Force Headquar- 
ters generally exercised control through the commanders of the 
seven military regions. Nuclear forces were directly subordinate 
to the General Staff Department. Conventional main, regional, 
and militia units were controlled administratively by the military 
region commanders, but the General Staff Department in Beijing 
could assume direct operational control of any main-force unit at 
will. Thus, broadly speaking, the General Staff Department exer- 
cised operational control of the main forces, and the military region 
commanders controlled the regional forces and, indirectly, the 
militia. 

General Political Department 

The General Political Department was responsible for ideologi- 
cal indoctrination, political loyalty, morale, personnel records, cul- 
tural activities, discipline, and military justice, and it provided the 
party structure for the PLA. It also published Jiefangjun Bao (Libera- 
tion Army Daily), the PLA's influential newspaper. The General 
Political Department director was at the head of a system of politi- 
cal commissars assigned to each echelon in the PLA. One of the 
primary tasks of the political commissar was the supervision of the 
party organization through party committees at the battalion level 
and above or through party branches in companies. Virtually all 
high-ranking officers in the military were party members. Until 
the early 1980s, when party membership in the PLA was restricted, 



560 



National Defense 



an effort was made to have a party or Communist Youth League 
member in every unit down to the smallest maneuver element. 
Political commissars were equal in rank and authority to the com- 
mander of their echelon in peacetime but theoretically deferred to 
the commander during war. Commissars assumed many time- 
consuming chores, such as personnel problems, relations with 
civilians, and troop entertainment. 

General Logistics Department 

The General Logistics Department, headed by a director, was 
responsible for production, supply, transportation, housing, pay, 
and medical services. Historically, much of this support came from 
the civilian populace, and before the establishment of the General 
Logistics Department it was organized most often by commissars. 
PLA logistical resources in 1980 were far fewer than those of 
Western or Soviet forces; in the event of war the Chinese military 
would be heavily dependent upon the militia and civilians. In 1985 
the General Logistics Department was reorganized, its staff cut by 
50 percent, and some of its facilities turned over to the civilian 
sector. 

Streamlining and Reduction in Force 

Efforts be gan in the 1980s to streamline the PLA and organize 
it into a modern fighting force. The first step in reducing the 
4.5-million-member PLA in the early 1980s was to relieve the PLA 
of some of its nonmilitary duties. The Railway Engineering Corps 
and the Capital Construction Engineering Corps were civilianized, 
and in 1983 the PLA internal security and border patrol units were 
transferred to the People's Armed Police Force. 

In 1985 China reorganized its 11 military regions into 7 and 
began a 2-year program to reduce the force by 1 million. Eight 
military regions were merged into four — Chengdu, Jinan, Lanzhou, 
and Nanjing — and three key regions — Beijing, Guangzhou, and 
Shenyang — remained intact (see fig. 23). The PLA accomplished 
its 1 -million-troop cut by streamlining the headquarters staffs of 
the three general departments, the military regions, and the mili- 
tary districts; reducing the size of the Air Force and the Navy; retir- 
ing older, undereducated, or incompetent officers; and transferring 
county- and city-level people's armed forces departments, which 
controlled the militia, to local civil authorities. 

The PLA also reorganized its field armies (main-force armies) 
into group armies to increase its capability to wage combined-arms 
warfare. Breaking with the previously triangular organization of 
military units, the group armies combined formerly independent 



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China: A Country Study 

arms or services into a comprehensive combat unit. Group armies 
consisted of infantry and mechanized infantry divisions, tank 
divisions or brigades, and a number of artillery, antichemical, air 
defense, engineer, signal, reconnaissance, electronic countermea- 
sure, and logistics troops. In the late 1980s, some group armies 
also had helicopter, air support, or naval units. 

In 1987 PLA strength was about 3 million. Ground forces num- 
bered about 2.1 million — the world's largest standing army; the 
Navy about 350,000 — including those assigned to Naval Aviation, 
Coastal Defense Forces, and Marine Corps; the Air Force about 
390,000; and the Strategic Missile Force about 100,000. The PLA 
was supported by an estimated 4.3 million basic (armed and trained) 
militia and 6 million ordinary (poorly armed and trained) militia. 
According to the 1984 Military Service Law, the militia, which 
was being combined with a newly developed reserve system, and 
the People's Armed Police Force also formed part of the Chinese 
armed forces (see Paramilitary Forces, this ch.). In 1986 reserve 
forces were included officially in the organizational system. 

Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics 

From the early 1950s until the mid-1970s, people's war remained 
China's military doctrine. The PLA's force structure, however, 
which came to include nuclear weapons as well as artillery, com- 
bat aircraft, and tanks, did not reflect the concept of people's war. 
In the late 1970s, Chinese military leaders began to modify PLA 
doctrine, strategy, and tactics under the rubric of "people's war 
under modern conditions." This updated version of people's war 
lacked a systematic definition, but it permitted Chinese military 
leaders to pay tribute to Mao's military and revolutionary legacy 
while adapting military strategy and tactics to the needs of modern 
conventional and nuclear warfare. Elaborating on Mao's concept 
of active defense — tactically offensive action with a defensive 
strategy — Chinese strategy was designed to defeat a Soviet inva- 
sion before it could penetrate deeply into China. Chinese strategists 
envisaged a forward defense, that is, near the border, to prevent 
attack on Chinese cities and industrial facilities, particularly in north 
and northeast China. Such a defense-in-depth would require more 
positional warfare, much closer to the border, in the initial stages 
of a conflict. This strategy downplayed the people's war strategy 
of "luring in deep" in a protracted war, and it took into account 
the adaptations in strategy and tactics necessitated by technologi- 
cal advances in weaponry. The PLA emphasized military opera- 
tions using modernized, combined arms tactics for the dual purpose 
of making the most effective use of current force structure and 



562 



National Defense 




Source: Based on U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, China: Military Regions, 1986. 

Figure 23. Military Regions and Fleet Commands, 1986 

of preparing the armed forces for more advanced weaponry in the 
future. 

The doctrine of "people's war under modern conditions" also 
incorporated the use of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. 
China's own nuclear forces, which developed a second-strike cap- 
ability in the early 1980s, provided Beijing with a credible, if mini- 
mum, deterrent against Soviet or United States nuclear attack. 
China repeatedly has vowed never to use nuclear weapons first, 
but it has promised retaliation against a nuclear attack. Chinese 
strategists also evinced an interest in tactical nuclear weapons, and 
the PLA has simulated battlefield use of such weapons in offen- 
sive and defensive exercises. 



563 



China: A Country Study 



Education and Training 

Reforms in training and education constituted an important part 
of the military modernization program in the 1980s. Senior offi- 
cials recognized that improving the military skills and raising the 
education levels of both officers and troops were necessary pre- 
requisites for the utilization of more advanced weaponry and the 
conduct of combined-arms operations. The PLA leadership focused 
education reforms on the military academy system and altered train- 
ing to emphasize the officer corps, mechanized warfare, and com- 
bined arms operations. 

Revitalization of the Military Academy System 

Beginning in 1978, the PLA began to revive the military academy 
system, which the Cultural Revolution had devastated. By 1984 
the system had over 100 institutions and consisted of 2 kinds of 
schools: command schools and specialized technical training centers. 
The PLA increased funding for military education, incorporated 
the study of foreign military experiences into the curriculum, and 
expanded contacts with foreign military academies. The rejuve- 
nation of the military academies highlighted the emphasis placed 
on officer training. The PLA stipulated that most new officers 
should be military academy graduates, set minimum education lev- 
els for all officers, and established special classes to help officers 
meet those standards. Education and military-academy training 
thus became criteria for promotion, in addition to seniority, per- 
formance, and experience. 

In 1986 the PLA introduced three measures that further strength- 
ened the military academy system. First, at the top level the PLA's 
Military Academy, Political Academy, and Logistics Academy 
merged to form the National Defense University, China's senior 
military training and research institution. Second, a new, three- 
level training system for command officers was announced, whereby 
command officers would receive regular training at junior, mid- 
dle, and higher military command academies. Third, noncommis- 
sioned officer (NCO) training entered the military academy system 
with the establishment of a naval academy for petty officers and 
an air force NCO academy and the creation of NCO classes in 
over forty ground force academies. 

Training Reforms 

Before the military modernization program began, PLA train- 
ing was highly politicized and emphasized single-unit infantry troop 
training. Training reforms started with the depoliticization of 



564 



National Defense 



training, whereby troops spent 80 percent of their time on mili- 
tary activities and 20 percent on political training. The scope of 
training then changed to concentrate on training officers capable 
of directing combined-arms warfare. Improved military education 
in the rejuvenated military academies provided some of this officer 
training. In addition, large-scale combined-arms exercises, which 
served to raise officer capabilities in commanding and coordinat- 
ing combined-arms operations under combat conditions, occurred 
on a regular basis. These exercises stressed defense against attack- 
ing tanks, paratroopers, and aircraft and on occasion involved the 
simulated use of tactical nuclear weapons. The PLA also began 
using simulation equipment in training and in 1985 held its first 
completely simulated combat exercise. In 1986 the PLA training 
system underwent further reforms that complemented changes in 
military organization. A combined-arms tactical training center was 
created for training the newly formed group armies (former field 
armies) on a rotational basis. The training center coordinated group 
army exercises and utilized laser devices and simulation equipment 
in its training. The PLA also established a systematic training pro- 
gram for new recruits, replacing the old system in which inductees 
received basic training in their units. Under the new system, before 
new recruits were assigned to PLA units, they completed four 
months of training by a training regiment attached to a group army. 
The training regiments also trained squad leaders. 

Personnel 

Defense modernization brought changes to military personnel 
policies and practices. Personnel reforms emphasized upgrading 
the quality of recruits, improving conditions of service, altering 
promotion practices to stress professional competence over seniority 
or political loyalty, and providing new uniforms and insignia. The 
1984 Military Service Law codified some of the changes in per- 
sonnel policies and set the stage for further changes, such as the 
restoration of ranks. 

Recruitment 

The Military Service Law provided the legal basis for conscrip- 
tion, and it combined compulsory and voluntary service. All citizens 
between eighteen and twenty-two, regardless of sex, nationality, 
profession, family background, religion, or level of education, were 
obliged to perform military service. Almost 10 million men reached 
conscription age each year, but the PLA chose less than 10 per- 
cent of those eligible. A very small number of women were inducted 
annually. In the 1980s the PLA attempted to upgrade the quality 



565 



China: A Country Study 



of its inductees by changing recruiting practices. The PLA previ- 
ously drew its recruits from rural youth of politically acceptable 
families. But the Military Service Law, the introduction of rural 
reforms offering greater economic opportunities for rural youth, 
and the PLA's requirements for higher educational levels caused 
recruitment to draw more recruits from better educated urban 
youth. Officers were drawn from military academy graduates; 
enlisted men and women who completed officer training in offi- 
cially designated institutions and passed officer fitness tests; gradu- 
ates of universities and special technical secondary schools; and 
civilian cadres and technical personnel recruited by nonmilitary 
units in the PLA. As a result of the new conscription and officer 
recruitment practices, the level of education in the PLA was much 
higher than that of the general population. 

In 1987 approximately 100,000 women served in the PLA and 
represented one-tenth of the officer corps and one-quarter of the 
specialized technicians. Women served primarily in scientific 
research, communications, medical, and cultural units. Members 
of China's ethnic minorities also served in the PLA, but their per- 
centage within the military was probably considerably lower than 
their proportion in the general population, partly because of their 
lower level of education and partly because of government and party 
suspicion of their loyalties. 

Conditions of Service 

The Military Service Law stipulated changes in conditions of 
service. Compulsory terms of service were three years for the ground 
forces and four for the Air Force and Navy. Soldiers could elect 
another term of one or two years in the ground forces and one year 
in the Navy and Air Force. After completing five years of compul- 
sory service, a soldier could switch to voluntary service and could 
serve an eight- to twelve-year term until the age of thirty-five. The 
conscription law also made provisions for limited preferential treat- 
ment of service personnel and their families. However, military 
service was regarded by some as a hardship because of low pay, 
poor food, lowered marriage prospects, and difficulties in finding 
jobs after demobilization. To alleviate the unattractive aspects of 
military service and to help local economic development, the PLA 
instituted a program of dual-use training, whereby soldiers learned 
skills useful in civilian life in addition to military training (see 
Defense Industry and the Economic Role of the People's Libera- 
tion Army, this ch.). 



566 



National Defense 



Promotion 

In the late 1970s, the PLA began altering its promotion prac- 
tices to reflect the new emphasis on professional competence. Previ- 
ously, there had been no retirement system in effect, and junior 
and field-grade officers had remained at their posts for many years 
with little opportunity for advancement. When promotion occurred, 
it was based on seniority, political rectitude, or a patron-client rela- 
tionship. Officers advanced up a single chain of command, remain- 
ing in the same branch or service for life. In 1978 the PLA 
reinstituted the retirement system established by the 1955 Mili- 
tary Service Law and promulgated officer service regulations, which 
set retirement ages for military officers. Thus the PLA began a 
two-pronged effort to retire older officers and to promote youn- 
ger, better educated, professionally competent officers. Older 
officers, including many over seventy years of age, were offered 
generous retirement packages as inducements to retire. The PLA 
also formulated new promotion standards that set minimum edu- 
cation levels for officers and emphasized education in military acade- 
mies as a criterion for promotion. Officers below the age of forty 
had to acquire a secondary-school education by 1990 or face 
demotion. Furthermore, past promotion practices were to be dis- 
carded in favor of greater emphasis on formal training, higher edu- 
cation levels, and selection of more officers from technical and 
noncombat units. With the reduction in force begun in 1985, profes- 
sional competence, education, and age became criteria for demobili- 
zation as well as promotion. By 1987 the PLA's promotion practices 
were based more on merit than they had been a decade earlier; 
nevertheless, political rectitude and guanxi (personal connections) 
continued to play an important role in promotion, and no central- 
ized personnel system had been established. 

Ranks, Uniforms, and Insignia 

The 1984 Military Service Law also stipulated that military ranks 
would be reintroduced to the PLA. Military leaders justified the 
restoration of ranks as improving organization, discipline, and 
morale and facilitating coordinated operations among different arms 
and services, thus serving to modernize and regularize the mili- 
tary. The PLA's experience in the 1979 Sino- Vietnamese border 
war, in which the absence of ranks led to confusion on the battle- 
field, was another factor leading to the restoration of ranks. 
However, the rank system was not immediately implemented 
because "preparatory work" still needed to be done. Implemen- 
tation was delayed by disputes in higher echelons in the PLA over 



567 



China: A Country Study 



who would receive what rank and by the long process of reducing 
the size of the military. In mid- 1987 the PLA still had not restored 
its system of ranks. The ranks for officers reportedly were to be 
based on the 1955 rank system, which included one supreme mar- 
shal and ten marshals at the very top. Ground force and Air Force 
ranks were to be senior general, general, lieutenant general, major 
general, senior colonel, colonel, lieutenant colonel, major, senior 
captain, captain, first lieutenant, and second lieutenant. Naval 
officer ranks were to be senior admiral, admiral, vice admiral, rear 
admiral, senior captain, captain, commander, lieutenant com- 
mander, senior lieutenant, junior lieutenant, and ensign. 

Although the restoration of ranks was delayed, in 1985 PLA per- 
sonnel were issued new uniforms and service insignia. Officers at 
and above regimental level wore woolen and blended woolen uni- 
forms; officers at battalion level and below and soldiers wore cot- 
ton uniforms. All personnel wore visored military caps, new collar 
insignia, and shoulder boards. The cap emblem was round with 
a design of five stars and the ideographs bayi (August 1st, the 
anniversary of the 1927 Nanchang Uprising) surrounded by wheat 
ears and cog wheels. Uniform colors were olive green for the ground 
forces; dark blue in winter, and a white jacket and dark blue trousers 
in summer for the Navy; and an olive green jacket and dark blue 
trousers for the Air Force. Officer jackets had epaulets and golden 
buttons with the five-star and August 1st design. Collar badges were 
red for the ground forces, black for the Navy, and blue for the Air 
Force. Personnel of the intraservice Strategic Missile Force wore 
distinctive patches but otherwise retained the uniform of their parent 
service. The new uniforms replaced the baggy, green fatigue uni- 
forms that had made it hard to distinguish between officers and 
soldiers. The change in uniforms served the needs of military 
modernization by raising morale, strengthening discipline, and 
facilitating command and organization. 

Defense Industry and the Economic Role of the People's 
Liberation Army 

The transformation of China's defense establishment into a sys- 
tem capable of independently sustaining modern armed forces was 
one of the major goals of the military modernization program. In 
the late 1970s and 1980s, defense spending remained relatively con- 
stant despite the shift in resources in favor of overall economic 
development. Reforms focused on reorganizing the defense 
research-and-development and industrial base, more closely inte- 
grating civilian and military science and industry, and selectively 
utilizing foreign technology. China sold arms for hard currency 



568 



National Defense 



to provide additional funds for defense industries. The PLA con- 
tinued to play its role in economic development by participating 
in selective construction projects, providing dual-use training, and 
producing most of its food needs. 

Military Expenditures 

In the 1980s Chinese statistics indicated that defense spending 
represented a decreasing percentage of government expenditures, 
falling from 16 percent in 1980 to 8.3 percent of the state budget 
in 1987. However, United States Department of Defense studies 
suggested that the published budget figures understated defense 
spending by about one-half. With the growth of the Chinese econ- 
omy under the modernization program, defense spending also 
represented a smaller percentage of the gross national product (GNP) 
than previously. United States Central Intelligence Agency analysts 
estimated that defense expenditures in 1978 absorbed 8 to 10 per- 
cent of GNP; in 1986 United States Department of Defense analysts 
estimated that China's military expenses fell within the range of 6 to 
8 percent of GNP. Comparison of indices of defense procurement 
spending and industrial production from 1971 to 1983 revealed that 
the former increased by 15 percent, whereas the latter rose by 
170 percent. These studies indicated that Chinese leaders have indeed 
subordinated military modernization to economic development. 

United States Department of Defense officials in 1986 estimated 
Chinese defense spending by resources and force categories for the 
1967 to 1983 period. Roughly 50 percent of defense expenditures 
were for weapons, equipment, and new facilities; 35 percent for 
operating costs; and 15 percent for research, development, and test- 
ing and evaluation. By service, these costs broke down to 25 per- 
cent for the ground forces; 15 percent for the Navy; 15 percent 
for strategic air defenses; 5 percent for ballistic missile forces; 
5 percent for tactical air forces; and about 35 percent for command, 
logistics, personnel, intelligence, medical care, administration, 
research, development, testing and evaluation, and other support. 
Beginning in the late 1970s, China devoted more resources to its 
Strategic Missile Force, indicating an effort to increase its strategic 
security while modernizing the economy, and to national command 
and support activities, reflecting an emphasis on modernization 
of the defense structure. 

Military Research and Development and the National Defense Science, 
Technology, and Industry Commission 

The NDSTIC was the coordinating body for military research 
and development and industrial production. The NDSTIC reported 



569 



China: A Country Study 



to the party Central Military Commission's National Defense 
Industries Committee and the State Council's Leading Group for 
Science and Technology. The NDSTIC supervised weapons 
research and development, coordinated military production of 
defense industries, and controlled funding for weapons procure- 
ment. The establishment of the NDSTIC was a reform measure 
designed to break down the barriers between civilian and military 
research and development and industry. Military science and 
industry previously had been secretive, segregated, and privileged 
sectors, having material, financial, and personnel resources superior 
to those available to the civilian sector. The creation of the NDSTIC 
was one measure by which Chinese leaders hoped to facilitate the 
transfer of technology between the military and civilian sectors. 
The NDSTIC, in particular through its trading arm, China Xin- 
shidai Corporation, coordinated procurement of foreign technol- 
ogy for military purposes. 

Defense Industry 

Beginning in 1978, Chinese leaders set out to transform the 
defense industries, which had a huge excess capacity and were criti- 
cized for having a "golden rice bowl" (rich but always begging 
for more). To utilize this excess capacity better and to break down 
the barriers between military and civilian industry, the machine- 
building ministries were reorganized, and civilians were appointed 
to manage them. The civilianized, renamed ministries and their 
responsibilities consisted of the Ministry of Nuclear Industry — 
nuclear weapons; Ministry of Aeronautics — aircraft; Ministry of 
Electronics Industry — electronics; Ministry of Ordnance Indus- 
try — munitions and armaments; Ministry of Astronautics — ballistic 
missiles and space systems; and China State Shipbuilding 
Corporation — naval construction. In 1986 the Ministry of Machine 
Building, which produced civilian heavy machinery and industrial 
equipment, and the Ministry of Ordnance Industry were consoli- 
dated into the new State Machine-Building Industry Commission 
as a way to strengthen the unified management of the national 
machine-building and weapons enterprises. In 1987 little informa- 
tion was available about this new commission or its relationship 
to the NDSTIC or to the State Economic Commission, whose 
Defense Bureau coordinated the civilian production of the defense 
industry. Further changes in defense industry structure occurred 
in 1986 and 1987, when inland defense enterprises were either relo- 
cated closer to transportation links or cities, closed down, or trans- 
ferred to local civilian control and production. 



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National Defense 



Weapons Production 

In 1987 China adopted a new contractual system for weapons 
research, development, and production. It was not clear from avail- 
able information how this contract system would affect the role of 
the NDSTIC as the coordinating body for defense science and 
industry. Previously, the NDSTIC controlled procurement fund- 
ing, reviewed proposals for weapons requirements funneled through 
the General Staff Department's Equipment Subdepartment, and 
coordinated with defense industries to produce the needed equip- 
ment. Under the new system, the state divided defense research 
and development funds into three categories: military equipment 
research, basic and applied sciences research, and unidentified tech- 
nological services. The first type of appropriation went to military 
arms and services, which signed contracts with research institutes 
or enterprises to develop and manufacture the required weapons. 
The contract system involved the PLA, which had been removed 
to a large extent from such activities, in the development and manu- 
facture of the weapons it would use. The second category of funds 
was devoted to basic research and applied science to help modern- 
ize the defense industry. The third category went to technological 
services necessary for research programs. This reform was another 
measure designed to integrate military and civilian industry by plac- 
ing the military production of defense industries within the frame- 
work of the planned-commodity economy. The new system further 
sought to provide the military with better equipment at a mini- 
mum cost, to force the defense industry to upgrade weapons designs 
and improve production, to improve the management of weapons 
research and development through state application of economic 
levers, to promote cooperation between research institutes and fac- 
tories, and to increase the decision-making powers of the enterprises. 

Procurement of weapons and equipment represented 45 percent 
of the defense budget during the 1967 to 1983 period. This figure 
included 25 percent for aircraft, 15 percent for ground forces 
weapons, and about 10 percent each for naval and missile systems. 
China's military-industrial complex, the third largest in the world, 
produced a wide variety of weapons, including light arms and 
ammunition, armor, artillery, combat aircraft, fast-attack craft, 
frigates, destroyers, conventional and nuclear submarines, elec- 
tronic equipment, tactical missiles, and ballistic missiles. With the 
notable exception of China's indigenously produced nuclear sub- 
marines, nuclear missiles, and satellites, most Chinese weaponry 
was based on Soviet designs of the 1950s and 1960s. Much of this 
equipment was obsolete or obsolescent, and beginning in the late 



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China: A Country Study 



1970s China made great efforts to upgrade the equipment by chang- 
ing indigenous designs or by incorporating Western technology. 
The greatest weaknesses were in conventional arms, precision- 
guided munitions, electronic warfare, and command, control, com- 
munications, and intelligence. China attempted to address these 
weaknesses by focusing military research on electronics — essential 
to progress in the previously mentioned areas — and by selectively 
importing key systems or technologies. 

The Role of Foreign Military Technology 

Following the withdrawal of Soviet aid and advisers in 1960, 
which crippled the defense industry and weapons production for 
several years, China stressed self-reliance in developing its own 
weaponry. The acquisition of foreign military technology became 
a contentious issue at times, particularly in the 1970s, when Maoists 
stressed complete self-reliance and more moderate leaders wished 
to import some foreign technology. The signing of an agreement 
to coproduce Rolls Royce Spey engines in 1975 signaled the reso- 
lution of that debate in favor of selective importation. Beginning 
in 1977, Chinese military delegations traveled abroad, particularly 
to Western Europe and, in the 1980s, to the United States, to visit 
Western defense manufacturers and to inspect the state of the art 
in military equipment. Chinese representatives showed great interest 
in a wide variety of weapons systems, but they made few purchases 
of complete weapons systems, concentrating instead on acquisition 
of selective components, equipment, or technologies and on con- 
cluding coproduction agreements. 

China's selective approach to acquiring foreign military tech- 
nology stemmed from the limited funds available for military mod- 
ernization and the desire of Chinese leaders to avoid dependence 
on any one supplier. The selective approach also reflected the 
knowledge that assimilation of foreign technology could present 
problems because of the low level of Chinese military technology 
and lack of qualified personnel. Finally, the leadership realized that 
China's past emphasis on modifying foreign weapons and on reverse 
engineering had greatly limited China's weapons development 
capacity. To overcome weapons deficiency in the short run and 
achieve indigenous military research, development, and produc- 
tion in the long run, China's leaders combined the selective import 
of weapons and technology with improved technical training of 
defense personnel and development of the civilian economy. 

China primarily was interested in obtaining defensive weapons 
from abroad to correct the PLA's most critical weaknesses. These 
weapons and equipment included antitank and antiaircraft missiles, 



572 



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armor-piercing ammunition, helicopters, trucks, jeeps, automo- 
biles, and tank fire-control systems, engines, and turrets for the 
ground forces; antiship missiles, air defense systems, antisubmarine 
warfare systems, and electronic countermeasures systems for the 
Navy; and avionics, including fire control and navigation systems, 
for the Air Force. Observers opined that the entire military needed 
improved command, control, communications, and intelligence 
equipment and computers for command and logistics. 

Arms Sales 

China's entrance into the international arms market in the 1980s 
was closely related to reforms in the defense industry and the leader- 
ship's desire to acquire the foreign technology needed to modern- 
ize PLA weaponry. Before 1980 China provided arms to friendly 
Third World countries at concessionary prices (see Relations with 
the Third World, ch. 12). Because China transferred arms based 
on ideological and foreign policy considerations, terms were gener- 
ous. Around 1980 China decided to sell weapons for profit to absorb 
excess capacity in the defense industry, make defense enterprises 
more economically viable, and earn the foreign currency required 
to purchase foreign military technology. China continued to sell 
military hardware at generous terms to some of its traditional friends 
and weapons customers, such as Pakistan, the Democratic Peo- 
ple's Republic of Korea (North Korea), Egypt, Sudan, and 
Somalia. Hard-currency sales to Middle Eastern countries, how- 
ever, particularly Iran and Iraq, accounted for the rapid increase 
in Chinese weapons sales in the 1980s. United States Arms Con- 
trol and Disarmament Agency studies indicated that from 1979 to 
1983 Chinese arms sales ranked eighth in the world, for a total 
of about US$3.5 billion, of which an estimated US$2. 1 billion went 
to Middle Eastern countries. In 1979 arms sales accounted for 
0.9 percent of total exports; in 1983 arms sales rose to 6.3 percent 
of total exports. By 1987 China had jumped to fifth place, ranking 
behind the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France. 

In the 1980s the defense industry and the PLA established a num- 
ber of trading corporations to sell Chinese military hardware and 
to acquire foreign technology. The most prominent of these corpo- 
rations were the China Xinshidai Corporation, affiliated with the 
NDSTIC; China Northern Industrial Corporation (commonly 
known as NORINCO), affiliated with the State Machine-Building 
Industry Commission; China National Aero-Technology Import and 
Export Corporation (CATIC), affiliated with the Ministry of Aero- 
nautics; Great Wall Industrial Corporation and China Precision 
Machinery Import and Export Corporation, both affiliated with the 



573 



China: A Country Study 



Ministry of Astronautics; China Electronics Import and Export 
Corporation, affiliated with the Ministry of Electronics Industry; 
China Shipbuilding Trading Corporation, affiliated with the China 
State Shipbuilding Corporation; and China Xinxing Corporation, 
affiliated with the PLA General Logistics Department. In 1984 these 
corporations began promoting Chinese weapons, actively seeking 
technology transfer and coproduction agreements with Western 
defense companies at international defense exhibitions in 1984. 

Civilian Production 

In late 1978 China initiated a policy of integrating civilian and 
military industry more closely in order to promote overall civilian 
economic development. This policy entailed civilianizing the 
machine-building ministries to make the defense industry more 
responsive to civilian control and needs; increasing defense indus- 
try production of civilian goods, particularly consumer goods; and 
transferring technology from the more advanced defense sector to 
the civilian sector of the economy. Production of civilian goods 
totaled 6.9 percent of total defense industry output in 1975. In 1980 
it rose to 18 percent, and by 1985 it had jumped to 41.8 percent 
of total output. Chinese officials predicted that by 1990 about 
80 percent of defense industry output would be civilian goods. The 
large excess capacity of the defense industry, resulting from declin- 
ing orders from the PLA, made possible the rapid growth in civilian 
output. The defense industry manufactured a wide variety of goods 
for civilian use, including motor vehicles, optical equipment, tele- 
vision sets, electrical appliances, pharmaceuticals, and medical 
instruments and prostheses. Many of these products were consumer 
goods in high demand. For example, in 1985 the Ministry of Ord- 
nance Industry manufactured 500,000 motorcycles, representing 
two-thirds of total motorcycle output, as well as 250,000 cameras, 
450,000 bicycles, and 100,000 refrigerators. 

Following the formulation of regulations and mechanisms for 
such transfers, defense industries began transferring technology to 
civilian industries on a large scale in the mid-1980s. Technology 
transfers provided defense enterprises with additional, lucrative 
sources of income and furnished civilian enterprises with a wide 
range of useful, advanced technology to modernize production. For 
example, the Ministry of Astronautics disseminated aerospace tech- 
nology to light industry and to the petroleum, chemical engineer- 
ing, machine-building, textile, communications, medical, and 
electronics industries. 



574 



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Economic Roles of the People's Liberation Army 

The PLA played a role in economic development practically from 
its inception. Beginning in the late 1930s and early 1940s, when 
the party was headquartered in Yan'an, the Red Army raised its 
own food. After 1949 the PLA became involved in economic recon- 
struction tasks — building railroads and factories, reclaiming waste- 
land, digging irrigation canals, establishing state farms, and 
participating in disaster relief operations. The PLA accepted its 
role as a force in economic construction and devoted segments of 
its structure, such as the Engineering Corps, Railway Engineer- 
ing Corps, Capital Construction Engineering Corps, Signal Corps, 
and Production and Construction Corps, to building up the national 
infrastructure. However, PLA regional- and main-force units 
played a much smaller role in aiding the civilian economy. 

This pattern continued into the 1980s. The PLA remained self- 
sufficient in food, participated in selective infrastructure develop- 
ment projects, and aided in disaster relief. From 1981 to 1985, the 
PLA contributed 110 million workdays to 44,500 construction 
projects, including the diversion of river water from the Luan He 
to Tianjin, construction of the Shengli oilfield in Shandong Province 
and the Huolinhe open-cut coal mine in Shaanxi Province, expan- 
sion of Zhanjiang port in Guangdong Province, and afforestation 
work involving the planting of 290 million trees. 

The PLA contributed to economic development in two additional 
ways. First, in November 1984 the government decided to trans- 
fer some military facilities to civilian control or joint military-civilian 
use. These facilities included airfields, ports, docks, railroads, depots 
and warehouses, and recreational areas. The devolution of these 
facilities to civilian control helped to alleviate problems that plagued 
the civilian economy. Second, beginning in the late 1970s, the PLA 
operated a large-scale program of dual-use training, whereby PLA 
personnel learned skills useful to the growing economy. Under this 
program, officers and soldiers received military training and training 
in specialized skills, such as livestock breeding, cultivation, process- 
ing, construction, machine maintenance, repair of domestic appli- 
ances, motor vehicle repair, and driving. In 1986 the PLA trained 
more than 650,000 soldiers in 25,000 training courses at over 6,000 
training centers. In early 1987 surveys indicated that over 70 per- 
cent of demobilized PLA personnel left the armed forces with skills 
they could use as civilians. 

Perception of Threat 

In the late 1980s, China viewed the Soviet Union as its principal 



575 



China: A Country Study 



military opponent. Simmering border disputes with Vietnam and 
India were perceived as lesser threats to security. China's burgeon- 
ing opening up policy, its claims to the Xisha (Paracel) and Nansha 
(Spratly) Islands, and the presence of offshore oil deposits made 
the South China Sea an area in which Beijing saw potential threats 
to its interests. Finally, although it did not regard Taiwan as a mili- 
tary threat, China nevertheless refused to rule out the use of force 
as a means of achieving reunification with Taiwan. 

The Soviet Union 

Despite common ideological roots, considerable Soviet assistance 
in the past, and warming relations since 1982, China in 1987 
regarded the Soviet Union's military strength and foreign policy 
as the major threat to its security. Tensions in relations between 
the two countries had begun to escalate in the mid-1950s (see Sino- 
Soviet Relations, ch. 12). The 1968 Soviet invasion of Czecho- 
slovakia and the buildup of Soviet forces in the Soviet Far East 
raised Chinese suspicions of Soviet intentions. Sharp border clashes 
between Soviet and Chinese troops occurred in 1969, roughly a 
decade after relations between the two countries had begun to 
deteriorate and some four years after a buildup of Soviet forces 
along China's northern border had begun. Particularly heated 
border clashes occurred in the northeast along the Sino-Soviet 
border formed by the Heilong Jiang (Amur River) and the Wusuli 
Jiang (Ussuri River), on which China claimed the right to navigate 
(see fig. 3). Border provocations occasionally recurred in later 
years — for example, in May 1978 when Soviet troops in boats and 
a helicopter intruded into Chinese territory — but major armed 
clashes were averted. 

In the late 1970s, China decried what it perceived as a Soviet 
attempt to encircle it as the military buildup continued in the Soviet 
Far East and the Soviet Union signed friendship treaties with Viet- 
nam and Afghanistan. In April 1979 Beijing notified Moscow that 
the thirty-year Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assis- 
tance — under which the Soviets aided the PLA in its 1950s 
modernization — would not be renewed. Negotiations on improv- 
ing Sino-Soviet relations were begun in 1979, but China ended 
them when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan late that year. 
In 1982 China and the Soviet Union resumed negotiations on nor- 
malizing relations. Although agreements on trade, science and tech- 
nology, and culture were signed, political ties remained frozen 
because of Chinese insistence that the Soviet Union remove the 
three obstacles to improved Sino-Soviet relations. Although Chinese 
leaders publicly professed not to be concerned, the Soviet base at 



576 



National Defense 



Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, Soviet provision of MiG-23 fighters 
to North Korea, and Soviet acquisition of overflight and port call- 
ing rights from North Korea intensified Chinese apprehension about 
the Soviet threat. Soviet Communist Party General Secretary 
Mikhail S. Gorbachev's 1986 offer to withdraw some troops from 
Afghanistan and the Mongolian People's Republic (Mongolia) were 
seen by Beijing as a cosmetic gesture that did not lessen the threat 
to China. 

In the mid-1980s the Soviet Union deployed about one-quarter 
to one-third of its military forces in its Far Eastern theater. In 1987 
Soviet nuclear forces included approximately 171 SS-20 inter- 
mediate-range ballistic missiles, which China found particularly 
threatening, and 85 nuclear-capable long-range Backfire bombers. 
Approximately 470,000 Soviet ground force troops in 53 divisions 
were stationed in the Sino-Soviet border region, including 
Mongolia. Although 65 percent of these ground force divisions were 
only at 20 percent of full combat strength, they were provided with 
improved equipment, including T-72 tanks, and were reinforced 
by 2,200 aircraft, including new generation aircraft such as the 
MiG-23/27 Flogger fighter. Chinese forces on the Sino-Soviet 
border were numerically superior — 1.5 million troops in 68 
divisions — but technologically inferior. Although the PLA units in 
the Shenyang and Beijing military regions were equipped with some 
of the PLA's most advanced weaponry, few Chinese divisions were 
mechanized. The Soviet Union held tactical and strategic nuclear 
superiority and exceeded China in terms of mobility, firepower, 
air power, and antiaircraft capability. Chinese leaders reportedly 
did not consider a Soviet attack to be imminent or even likely in 
the short term. They believed that if the Soviets did attack, it would 
be a limited strike against Chinese territory in north or northeast 
China, rather than a full-scale invasion (see Doctrine, Strategy, 
and Tactics, this ch.). 

Vietnam 

China's relations with Vietnam began to deteriorate seriously 
in the mid-1970s (see An Overview of China's Foreign Relations, 
ch. 12). After Vietnam joined the Soviet-dominated Council for 
Mutual Economic Cooperation (Comecon) and signed the Treaty 
of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union in 1978, 
China branded Vietnam the "Cuba of the East" and called the 
treaty a military alliance. Incidents along the Sino- Vietnamese 
border increased in frequency and violence. In December 1978 Viet- 
nam invaded Cambodia, quickly ousted the pro-Beijing Pol Pot 
regime, and overran the country. In February 1979 China attacked 



577 



China: A Country Study 



along virtually the entire Sino- Vietnamese border in a brief, limited 
campaign that involved ground forces only. In March Beijing 
declared its "lesson" finished and withdrew all its troops (see 
Historical Development, 1927-79, this ch.). 

After the war, both China and Vietnam reorganized their border 
defenses. The border war strengthened Soviet- Vietnamese relations. 
The Soviet military role in Vietnam increased during the 1980s 
as the Soviets provided arms to Vietnam; moreover, Soviet ships 
enjoyed access to the harbors at Danang and Cam Ranh Bay, and 
Soviet reconnaissance aircraft operated out of Vietnamese airfields. 
Low-level conflict continued along the Sino-Vietnamese border as 
each side conducted artillery shelling and probed to gain high spots 
in the mountainous border terrain. Border incidents increased in 
intensity during the rainy season, when Beijing attempted to ease 
Vietnamese pressure against Cambodian resistance fighters. In 1986 
China deployed twenty-five to twenty-eight divisions and Vietnam 
thirty-two divisions along their common border. Nevertheless, most 
observers doubted that China would risk another war with Viet- 
nam in the near future. 

India 

Beijing considered recurring Sino-Indian border clashes a poten- 
tial threat to its security. Negotiations since the 1962 Sino-Indian 
border war failed to resolve the conflicting border claims, and each 
side improved its military and logistics capabilities in the disputed 
regions. Since the war, China has continued its occupation of the 
Aksai Chin area, through which it built a strategic highway link- 
ing Xizang and Xinjiang autonomous regions. China had a vital 
military interest in maintaining control over this region, whereas 
India's primary interest lay in Arunachal Pradesh, its state in the 
northeast bordering Xizang Autonomous Region. In 1987, although 
India enjoyed air superiority, rough parity on the ground existed 
between the two military forces, which had a combined total of 
nearly 400,000 troops near the border. The Indian Army deployed 
eleven divisions in the region, backed up by paramilitary forces, 
whereas the PLA had fifteen divisions available for operations on 
the border. After a 1986 border clash and India's conversion of 
Arunachal Pradesh from union territory to state, tensions between 
China and India escalated. Both sides moved to reinforce their capa- 
bilities in the area, but neither ruled out further negotiations of 
their dispute. Most observers believe that the mountainous terrain, 
high-altitude climate, and concomitant logistic difficulties made it 
unlikely that a protracted or large-scale conflict would erupt on 
the Sino-Indian border. 



578 



National Defense 



South China Sea 

The South China Sea area was strategically important to Bei- 
jing because of the discovery of offshore oil in China's 200-nautical- 
mile exclusive economic zone, increased foreign trade in the South 
China Sea, and China's territorial claims there. The Xisha and 
Nansha islands also were claimed, and some occupied, by Viet- 
nam, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Malaysia. Beijing's claims to 
these island groups predated all others except those by the Guo- 
mindang authorities. In 1974 the PLA Navy ousted South Viet- 
namese forces from the Xisha and occupied some of the islands, 
which were valuable as Chinese fishing bases and guano sites. 
Although Chinese occupation of the Xisha effectively expanded its 
exclusive economic zone, the discovery of offshore oil deposits near 
Hainan Island intensified China's interest in both island groups. 
With the expansion of Chinese foreign trade, Beijing's interest grew 
in maintaining a naval presence in the Xisha Islands, which sit 
astride the strategic Hong Kong-Singapore shipping route. Chinese 
fishermen also used the Nansha Islands, but most of these were 
occupied by Vietnam, Taiwan, and the Philippines. In the 1980s 
the PLA Navy built up the South Sea Fleet, strengthened its naval 
facilities and deployments in the Xisha Islands, and conducted naval 
exercises in the South China Sea. To strengthen its military posi- 
tion in the Xisha Islands and protect itself against the Soviet base 
at Cam Ranh Bay, Beijing also reinforced its claim to the Nansha 
Islands. 

Taiwan 

Taiwan does not pose a military threat to China, despite Taipei's 
vow to "recover the mainland." Tensions in the Taiwan Strait 
decreased beginning in the late 1970s, when China called for peace- 
ful reunification with Taiwan and reduction of PLA forces in Fujian 
Province opposite Taiwan. Nevertheless, Beijing refused to rule 
out the use of force against Taiwan in the event that Taiwan had 
serious internal disturbances or declared independence. In the late 
1980s, a Chinese attack against Taiwan was considered unlikely 
by most observers. The Navy lacked the amphibious forces neces- 
sary to mount a full-scale invasion. The Navy had the capability 
to mount a blockade of Taiwan, but this measure also was consid- 
ered unlikely. 

Foreign Military Cooperation 

In the 1950s China limited its military cooperation almost entirely 
to communist nations and to insurgent movements in Southeast 



579 



China: A Country Study 



Asia. The Soviet Union provided China with substantial assistance, 
and with advice in modernizing the PLA and developing China's 
defense industry (see Military Modernization in the 1950s and 
1960s, this ch.). China provided North Korea with arms and 
assistance, and the PLA and the Korean People's Army developed 
close ties because of their association in the Korean War. In 1961 
China and North Korea signed a mutual defense agreement, and 
Chinese-North Korean military cooperation continued in the late 
1980s. China also provided weapons and military and economic 
assistance to Vietnam, which ended in 1978 when relations between 
the two countries soured. In the 1950s and 1960s, China provided 
weapons to communist insurgent groups in Laos, Cambodia, 
Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. 

In the 1960s and 1970s, China began developing military ties 
with Third World nations in Asia and Africa, while maintaining 
or promoting cooperation with North Korea, the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), and Albania. Chinese mili- 
tary cooperation with North Korea and North Vietnam stemmed 
from security considerations. Chinese military assistance to Third 
World countries arose from attempts to extend Chinese influence 
and counteract Soviet and United States influence. China became 
increasingly anti-Soviet in the 1970s. In the 1980s China developed 
close military ties and provided considerable military assistance to 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka in South Asia; Egypt in the 
Middle East; and Tanzania, Sudan, Somalia, Zaire, and Zambia 
in Africa. 

In the late 1970s, the scope and tenor of foreign military coopera- 
tion changed with the shift to commercial arms sales, attempts to 
gain some influence in Eastern Europe, and improvement in rela- 
tions with the United States and Western Europe. Chinese mili- 
tary assistance to communist insurgents, especially in Southeast 
Asia, tapered off. Nevertheless, China continued to provide weap- 
ons both to the Khmer Rouge and to noncommunist Cambodian 
resistance groups, and it developed close relations with and sold 
weapons to Thailand. Traditionally friendly states in South Asia 
continued to have close military ties with China and to purchase 
Chinese military hardware under generous terms. Chinese- 
Albanian relations deteriorated in the 1970s, and Beijing termi- 
nated all assistance in 1978. But at the same time, China began 
to exchange military delegations with two other East European 
countries — Yugoslavia and Romania. Chinese military relations 
with these two countries were limited and, especially in the case 
of Romania (a Warsaw Pact member), served to irritate the Soviet 
Union. 



580 



The Chinese Navy's Huangfeng class fast-attack craft 

Courtesy Conmilit 



A major change in foreign military cooperation occurred when 
China began developing military contacts with West European 
nations and the United States in the late 1970s and the 1980s. This 
change reflected China's desire to counter Soviet influence, espe- 
cially in Europe, as well as to develop relations with modern armed 
forces. China needed advanced hardware and technology and 
organizational, training, personnel, logistics, and doctrinal con- 
cepts for modernizing the PLA. Chinese military ties with West 
European countries were strongest with Britain, France, and Italy. 
Chinese military relations with the United States developed rapidly 
in the 1980s and included exchanges of high-level military officials 
and working-level delegations in training, logistics, and education. 
The United States sold some weapons to China for defensive pur- 
poses, but China was unlikely to purchase large amounts of Ameri- 
can arms because of financial and political constraints (see 
Sino-American Relations, ch. 12). 

Beginning in 1979, when China introduced its policy of open- 
ing up to the outside world, military exchanges with foreign coun- 
tries grew substantially (see Historical Legacy and Worldview, 
ch. 12). The PLA hosted 500 military delegations from 1979 to 
1987 and sent thousands of military officials abroad for visits, study, 
and lectures. China received port calls from thirty-three foreign 
warships, including United States, British, French, and Australian 



581 



China: A Country Study 

ships, and it sent two naval ships to visit Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
and Sri Lanka in 1985. PLA departments, academies, and research 
institutes opened their doors to foreign military visitors. In 1987 
China had ties with eighty-five foreign armies, posted Chinese mili- 
tary attaches in sixty countries, and hosted forty military attaches 
in Beijing. 

Force Structure 
Ground Forces 

The PLA ground forces consisted of conventionally armed main 
and regional units and in 1987 made up over 70 percent of the 
PLA. It provided a good conventional defense but had only limited 
offensive potential and was poorly equipped for nuclear, biologi- 
cal, or chemical warfare. Main forces included about 35 group 
armies, comprising 118 infantry divisions, 13 armored divisions, 
and 33 artillery and antiaircraft artillery divisions, plus 71 indepen- 
dent regiments and 21 independent battalions of mostly support 
troops. Regional forces consisted of 73 divisions of border defense 
and garrison troops plus 140 independent regiments. 

Under the old system, a field army consisted of three partially 
motorized infantry divisions and two regiments of artillery and 
antiaircraft artillery. Each field army division had over 12,000 per- 
sonnel in three infantry regiments, one artillery regiment, one 
armored regiment, and one antiaircraft artillery battalion. Organi- 
zation was flexible, the higher echelons being free to tailor forces 
for combat around any number of infantry divisions. At least theo- 
retically, each division had its own armor and artillery — actual 
equipment levels were not revealed and probably varied — and the 
assets at army level and within the independent units could be 
apportioned as needed. 

The new, main-force group armies typically included 46,300 
troops in up to four divisions, believed to include infantry, armor, 
artillery, air defense, airborne, and air support elements. Although 
the new group armies were supposed to reflect a move to combined- 
arms operations, because of a lack of mechanization they continued 
to consist of infantry supported by armor, artillery, and other units. 
The 13 armored divisions each had 3 regiments and 240 main battle 
tanks but lacked adequate mechanized infantry support. There was 
little evidence of the use of armored personnel carriers during the 
Sino- Vietnamese border conflict in 1979, and tanks were used as 
mobile artillery and as support for dismounted infantry. Artillery 
forces emphasized towed guns, howitzers, and truck-mounted mul- 
tiple rocket launchers. In the 1980s some self-propelled artillery 



582 



National Defense 



entered service, but the PLA also produced rocket launchers as 
a cheaper but not totally effective alternative to self-propelled guns. 
There was a variety of construction equipment, mobile bridging, 
trucks, and prime movers. A new multiple rocket launcher for scat- 
tering antitank mines appeared in 1979, but mine-laying and mine- 
clearing equipment remained scarce. 

Regional forces consisted of full-time PLA troops organized as 
independent divisions for garrison missions. Garrison divisions were 
static, artillery-heavy units deployed along the coastline and borders 
in areas of likely attack. Regional forces were armed less heavily 
than their main-force counterparts, and they were involved in train- 
ing the militia. They were the PLA units commonly used to restore 
order during the Cultural Revolution. 

In 1987 the PLA ground forces, which relied upon obsolescent 
but serviceable equipment, were most anxious to improve defenses 
against armored vehicles and aircraft. Most equipment was pro- 
duced from Soviet designs of the 1950s, but weapons were being 
incrementally upgraded, some with Western technology. One 
example of upgraded, Soviet-design equipment was the Type 69 
main battle tank, an improved version of the Type 59 main battle 
tank, itself based on the Soviet T-54. The Type 69 main battle 
tank had improved armor, a gun stabilizer, a fire control system 
including a laser range finder, infrared searchlights, and a 105mm 
smooth-bore gun. In 1987 the existence of a new, Type 80 main 
battle tank was revealed in the Western press. The tank had a new 
chassis, a 105mm gun, and a fire control system. Production of 
the Type 80 tank had not yet begun. The PLA was believed to 
have atomic demolition munitions, and there were unconfirmed 
reports that it also had tactical nuclear weapons. In any case, nuclear 
bombs and missiles in the Chinese inventory could be used in a 
theater role. The PLA had a scarcity of antitank guided missiles, 
tactical surface-to-air missiles, and electronics to improve communi- 
cations, fire control, and sensors. China began production of the 
Soviet Sagger antitank missile in 1979 but lacked a more power- 
ful, longer range, semiautomatic antitank guided missile. The PLA 
required a mobile surface-to-air missile and an infantry shoulder- 
fired missile for use against helicopters and certain other aircraft 
(see Appendix C). 

Air Force 

The primary mission of the PLA Air Force was the defense of 
the mainland, and most aircraft were assigned to this role. A smaller 
number of ground attack and bomber units were assigned to inter- 
diction and possibly close air support, and some bomber units 



583 



National Defense 



could be used for nuclear delivery. The force had only limited mili- 
tary airlift and reconnaissance capabilities. 

The Soviet Union helped to establish the Air Force in 1949 and 
began to provide aircraft in late 1951. Production technology came 
two years later. By 1956 China was assembling F-4s (copies of 
MiG-15s) and eight years later was producing both the F-5 
(MiG-17) and the F-6 (MiG-19) under license. Meanwhile, Soviet 
instructors were training the new pilots in Soviet tactics. The with- 
drawal of Soviet aid in 1960 crippled China's aircraft industry. The 
industry declined markedly through 1963, further hindered by the 
high priority accorded to the competing missile and nuclear weapons 
program. The aircraft industry began to recover in about 1965, 
however,, when China began providing F-4s and F-5s to North 
Vietnam. 

Chinese pilots saw considerable action in the Korean War and, 
to a lesser extent, during the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1958. During 
the China- Vietnam border conflict of 1979, the Chinese avoided 
air battles, probably at least partly because they lacked the confi- 
dence to challenge Vietnam's air force, which though far smaller 
was better armed and trained. 

The Air Force underwent reorganization and streamlining as 
part of the reduction in force begun in 1985. Before the 1985 reor- 
ganization, the Air Force reportedly had four branches: air defense, 
ground attack, bombing, and independent air regiments. In peace- 
time the Air Force Directorate, under the supervision of the PLA 
General Staff Department, controlled the Air Force through air 
army headquarters located with, or in communication with, each 
of the seven military region headquarters. In war, control of the 
Air Force probably reverted to the regional commanders. In 1987 
it was not clear how the reorganization and the incorporation of 
air support elements into the group armies affected air force organi- 
zation. 

The largest Air Force organizational unit was the division, which 
consisted of 17,000 personnel in three regiments. A typical air 
defense regiment had three squadrons of three flights; each flight 
had three or four aircraft. The Air Force also had 220,000 air 
defense personnel who controlled about 100 surface-to-air missile 
sites and over 16,000 antiaircraft guns. In addition, it had a large 
number of early-warning, ground-control-intercept, and air-base 
radars manned by specialized troops organized into at least twenty- 
two independent regiments. 

In the 1980s the Air Force made serious efforts to raise the edu- 
cation level and improve the training of its pilots. Superannuated 
pilots were retired or assigned to other duties. All new pilots were 



584 




An Air Force pilot with his F- 7 /Fishbed jet fighter 
Courtesy Xinhua News Agency 

at least middle-school graduates. The time it took to train a quali- 
fied pilot capable of performing combat missions reportedly was 
reduced from four or five years to two years. Training emphasized 
raising technical and tactical skills in individual pilots and partici- 
pation in combined-arms operations. Flight safety also increased. 

In 1987 the Air Force had serious technological deficiencies — 
especially when compared with its principal threat, the Soviet 
Union — and had many needs that it could not satisfy. It needed 
more advanced aircraft, better avionics, electronic countermeasures 
equipment, more powerful aircraft weaponry, a low-altitude surface- 
to-air missile, and better controlled antiaircraft artillery guns. Some 
progress was made in aircraft design with the incorporation of 
Western avionics into the F-7 (a copy of the MiG-21) and F-8 
(an indigenous model derived from various Soviet designs), the 
development of refueling capabilities for the B-6D bomber and the 
A-5 attack fighter, increased aircraft all-weather capabilities, and 
the production of the HQ-2J high-altitude surface-to-air missile 
and the C-601 air-to-ship missile. 

Navy 

Although naval personnel comprised only 12 percent of PLA 
strength, the PLA Navy ranked in 1987 as the third largest navy 
in the world. In 1987 the Navy consisted of the naval headquarters 



585 



China: A Country Study 

in Beijing; three fleet commands — the North Sea Fleet, based at 
Qingdao, Shandong Province; the East Sea Fleet, based at Shang- 
hai; and the South Sea Fleet, based at Zhanjiang, Guangdong 
Province — and about 2,000 ships. The 350,000-person Navy 
included Naval Air Force units of 34,000 men, the Coastal Defense 
Forces of 38,000, and the Marine Corps of 56,500. Naval Head- 
quarters, which controlled the three fleet commands, was subor- 
dinate to the PLA General Staff Department. 

China's 1,500-kilometer coastline was protected by more than 
100 diesel-powered Romeo- and Whiskey-class submarines, which 
could remain at sea only a limited time. Inside this protective ring 
and within range of shore-based aircraft were destroyers and frigates 
mounting Styx antiship missiles, depth-charge projectors, and guns 
up to 130mm. Any invader penetrating the destroyer and frigate 
protection would be swarmed by almost 900 fast-attack craft. 
Stormy weather could limit the range of these small boats, however, 
and curtail air support. Behind the inner ring were Coastal Defense 
Force personnel operating naval shore batteries of Styx missiles 
and guns, backed by ground force units deployed in depth. 

In 1949 Mao asserted that "to oppose imperialist aggression, 
we must build a powerful navy." The Naval Academy was set up 
at Dalian in March 1950, mostly with Soviet instructors. The Navy 
was established in September 1950 by consolidating regional naval 
forces under General Staff Department command. It then consisted 
of a motley collection of ships and boats acquired from the Guomin- 
dang forces. The Naval Air Force was added two years later. By 
1954 an estimated 2,500 Soviet naval advisers were in China — 
possibly one adviser to every thirty Chinese naval personnel — and 
the Soviet Union began providing modern ships. With Soviet assis- 
tance, the navy reorganized in 1954 and 1955 into the North Sea 
Fleet, East Sea Fleet, and South Sea Fleet, and a corps of admirals 
and other naval officers was established from the ranks of the ground 
forces. In shipbuilding the Soviets first assisted the Chinese, then 
the Chinese copied Soviet designs without assistance, and finally 
the Chinese produced vessels of their own design. Eventually Soviet 
assistance progressed to the point that a joint Sino-Soviet Pacific 
Ocean fleet was under discussion. 

Through the upheavals of the late 1950s and 1960s the Navy 
remained relatively undisturbed. Under the leadership of Minister 
of National Defense Lin Biao, large investments were made in naval 
construction during the frugal years immediately after the Great 
Leap Forward. During the Cultural Revolution, a number of top 
naval commissars and commanders were purged, and naval forces 
were used to suppress a revolt in Wuhan in July 1967, but the 



586 



National Defense 



service largely avoided the turmoil. Although it paid lip service 
to Mao and assigned political commissars aboard ships, the Navy 
continued to train, build, and maintain the fleets. 

In the 1970s, when approximately 20 percent of the defense 
budget was allocated to naval forces, the Navy grew dramatically. 
The conventional submarine force increased from 35 to 100 boats, 
the number of missile-carrying ships grew from 20 to 200, and the 
production of larger surface ships, including support ships for ocean- 
going operations, increased. The Navy also began development 
of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN) and nuclear-powered 
ballistic missile submarines (SSBN). 

In the 1980s the Navy was developing into a regional naval power 
with some blue-water capabilities. Naval construction continued 
at a level somewhat below the 1970s rate. Modernization efforts 
encompassed higher educational and technical standards for per- 
sonnel; reformulation of the traditional coastal defense doctrine and 
force structure in favor of more blue- water operations; and train- 
ing in naval combined-arms operations involving submarine, sur- 
face, naval aviation, and coastal defense forces. Examples of the 
expansion of China's blue-water naval capabilities were the 1980 
recovery of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in the 
Western Pacific by a twenty-ship fleet, extended naval operations 
in the South China Sea in 1984 and 1985, and the visit of two naval 
ships to three South Asian nations in 1985. In 1982 the Navy con- 
ducted a successful test of an underwater-launched ballistic mis- 
sile; in 1986 the Navy's order of battle included two Xia-class 
SSBNs armed with twelve CSS-NX-4 missiles and three Han-class 
SSNs armed with six SY-2 cruise missiles. The Navy also had some 
success in developing a variety of ship-to-ship, ship-to-shore, shore- 
to-ship, and air-to-ship missiles. In the late 1980s, major deficien- 
cies reportedly remained in antisubmarine warfare, mine warfare, 
naval electronics (including electronic countermeasures equipment), 
and naval aviation capabilities. 

Nuclear Forces 

In the late 1980s, China was the world's third-largest nuclear 
power, possessing a small but credible nuclear deterrent force of 
225 to 300 nuclear weapons. Beginning in the late 1970s, China 
deployed a full range of nuclear forces and acquired an incipient 
nuclear second-strike capability. The nuclear forces were operated 
by the 100,000-person Strategic Missile Force, which was controlled 
directly by the General Staff Department. 

China began developing nuclear weapons in the late 1950s with 
substantial Soviet assistance. When Sino-Soviet relations cooled 



587 



China: A Country Study 

in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Soviet Union withheld plans 
and data for an atomic bomb, abrogated the agreement on trans- 
ferring defense technology, and began the withdrawal of Soviet 
advisers in 1960. Despite the termination of Soviet assistance, China 
committed itself to continue nuclear weapons development to break 
"the superpowers' monopoly on nuclear weapons," to ensure 
Chinese security against the Soviet and United States threats, and 
to increase Chinese prestige and power internationally. 

China made remarkable progress in the 1960s in developing 
nuclear weapons. In a thirty-two-month period, China successfully 
exploded its first atomic bomb (October 16, 1964), launched its 
first nuclear missile (October 25, 1966), and detonated its first 
hydrogen bomb (June 14, 1967). Deployment of the Dongfeng-1 
conventionally armed short-range ballistic missile and the 
Dongfeng-2 (CSS-1) medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) 
occurred in the 1960s. The Dongfeng-3 (CCS-2) intermediate- 
range ballistic missile (IRBM) was successfully tested in 1969. 
Although the Cultural Revolution disrupted the strategic weapons 
program less than other scientific and educational sectors in China, 
there was a slowdown in succeeding years. 

In the 1970s the nuclear weapons program saw the development 
of MRBM, IRBM, and ICBM capabilities and marked the begin- 
ning of a minimum deterrent force. China continued MRBM 
deployment, began deploying the Dongfeng-3 IRBM, and success- 
fully tested and commenced deployment of the Dongfeng-4 (CSS-3) 
limited-range ICBM. 

By 1980 China had overcome the slowdown in nuclear develop- 
ment caused by the Cultural Revolution and had some spectacu- 
lar successes in its strategic weapons program. In 1980 China 
successfully test launched its full-range ICBM, the Dongfeng-5 
(CSS-4); the missile flew from central China to the Western Pacific, 
where it was recovered by a naval task force. The Dongfeng-5 pos- 
sessed the capability to hit targets in the western Soviet Union and 
the United States. In 1981 China launched three satellites into space 
orbit from a single booster, indicating that China might possess 
the technology to develop multiple, independently targetable reentry 
vehicles (MIRVs). China also launched the Xia-class SSBN in 1981, 
and the next year it conducted its first successful test launch of the 
CSS-NX-4 submarine-launched ballistic missile. In addition to 
the development of a sea-based nuclear force, China began con- 
sidering the development of tactical nuclear weapons. PLA exer- 
cises featured the simulated use of tactical nuclear weapons in 
offensive and defensive situations beginning in 1982. Reports of 



588 




Surface-to-air missiles in transit 
Courtesy Xinhua News Agency 



589 



China: A Country Study 



Chinese possession of tactical nuclear weapons remained uncon- 
firmed in 1987. 

In 1986 China possessed a credible minimum deterrent force with 
land, sea, and air elements. Land-based forces included ICBMs, 
IRBMs, and MRBMs. The sea-based strategic force consisted of 
SSBNs. The Air Force's bombers were capable of delivering nuclear 
bombs but would be unlikely to penetrate the sophisticated air 
defenses of modern military powers such as the Soviet Union. 

China's nuclear forces, in combination with the PLA's conven- 
tional forces, served to deter both nuclear and conventional attack. 
Chinese leaders repeatedly have pledged never to be the first to 
use nuclear weapons, and they have accompanied the no-first-use 
pledge with a promise of certain nuclear counterattack if nuclear 
weapons are used against China. China envisioned retaliation 
against strategic and tactical attacks and would probably strike coun- 
tervalue rather than counterforce targets. The combination of 
China's few nuclear weapons and technological factors such as 
range, accuracy, and response time might further limit the effec- 
tiveness of nuclear strikes against counterforce targets. China is 
seeking to increase the credibility of its nuclear retaliatory capa- 
bility by dispersing and concealing its nuclear forces in difficult 
terrain, improving their mobility, and hardening its missile silos. 

Paramilitary Forces 

Militia 

The role of the militia and the degree of party and PLA control 
over it have varied over the years. During the 1940s the militia 
served primarily as a PLA support force. After 1949 the party con- 
solidated control over the country and gradually used the militia 
to maintain order and help the PLA with defense of the borders 
and coast. In the mid-1950s Minister of National Defense Peng 
Dehuai attempted to build a reserve system incorporating the 
militia. Peng's efforts were thwarted when the party expanded the 
militia, assigning it duties as a production force and internal secu- 
rity force during the Great Leap Forward. Lin Biao reduced the 
size of the militia and reemphasized military training in the early 
1960s. The militia was fragmented during the early years of the 
Cultural Revolution, but in the 1970s it was rebuilt and redirected 
to support the PLA. The Gang of Four attempted to build up the 
urban militia as an alternative to the PLA, but the urban militia 
failed to support the Gang of Four in 1976, when Hua Guofeng 
and moderate military leaders deposed them. The militia's logistical 
support of the PLA was essential during the Sino-Vietnamese 



590 



National Defense 



border war of 1979. In the 1980s Chinese leaders undertook to 
improve the militia's military capabilities by reducing its size and 
its economic tasks. 

In 1987 the militia was controlled by the PLA at the military 
district level and by people's armed forces departments, which 
devolved to civilian control at the county and city levels as part 
of the reduction in force. The militia was a smaller force than previ- 
ously, consisting of 4.3 million basic or primary — armed — militia, 
and the 6-million-strong general or ordinary militia. The basic 
militia was comprised of men and women aged eighteen to twenty- 
eight who had served or were expected to serve in the PLA and 
who received thirty to forty days of military training per year. The 
basic militia included naval militia, which operated armed fishing 
trawlers and coastal defense units, as well as specialized detach- 
ments, such as air defense, artillery, communications, antichemi- 
cal, reconnaissance, and engineering units, which served the PLA. 
The ordinary militia included men aged eighteen to thirty-five who 
met the criteria for military service; they received some basic mili- 
tary training but generally were unarmed. The ordinary militia 
had some air defense duties and included the urban militia. Efforts 
were made to streamline militia organization and upgrade militia 
weaponry. By 1986 militia training bases had been established in 
over half the counties and cities in the nation. 

The militia's principal tasks in the 1980s were to assist in produc- 
tion, to undergo military training, and to defend China's frontiers 
in peacetime. In wartime, the militia would supply reserves for 
mobilization, provide logistical support to the PLA, and conduct 
guerrilla operations behind enemy lines. 

Reserve Service System 

The 1984 Military Service Law stipulated the combination of 
the militia and the reserve service system. Military training for 
senior middle-school and college and university students com- 
menced in 1984 as China sought to provide additional qualified 
reserve-service officers. The reserve force consisted primarily of 
the militia and was organized into reserve-service divisions and regi- 
ments. In 1987 China began to make reference to the National 
Defense Reserve Force, which apparently consisted of reserve sol- 
diers (including all militia, demobilized soldiers, and specialized 
technical personnel registered for reserve service) and reserve officers 
(including demobilized officers and soldiers assigned to reserve 
officer service, college and university graduates, and civilian cadres 
and specialized technicians). 



591 



An air-defense shelter in 
Beijing is turned into an 
underground inn. 

Courtesy 
China Reconstructs 




Production and Construction Corps 

Before the Cultural Revolution, the Production and Construc- 
tion Corps was a paramilitary organization of 3 to 4 million peo- 
ple under joint government, party, and PLA control. The 
Production and Construction Corps was used in remote and unpro- 
ductive areas to build roads, reclaim land, construct defense and 
water works, and operate mines, state farms, and industrial plants. 
A secondary role was border defense, and some units were armed 
with light infantry weapons. All received basic military training. 
Unlike the militia, Production and Construction Corps personnel 
were full time and uniformed. The PLA took over the Production 
and Construction Corps during the Cultural Revolution, then 
civilianized it in the 1970s. In the 1980s the corps appeared to have 
been abolished except in Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region. 
There it operated under regional party and government organiza- 
tions, the Xinjiang Military District, and the Ministry of Agricul- 
ture, Animal Husbandry, and Fishery. 

People's Armed Police Force 

The People's Armed Police Force was formed in 1983 when the 
PLA transferred its internal security and border defense units to 
the Ministry of Public Security (see Public Security Forces, ch. 13). 
In wartime, the armed police, as part of China's armed forces, 



592 



National Defense 



presumably would perform border defense and support functions 
in assisting the PLA. 

Accomplishments and Prospects 

Beginning in the late 1970s, China's military modernization pro- 
gram achieved success in increasing China's status as a regional 
power. The PLA disengaged itself from politics and concentrated 
its attention on military tasks. Reforms in organization, doctrine, 
education and training, and personnel practices brought the PLA 
much closer to its objective of molding a modern combat force capa- 
ble of waging combined-arms warfare. Defense science and industry 
became more closely integrated with their civilian counterparts and 
began producing more civilian goods in addition to modernizing 
PLA weaponry with foreign technology. Nevertheless, PLA capa- 
bilities still lagged behind advanced world levels, and the presence 
of potent adversaries on China's borders meant that defense mod- 
ernization would be a long-term program, probably lasting well 
into the next century. 

Beginning in the late 1970s, the volume of information published 
on the Chinese military increased greatly. Ellis Joffe's The Chinese 
Army After Mao provides a good introduction to military moderni- 
zation and changes in the PLA in the 1980s. The role of politics 
in PLA development is delineated in Harlan W. Jencks' From 
Muskets to Missiles; Harvey W. Nelsen's The Chinese Military System; 
and Monte R. Bullard's China's Political- Military Evolution. The 
Jencks and Nelsen books also contain valuable information on PLA 
organization and force structure in the early 1980s. The United 
States Defense Intelligence Agency's 1984 Handbook of the Chinese 
People's Liberation Army is another good source on PLA organiza- 
tion, equipment, and tactics. Various aspects of military reforms 
in defense policy, doctrine, training and education, defense indus- 
try, weapons modernization, and force structure are dealt with in 
The Chinese Defense Establishment, edited by Paul H. B. Godwin; 
Chinese Defence Policy, edited by Gerald Segal and William T. Tow; 
and China's Military Reforms, edited by Charles D. Lovejoy and 
Bruce W. Watson. These books also deal with the international 
implications of Chinese military power. China's involvement in 
foreign conflicts is covered in Segal's Defending China. Chinese mili- 
tary assistance and arms sales are treated in China and the Arms Trade 
by Anne Gilks and Segal. China as a Maritime Power by David G. 



593 



China: A Country Study 



Muller, and Eighth Voyage of the Dragon by Bruce Swanson provide 
good overviews of the PL A Navy. 

Articles on the Chinese military appear in the general, scholarly, 
and military periodical literature. Far Eastern Economic Review and 
Asiaweek offer the most articles among weekly news publications. 
China Quarterly, Asian Survey, and Problems of Communism feature 
occasional articles on the PLA. Useful military publications include 
Jane's Defence Weekly, Asian Defence Journal, International Defense Review , 
Aviation Week and Space Technology , and Flight International. (For fur- 
ther information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



594 



Appendix A 



Tabic 

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

2 Provincial-Level Units and Selected Urban Centers, Pinyin 

Form and Wade-Giles Form 

3 Selected Place-Names, Pinyin Form and Conventional Form 

4 Climatic Statistics for Twenty Selected Stations 

5 Age Structure, 1982 Census 

6 Population, 1953-87. Reconstructed Data Model 

7 Estimated Distribution of Population by Region, 1987 

8 Cities with Populations over 1 Million, 1982 

9 Size and Distribution of Minority Nationalities, 1982 

10 Number of Schools and Students, Selected Years, 1957-85 

1 1 Composition of Gross Value of Agricultural Output, Selected 

Years, 1955-85 

12 Manufactured Agricultural Inputs, Selected Years, 1955-85 

13 Grain Production and Per Capita Consumption of Selected 

Products, Selected Years, 1955-85 

14 Agricultural Exports and Imports, 1985 

15 Production, Use, and Import of Major Commodities, Selected 

Years, 1952-85 

16 Gross Value of Industrial Output, by Region, 1952, 1957, 

and 1983 

17 Composition of Trade, Selected Years, 1970-85 

18 Major Trading Partners, 1986 



595 



Appendix A 



Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 



When you know Multiply by To find 



Millimeters 0.04 inehes 

Centimeters 0.39 inehes 

Meters 3.3 feet 

Kilometers 0.62 miles 

Hectares (10,000 m 2 ) 2.47 acres 

Square kilometers 0.39 square miles 

Cubic meters 35.3 cubic feet 

Liters 0.26 gallons 

Kilograms 2.2 pounds 

Met rie tons 0.98 long tons 

' 1.1 short tons 

2,204 pounds 

Degrees Celsius 9 degrees Fahrenheit 

(Centigrade) divide by 5 

and add 32 



597 



China: A Country Study 



Table 2. Provincial-Level Units and Selected Urban Centers, 
Piny in Form and Wade-Giles Form 



Wadc-Gik 



Pimm 



Provincial-Level Units 



Anhui An-hui 

Beijing Pei-ching 

Fujian Fu-chien 

Gansu Kan-su 

Guangdong Kuang-tung 

Guangxi-Zhuang . . . Kuang-hsi-Chuang 

Gui/.hou Kui-chou 

Hcbei Ho-pei 

Heilongjiang Hei-lung-chiang 

Henan Ho-nan 

Hubei Hupci 

Hunan Hu-nan 

Jiangsu Chiang-su 

Jiangxi Chiang-hsi 

Jilin Chi-lin 

Liaoning Liao-ning 

Nei Monggol Nei-meng-ku 

Ningxia-Hui Ning-hsia-Hui 

Qinghai Ch'ing-hai 

Shaanxi Shcn-hsi 

Shandong Shan-tung 

Shanghai Shang-hai 

Shanxi Shan-hsi 

Sichuan Ssu-ch'uan 

Tianjin Tien-chin 

Xinjiang- Hsin-chiang- 

Uygur Wci-wu-crh 

Xizang Hsi-tsang 

Yunnan Yun-nan 

Zhcjiang Chc-chiang 



An-hui Anhui 

Chc-chiang Zhcjiang 

Chiang-hsi Jiangxi 

Chiang-su Jiangsu 

Chi-lin Jihn 

Ch'ing-hai Qinghai 



Fujian 

Heilongjiang 
Henan 
Hcbci 
Xinjiang 
Uvgur 



Fu-chien 

Hci-lung-chiang 

Ho-nan 

Ho-pci 

Hsin-chiang- 

Wci-wu-crh . 

Hsi-tsang . Xizang 

Hu-nan Hunan 

Hupci Hubci 

Kan-su Gansu 

Kuang-hsi- Guangxi- 

Chuang Zhuang 

Kuang-tung Guangdong 

Kui-chou Guizhou 

Liao-ning Liaoning 

Nei-mcng-ku Nei Monggol 

Ning-hsia-Hui Ningxia-Hui 

Pei-ching Beijing 

Shang-hai Shanghai 

Shan-hsi Shanxi 

Shan-tung Shandong 

Shcn-hsi Shaanxi 

Ssu-ch'uan Sichuan 

Tien-chin Tianjin 

Yun-nan Yunnan 



Selected Urban Centers 



Changchun Ch ang-ch un 

Chengdu Ch'eng-tu 

Chongqing Ch'ung-ch'ing 

Dalian Ta-lien 

Guangzhou Kuang-chou 

Harbin Ha-erh-pin 

Lucia* Lii-Ta 

Nanjing Nan-ching 

Qingdao Ch'ing-tao 

Shenyang Shen-yang 

Taiyuan T'ai-yuan 

Wuhan Wu-han 

Uriimqi Wu-lu-mu-ch'i 

Xi'an Hsi-an 

Yan'an Yen-an 



Ch'ang-ch'un Changchun 

Ch'eng-tu Chengdu 

Ch'ing-tao Qingdao 

Ch'ung-ch'ing Chongqing 

Ha-erh-pin Harbin 

Hsi-an Xi'an 

Kuang-chou Guangzhou 

Lii-Ta* Liida 

Nan-ching Nanjing 

Shcn-yang Shenyang 

T'ai-yuan Taiyuan 

Ta-lien Dalian 

Wu-han Wuhan 

Wu-lu-mu-ch'i .... Uriimqi 
Yen-an Yan'an 



ula/Lii-Ta comprises the twin 
ariant: Daircn). 



itics of Liishun/Lu-shun (variant: Port Arthur) and Dalian/Ta-lien 



Source: Based on information from United States Department of Interior, Board on Geo- 
graphic Names, Gazetteer of the People's Republic of China: Pinyin to Wade-Giles, Wade- 
Giles to Pinyin, Washington. July 1979. 



598 



Appendix A 



Table 3. Selected Place-Names, Pinyin Form and Conventional Form 



Pinvin* 



to Conventional 
Form 



Convemiona 



(o Pinvin* 



Beijing Peking 

Chang Jiang Yangtze River 

Da Hinggan Greater Khingan 

Ling Range 

Dongbei 

Pingyuan Manchurian Plain 

Ergun He Argun River 

Gangdise Shan .... Kailas Range 

Guangzhou Canton 

Guangxi-Zhuang Kwangsi-Chuang 

Zizhiqu Autonomous 

Region 

Heilong Jiang Amur River 

Huang He Yellow River 

Junggar Pendi Dzungarian Basin 

Karakorum 

Shankou Karakoram Pass 

Kunlun Shan Kunlun Mountains 

Laneang Jiang Mekong River 

Mu Us Shamo .... Ordos Desert 
Nei Monggol Inner Mongolian 

Zizhiqu Autonomous 

Region (Inner 
Mongolia 
Ningxia-Hui Ninghsia-Hui 

Zizhiqu Autonomous 

Region 

Nu Jiang Salween River 

Qaidam Pendi Tsaidam Basin 

Qingdao Tsingtao 

Qinghai Hu Koko Nor 

Qing-Zang 

Gaoyuan Tibet, Plateau of 

Qin Ling Tsinling 

Mountains 

Qiongzhou 

Haixia Hainan Strait 

Shantou Swatow 

Sichuan Pendi Szcchwan Basin 

Songhua Hu Sungari Reservoir 

Songhua Jiang Sungari River 

Taklimakan Takla Makan 

Shamo Desert 

Tarim He Tarim River 

Tarim Pendi Tarim Basin 

Tianjin Tientsin 

Tian Shan Tien Shan 

Tumen Jiang Tumen River 

Turpan Pendi Turfan Depression 

Wanli 

Changchcng Great Wall 

Wusuli Jiang Ussuri River 

Xiamen Amoy 



Amoy Xiamen 

Amur River Heilong Jiang 

Argun River Ergun He 

Brahmaputra Yarlung Zangbo 

River Ji an g 

Canton Guangzhou 

China, People's Zhonghua Rcnmin 

Republic of Gongheguo 

Dzungarian Basin . . Junggar Pendi 

Great' Wall Wanli 

Changchcng 
Greater Khingan Da Hinggan 

Range Ling 

Hainan Strait Qiongzhou Haixa 

Inner Mongolian 

Autonomous 

Region (Inner Nei Monggol 

Mongolia) Zizhiqu 

Kailas Range Gangdise Shan 

Karakoram Pass . . . Karakorum 
Shankou 

Kashgar Kashi 

Koko Nor Qinghai Hu 

Kunlun 

Mountains Kunlun Shan 

Kwangsi-Chuang 

Autonomous Guangxi-Zhuang 

Region Zizhiqu 

Lesser Khingan Xiao Hinggan 

Range Ling 

Manchurian Plain . . Dongbei 

Pingyuan 

Mekong River Laneang Jiang 

Ninghsia-Hui 

Autonomous Ningxia-Hui 
Region Zizhiqu 

Ordos Desert Mu Us Shamo 

Pearl River Zhu Jiang 

Peking Beijing 

Red River Yuan Jiang 

Salween 

River Nu Jiang 

Sinkiang-Uighur 

Autonomous Xinjiang-Uygur 
Region Zizhiqu 

Sungari 

Reservoir Songhua Hu 

Sungari River Songhua Jiang 

Swatow Shantou 

Szcchwan Basin .... Sichuan Pendi 
Takla Makan Taklimakan 

Desert Shamo 

Tarim Basin Tarim Pendi 



599 



China: A Country Study 



Table 3. — Continued. 



to Conventional 
Form 



Conventional 
Form 



to Pinyin* 



Xiao Hinggan Lesser Khingan 

Ling Range 

Xinjiang-Uygur Sinkiang Uighur 

Zizhiqu Autonomous 

Region 

Xizang Tibetan 

Zizhiqu Autonomous 

Region (Tibet) 

Yalu Jiang Yalu River 

Yarlung Brahmaputra 
Zangbo Jiang .... River 

Yuan Jiang Red River 

Zhonghua Renmin China, People's 

Gongheguo Republic of 

Zhu Jiang Pearl River 



Tarim River Tarim He 

Tibetan 

Autonomous Xizang 
Region (Tibet) . . . Zizhiqu 

Tibet, Plateau of ... Qing-Zang 
Gaoyuan 

Tien Shan Tian Shan 

Tientsin Tianjin 

Tsaidam Basin .... Qaidam Pcndi 

Tsingtao Qmgdao 

Tsinling 

Mountains Qin Ling 

Tumen River Tumen Jiang 

Turfan 

Depression Turpan Pendi 

Ussuri River Wusuli Jiang 

Yalu River Yalu Jiang 

Yangtze River Chang Jiang 

Yellow River Huang He 



*Including generic parts of Chinese place-names. 

Source: Based on information from United States Department of Interior, Board on Geo- 
graphic Names, Gazetteer of the People's Republic of China, Pinyin to Wade-Giles, Wade- 
Giles to Pinyin, Washington, July 1979, 915-16: 



600 



Appendix A 



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601 



China: A Country Study 



Table 5. Age Structure, 1982 Census 



Population Percentage 
Age-Group (in thousands)* of total* 



0-4 94,704 9.43 

5-9 1 10,736 1 1.03 

10-14 131,811 13.13 

15-19 125,366 12.49 

20-24 74,363 7.41 

25-29 92,564 9.22 

30-34 72,958 7.27 

35-39 54,222 5.40 

40-44 48,438 4.82 

45-49 47,403 4.72 

50-54 40,816 4.07 

55-59 33,894 3.38 

60-64 27,362 2.73 

65-69 21,260 2.12 

70-74 14,348 1.43 

75-79 8,617 0.86 

80-84 3,705 0.37 

85-89 1,088 0.11 

90 and over 257 0.03 



TOTAL 1,003,912 100.02 



* Approximate because of rounding. 

Source: Based on information from Zhongguo 1982 Nian Renkou Pucha Ziliao (Dianzi Jisuanji 
Huizong) [1982 Population Census of China (Results of Computer Tabulation)], 
Beijing, March 1985, 272-81. 



602 



Appendix A 



Table 6. Population, 1953-87. Reconstructed Data Model 







Crude 


Crude 


Rale of 


Total 




Infant 






Birth 


Death 


Natural 


Fertility 




Mortality 




Midyear 


Rate 


Rale 


Increase 


Rate 


1, ile- 


Rate 




Populat n >n 


(per 


(per 


(per 






filer 


w 


ir (thousands) ( 


hwusand) 


thousand) 


thousand) 


thousand) 


al Buth 


thousand) 


1 953 . 


584,191 


42.24 


25.77 


16.47 


6.05 


40.25 


175 


1954 . 


594,725 


43.44 


24.20 


19.24 


6.28 


42.36 


164 


1955 . 


606,730 


43.04 


22.33 


20.71 


6.26 


44.60 


154 


19.% . 


619,136 


39.89 


20.1 1 


19.78 


5.86 


46.99 


143 


1 957 . 


633,215 


43.25 


18.12 


25.13 


6.40 


49.54 


132 


1 958 . 


646,703 


37.76 


20.65 


17.1 1 


5.68 


45.82 


146 


1959 . 


654,349 


28.53 


22.06 


6.47 


4.31 


42.46 


160 


I960 . 


. . . . 650,661 


26.76 


44.60 


-17.84 


4.02 


24.56 


284 


1961 . 


644,670 


22.43 


23.01 


-0.58 


3.29 


38.44 


183 


1962 . 


653,302 ' 


41.02 


14.02 


27.00 


6.03 


53.00 


89 


1 963 . 


674,249 


49.79 


13.81 


35.98 


7.51 


54.91 


87 


1 964 . 


696,065 


40.29 


12.45 


27.84 


6.18 


57.08 


86 


1 965 . 


715,546 


38.98 


1 1.61 


27.37 


6.07 


57.81 


84 


1 966 . 


735,904 


39.83 


11.12 


28.71 


6.26 


58.59 


83 


1967 . 


755,320 


33.91 


10.47 


23.44 


5.32 


59.41 


82 


1 968 . 


" 776,153 


40.96 


10.08 


30.88 


6.45 


60.29 


81 


1 969 . 


798,641 


36.22 


9.91 


26.31 


5.73 


60.84 


76 


1970 . 


820,403 


36.98 


9.54 


27.44 


5.82 


61.41 


70 


1971 . 


842,456 


34.87 


9.24 


25.63 


5.45 


61.98 


65 


1972 . 


863,439 


32.45 


8.85 


23.60 


4.99 


62.55 


60 


1973 . 


883,020 


29.85 


8.58 


21.27 


4.54 


62.96 


56 


1974 . 


901,318 


28.08 


8.32 


19.76 


4.17 


63.37 


52 


1975 . 


917,899 


24.79 


8.07 


16.72 


3.58 


63.79 


49 


1976 . 


932,671 


23.05 


7.84 


15.21 


3.23 


64.21 


45 


1977 . 


946,100 


21.04 


7.65 


13.39 


2.85 


64.63 


41 


1978 . 


958,766 


20.73 


7.52 


13.21 


2.72 


65.06 


37 


1979 . 


.... 971,786 


21.37 


7.61 


13.76 


2.75 


64.98 


39 


1980 . 


983,379 


17.63 


7.65 


9.98 


2.24 


64.89 


42 


1981 . 


994,905 


21.04 


7.73 


13.31 


2.69 


64.80 


44 


1 982 . 


1,008,175 


21.09 


7.89 


13.20 


2.71 


64.72 


46 


1983 . 


1,020,722 


18.66 


7.93 


10.73 


2.28 


65.05 


42 


1984 . 


1,032,814 


17.52 


7.79 


9.73 


2.11 


65.46 


40 


1985 . 


1,043,203 


17.82 


7.72 


10.10 


2.12 


65.75 


39 


1986 . 


1,053,716 


17.43 


7.69 


9.74 


2.03 


65.99 


38 


1987 . 


1,064,147 


17.38 


7.65 


9.73 


2.00 


66.24 


37 


*Data ir 


i this tabic may vary 


from of fie 


ally reporte 


d statistics. 









Based on information from computer reconstruction provided by Judith Banister, 
China Branch, Center for International Research, U.S. Bureau of the Census, 
January 1987. 



603 



China: A Country Study 

Table 7. Estimated Distribution of Population by Region, 1987 











Density 






Population 


Area 


(people 


Region* 




(in 


(in square 


per square 


Provincial 


-Level Unit 


thousands) 


kilometers) 


kilometer) 



Northeast 

Heilongjiang 33,945 460,000 74 

jilin 23,230 180,000 129 

Liaoning 37,203 140,000 266 

North 

Beijing 10,200 16,807 607 

Hebei 56,364 180,000 313 

Nci Monggol 20,689 1,200,000 17 

Shanxi .7 26,724 150,000 178 

Tianjin 8,396 11,305 743 

Kast 

Anhui 52,225 130,000 402 

Fujian 27,708 120,000 231 

Jiangsu 62,622 100,000 626 

jiangxi 35,135 160,000 220 

Shandong 78,231 150,000 521 

Shanghai 12,323 6,185 1,992 

Zhcjiang 40,695 100,000 407 

Central-South 

Guangdong 63,987 210,000 305 

Guangxi .' 39,928 230,000 174 

Henan 78,440 160,000 490 

Hubei 49,802 180,000 277 

Hunan 57,229 210,000 272 

Southwest 

Guizhou 30,102 170,000 177 

Siehuan 103,201 570,000 181 

Xizang 2,062 1,200,000 2 

Yunnan 34,728 390,000 89 

Northwest 

Gansu 20,875 450,000 46 

Ningxia 4,266 60,000 71 

Qinghai 4,237 720,000 6 

Shaanxi 30,277 190,000 159 

Xinjiang 14,108 1,600,000 9 

* Regional divisions are tor descriptive purposes only and have no official administrative significance. 

Source: Based on information from China Handbook Editorial Committee. China Hand- 
book Series: Geography, Beijing, 1983, 131-253. 



604 



Appendix A 



Table 8. Cities with Population over 1 Million, 1982 



Total Population of Suburban 

Provincial- Population City Districts Population 

City Level Unit (in thousands)* (in thousands)* (in thousands)* 



Shanghai 


. . . Shanghai 


6,321 


6,321 





Beijing 


. . . Beijing 


5,598 


2,418 


3,180 


Tianjin 


. . . Tianjin 


5,143 


3,943 


1,999 


Shenyang 


. . . Liaoning 


4,003 


2,658 


1.345 




Hubei 


3,252 


2,624 


628 


Guangzhou . . . . 


. . . Guangdong 


3,148 


1,943 


1,205 


Chongqing .... 


. . . Sichuan 


2,634 


456 


2,179 


Harbin 


. . . Heilongjiang 


2,543 


2,543 





Chengdu 


. . . Sichuan 


2,467 


1,238 


1,229 


Zibo 


. . . Shandong 


2,232 


2,232 





Xi'an 


. . . Shaanxi 


2,197 


1,227 


969 


Nanjing 


. . . Jiangsu 


2,134 


1,206 


928 


Liupanshui .... 


. . . Guizhou 


2,090 


2,090 





Taivuan 


, . . Shanxi 


1,775 


1,240 


534 


Changchun .... 


. . . Jilin 


1,757 


1,307 


450 


Dalian 


. , , Liaoning 


1,479 


967 


512 


Zhengzhou .... 


. . . Hcnan 


1,428 


900 


527 


Kunming 


. . . Yunnan 


1,426 


581 


845 


Lanzhou 


. . . Gansu 


1,416 


1,183 


234 


Jinan 


. . . Shandong 


1,338 


876 


462 


Tangshan 


Hebei 


1,338 


1,338 





Guivang 


. . . Guizhou 


1,319 


740 


579 






1,270 


1,270 





Zaozhuang . . . . 


-do- 


1,238 


1,238 







. . . Jiangxi 


1,225 


265 


960 


Qiqihar 


. . . Heilongjiang 


1 ,224 


1,224 





Anshan 


. . . Liaoning 


1,214 


888 


326 


Fushun 


-do- 


1,193 


1,050 


142 


Hangzhou . . . . 


. . . Zhejiang 


1,192 


1,192 





Qjngdao 


. . . Shandong 


1,174 


1,174 





Fuzhou 


. . . Fujian 


1,129 


787 


342 


Shaoxing 


. . . Zhejiang 


1,107 


134 


973 


Jilin 


. . . jilin 


1,079 


804 


275 


Changsha 


. . . Hunan 


1,076 


834 


243 


Baotou 


. . . Nci Monggol 


1,070 


1,070 





Shijiazhuang . . 


Hebei 


1,066 


1,066 







. . . Jiangxi 


1,061 


832 


230 


Huainan 


. . . Anhui 


1,025 


1,025 






d.o. — ditto 

* Approximate because of rounding. 



Source: Based on information from Zhongguo 1982 Nian Renkou Pucha Ziliao (Dianzi Jisuanji 
Huizong) [1982 Population Census of China (Results of Computer Tabulation)], 
Beijing, March 1985, 64-85. 



605 



China: A Country Study 

Table 9. Size and Distribution of Minority Xationalities, 1982 

Minority Approximate 

Nationality Population Major Areas of Distribution 



Zhuang 13,400,000 Guangxi-Zhuang Autonomous Region: Yunnan. 

Guangdong. Guizhou provinces 
Hui 7,200,000 Xingxia-Hui Autonomous Region: Gansu, Henan. 

Qinghai, Yunnan. Hcbci. Shandong provinces; 

Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region 
Uygur 6,000,000 Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region: Hunan 

Province 

Yi 5,500,000 Yunnan, Sichuan. Guizhou provinces: Guangxi- 

Zhuang Autonomous Region 

Miao 5,000,000 Guizhou. Hunan. Yunnan. Sichuan provinces: 

Guangxi-Zhuang Autonomous Region 

Manchu 4,300,000 Liaoning. Heilongjiang. Jilin. Hcbci provinces; Nci 

Monggol Autonomous Region: Beijing Munici- 
pality 

Zang (Tibetan) . . . 3.800,000 Xizang Autonomous Region; Sichuan. Qinghai. 

Gansu provinces 

Mongolian 3,400,000 Nei Monggol Autonomous Region: Liaoning 

Province: Xinjiang-Uvgur Autonomous Region 

Tujia 2,800.000 Hubei. Hunan. Sichuan provinces 

Buyi 2,100,000 Guizhou Province 

Korean 1.800.000 Jihn. Heilongjiang. Liaoning provinces 

Dong 1.400.000 Guizhou. Hunan provinces: Guangxi-Zhuang 

Autonomous Region 

Yao 1.400.000 Guangxi-Zhuang Autonomous Region; Hunan. 

Yunnan. Guangdong provinces 

Bai 1,100,000 Yunnan Province 

Hani 1,100,000 -do- 

Kazak 900,000 Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region 

Li 890.000 Guangdong. Guizhou provinces 

Dai 840,000 Yunnan Province 

Lisu 480,000 -do- 
She 370.000 Fujian. Zhejiang provinces 

Lahu 300,000 Yunnan Province 

Va 300,000 -do- 

Shui 290,000 Guizhou Province 

Dongxiang 280.000 Gansu Province: Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous 

Region 

Naxi 250,000 Yunnan Province 

Tu 160,000 Qinghai Province 

Kirgiz 114.000 Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region 

Qiang 100,000 Sichuan Province 

Daur 95,000 Xei Monggol Autonomous Region: Heilongjiang 

Province 

Jingpo 93,000 Yunnan Province 

Mulao 90.000 Guangxi-Zhuang Autonomous Region 

Xibe 84.000 Liaoning Province: Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous 

Region 



606 



Appendix A 



Table 9. — Continued. 



Minority Approximate 
Nationality Population Major Areas of Distribution 



Salar 69,000 Qinghai, Gansu provinces 

Bulang 58,000 Yunnan Province 

Gelao 54,000 Guizhou Province 

Maonan 38.000 Guangxi-Zhuang Autonomous Region 

Tajik 27,000 Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region 

Pumi 24,000 Yunnan Province 

Nu 23,000 -do- 

Achang 20,000 -do- 

Ewcnki 19,000 Nei Monggol Autonomous Region; Hcilongjiang 

Province 

Jing 13,000 Guangxi-Zhuang Autonomous Region: Guizhou, 

Guangdong provinces 

Bcnglong 12,000 Yunnan Province 

Uzbek 12,000 Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region 

Jinuo 12,000 Yunnan Province 

Yugur 11 ,000 Gansu Province 

Baoan 9,000 -do- 

Drung 4,600 Yunnan Province 

Tartar 4,100 Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region 

Oroqcn 4,100 Nei Monggol Autonomous Region; Hcilongjiang 

Province 

Russian 2,900 Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region 

Gaoshan 1,700 Fujian, Guizhou provinces 

Hezhe 1,500 Hcilongjiang Province 

Moinba 1,140 Xizang Autonomous Region 

Lhoba 1,100 -do- 
Other 800,000 Guizhou, Yunnan provinces 



d.o. — ditto 

Source: Based on information from Zhongguo 1982 Nian Renkou Pucha Ziliao (Dianzi Jisuanji 
Huizong) [1982 Population Census of China (Results of Computer Tabulation)], 
Beijing, March 1985, 218-31. 



607 



China: A Country Study 
Table 10. Number of Schools and Students, Selected Years, 1957-85 



Kind of School 1957 1965 1975 1985 



Number of schools 



Institutions of higher 



learning 1 


229 


434 


387 


1,016 


Secondary schools 

Regular 

Technical 

Agricultural and 

vocational 


11,096 
728 
592 

. . n.a. 


18,102 
871 
394 

61,626 


123,505 
1,326 
887 

n.a. 


93,221 
2,529 
1 028 

28,070 


Total secondary 

schools 


12,474 2 


80,993 


125,718 


104,848 


Primary schools 


547,306 


1,681,939 


1,093,317 


832,309 


Kindergartens 


16,420 


19,226 


171,749 


172,262 


Schools for blind and 

for deaf students 


66 


266 


246 


350 


umber of students i 










Institutions ol higher 

learning 1 


44.1 


67.4 


50.1 


170.3 


C 1 „„1 1„ 

secondary schools 

Regular 

Technical 

Teacher training 

Agricultural and 

vocational 


628.1 
48.2 
29.6 

n.a. 


933.8 
39.2 
15.5 

443.3 


4,466.1 
40.5 
30.2 

n.a. 


4,706.0 
101.3 

55.8 

229.5 


Total secondary 

schools 


708.1 2 


1,431.8 


4,536.8 


5,092.6 


Primary schools 


6,428.3 


11,620.9 


15,094.1 


13,370.2 


Kindergartens 


108.8 


171.3 


620.0 


1,479.7 


Schools for blind and 

for deaf students 


0.8 


2.3 


2.7 


3.8 



n.a. — nol available. 

1 Institutions of higher learning include colleges and universities, professional colleges, and scientific 
research institutions. They do not include adult education, spare-time colleges, or correspondence schools. 
- Total as provided in original source. 
1 Tens of thousands. 



Source: Based on information from China, State Statistical Bureau, Statistical Yearbook of 
China, 1986. Oxford, New York, Tokyo: Oxford University Press, 1986, 623, 626. 



608 



Appendix A 



Table 11. Composition of Gross Value of Agricultural Output, 
Selected Years, 1955-85 
(in percentage) 



Snior 1955 1965 1975 1985 



Crops . 81.8 75.8 72.5 49.8 

Livestock 12.2 14.0 14.0 14.5 

Forestry 1.2 2.0 2.9 3.8 

Fishery 0.4 1.7 1.5 1.8 

Sideline production 4.4 6.5 9.1 30.1 



TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 



Source: Based on information from China, State Statistical Bureau. Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian 
(China Statistical Yearbook), Beijing, 1985 and 1986, various pages. 



Table 12. Manufactured Agricultural Inputs, Selected Years, 1955-85 



Item Unit 1955 1965 1975 1985 



Chemical Fertilizer 

Production 

Use 


thousands of tons 
thousands of tons 


255 
200 


1,726 
1,942 


5,247 
5,369 


13,350 
17,758 


Tractors 

Large 

Small 


thousands 
thousands 


5 


73 
4 


345 
599 


864 
3,810 


Rural electrical 
power 


millions of 

kilowatt hours 


104 


3,710 


18,310 


51,200 


Chemical pesticides 
production 


thousands of tons 


26 


193 


422 


205 



means negligible 



Source: Based on information from United States, Department of Agriculture, Economic 
Research Service, Agricultural Statistics of the People's Republic of China, 1949-82, Statisti- 
cal Bulletin No. 714. October 1984, 29-34; and China, State Statistical Bureau. 
Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian (China Statistical Yearbook), Beijing, 1986. 147-49. 



609 



China: A Country Study 

Table 13. Grain Production and Per Capita Consumption 
of Selected Products, Selected Years, 1955-85 

19. r >. r > 1 1965 1975 198") 



Grain Production 2 



Wheat 


22,965 


25.220 


45,310 


85.810 




78.025 


87.720 


1 25,560 


168.857 


r • 


20. .'"520 


23,660 


47,220 


63.830 




9,529 


7. 100 


1 0. 7.50 


5,610 




10,276 


6,200 


7. 1 50 


5.980 




1 ^ 1 90 


1 o ft^n 
j y ,oou 


Zo.J / 1 1 


na run 


Soybeans 


9,120 


6,140 


7,240 


10.509 


Other 


18.580 


18.625 


12.765 


12,474 


Total strain production .... 


183,935 


194.525 


284.565 


379.1 10 


Vr capita consumption ; 










Grain 


195.0 


183.0 


190.0 


254.0 


Edible oil 


2.2 


1.7 


1.7 


5.1 


Pork 


4.9 


6.3 


7.6 


14.0 


Beef and mutton 


1.0 


1.0 


0.7 


1.3 




0.5 


0.4 


0.4 


1.6 


Eggs 


1.2 


1.4 


1.6 


5.0 


Aquatic products 


4.0 


3.3 


3.3 


4.9 




1.1 


1.7 


2.3 


5.6 


Total per capita consumption 


274.7 


198.8 


209.6 


291.5 


KsiimaU'. 










Thousands ol ions. 










Kilograms. 










>ourcc: Based on information from China, State Statistical Bureau 


Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian 


(China Statistical Yearboo 


k). Beijing, 1986. 









610 



Appendix A 



Table 14. Agricultural Exports and Imports, 1985 
(in millions of United States dollars) 

Value 



Exports 



Textile fibers 1,163 

Fresh and frozen meat 987 

Fruits and vegetables 984 

Grain 782 

Coffee, tea, and spices 524 

Oilseed and nuts 502 

Crude animal and vegetable materials 494 

Live animals 329 

Other 747 

Total exports 6,512 

Imports 

Textile fibers 1,576 

Grain 1 ,050 

Wood 647 

Crude rubber 315 

Sugar 216 

Tobacco 201 

Other 655 

Total imports 4,660 



Source: Based on information from United States Central Intelligence Agency, China: 
International Trade, Fourth Quarter, 1985, Research Paper, No. EA CIT 86-001 . July 
1986, 8-11. 



Table 15. Production, Use, and Import of Major Commodities, 
Selected Years, 1952-85 
(in millions of tons) 



Grain Cotton Chemical Fertilizer Grain 
Year Output Output Use Imports 



1952 161 1.3 0.078 0.0 

1957 191 1.6 0.373 0.2 

1965 195 2.1 1.942 6.4 

1970 240 2.3 4.266* 5.4 

1975 275 2.4 5.369 3.7 

1980 321 2.7 12.694 13.4 

1985 379 4.2 17.758 5.7 



* Estimate. 

Source: Based on information from China, State Statistical Bureau, Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian 
(China Statistical Yearbook), Beijing, 1981-86, various pages; and Zhongguo Nongye 
Nianjian (China Agricultural Yearbook), Beijing, 1980-86, various pages. 



611 



China: A Country Study 



Table 16. Gross Value of Industrial Output, by Region, 

1952, 1957 and 1983 
(in millions oi 1952 yuan) 1 



Region - 

Provincial-Level Unit 1952 19. r >7 1983 :i 1983 1 



Northeast 

Heilongjiang 1,189 3,930 34,406 28,850 

Jilin 1,102 2,378 24,704 16,507 

Liaoning 4,523 1 1,710 71,549 51,664 

Total northeast 6,814 18,018 130,659 97,021 



North 

Beijing 825 2,300 39,954 25,060 

He'bei 1,342 2,805 33,660 25,269 

Nei Monggol 192 757 9,195 7,534 

Shanxi . . 643 1,832 19,055 15,187 

Tianjin 1,836 4,300 34,830 22,920 

Total north 4,838 11,994 136,694 95,970 



East 

Anhui 628 1,501 20,348 16,069 

Fujian 414 1,224 13,276 9,581 

Jiangsu 2,584 4,553 81,970 56,945 

Jiangxi 575 1,173 13,945 10,620 

Shandong 2,091 4,068 53,625 40,558 

Shanghai 6,510 12,969 102,629 67,858 

Zhcjiang 1,099 2,374 37,783 26,81 1 

Total east 13,901 27,862 323,576 228,442 



Central-South 

Hcnan 881 1,705 31,033 23,664 

Hubei 955 2,799 43,268 31,266 

Hunan 770 1,819 28,574 29,586 

Guangdong 1,745 3,812 44,016 30,594 

Guangxi 343 798 12,585 9,488 

Total central-south 4,694 10,933 159,476 124,598 



612 



Appendix A 



Table 16. — Continued. 



Region 2 

Provincial-Level Unit 1952 1957 1983 4 1983 1 



Southwest 

Guizhou ' 269 605 8,569 6,223 

Sichuan 1,649 4,873 46,706 33,997 

Xizang --- 10 154 130 

Yunnan 333 1,101 11,270 8,916 

Total southwest 2,251 6,589 66,699 49,266 



Northwest 

Gansu 230 560 12,132 8,811 

Ningxia •: 10 25 2,145 1,612 

Qinghai 837 101 1,928 1,427 

Shaanxi 381 1,263 18,538 12,945 

Xinjiang 175 446 5,947 5,349 

Total northwest 1,633 2,395 40,690 30,144 



Total 34,031 77,791 857,797 599,232 



means negligible. 

1 For value of yuan — see Glossary. 

- Regional divisions are for descriptive purposes only and have no official administrative significance. 
' Actual. 

1 To make (he shares of output comparable and the output indexes measure real growth, the data for 
198!! are converted from 1980 prices to 1952 prices by deflating the output of industrial branches of 
industry within each provincial-level unit by the national price indexes for the respective branches. 

Source: Based on information from Robert Michael Field, "China: The Changing Struc- 
ture of Industry," pages 526-27, in United States Congress, 99th, 2d Session, Joint 
Economic Committee, ed., China's Economy Looks Toward the Year 2000, 1: The Four 
Modernizations, Washington, 1986. 



613 



China: A Country Study 



Table 17. Composition of Trade, Selected Years, 1970-85 1 
(in percentage) 

1970 1975 1980 1985 



Exports 

Food and live animals 

Beverages and tobacco 

Crude materials (including 

textiles, fibers, and wastes) . 
Petroleum and petroleum 

products 

Edible oils 

Chemicals 

Manufactured goods (including 

finished textiles and iron 

and steel products) 

Machinery and transport 

equipment 

Miscellaneous manufactures . 
Other 

Total exports 2 



30.6 


28.7 


17.0 


12.5 


0.9 


1.1 


0.6 


0.4 


17.6 


11.8 


9.6 


9.4 


2.8 


14.4 


23.3 


23.0 


1.2 


0.8 


0.4 


4.2 


5.3 


5.0 


6.2 


5.1 


27.4 


23.1 


23.3 


19.8 


3.5 


3.6 


3.2 


3.8 


10.4 


11.2 


15.9 


21.3 


0.2 


0.4 


0.3 


4.2 


99.9 


100.1 


99.8 


103.7 



Imports 





16.1 


11.9 


14.8 


4.1 


Crude materials (excluding 










fuels) 


1 1.5 


10.7 


17.2 


8.4 


Petroleum and petroleum 












2.0 


1.9 


0.9 


1.3 


Edible oils 


0.2 


0.6 


0.9 


1.3 




15.2 


11.9 


11.3 


9.3 


Manufactured goods (including 










iron and steel products) 


33.7 


32.1 


23.7 


27.5 


Machinery and transportation 












19.8 


29.4 


27.7 


41.5 




1.2 


1.1 


2.5 


6.2 


Other 




0.4 


0.9 


1.5 




97.7 


100.0 


99.9 


101.1 



- - - means negligible. 
1 Free on board. 

- Totals do no! add to 100 percent because of rounding. 



Source: Based on information from United States Central Intelligence Agency, Handbook 
of Economic Statistics, 1986, September 1986, 106-107. 



614 



Appendix A 



Table 18. Major Trading Partners, 1986 



lYircnlagv of Trade 



Kxports 



Hong Kong 31.6 

Japan 15.3 

United Slates 8.5 

United Kingdom 4.6 

Soviet Union 4.0 

Singapore 3.9 

Jordan 3.4 

West Germany 3.3 

Netherlands 1.5 

Poland 1.5 

Other 22.4 

Total exports 100.0 

Imports 

Japan . . 28.9 

Hong Kong 13.1 

United States 10.8 

West Germany 8.4 

Soviet Union 3.4 

Australia 3.2 

Italy 2.6 

United Kingdom 2.3 

Canada . 2.3 

France 1.7 

Other 23.3 

Total imports 100.0 



Source: Based on information I'rom China, General Administration of Customs, Chinese 
Customs Statistics, No. 1 (1987) [Hong Kong], April 1987, table 4, in Business China 
[Hong Kong], June 22, 1987, 92. ' 



615 



Appendix B 



( :hn>nolos>y and I .isis 

1 Chronology of Chinese Communist Party National Party Con- 

gresses and Plenums, 1921-87 

2 Selected Foreign-Trade Corporations and Enterprises, 1987 

3 Government Organizations, 1987 

4 Diplomatic Relations, 1949-87 



617 



Appendix B 



Table 1 . Chronology of Chinese National Party Congresses 
and Plenums, 1921-87 



Congr 



Signifi 



First 



Shanghai First July 1921 Attended by thirteen 

representatives; elected 
general secretary and 
three-man Central 
Bureau; developed 
general political pro- 
gram. Mao Zedong 
recording secretary. 
Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) had fifty- 
seven members. 



Second 

Shanghai First July 1922 Adopted concept of dem- 

ocratic centralism (sec 
Glossary), elected Cen- 
tral Executive Commit- 
tee (in 1927 shortened 
to Central Committee), 
and decided to join 
Comintern (see Glos- 
sary). Accepted united 
front with Guomin- 
dang, although opposed 
by some, as temporary 
expedient to combat 
warlords and foreign 
imperialism. Party 
grew to 123 members. 



Third 

Guangzhou First June 1923 Under Comintern pres- 

sure, formally sanc- 
tioned united-front 
policy made CCP 
members concurrently 
Guomindang members. 
Tension built as CCP 
attempted to fulfill con- 
flicting goals of na- 
tional and social 
revolutions. Party had 
432 members in 1923. 



619 



China: A Country Study 



Table 1. — Continued. 

Congress 

Location Plenum Date Significance 

Fourth 

Shanghai First January 1925 CCP's activist role in 

Beijing Second October 1925 labor and peasant cir- 

Bcijing Third July 1926 cles augmented by ex- 



plosive anti-imperialist 
social movements. 
Growing CCP influ- 
ence increased strains 
in united front. Secre- 
tariat established to 
handle documentation 
and communications. 
Party had 950 mem- 
bers by 1925. 

Fifth 

Wuhan First April-May 1927 Elected CCP's first 

Political Bureau. Ten- 
sions mounted within 
party over concessions 
to maintain united 
front. After abandon- 
ment of united front 
policy in mid-July, the 
August 7 Emergency 
Conference elected 
new party leadership, 
emphasized tight orga- 
nization and party dis- 
cipline, and called for 
armed struggle against 
Guomindang. Over 
10,000 party members 
on rolls. 



620 



Appendix B 



Table 1. — Continued. 



Congress 

Location Plenum Date Significance 



Sixth 



Moscow First June-July 1928 Conflict arose among 

Shanghai Second November 1929 leaders concerning 

Shanghai Third September 1930 proper course for the 

Shanghai Fourth January 1931 Chinese revolution: 

Ruijin Fifth January 1934 revolutionary move- 

Yan'an Sixth October 1938 ment responsive to 

Yan'an Seventh April 1945 local— mainly rural- 



conditions; urban revo- 
lution; or strict adher- 
ence to Moscow's 
instructions. Mao 
Zedong, a leader in 
rural-oriented group, 
emerged dominant by 
1935, bolstered by his 
military skill during the 
Long March (1934- 
35). Mao Zedong 
Thought formally 
adopted at the Seventh 
Plenum. The Sino- 
Japanese War (1937- 
45) and the concomi- 
tant second united 
front with Guomindang 
against Japan became 
sources of inner-party 
tension. Party grew 
from 40,000 in 1928 to 
1.2 million by 1945. 



Seventh 



Yan'an First April-June 1945 Part y Constitution of 

Xibaipo Second March 1949 1945- stressed greater 

Beijing Third June 1950 centralism. After defeat 

Beijing Fourth February 1954 of the Guomindang 

Beijing Fifth April 1955 and establishment of 

Beijing Sixth October 1955 the People's Republic 

Beijing Seventh September 1956 of China in October 



on indoctrination, rec- 
tification, and mass 
campaigns was supple- 
mented with economic 
recovery and consolida- 
tion programs. Focus 
of party work shifted 
from countryside to cit- 
ies. Party membership 
totaled 10.2 million by 
1956. 



621 



China: A Country Study 
Table 1. — Continued. 



Congress 



Location 


Plenum 


Date 


Signilicance 


Eighth [First Session] 




September 1956 




_ .. 


r irst 


oeptember lyjo 


\A A A " 

IVlao advocated strug" 




Second 


novtmuei i j ju 


gle between the two 


Beijing 


Third 


SfT^r fin r»f» r — 


o o n o q 1 r~\ (j 1 1 npp ranin 






October 1957 


communization and 


Rpi iin(j 


Fourth 


May 1958 


continuing revolution 








which he favored and 


fC A C 1 

[oecond oessionj 




IV! a v IQ^R 
lvidy i jjo 


central planning, rcli- 








dllCC <Jll p<iiiy ui gain 


• 

Beijing 


Fifth 


IVldy 1 .7 JO 


zations and limited 


Wuchang 


Sixth 


November— 


individual incentives. 






Fiprpmnrr 


' 1 n f* Tailiirf 1 of rnp 

1 11C IdllLllC Ul lli 1 - 






1958 


Great Leap Forward 




Seventh 


April 1959 


(1956-60) led to a 


Lushan 


Eighth 


August 1959 


temporary ascendancy 


Beijing 


Ninth 


January 1961 


of Liu Shaooji, Deng 




Tenth 


Sentemher 1962 


Yiannincr and othpr^ 


Rpi nnrr 


Eleventh 


August 1966 


who stressed planned 


Beijing 


Twelfth 


Ortrihrr 1 QfiR 
V^/CLUUCI 1 J7UO 


development. In re- 








ennn^p \/| o o turnpH to 

ofJUllot., lvlaU IU1 11CU IU 








Lin Biao who was 








hinlnmo' z\ Pf^oolf* q 
uuiiLiiiig a. r cupic J> 








Liberation Arriiy 








(PLA) power base, 








and reverted to fac- 








tionalism, calling his 








opponents "revision- 








ists." The ensuing 








Cultural Revolution 








(1966-76) eventually 








required the PLA to 








restore stability be- 








cause party and state 



organizations had been 
disrupted. CCP mem- 
bership reached 20 
million by 1966. 



622 



Appendix B 



Table 1. — Continued. 



Congress 
Location 



Plenum 



Date 



Significance 



Ninth 



Beijing 
Lushan 



First 
Second 



April 1969 
September 1970 



Party constitution of 
1969 named Lin Biao 
as Mao's successor. 
Mao continued as 
chairman with Lin as 
vice chairman. Mao 
Zedong Thought ex- 
tolled. New Central 
Committee included 
45 percent military 
representation (27 per- 
cent on the Eighth 
Central Committee). 
Political outcome was 
to empower three fac- 
tions: the Maoists; 
administrators around 
Zhou Enlai; and the 
PLA around Lin Biao. 
After Lin's 1971 at- 
tempted coup, PLA 
influence was reduced. 
Party membership was 
28 million by 1973. 



Tenth 



Beijing First August 1973 

Beijing Second January 1975 

Beijing Third July 1977 



Zhou's Enlai 's policies 
strengthened with 
rehabilitation of purged 
leaders, notably Deng 
Xiaoping. After Zhou's 
death (January 1976), 
tensions increased. 
Mao's death in Sep- 
tember 1976 precipi- 
tated open confron- 
tation. Hua Guofeng, 
Mao's successor, 
arrested the Gang of 
Four and attempted to 
consolidate his position. 
But by July 1977, Hua 
faced a challenge from 
Deng Xiaoping, who 
regained all his posts at 
the Third Plenum. 
Party members in- 
creased to 35 million in 
1977. 



623 



China: A Country Study 



Table 1. — Continued. 



Congress 

Location Plenum Date Significance 



Eleventh 

Beijing First August 1977 Hua Guofeng continued 

Beijing Second February 1978 party chairman. New 

Beijing Third December 1978 party constitution of 

Beijing Fourth September 1979 1977 approved. Deng 

Beijing Fifth February 1980 Xiaoping confirmed as 

Beijing Sixth June 1981 party vice chairman, 



giving him a platform 
from which to advo- 
cate reform. Hua's 
links to the Maoist 
legacy undercut his 
ability to lead, and at 
the Third Plenum, 
Deng's practical 
approach set the CCP 
on a course of reform 
instead of class strug- 
gle. Deng's forces 
assumed command 
with the rise of Zhao 
Ziyang and Hu Yao- 
bang; reassessment of 
Mao's role preserved 
Mao Zedong Thought 
but condemned his 
mistakes in later years. 
Hua's resignation as 
party chairman was 
accepted and Hu 
Yaobang became 
chairman, as well as 
secretary general of 
the restored Secre- 
tariat. Party ranks 
increased to 40 million 
by 1981. 



624 



Appendix B 



Table 1. — Continued. 



Congress 

Location Plenum Date Significance 



Twelfth 

Beijing First September 1982 With emphasis on collec- 

Beijing Second October 1983 tive leadership, the new 

Beijing Third October 1984 party constitution of 

Beijing Fourth September 1985 1982 abolished the post 

Beijing Fifth September 1985 of party chairman. 

Beijing Sixth September 1986 Deng further consoli- 



dated the reform lead- 
ership's position with 
high-level appointments 
and retirements of 
party veterans to new 
Central Advisory Com- 
mission. Party rectifica- 
tion and key urban 
economic reforms initi- 
ated. Additional elderly 
leaders retired and 
younger, better edu- 
cated ones elevated at 
September 18-23, 1985 
National Conference of 
Party Delegates. Hu 
Yaobang demoted at 
enlarged Political 
Bureau meeting in 
January 1987 for fail- 
ing to control student 
demonstrations and 
thereby undermining 
party discipline and 
predominance. Party 
membership reached 46 
million by 1987. 



625 



China: A Country Study 



Table 2. Selected Foreign- Trade Corporations and Enterprises, 1987 

Corporation Subordinate to 

China Electronics Import and Export Corpora- 
tion (CEIEC) Ministry of Electronics Industry 

China Light Industrial Corporation for Foreign 
Economic and Technical Cooperation 

(LIGHTIND) Ministry of Light Industry 

China National Aero-Technology Import and 

Export Corporation (CATIC) Ministry of Astronautics 

China National Agricultural Machinery Import State Machine-Building Industry 

and Export Corporation (AGRIMEX) Commission 

China National Arts and Crafts Import and Ministry of Foreign Economic 

Export Corporation (ARTCHINA) Relations and Trade 

China National Cereals, Oils, and Foodstuffs 

Import and Export Corporation Ministry of Foreign Economic 

(CEROILFOOD) Relations and Trade 

China National Chemicals Import and Export Ministry of Foreign Economic 

Corporation (SINOCHEM) Relations and Trade 

China National Foreign Trade Transportation 

Import and Export Corporation Ministry of Foreign Economic 

(SINOTRANS) Relations and Trade 

China National Import and Export Corporation Ministry of Foreign Economic 

of Medical Health Products (MEHECO) . . . Relations and Trade 

China National Instrument Import and Export Ministry of Foreign Relations 

Corporation (INSTRIMPEX) and Trade 

China National Light Industrial Products 

Import and Export Corporation Ministry of Foreign Economic 

(INDUSTRY) Relations and Trade 

China National Machinery and Equipment 

Import and Export Corporation State Machine-Building Industry 

(EQUIMPEX) Commission 

China National Machinery Import and Export Ministry of Foreign Economic 

Corporation (MACHIMPEX) Relations and Trade 

China National Metallurgical Import and Ministry of Metallurgical 

Export Corporation (CMIEC) Industry 

China National Metals and Minerals Import 

and Export Corporation Ministry of Foreign Economic 

(MINMETALS) Relations and Trade 

China National Native Produce and Animal 

Byproducts Import and Export Corporation Ministry of Foreign Economic 

(CHINATUHSU) Relations and Trade 



626 



Appendix B 



Table 2. — Continued. 

Corporation 

China National Offshore Oil Corporation 

(CNOOC) 

China National Packaging Import and Export 
Corporation (CHINAPACK) 

China National Publications Import and Export 
Corporation (PUBIMPORT) 

China National Seed Corporation (CNSC) 

China National Technical Import and Export 
Corporation (TECHIMPORT) 

China National Textiles Import and Export 
Corporation (CHINATEX) 

China Northern Industrial Corporation 

(NORINCO) 

China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation 
(CNIEC) 

China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) . . 

China Oriental Scientific Instruments Import 
and Export Corporation (ASCHI) 

China Petrochemical Corporation 

(SINOPEC) 

China Scientific Instruments and Materials 
Corporation (CSMIC) 

China State Shipbuilding Corporation 

(CSSC) 

Great Wall Industrial Corporation (GWIC) . . . 



Subordinate to 



Ministry of Petroleum Industry 

Ministry of Foreign Economic 
Relations and Trade 

State Science and Technology 
Commission 

Ministry of Agriculture, Animal 
Husbandry, and Fishery 

Ministry of Foreign Economic 
Relations and Trade 

Ministry of Foreign Economic 
Relations and Trade 

State Machine-Building Industry 
Commission 



Ministry of Nuclear Industry 
Ministry of Communications 



Chinese Academy of Sciences 



State Council 

State Science and Technology 
Commission 



State Council 

Ministry of Astronautics 



627 



China: A Country Study 



Table 3. Government Organizations, 1987* 



Leading Groups 



Central Job Titles Reform 
Commodity Prices 
Electronics Industry Invigoration 
Enterprise Consolidation 
Foreign Funds and Management 
General Survey of China's Industry 



Nationwide "Safety Month" Activities 
Nuclear Power Plants 
Rural Energy Development 
Science and Technology 
Sea, Land, and Air Ports 



Ministries 



Aeronautics 

Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, and 

Fishery 
Astronautics 
Chemical Industry 
Civil Affairs 
Coal Industry 
Commerce 
Communications 
Culture 

Electronics Industry 

Finance 

Foreign Affairs 

Foreign Economic Relations and Trade 
Forestry 

Geology and Minerals 
Justice 



Labor and Personnel 

Light Industry 

Metallurgical Industry 

National Defense 

Nuclear Industry 

Petroleum Industry 

Posts and Telecommunications 

Public Health 

Public Security 

Radio, Cinema, and Television 

Railways 

State Security 

Supervision 

Textile Industry 

Urban and Rural Construction and 

Environmental Protection 
Water Resources and Electric Power 



Commissions 

National Defense Science, Technology, State Nationalities 

and Industry State Planning 

State Economic State Physical Culture and Sports 

State Education State Restructuring of Economic System 

State Family Planning State Science and Technology 
State Machine-Building Industry 



628 



Appendix B 



Table 3. — Continued. 



Agencies 



Auditing Administration 

China Council for the Promotion of 

International Trade 
China Shipping Inspection Bureau 
China Travel and Tourism Bureau 
China Welfare Fund 
Foreign Experts Bureau 
General Administration of Civil Aviation 
General Administration of Customs 
Nuclear Safety Administration 
Press and Publications Administration 
Religious Affairs Administration 
State Administration of Exchange 

Control 
State Archives Bureau 
State Building Materials Industry 

Administration 
State Commodities Prices General 

Administration 



State Environmental Protection Bureau 
State Import and Export Commodities 

Inspection Administration 
State Materials and Equipment Bureau 
State Meteorological Administration 
State Oceanography Bureau 
State Patent Bureau 
State Pharmaceutical Administration 
State Seismological Administration 
State Standardization Bureau 
State Statistical Bureau 
State Supplies Bureau 
State Tobacco Monopoly Administration 
State Weights and Measures Bureau 
Trade Mark Bureau 
Xinhua (New China) News Agency 



Offices 



Central Greening Commission 
China Rural Development Research 
Center 

Chinese Olympic Committee 
Counselors Office 

Economic Legislation Research Center 
Economic, Technological, and Social 

Development Research Center 
Environmental Protection Commission 
Government Offices Administrative 

Bureau 



Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office 
Media and Publications Office 
National Academic Degree Committee 
National Antarctic Survey Committee 
Northeastern Economic Zone Planning 
Office 

Special Economic Zones Office 
State Commission for Guiding the 
Examination of Economic Manage- 
ment Cadres 
State Language Work Committee 



Banks 



Agricultural Bank 
Bank of China 

China Industrial and Commercial Bank 
China Investment Bank 



Communications Bank 

People's Bank of China 

People's Construction Bank 

People's Insurance Company of China 



The organizations in this list are subordinate to the State Council. 



629 



China: A Country Study 



Table 4. Diplomatic Relations, 1949-87 1 



Year 

Country Established 2 



Afghanistan 1955 

Albania 1949 

Algeria » 1958 

Angola 1983 

Antigua and Barbuda 1983 

Argentina 1972 

Australia 1972 

Austria 1971 

Bangladesh 1975 

Barbados 1977 

Belgium 1971 

Belize 1987 

Benin 4 1964 

Bolivia 1985 

Botswana 1975 

Brazil 1974 

Bulgaria 1949 

Burkina Faso 1973 

Burma 1950 

Burundi 4 1963 

Cambodia 5 1958 

Cameroon 1971 

Canada 1970 

Cape Verde 1976 

Central African 

Republic 4 1964 

Chad 1972 

Chile 1970 

Colombia 1980 

Comoros 1975 

Congo- 1964 

Cote d'l voire 1983 

Cuba 1960 

Cyprus 1972 

Czechoslovakia 1949 

Denmark 1950 

Djibouti 1979 

Ecuador 1980 

Egypt 1956 

Equatorial Guinea 1970 

Ethiopia 1970 

Fiji 1975 

Finland 1950 

France 1964 

Gabon 1974 

Gambia 1974 

Germany, East 1949 

Germany, West 1972 

Ghana 4 1960 

Greece 1972 

Grenada 1985 

Guinea 1959 

Guinea-Bissau 1974 



Year 

Country Established 1 



Guyana 1972 

Hungary 1949 

Iceland 1971 

India 1950 

Indonesia 6 1950 

Iran 1971 

Iraq 1958 

Ireland 1979 

Italy 1970 

Jamaica 1972 

Japan 1972 

Jordan 1977 

Kenya 1963 

Kiribati 1980 

Korea, North 1949 

Kuwait 1971 

Laos 1962 

Lebanon 1971 

Lesotho . 1983 

Liberia 1977 

Libya 1978 

Luxembourg 1972 

Madagascar 1972 

Malaysia 1974 

Maldives 1972 

Mali 1960 

Malta 1972 

Mauritania 1965 

Mauritius 1972 

Mexico 1972 

Mongolia 1949 

Morocco 1958 

Mozambique 1975 

Nepal 1955 

Netherlands 7 1954 

New Zealand 1972 

Nicaragua 1985 

Niger 1974 

Nigeria 1971 

Norway 1954 

Oman 1978 

Pakistan 1951 

Papua New Guinea 1976 

Peru 1971 

Philippines 1975 

Poland 1949 

Portugal 1979 

Romania 1949 

Rwanda 1971 

San Marino 8 1971 

Sao Tome and Principe 1975 

Senegal 1971 

Seychelles 1976 



630 



Appendix B 



Table 4. — Continued. 



Country 



Year 
Established - 



Country 



Year 
Established - 



Tanzania 
Thailand 
Togo . . . 



Trinidad and Tobago 
Tunisia 4 



Sierra Leone 
Somalia . . . , 
Soviet Union 

Spain 

Sri Lanka . , 

Sudan 

Suriname . . 
Sweden . . . . 
Switzerland . 
Syria 



1971 
1960 
1949 
1973 
1957 
1959 
1976 
1950 
1950 
1956 
1964 
1975 
1972 
1974 
1964 



Turkey 

Uganda 

United Arab Emirates 
United Kingdom 7 . . 

United States 

Vanuatu 

Venezuela 

Vietnam 

Western Samoa 

Yemen, North 

Yemen, South 

Yugoslavia 

Zaire 4 

Zambia 

Zimbabwe 



1971 
1962 
1984 
1954 
1979 
1982 
1974 
1950 
1975 
1956 
1968 
1955 
1961 
1964 
1980 



1 Israel (1950) and Bhutan (1971) have recognized China, but diplomatic relations have not been 
established. China and Singapore have exchanged commercial representative offices since 1981, but 
have no formal diplomatic ties. 

2 When a disc repancy exists between the year of recognition and the year in which full diplomatic rela- 
tions went into effect, the latter date is given. 

s China established diplomatic relations with the provisional government of Algeria in 1958 before 
Algerian independence in 1962. 

4 China's relations with six African nations were broken off in the 1960s and reestablished in the 1970s: 
Benin (broken off, 1966, resumed, 1972), Burundi (broken off, 1965, resumed, 1971), Central Afri- 
can Republic (broken off, 1966, resumed, 1976), Ghana (broken off, 1966, resumed, 1972), Tunisia 
(broken off, 1964, resumed 1971), and Zaire (broken off, 1961, resumed, 1972). The Chinese embassy 
in Zaire closed soon after it opened in 1961. 

5 Beijing recognizes the exiled Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea led by Prince Norodom 
Sihanouk. 

" Beijing's ties with Jakarta were broken off in 1967 after Indonesian accusations of Chinese involve- 
ment in a coup attempt. Diplomatic relations had not been restored as of mid-1987. 

7 China's relations with the Netherlands and the United Kingdom were at the charge d'affaires level 
from 1954 until 1972, when they were upgraded to the ambassadorial level. In 1981 China reduced 
its level of representation in the Netherlands to charge d'affaires to protest the sale of Dutch sub- 
marines to Taiwan. Ambassadorial relations were reestablished in 1984. 

8 Consular relations only. 



631 



Appendix C 



THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY AT A GLANCE 
Ground Forces 

Strength: 2,110,000 

Group armies (main forces) 
35 armies, comprising: 
118 infantry divisions 
13 armored divisions 
17 artillery divisions 
16 antiaircraft artillery divisions 

At least 71 independent regiments and 21 independent bat- 
talions (artillery, antiaircraft artillery, signal, antichemi- 
cal warfare, reconnaissance, and engineer) 

Regional forces 

73 divisions 
140 independent regiments 

Major weapons systems 
Armor 

Type 80 main battle tank — 105mm gun, 38 tons, had not yet 

entered production in 1987 
Type 69 main battle tank — 105mm gun, 36 tons, improved 

Type 59 tank 

Type 59 main battle tank — 100mm gun, 36 tons, improved 
copy of Soviet T-54 tank 

Type 63 light tank — 85mm gun, 18 tons, improved version 
of Soviet PT-76 amphibious light tank 

Type 62 light tank — 85mm gun, 21 tons, reconnaissance ver- 
sion of Type 59 tank 

T-34 main battle tank — 85mm gun, 32 tons, Soviet manufac- 
ture, may be given to regional forces 

M-1984 armored personnel carrier — 6 x 6 wheeled type with 
23mm gun 

M-1974 armored personnel carrier — 2 crew, 20 passengers, 
12.7mm machine gun, tracked, amphibious 

M-1967 armored personnel carrier — 4 crew, 10 passengers, 
tracked, amphibious 



633 



China: A Country Study 



Artillery 

152mm gun — Type 83, entered service in 1980s 
152mm self-propelled howitzer — Type 83, entered service in 
1980s 

152mm gun/howitzer — Type 66, towed, copy of Soviet D-20 
152mm howitzer — copy of Soviet M- 1943 
130mm field gun — Type 59-1, towed, same chassis as 122mm 
gun 

122mm gun/howitzer — Type 83, copy of Soviet D-30 
122mm gun — Type 60, towed, copy of Soviet D-74 
122mm howitzer — Type 54, towed, copy of Soviet M-1938 
122mm self-propelled howitzer — Type 54 howitzer mounted 

on M-1967 armored personnel carrier 
85mm antitank gun — Type 55, towed, copy of Soviet D-44 
130mm rocket launcher — Type 70, 19-tube, armored-person- 
nel-carrier-mounted 
130mm rocket launcher — Type 63, 19-tube, truck-mounted 
122mm rocket launcher — Chinese version of Soviet BM-21 
107mm rocket launcher — Type 63-1, 12-tube, towed 
M-1979 antitank minelaying rocket launcher — 10 tubes 

Antiaircraft artillery 

100mm antiaircraft gun — Type 59, radar, towed, copy of 
Soviet KS-19 

85mm antiaircraft gun — radar, towed, copy of Soviet KS18 
57mm antiaircraft gun — Type 59, radar or optic, towed, copy 
of Soviet S-60 

37mm antiaircraft gun — Type 65, optic, towed, twin-barrel 
37mm antiaircraft gun — Type 55, optic, towed, copy of Soviet 
M-1939 

14.5mm antiaircraft machine gun — Type 58, optic, towed, 

4-barrel copy of Soviet ZPU-2 
14.5mm antiaircraft machine gun — Type 56, optic, towed, 

twin-barrel copy of Soviet ZPU-4 

Air Force 

Strength: 390,000, including 220,000 air defense personnel 
Combat elements organized in group armies of varying num- 
bers of air divisions 



634 



Appendix C 



Weapons 

100 surface-to-air missile sites 
16,000 antiaircraft guns 

Aircraft 

30 F-8/Finback fighters (indigenous model derived from 
Soviet designs) 
200 F-7/Fishbed fighters (copy of MiG-21) 
3,000 F-6/Farmer fighters (copy of MiG-19) 
400 F-5/Fresco fighters (copy of MiG-17) 
500 F-4/Fagot (copy of MiG-15) and A-5/Fantan (derived 

from F-6) ground attack fighters 
120 B-6/Badger bombers (copy of Tu-16 intermediate-range 
bomber) 

500 B-5/Beagle bombers (copy of 11-28 medium-range bomber) 
550 transports (Y-5, Y-7, Y-8, 11-14, 11-18, Tridents, etc.) 
400 helicopters (Z-5/6, Z-9, Alouette, Super Frelon, Bell, 
Super Puma, and Sikorsky) 



Navy 

Strength: 350,000 including Coastal Defense Forces, Naval Air 
Force, and Marine Corps 

Ships and boats 

Submarines 

2 Xia-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines 
(SSBN) (See Strategic Missile Force) 

3 Han-class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN) 

1 Golf-class ballistic missile submarine (SSB) (trials) 
90 Romeo-class diesel attack submarines (SS) 

20 Whiskey-class diesel attack submarines (SS) 

2 Ming-class training submarines (SS) 

Surface combatants 

11 Liida-class destroyers 
4 Anshan-class destroyers 
20 Jianghu-class frigates 
2 Jiangdong-class frigates 

4 Chengdu-class frigates 

5 Jiangnan-class frigates 



635 



China: A Country Study 



14 patrol combatants 
181 patrol craft — large and river/coastal 
877 fast-attack craft (gun, missile, or torpedo) 

33 mine warfare ships 
613 amphibious warfare ships and craft 

49 support ships 

Naval Air Force 

50 B-6/Badger bombers 
130 B-5/Beagle bombers 

600 fighters, including F-4, F-5, F-6, and F-7 

Strategic Missile Force 

Strength: 100,000 in 6 or 7 divisions 
Nuclear warheads: estimated between 225 and 300 
Missiles 

50 Dongfeng-2 (CSS-1) medium-range ballistic missiles 
(MRBM) (650nm) 

60 Dongfeng-3 (CSS-2) intermediate-range ballistic missiles 
(IRBM) (l,620nm) 

4 Dongfeng-4 (CSS-3) limited-range intercontinental ballistic 
missiles (ICBM) (3,780nm) 

2 Dongfeng-5 (CSS-4) full-range intercontinental ballistic mis- 
siles (ICBM) (8,100nm) 

Submarines 

2 Xia-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), 
each with 12 CSS-NX-4 IRBMs (l,190nm to l,620nm) 



Source: Based on information from United States Defense Intelligence Agency, Handbook 
of the People's Liberation Army, Washington, 1984, various pages; and International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1986-87, London, 1986, 140-45. 



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[Beijing], 34, No. 3, March 1985, 25-27. 

Liu, Leo Yuen-Yun. China as a Nuclear Power in World Politics . Lon- 
don: Macmillan, 1972. 

Lovejoy, Charles D., Jr., and Bruce W. Watson (eds.). China's 
Military Reforms: International and Domestic Implications . Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1986. 

Maxwell, Neville. India's China War. Bombay: Jaico, 1970. 

"Military Situation Surrounding Japan. " Pages 23-41 in Japan, 
Defense Agency (ed.), Defense of Japan, 1985. Tokyo: Japan 
Times, 1985. 

Muller, David G., Jr. China as a Maritime Power. Boulder: West- 
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Institute. Proceedings, 110, No. 9, September 1984, 50-55. 

Unnikrishnan, Nandan. "Rapid Modernization of China's Air- 
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Nelsen, Harvey W. The Chinese Military System: An Organizational 
Study of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. (2d ed.) Boulder: West- 
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. "Internal Management in the Armed Forces: Confucian 

Anachronism or Model?" Pages 139-54 in Paul H.B. Godwin 
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"A New Army for a New Society," China News Analysis [Hong 
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"New Blood for the Army," Asiaweek [Hong Kong], 11, No. 26, 
June 28, 1985, 13. 

Ng-Quinn, Michael. "The Chinese Military: Political Demands and 
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Parris, Ed. "Chinese Defense Expenditures, 1967-83." Pages 148- 
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Robinson, Thomas W. "Chinese Military Modernization in the 
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Schofield, Carolyn. "China's Defence Procurement and Produc- 
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Segal, Gerald. "China." Pages 16-34 in Martin Edmonds (ed.), 
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Segal, Gerald, and William T. Tow (eds.). Chinese Defence Policy . 
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Shambaugh, David L. "China's Defense Industries: Indigenous 
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(Various issues of the following publications were also used in 
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Political, Sociological, and Military Affairs; and Pacific Defence Reporter 
[Victoria, Australia].) 



697 



Glossary 



barefoot doctor — Especially during the Cultural Revolution (q.v.), 
a paramedical worker possessing minimal formal training who 
provided part-time medical service, primarily in rural areas. 
Promoted basic hygiene, preventive health care, and family 
planning, and treated common illnesses. Acted as a primary 
health-care provider at the grass-roots level. 

big-character posters (dazibao) — Posters, limited-circulation news- 
papers, excerpted press articles, pamphlets, and blackboard 
news using large-sized ideographs and mounted on walls as a 
popular form of communication. Used in China since imperial 
times but more commonly since literacy increased after the 1911 
revolution. Used more frequently after 1949 to publicize party 
programs and as a means of protest. Became ubiquitous dur- 
ing the Cultural Revolution (q.v.); guaranteed as one of the 
"four big rights" in the 1975 state constitution. 

cadre — Person who holds any responsible position (usually in 
administrative work) in either the party or the governmental 
apparatus throughout the nation. Term often denotes, in a more 
restricted sense, a person who has been fully indoctrinated in 
party ideology and methods and uses this training in his or her 
work. 

China Proper — Used broadly to mean China within the Great Wall, 
with its eighteen historic provinces. Divisible into two major, 
sharply contrasting regions, north China and south China. The 
dependencies on the north and west — Manchuria (now usually 
referred to as northeast China), Mongolia, Xizang (Tibet), and 
Xinjiang or Chinese Turkestan — were known in the imperial 
era as Outer China. 

Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) — 
A quasi-constitutional united front (q.v.) organization that pro- 
vides an institutional framework for interaction between party 
and state leaders and representatives of mass groups and 
democratic parties (q.v.). Members include distinguished schol- 
ars, educators, and intellectuals, key representatives of religious 
and minority nationality groups, and leading members of 
political parties loyal to the Chinese Communist Party during 
the anti-Guomindang years. The first CPPCC convened in 
1949, the second in 1954, the third in 1959, the fourth in 1964, 
the fifth in 1978, and the sixth in 1983, the seventh was sched- 
uled for 1988. The CPPCC's 1949 Common Program served 



699 



China: A Country Study 

as the law of the land until superseded by the 1954 state con- 
stitution. 

class struggle — In Marxist terms, the conflict waged by the masses 
of the workers and the oppressed under the leadership of the 
communist party against the privileged, oppressive, and 
property-owning ruling class. Until late 1978, class struggle 
was the official line of the Chinese Communist Party. 

Comintern — Short form for Communist International or the Third 
International, which was founded in Moscow in 1919 to coor- 
dinate the world communist movement. Officially disbanded 
in 1943, the Comintern was revived as the Cominform (Com- 
munist Information Bureau) from 1947 to 1956. 

county (xiari) — Rural administrative unit below the provincial level. 

Cultural Revolution — A slogan introduced by Mao Zedong in 1940, 
noted again by Liu Shaoqi in 1958, and used more frequently 
in connection with leftist attacks on the "cultural front" in late 
1965 and early 1966. The expression was used to denote the 
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, a political campaign 
officially inaugurated in August 1966 to rekindle revolution- 
ary fervor of the masses outside formal party organizations. 
The Cultural Revolution decade (1966-76) can be divided into 
three periods: 1966-69, from the militant Red Guard (q. v.) 
phase to the Ninth National Party Congress; 1969-71, the 
period of the zenith and demise of Lin Biao; and 1971-76, the 
period of Mao's declining health and the ascendancy of the 
Gang of Four (q.v.). At the August 1977 Eleventh National 
Party Congress, the Cultural Revolution was declared officially 
to have ended with the arrest in October 1976 of the Gang of 
Four. 

danwei (work unit) — The basic-level organization through which 
party and government officials control social, political, and eco- 
nomic behavior of residents. The danwei typically controls the 
allocation of housing, grain, edible oil, and cotton rations; the 
issuance of permits to travel, to marry, and to bear or adopt 
children; and permission to enter the army, party, and univer- 
sity, and to change employment. 

"Democracy Wall" — A wall in the Xidan district in Beijing where, 
beginning in December 1978, in line with the party's policy 
of "seeking truth from facts," activists in the democracy move- 
ment recorded news and ideas, often in the form of big-character 
posters (q.v.). These activists were encouraged to criticize the 
Gang of Four and previous (failed) government policies, but 
the wall was closed in December 1979 when the leadership and 
the communist party system were being criticized along with 



700 



Glossary 



past mistakes and leaders. The shutdown eoincided with sup- 
pression of political dissent. 

democratic centralism — A system through which the people influ- 
ence the policies of the government and party members influ- 
ence the policies of the party; the government and party maintain 
centralized administrative power to carry out the policies 
demanded by their constituents. Within both representative and 
executive organizations, the minority must abide by the deci- 
sions of the majority, and lower bodies must obey the orders 
of the higher level organizations. The concept, derived from the 
organizing principles of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union, was called for as early as 1928 by Mao Zedong. 

democratic parties — Eight political parties that have been loyal to 
the communist government since 1949. They are China Asso- 
ciation for Promoting Democracy, China Democratic League, 
China Democratic National Construction Association, China 
Zhi Gong Dang (Party for Public Interest), Chinese Peasants' 
and Workers' Democratic Party, Jiusan (September Third) 
Society, Guomindang Revolutionary Committee, and Taiwan 
Democratic Self-Government League. 

''expert" — Term usually juxtaposed with "red" (q.v.). Denotes 
special knowledge or skills, or both, relating to economic man- 
agement, science, and technology. Cadres are required to be 
both red and expert, the emphasis on one or the other depending 
on the current political milieu. 

fiscal year (FY) — January 1 to December 31. 

Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence — Mutual respect for each 
other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; mutual nonaggres- 
sion; mutual noninterference in each other's internal affairs; 
equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence. Origi- 
nated with a 1954 agreement between Zhou Enlai and India's 
Jawaharlal Nehru. 

four cardinal principles — Socialism; dictatorship of the proletariat; 
supporting the party leadership; and Marxism-Leninism-Mao 
Zedong Thought. In vogue in China since 1979. 

Four Modernizations — The core of a development strategy aimed 
at turning the country into a relatively advanced industrial- 
ized nation by the year 2000. The modernizations are those 
of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national 
defense. The concept was embodied first in the Third Five- 
Year Plan (1966-70), launched in earnest by Zhou Enlai at 
the Fourth National People's Congress (1975), and adopted 
as the official party line at the Third Plenum of the Eleventh 
Central Committee (December 1978). 



701 



China: A Country Study 

Gang of Four — Term used by the post-Mao leadership to denote 
the four leading radical figures — Jiang Qing (Mao's fourth 
wife), Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen — 
who played a dominant political role during the Cultural Revo- 
lution (q.v.) decade (1966-76) until Mao's death in Septem- 
ber 1976 and their arrest several weeks later. Their "antiparty" 
deeds are often linked with Lin Biao, an early leader of the 
Cultural Revolution, who also has been discredited. 

Great Leap Forward — A drive to increase industrial and agricul- 
tural production following the suspension of Soviet aid and the 
desire to catch up with the advanced nations of the world. The 
campaign was conceived by Mao Zedong in late 1957, adopted 
by the National People's Congress (q.v.) in 1958; it continued 
through 1960. Emphasis was placed on accelerated collectiviza- 
tion of agriculture, national self-sufficiency, and labor-intensive 
methods. The campaign resulted in widespread waste of 
resources and was partially responsible for famine in 1960 and 
1961. 

Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution — See Cultural Revolution. 

gross national product (GNP) — The total value of final goods and 
services produced in the economy. The "estimated GNP" 
figures used in the text are estimates by United States govern- 
ment analysts of Chinese GNP according to the U.S. defini- 
tion, which includes personal consumption, gross investment, 
all government expenditures, and net exports. Through 
mid- 1987, Chinese calculations of national income excluded 
government and personal services, passenger transportation, 
and depreciation investment. 

Han — Also Han Chinese. Term used to designate the ethnic major- 
ity, which constitutes 93 percent of the population. The fifty- 
five minority nationalities make up the remainder. 

Hundred Flowers Campaign — Also Double Hundred Campaign. 
Party-sponsored initiative to permit greater intellectual and 
artistic freedom. Introduced first into drama and other arts in 
the spring of 1956 under the official slogan "Let a hundred 
flowers bloom, let the hundred schools of thought contend." 
With Mao's encouragement in January 1957, the campaign 
was extended to intellectual expression and, by early May 1957, 
was being interpreted as permission for intellectuals to criti- 
cize political institutions of the regime. The effect was the large- 
scale exposure and purge of intellectuals critical of party and 
government policies. 

"iron rice bowl" — A Chinese idiom referring to the system of 
guaranteed lifetime employment in state enterprises, in which 



702 



Glossary 



the tenure and level of wages are not related to job perfor- 
mance. 

Long March — The 12,500-kilometer-long trek made by the Red 
Army in the face of the Guomindang's "annihilation cam- 
paigns." Began in October 1934 in Jiangxi Province and ended 
in October 1935 in Shaanxi Province. Some 100,000 persons 
left the communist base area in Jiangxi but only about 28,000 
arrived in Yan'an, Chinese Communist Party headquarters for 
the next decade. It was during the Long March that Mao 
Zedong gained his preeminent role in the party. 

Mao Zedong Thought — Sayings and writings of Mao that served 
as a major source of national ideology until his death in 1976 
and since then have undergone a cautious but critical reap- 
praisal. By 1980 the meaning of the term had expanded to 
include the collective thoughts of all key party leaders. 

"mass line" — Term for party policy aimed at broadening and cul- 
tivating contacts with the masses of the people and to accentu- 
ate the leadership role of the Chinese Communist Party. 

mass movement — Derived from the concept of "mass line" (q. v.). 
Party-directed campaign designed to mobilize the masses in 
support or execution of major policies. Such movements were 
characteristic of the 1950s through the 1970s and were con- 
trolled and coordinated by permanent mass organizations. 

National People's Congress — Highest organ of the state, elected in 
accordance with the principles of democratic centralism (q.v.). 
As of 1987, six congresses had been held, the first (1954), second 
(1959), third (1965), fourth (1975), fifth (1978), and sixth (1982), 
the seventh was scheduled for 1988; annual sessions were held 
most years except during the Cultural Revolution (q.v.). The 
Standing Committee is the permanent organ of the National 
People's Congress and functions between annual sessions. 

neighborhood — Term in general use in China for the urban admin- 
istrative unit usually found immediately below the district level, 
although an intermediate, subdistrict level exists in some cities. 
Neighborhoods encompass 2,000 to 10,000 families. Within 
neighborhoods, families are grouped into smaller residential 
units of 100 to 600 families and supervised by a residents' com- 
mittee; these are subdivided into residents' small groups of 
fifteen to forty families. 

New Culture Movement — Refers to the period between 1917 and 
1923, which was marked by student and intellectual ferment 
and protests against the warlord government. Culminated in 
the May Fourth Movement of 1919. 



703 



China: A Country Study 

one country, two systems — A policy originating in the early 1980s 
that promotes reunification of Hong Kong, Macao, and Tai- 
wan with the mainland and offers them a high degree of 
autonomy as special administrative regions of China. Through 
separate agreements with Britain and Portugal, Hong Kong 
and Macao are to revert to Chinese control in 1997 and 1999, 
respectively. 

overseas Chinese — Term usually used to refer to any person of 
Chinese origin living abroad on a permanent basis, without 
regard to his or her current citizenship. Overseas Chinese 
minorities are concentrated principally in Southeast Asia but 
are also found in other parts of Asia, the Middle East, Europe, 
North America, South America, and the Caribbean. Overseas 
Chinese have long been important to the government in power 
in China as a source of business contacts and of financial and 
moral support from abroad. The majority of foreign invest- 
ment in China is by overseas Chinese, and more than 90 per- 
cent of all foreign tourists who visit China are overseas Chinese. 
Also used in China to refer to persons living in China who have 
returned from sojourns abroad. 

people's commune — Formerly the highest of three administrative 
levels in rural areas in the period from 1958 to 1982-85, when 
they were replaced by townships (q.v.). Communes, the larg- 
est collective units, were divided in turn into production 
brigades and production teams (q.v.). The communes had gov- 
ernmental, political, and economic functions. 

production brigade — Formerly the intermediate administrative level 
in the people's commune system, the organizational structure 
of the collective sector in agriculture. The highest level was the 
commune; the lowest, the production team. Most brigades were 
transformed into townships or villages in the period from 1982 
to 1985. (See also people's commune, production team, town- 
ships, villages.) 

production team — Formerly the basic accounting and farm produc- 
tion unit in the people's commune system. Production teams 
were largely disbanded during the agricultural reforms of 
1982-85. In the administrative hierarchy, the team was the 
lowest level, the next higher levels being the production brigade 
and people's commune. Typically the team owned most of the 
land and was responsible for income distribution. Since 1984 
most teams have been replaced by villages. (See also people's 
commune, production brigade, village.) 

putonghua — The common spoken language; also called guoyu (national 
language). The official spoken language of China, used in its 



704 



Glossary 



various forms by more than 70 percent of the population. The 
People's Republic government started promoting putonghua in 
1956 for use in schools, the cultural arena, and daily life as 
a means of bringing about the standardization of the language 
used by the Han (q.v.) nationality. Putonghua is based on the 
northern dialect, and uses Beijing pronunciations as its 
standard. 

"red" — A term referring to political and ideological attitudes pre- 
scribed by Maoist doctrine. Usually juxtaposed with "expert" 
(q.v.), the term was seldom used in the 1980s. 

Red Guards — Generally used to refer to young people — primarily 
students — in their teens and twenties who began in May 1966 
to support the leftist intraparty struggle then emerging against 
Liu Shaoqi and others. They made world famous the "little 
red book," Quotations from Chairman Mao, and were known for 
their use of big-character posters {q.v.) during the Cultural 
Revolution (q. v. ) . Acting under the leadership of Mao and his 
radical adherents, Red Guards were the "soldiers" and the 
vanguard of the Cultural Revolution. The term Red Guard 
was derived from the early days of the Chinese Communist 
Party's armed struggle. 

rehabilitation — A practice dating from the early years of the Chinese 
Communist Party. Denotes the reinstatement in positions of 
responsibility of former government and party officials and mili- 
tary personnel who had been accused of wrongdoing. Rehabili- 
tations sometimes take place posthumously to clear a former 
leader's name and reputation. 

responsibility system — A practice, first adopted in agriculture in 
1981 and later extended to other sectors of the economy, by 
which local managers are held responsible for the profits and 
losses of the enterprise. This system partially supplanted the 
egalitarian distribution method, whereby the state assumed all 
profits and losses. 

revisionism — As used by communists, term refers to political, eco- 
nomic, and social tendencies that stray to the right of ortho- 
dox Marxism-Leninism. The Chinese communists long insisted 
that these tendencies were counterrevolutionary and that 
internal and external enemies (such as the Soviet Union) were 
infected by this negative phenomenon. 

Socialist Education Movement — Inaugurated in September 1962 
at the Tenth Plenum of the Eighth National Party Congress 
Central Committee as a mass ideological campaign for both 
party cadre and the general population. The movement was 
patterned along the lines of the Yan'an rectification campaign 



705 



China: A Country Study 

of 1942-45 and was intended to increase ideological "correct- 
ness" and consciousness, especially in regard to reversing 
"capitalist" and "revisionist" tendencies perceived in social 
and economic life. The Socialist Education Movement, which 
continued at least until 1965, is considered a precursor of the 
Cultural Revolution (q.v.). 

special economic zones — Small coastal areas established beginning 
in 1979 to promote economic development and introduction 
of advanced technology through foreign investment. Special 
preferential terms and facilities are offered to outside investors 
in taxation, land-use fees, and entry and exit control for joint 
ventures, cooperative ventures, and enterprises with sole for- 
eign investment. Special economic zones have greater decision- 
making power in economic activities than provincial-level units. 
Market regulation is primary. 

township (xiang) — The basic government administrative unit below 
the county level in rural areas. Townships existed before peo- 
ple's communes were organized in 1958 and were reconstituted 
when production brigades and communes were disbanded dur- 
ing the period 1982-85. Each township has a people's congress 
and an elected chairman. In the mid-1980s, townships were 
about the same size as the communes they had replaced. (See 
also county, people's communes, production brigades.) 

united front — Chinese Communist Party strategy that attempts to 
utilize an organization or movement for the purpose of build- 
ing a consensus and an organized following for party-supported 
programs and goals. Historically, the term is associated with 
the Guomindang-Chinese Communist Party first united front 
(1923-27) and second united front (1937-45). 

village (nongcun) — Replaced production brigades (q.v.) from 1982 
to 1985 as the lowest-level semiofficial government entity. They 
provide bureaucratic coordination and welfare payments and 
settle disputes. Party branches are usually organized at the vil- 
lage level. 

yuan (¥) — China's monetary unit, which in mid-1987 had an 
exchange rate of US$1 to ¥3.72, or¥l to US$.269. The yuan 
is divided into 100 fen, and 10 fen constitute 1 jiao. The cur- 
rency is known as renminbi (RMB), meaning the people's cur- 
rency. The inscription renminbi (or renminbiao) appears on bank 
notes as well as yuan, and the terms renminbi and yuan are used 
synonymously in quoting exchange rates. In transactions the 
terms are universally replaced by the word kuai (piece). Begin- 
ning in the early 1980s, the standard currency was paralleled 



706 



Glossary 

by a special currency called Foreign Exchange Certificates, 
which were issued in exchange for "hard" foreign currencies. 



707 



Index 



Academia Sinica, 376, 377 

acupuncture, 95, 382 

Afghanistan, 64; boundary issues, 477; 

foreign policy, 480; Soviet invasion of, 

490, 491, 576 
Africa {see also under names of individual 

countries): military cooperation, 580; 

alleged subversive activities in, 480, 496 
Agrarian Reform Law of June 28, 1950, 

41, 271-72 

Agricultural Bank, 243, 244, 245, 351; 
policy role, 278 

agriculture, {see also communes; grain; 
land reform), xxiii-xxiv, 61, 267-97; 
advanced producers' cooperatives, 215, 
272; ancient period, 5-7; animal hus- 
bandry, 291-92; collectivization, 41, 

42, 125, 208; communes, 44, 217, 
231-32, 272-73; contract responsibility 
system, 126, 207, 224, 225, 231, 232, 
275-76, 337-38, 455; cotton, 277, 
289-90; credit arrangements, 244, 280; 
crops, 267, 268-70, 281, 286-91; 
domestic trade, 212, 337-40; economic 
organization, 231-34, 278-81; fertiliz- 
ers, 274, 281-82; fisheries, 292; foreign 
trade, 294-97; forestry, 292; govern- 
ment role, 127-28, 218-19, 230, 
271-81; and gross national product 
(GNP), 231, 268; investments in, 216, 

271, 272, 276-77; irrigation, 2, 216, 
270, 274, 284; labor force, 90, 208, 
231, 234, 268, 270-71; land ownership, 
126, 208, 234; marketing organization, 
225-26, 277, 279-80; mechanization, 
231, 281, 282-83; pest control, 284-85; 
pricing policies, 219, 224, 248, 277, 
280; private plots, 219, 232; produc- 
tion, 216, 219, 221, 223-24, 277, 
286-94; regional disparities, 212-13; 
research and training, 285-86; seed 
varieties, 285; shortage of arable land, 
xxiii, 260, 268; "specialized house- 
holds," 224, 232, 258; state farms, 234, 

272, 278; state procurement system, 
337, 338; taxation, 242 

air force, 544, 560, 569; campaigns, 584; 
manpower, 546, 562; rank system, 568; 



Soviet assistance, 584; structure and 
equipment, xxvii, 583-85; terms of 
service, 566; training, 584-85; uni- 
forms, 568 

airports and aviation, xxv, 237, 356, 
363-64; aircraft production, 316; pas- 
senger traffic, 357 

Aksai Chin, 45-46, 65, 578 

Albania, 501, 580 

Alexandria, 12 

All-China Federation of Industry and 

Commerce, 418, 421 
All-China Federation of Literary and Art 

Circles, 421 
All-China Federation of Trade Unions, 

418, 420 

All-China Federation of Youth, 421 
All-China Students' Federation, 421 
All-China Women's Federation, 418, 421 
Altai Mountains, 67 
Altun Shan, 67 

Amur River. See Heilong Jiang 

Analects {Lunyu), 186 

ancestor worship, 132, 146 

Andropov, Yuriy, 491 

Anhui Province, 343, 362, 388, 461; 
industry, 325 

Annam {see also Vietnam), 26 

Anshan, 305; iron and steel complex, 308, 
310, 313, 316, 392 

Anti-Rightist Campaign, 42, 181; legal 
profession, 514; police domination, 515 

Antioch, 12 

Anyang, 5, 6 

Aomen. See Macao 

Argentina, 295 

Argun River. See Ergun He 

armed forces {see also defense industry; 
national defense; police), xxvii-xxviii, 
xxxvi-xxxvii, 543-75; air force, 544, 
546, 560, 562, 569, 584; Central Mili- 
tary Commissions, 424-25, 557-59; 
and the Chinese Communist Party, 
116, 416, 548; civil-military relations, 
548, 555-57; civilianization of activi- 
ties, 551, 561, 575; conditions of ser- 
vice, 122, 566-68; contacts with foreign 
countries, 544; courts, 524-25; defense 



709 



China: A Country Study 



expenditures, xxviii, 569; doctrine, 
strategy and tactics, 553, 562-63; edu- 
cation and training, 564-65, 575; 
equipment, xxvii, xxxvii, 582-90; for- 
eign technology, 544, 570, 572-73; 
ground forces, 544, 582-83; historical 
development, 24, 29, 545-47; man- 
power, 546, 562; military regions, 547, 
550, 561; Military Service Law, 553, 
557, 565, 566, 567; militia, xxviii, 544, 
590-91; modernization programs, 464, 
543-44, 547-49, 551-55; navy, 544, 
546, 566, 585-87; nuclear capabilities, 
560, 563, 587-90; organization of, 
557-62; paramilitary forces, xxviii, 
544, 562, 590-93; people's war princi- 
ples, 546, 562-63; political education, 
548, 556; Production and Construction 
Corps, 592; promotion, 567; public 
attitudes towards, 108, 115-16, 557; 
ranks, 567-68; recruitment, 565-66; 
reductions in force, 561-62; reserve 
service system, 591; retirement, 567; 
self-reliance policies, 548; Soviet 
model, 547-48; Strategic Missile Force, 
544, 587; training, 548, 553, 584-85; 
uniforms, 568 

Asian countries {see also under names of 
individual countries): foreign relations, 
480; military cooperation, 580 

Asian Development Bank, 348 

Australia, 581; foreign relations, 498; 
trade with, 295, 324, 499 

Austria, 330 

automotive industry, 315, 360-61 
Autumn Harvest Uprising, 34, 35, 545 



Bajin, 188 

Baghdad, 12 

Bai Hua, 182-83 

Baijuyi, 187 

Bangladesh, 580, 582 

Bank of China, xxiv, 230, 243, 244, 348, 
351, 483 

bankruptcy laws, 458 

banks and banking, 243-46; agricultural 
sector, 280; foreign exchange, 230, 244, 
347; investment loans, 226, 242; na- 
tionalization, 42, 214, 243; personal 
savings accounts, 246 

bao jia (tithing), 525, 526 



baogan (household production responsibil- 
ity), 275-76 

Baohuang Hui (Protect the Emperor Soci- 
ety), 28 

Baoshan, 313, 500 

Baotou, 306 

Bay of Hangzhou, 71 

Beijing, xxi, 48, 52, 61, 81, 177, 199, 431, 
440; import-export companies, 349; 
industry, 235, 314, 315, 319; interna- 
tional airport, xxv; machinery centers, 
314; military region, 561; population, 
82; shopping, 343-44; university, xxii, 
201; visitor regulations, 80; during 
Yuan dynasty, 17 

Beijing Foreign Languages Institute, 484 

Beijing Institute for International Stra- 
tegic Studies, 485 

Beijing Research Academy, 377 

Beijing Research Laboratory, 377 

Beijing Review, 184, 185 

Beijing-Tianjin-Tangshan Economic 
Zone, xxiii, 342 

Beiping {see also Beijing), 28 

Bhutan, U.S. forces in, 65 

bicycles, 301, 322 

Bo Hai Gulf, 68, 69; oil reserves, 327 
Bo Yibo, 46 

Book of Changes {Yijing), 185-B6 

border disputes: with Burma, 65; with 
India, 45, 65, 477, 496, 544, 578; set- 
tlements, 477; with Soviet Union, 
21-22, 49, 64-65, 477, 489-90, 491, 
492, 576; with Vietnam, 55, 477, 496, 
544, 552-53, 577 

Borodin, Mikhail, 33 

Boxer Uprising, 28-29 

Brahmaputra River, 65 

Brezhnev, Leonid, 491 

Brunei, 65 

Buddhism. See religion 

budget, 242-43 

bureaucracy. See cadre system 

Burma, 26, 65; military ties with, 580 



cadre system {see also government), 53, 
238, 434-37; abolishment of tenure, 
410, 434, 436; accountability of, 464; 
centralization, 11, 15; examination sys- 
tem, 106, 107-8, 180; imperial period, 
11-12, 14, 15, 106-8; job assignments, 
143; legal cadres, 510-11, 513; and 



710 



Index 



mass organizations, 418; personnel 
reform, 436-37; prestige, 115-16; in 
public security, 527-28; "red" and 
"expert" criteria, 436; reorganization 
of, 410, 445, 446, 463-64; retirement, 
122, 436; rural areas, 127-28; wages 
and benefits, 114-15, 122 
calligraphy. See cultural developments 
Cambodia, 480; and France, 26; invasion 
of, 577, 578; military cooperation, 580 
"Cambulac," 17. See also Beijing 
Canada: technical assistance, 330; trade 

with, 295, 499 
Cankao Xiaoxi (Reference News), 200, 439 
Cankao Ziliao (Reference Information), 

200, 439 
Canton. See Guangzhou 
Cao Yu, 192 

Capital Construction Engineering Corps, 
561, 575 

census. See population 

Central Advisory Commission, 411, 416, 
451; establishment of, 452 

Central Commission for Discipline In- 
spection, 449, 451 

Central Committee, 50; economic plan- 
ning, 239; foreign policy role, 482; 
membership, 413, 556; staff reductions, 
435; United Front Work Department, 
418 

Central Military Commissions: and for- 
eign policy, 482; party, 415; State, 
424-25 

Central People's Broadcasting Station, 

366, 368, 440 
Central Radio and Television University, 

178 

Changjiang, xxii, 6, 68, 237, 245, 284, 
328, 330, 355; freight traffic, xxv, 
361-62 

Changjiang Basin, 289 

Chang Jiang Delta, 69 

Chang Jiang Valley, 37, 119, 269; 
agricultural crops, 288, 289; forestry 
products, 292; industry, 235; popula- 
tion, 78 

Chang'an {see also Xi'an), 11, 14 
Changchun, 159, 314 
Changsha, 34 

chemicals industry, 221, 317-18 
Chen Boda, 48, 56 
Chen Duxiu, 188 
Chen Junsheng, xxxix 



Chen Xilian, 55 

Chen Xitong, xxxix 

Chen Yun, xxxv, xxxvii-xxxviii, 46, 54, 
413, 449, 456, 458; opposition of, 462 

Chengdu, 314, 561 

Chernenko, Konstantin, 490 

Chiang Ching-kuo, xl 

Chiang Kai-shek, xxxii, 33, 37, 39, 419, 
478, 509, 526; Northern Expedition, 
33-34 

Chin-men. See Jinmen 

China Association for Promoting Democ- 
racy, 419 

China Association of Science and Tech- 
nology, 394-95, 396 

China Central Television (CCTV), 366, 
368, 440 

China Council for the Promotion of Inter- 
national Trade (CCPIT), 351-52, 483 

China Daily, 200 

China Democratic League, 419 

China Democratic National Construction 
Association, 419 

China Electronics Import and Export 
Corporation, 574 

China Industrial and Commercial Bank, 
243, 351; education loans, 173 

China International Economic Consul- 
tants Corporation, 350 

China International Trust and Invest- 
ment Corporation, 351 

China Investment Bank, 243, 351 

China Merchant Steam Navigation Com- 
pany, 433 

China National Aero-Technology Import 
and Export Corporation (CATIC), 573 

China National Offshore Oil Corpora- 
tion, 327 

China National Seed Company, 285 

China News Service (Zhongguo Xinwen- 
she), 199, 440 

China Northern Industrial Corporation 
(NORINCO), 350, 573 

China Ocean Shipping Company 
(COSCO), 356 

China Precision Import and Export Cor- 
poration, 573 

China Proper, 6,11, 69, 268; population 
density, 78 

China Publishing House (Zhonghua 
Shuju), 198, 199 

China Shipbuilding Trading Corpora- 
tion, 574 



711 



China: A Country Study 



China Shipping Inspection Bureau, 362 
China State Shipbuilding Corporation, 
570 

China Travel and Tourism Bureau, 229, 
351 

China Xinshidai Corporation, 570, 573 
China Xinxing Corporation, 574 
China Zhi Gong Dang (Party for Public 

Interest), 419 
Chinese Academy of Sciences, 387-88; 
emphasis on basic research, 388; export 
companies of, 401; founding of, 377; 
membership, 388; privileged position 
of, 393; Soviet cooperation, 378, 396 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 5; 

Law Institute, 518 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) {see also 
government), 4, 39, 409-21; attitude 
towards religion, 145; Central Advisory 
Commission, 411, 416; Central Com- 
mission for Discipline Inspection, 416; 
Central Committee, 50, 239, 413; Cen- 
tral Military Commission, 57, 391, 
415, 451, 485, 551, 555; constitution, 
xxxvii-xxxviii, 411-12, 422; control of 
the People's Liberation Army, 556-57; 
and the Cultural Revolution, 49, 57; 
decentralization of authority, 41 1 ; dis- 
cipline, 416, 436, 456; economic goals, 
213, 230, 412; and education, xxxviii, 
156; elections, 417; "four cardinal prin- 
ciples," 154; and government, 460-61; 
and the Great Leap Forward, 217; and 
the Guomindang, 34, 37, 38-39; intel- 
lectuals and, 42; job assignments, 143; 
judicial role, 515, 519; land reform, 
271-72; and the mass media, 438; and 
mass organizations, 418-21; member- 
ship, 116-17, 417; and the military, 
1 16, 416, 548, 556; minority national- 
ities, 88; Party Congresses, 50, 51-52, 
53, 57, 412-13; party rectification pro- 
gram, 417-18, 436-37, 456-57; Politi- 
cal Bureau, xxvi, xxxvii-xxxviii, 36, 
50, 54, 413-14; political realignments, 
447-50; populist-style leadership, 
46-47; prestige, 117; Propaganda 
Department, 54, 185, 366; purges, 42, 
55; reevaluation of party history, 450; 
retirement of senior leaders, xxxvii- 
xxxviii, 452-53; role in modernization, 
463-64; rural areas, 279, 416; Secre- 
tariat, 409, 415; Soviet support, 32-33; 



ties with foreign parties, 481, 482, 490; 
and work units, 116-17, 120-21 

Chinese Peasants' and Workers' Demo- 
cratic Party, 419 

Chinese People's Association for Friend- 
ship with Foreign Countries, 421, 
485-86 

Chinese People's Institute of Foreign 
Affairs, 486 

Chinese People's Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC), xxxviii, 418-19; 
constitutional framework, 422; mem- 
bership, 418; minority nationalities, 
100; science policy, 377 

Chinese People's Volunteers, 547 

Chinese Turkestan. See Xinjiang-Uygur 
Autonomous Region 

Chinese University of Science and Tech- 
nology, 388 

Chongqing, 199, 245; industry-, 305, 314, 
318 

Chuci (Songs of Chu), 186 

Chun Qiu (Spring and Autumn), 186 

Ci Xi, 25, 28 

Cihuai Canal, 362 

CITIC Group, 351 

civil aviation. See airports and aviation 

civil bureaucracy. See cadre system 

civil law. See judicial system 

civil rights: abolishment of the "four big 
rights," 422-23; constitutional develop- 
ments, 513, 516, 518, 519, 521; impe- 
rial period, 508-9 

civil wars and dissension, 13, 30-31; an- 
cient period, 11, 14; Civil War, xxxii, 
240, 302, 310, 448, 546; against Japan, 
32; Lhasa riots, xxxix; 19th century, 
21, 23-24; post-World War II, 38-39; 
Republican Revolution of 191 1, 29-30; 
student demonstrations, xxxv, 461; 
Taiping Rebellion, 23-24 

Classic of Documents {Shujing), 186 

Classic of Poetry {Shijing), 186 

climate, xxii, 61, 71 

coal, 301, 324; reserves, 309 

Cochin China. See Republic of Vietnam 

collectives: agriculture, 41, 42, 125, 208, 
234; benefits, 115, 122; constitutional 
rights, 423; industry, 235-36; public 
works responsibilities, 234 

College of International Relations, 484 

colleges. See universities and colleges 

Comintern, 33, 34, 36 



712 



Index 



Commercial Press (Shangwu Yinshu- 
guan), 198, 199 

communes, 44-45, 112; agriculture, 125, 
217, 231-32, 272-73; dissolution of, 
xxxiii, 164, 207, 225, 275; family plan- 
ning activities, 76-77; and household 
unit, 125, 130; income distribution, 
232; non-agricultural, 44; public order 
responsibilities, 535; social conse- 
quences of, 133-34; structure of, 46, 
217, 231-32; and upward mobility, 125 

communications, xxv-xxvi, 35, 209, 212, 
304, 366-69; facsimile and computer 
services, 368; foreign broadcasting, 
196, 200, 369, 439-40; foreign circu- 
lation, 438-39; historical development, 
365-66; Intelsat membership, 367; in- 
ternational network, 366; labor force, 
236; limits on criticism, 438; newspa- 
pers, 199-200, 438-39; post-World 
War II, 214; radio, 196, 368, 440; re- 
stricted publications, 439; satellites, 
367, 439-40; services for minority 
groups, 368; telecommunications, 365- 
69, 439; telegraph, 367-68; telephone 
services, 366-67; television, 196, 368- 
69, 440; use as propaganda tool, 438 

Communications Bank, 243 

Communist Youth League, 418, 420-21; 
and armed forces involvement, 531, 
561; membership, 420 

computers. See electronics industry 

Confucianism, 145; and the civil service, 
11-12, 17; classics, 8, 16, 104, 185; 
influence on intellectuals, 376; and 
social control, 508; values of, 104-6 

Confucius, 5, 8, 10; shrine, 146; writings 
of, 186 

constitutional developments {see also State 
Constitution of 1982): civil rights, 422- 
23, 513, 516; Common Program, 511; 
to facilitate modernization, xxxviii, 
409, 421; "four big rights," 49, 516; 
influence of Mao Zedong Thought, 
515; party constitution, 411-12, 451; 
State Constitution of 1954, 42, 512-15; 
State Constitution of 1975, 515-17; 
State Constitution of 1978, 517-21 

construction industry, 318-19; funding, 
14, 244, 323, 575; housing, 254-55, 
322-23 

consumer goods and services: availability, 
228, 301-2; bicycles, 136, 322; house- 



hold goods, 254, 322; inflation, xxxvi, 
249-50; prices, 246-49; processed food, 
321-22; rationing, 120, 230, 252, 344; 
retail sales, 343-44; rural areas, 277, 
344; service sector, 237-38; televisions, 
136, 322, 368-69; urban-rural differ- 
ences, 258, 344; and work units, 122 

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(Comecon), 501, 577 

courts {see also procuratorates), 522-25; 
adjudication committees, 523; military, 
524-25; Organic Law, 519, 523; Su- 
preme People's Court, 513, 515-16, 
517, 523 

crime and punishment {see also judicial 
system), 207, 228, 262, 515, 516; cate- 
gories of offenses, 537-38; for counter- 
revolutionary activities, 520; crime 
rate, 456-57, 539; death penalty, 507, 
521, 538; juveniles, 539; mediation 
committees, 536-37; mutual surveil- 
lance, 526-27; penal system, 507, 539; 
penalties, 538 

crops. See agriculture; grain 

Cuba, 295 

cultural developments {see also Confucian- 
ism; society), 185-202; ancient period, 
6, 12, 14, 16, 17; Beijing Opera, 190- 
92; and the Cultural Revolution, 188- 
96; drama, 190-92; folk and variety 
arts, 197-98; foreign influences, 189- 
90, 192, 193-94; libraries and archives, 
200-2; literature, 185-88, 188-90; "the 
literature of the wounded," 189; mo- 
tion pictures, 195-96; music, 192-94; 
newspapers, 199-200; painting and cal- 
ligraphy, 194-95; post-Mao, 154, 189- 
90; publishing, 198-99; radio and tele- 
vision, 196; socialist realism, 188-89, 
195; Soviet influences, 188, 193, 195 

Cultural Revolution, xxxiii, 47-53, 99; 
army role, 549-51; attitude towards 
intellectuals, 181, 379, 383; cultural 
activity during, 188-96; economic 
effects, 220-21, 239, 303; educational 
policies, 141-42, 153, 163; elimination 
of service sector, 237; foreign policy 
repercussions, 474, 480-81, 484, 490, 
492, 496; impact on science and tech- 
nology, 373, 374, 380, 386; internal 
migration during, 79; labor force 
'effects, 220, 309, 514; Mao's "four big 
rights," 49; political effects, 445; 



713 



China: A Country Study 



reassessment of, 4, 55, 57, 422, 447, 
450; and religion, 145-46; role of youth 
in, 48-49; wage equality, 115 
currency, 7, 214 

Czechoslovakia, Soviet invasion of, 490, 
492, 550, 576 

Dagang, 326 

Dalai Lama, xxxix-xl, 45 

Dalian, xxv, 228, 309, 348 

Damanskiy Island. See Zhenbao Island 

danwei {work units), 114-16, 120-24, 128; 
economic limitations of, 148, 149; per- 
mission to marry, 139; organizational 
structure, 120, 147-48; research insti- 
tutes as, 387; social responsibilities, 
1 15, 120; specialization of, 147; wages 
and benefits, 121-22 

dao (Way), 10 

Daoism. See Taoism 

Daqing, 326, 328 

Datong, 324 

Daya Bay, 331 

Dazhai, 274 

defense industry (see also armed forces), 
375, 390-91; accomplishments, 391; 
arms sales, 573-74; budget, 569; civil- 
ianization of, 570-71; concentration of 
skilled personnel, 387; equipment pro- 
duction, 332, 571-72; funding reform, 
400; integration with civilian industries, 
332, 544, 553, 568-69, 574; privileged 
position of, 393; research and develop- 
ment, 569-70; selective importation of 
foreign technology, 572-73; trading 
corporations, 573-74 

democratic centralism, xxvi, 411, 426, 454, 
461, 520; and local administration, 429 

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (see 
also Korea): arms sales to, 573; bound- 
ary issues, 477; exports to, 295; foreign 
relations, 498; military cooperation, 580 

Democratic Republic of Vietnam (see also 
Republic of Vietnam; Vietnam), 580 

demography. See population 

Deng Liqun, 183, 460, 461 

Deng Xiaoping, xxxi, xxxiii, xxxiv, 
xxxviii, 42, 46, 52, 55, 181, 304, 413, 
416; agricultural reforms, 79; back- 
ground, 448; Building Socialism with 
Chinese Characteristics, 465; and the 
Chinese Communist Party, 46-47, 52, 



53, 448; civil bureaucracy reforms, 
434-35; and the constitution. 421: cult 
of personality, 465; and the Cultural 
Revolution, 48, 49; economic policies, 
51, 208, 213, 222, 225. 346, 445. 447. 
449; education policies, 154-56. 167: 
foreign policy, 477, 481, 486; leader- 
ship style, 449, 454, 466; Mao's ideol- 
ogy and, 47, 448: and military 
modernization, 464, 551. 552, 553. 
555; and minority nationalities, 88; 
political reforms, 460-61; purged from 
power, 49, 52, 222; rehabilitation, 53. 
447-48, 552; and religion, 146; resig- 
nation from Political Bureau, xxxvii; 
science and technology policy, 373, 
374, 382-83; The Selected Works of 
Deng Xiaoping, 465; "spiritual pollu- 
tion" campaign, 183-84, 457; use of 
ideology, xxxiv, 466. 468; visit to 
United States, 493 

Deng Yingchao, 449 

development plans: 1953-57, 41, 215-16. 
240, 301, 302, 306, 346: 1958-62, 43. 
216, 240; 1966-70, 240: 1971-75, 240, 
303; 1976-80. 240; 1981-85, 240: 
1986-90, 153, 166, 240. 304, 310. 315. 
316, 323, 356-57, 415; annual plans. 
240-41; regional plans, 342; target 
allocations, 240-41 

Deyang, 315 

dissension. See civil wars and dissension 
domestic trade. See internal trade 
Dongbei Plain, 68 

Double Hundred Campaign. See Hundred 

Flowers Campaign 
down to the countryside movement (xia- 

fang), 43-44. 47-48 
Dream of the Red Chamber. See Hong Lou 

Meng 
Du Fu, 187 

dynasties (see also names of individual 
dynasties), history: ancient period, 
5-10; Han, 10, 11-13; Jin, 13; Ming. 
18; Qin, 11; Qing, 18-20; Shang, 5-6; 
Song, 14-15; Sui, 13-14; Tang, 14; 
Three Kingdoms, 13; Xia, 5; Yuan. 
16-17; Zhou, 6-7, 10 



East China Sea, 69. 71 
Eastern Europe (see also under names of 
individual countries): foreign relations. 



714 



Index 



500-1; scientific cooperation, 396; 
trade with, 501 

Eastern Zhou dynasty, 7, 11, 185 

economy (see also agriculture; industry), 
xxiii-xxiv, 207-62; budget, 242-43; 
capital investments, 210-11; capitalism, 
xxxiv, 224; centrally planned economy, 
207, 208; Civil Code stipulations, 427- 
28; control mechanisms, 223, 229-30, 
232; development planning, 215-16, 
238-42; development zones, 226, 228, 
342-43; Four Modernizations program, 
54-58; gross national product, 208; in- 
flation, 207, 214, 228, 249-50; market 
exchanges, 124, 149; 19th century, 21; 
policies, 207, 213-28, 223; post-Mao, 
222-23; post-World War II, 37-38, 
213-14; pricing policies, xxxvi, 209, 
246-49, 302; reduction of central plan- 
ning, 223, 242; reform programs, xxxv- 
xxxvi, 149, 207, 209, 222-28, 454-55; 
Soviet model, 215-16, 301; statistical 
data, 109-10; structure of, 228-50; sub- 
sidies to minorities, 86, 101; urban re- 
forms, 458-59 

education (see also universities and colleges), 
xxii, 153-80; administration of, 155-56, 
157, 158; adult, 177-79; compulsory, 
153, 155, 157-59, 160; and Confucian- 
ism, 104; and the Cultural Revolution, 
141-42; enrollment rates, 160, 161-62, 
164, 165, 166; examination system, 142, 
143; foreign language study, 161; for- 
eign training, 62, 83, 154, 173, 375; 
funding of, 159, 160, 174; key schools, 
159; labor force, 176, 177, 238; and 
literacy, 179-80; Maoist policies, 141- 
42; National Conference on Education 
(1985), 156-57; "nonformal" courses, 
177-79; parental involvement, 140; poli- 
cies, 154-56; political and moral train- 
ing, 161; preschool, 162; primary, 160- 
62; productive labor requirements, 161; 
reform of, xxxvi, 47- 48, 153, 156-57; 
rural-urban distinctions, 119, 259, 270; 
school systems, 156-67; science and 
technology, 153, 154; secondary, 163- 
66; spare-time schools, 178; special 
schools, 163; teacher training, 176-77; 
and upward mobility, 110, 112; via tele- 
vision, 178- 79; vocational and techni- 
cal, 163, 164-66 

Egypt, military ties with, 573, 580 



elections, 461; Party, 417; procuratorates, 
520; state, 410 

electronics industry: computers, 306, 332; 
consumer products, 317; labor force, 
317; limitations of, 308; research, 392 

elite groups. See intellectuals; society 

emigration, 38, 62, 83; labor force exports, 
83; Tibetan refugees, 45 

energy, xxiv; coal, 310; consumption, 209, 
283; electricity, 283, 330; foreign assis- 
tance, 330; hydroelectricity, 260, 302, 
328, 329-30; nuclear power, 302, 330- 
31; oil and natural gas, 326-28; power 
shortages, 310, 328; thermal power 
plants, 329 

Engineering Corps, 575 

Enlightenment Daily. See Guangming Ribao 

Ergun He, 64 

ethnic groups. See Han Chinese; minority 
nationalities 

Europe. See Eastern Europe; under names 
of individual countries; Western Europe 

exports, xxiv, 223, 297; agricultural prod- 
ucts, 270, 295, 321, 346; alcoholic bever- 
ages, 322; crude oil and petroleum, 326, 
352-53; manufactured goods, 352; mili- 
tary equipment, 332; rare metals, 309; 
tea and silk, 290; textiles, 320, 353 



fa (School of Law), 8, 10, 508 

family life: ancestor worship, 132, 146; 
birth control programs, 62, 75-78; effect 
of communes on, 44; kinship principles, 
131-32; marriage, 131, 132, 139; and 
nonstandard family forms, 130, 131; 
role of the household, 126-27, 130-32, 
138, 139-40; rural society, 130-32; size, 
130, 138; and social stratification, 
109-10; urban areas, 138-40 

Fan Memorial Biological Institute, 377 

Fang Yi, 384, 394 

Federal Republic of Germany. See West 

Germany 
feudalism, 6-7 
film industry, 195-96 
First Workers' and Peasants' Army. See 

Red Army 
fisheries, 292 

"five anti" movement. See "wu fan" 

movement 
Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, 45, 

480-81; and Third World relations, 497 



715 



China: A Country Study 



five-year plans. See development plans 

food {see also grain): consumption, 209, 
251-52, 288; and internal migration, 
79-80; post-World War II, 214; pro- 
duction, 321-22; rationing system, 118; 
shortages, 44, 210, 218, 273 

Foreign Affairs College, 484 

Foreign Affairs Small Group, 482, 486, 
488 

foreign debts, 348 

foreign exchange, 209; administration of, 
230, 244, 351; credit card for, 245; 
reserves, 347 

Foreign Investment and Control Com- 
mission, 349 

foreign investments, 221; categories of, 
348; and the Civil Code, 427-28; con- 
stitutional framework, 424; government 
policy, 218; industry loans and credit, 
309; joint ventures, xxxiii, 207, 226, 
260, 309, 433; legalization of, 226; spe- 
cial economic zones for, 226, 228 

foreign policy, xxvii, xl-xli, 473-503; 
Chinese nationalism and, 476-78; con- 
stitutional framework, 424; decision- 
making processes, 481-88; developed 
nations, 498-501; diplomatic relations, 
xli, 473; economic modernization as 
basis, 473; embassies and consulates, 
484; Europe, 500-1 ; Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence, 45, 480-81, 497; 
influence of ideology, 478-81; interna- 
tional organizations, 501-3; Japan, 
499-500; Mao's Theory of the Three 
Worlds, 497; opening up policy, xxxvi, 
455; opposition to imperialism, 479; 
organizations involved in, 482-88; 
"people-to-people" diplomacy, 485- 
86; pragmatic shifts in, 480; Soviet 
Union, xl, 46, 488-91; special adminis- 
trative regions, 434; support for world- 
wide revolution, 479-80; Taiwan, xl, 
45; territorial cessions, 26; territorial 
integrity goals, 477; Third World, 
495-98; training of personnel, 484; 
United States, xli, 45, 51, 492-95; with 
the West, 51 

foreign technology. See scientific and tech- 
nological developments 

foreign trade, xxiv, 21, 22, 209, 344-54; 
ancient period, 12-13, 17, 18, 345; 
banking structure for, 351 ; corporations 
and enterprises, 349, 350, 351-52; 



decentralization of, 349-50; expansion 
of, 224-25, 226, 346; export-import 
patterns, 352-53; and gross national 
product (GNP), xxiv, 345-46; histori- 
cal overview, xxxii, 344-47; "open 
cities," 348; opening up policy, 346- 
47; organization, 349-52; policy, 230, 
347-48; post-Mao, 222; reform poli- 
cies, 454-55; special economic zones, 
348; trade deficits, 347; trading part- 
ners, 353-54; world ranking, 347 

foreigners, 3, 476; campaigns against, 
28-29, 40-41; early assimilation of, 
xxxii, 3; rejection of Western philoso- 
phies, 375-76; traditional view of, 4, 
475; unequal treaties with, xxxii, 476 

forestry, 292 

Four Modernizations, xxxiii-xxxvii, 54- 
58, 62, 221, 275, 409; economic poli- 
cies, 222-23; education policies, 
153-54, 168-69; effect on local admin- 
istration, 430; historical antecedents, 
xxxi; ideological basis, xxxiv; industry, 
304; labor force changes, 409; national 
defense, 552; politics of, xxxv, 445, 
446, 454, 462-65; and population 
growth, 76; role of intellectuals, 182, 
409; science and technology policy, 
308, 373, 382-83 

France, 21, 330, 501; exports from, 295; 
military ties with, 581; and Vietnam, 
26 

Freedom Land (Kalayaan), 65 
Fu Xi, 186 

Fujian Province, 226, 234, 269, 433, 579; 

agricultural crops, 290; import-export 

companies, 349 
Fushun, 305, 324 



Gang of Four, 53, 55, 57, 88, 142, 190, 
213, 240, 383, 507, 518; arrest of, 551; 
control of militia, 528; economic goals, 
221-22, 239; effect on industry, 303-4; 
trial of, 56, 522 

Gangdise Shan, 67 

Gansu Corridor, 68 

Gansu Province, 11, 68, 213; industry, 
325; population, 78; rural incomes, 258 

Gao Gang, 42 

General Administration of Civil Aviation 
of China (CAAC), xxv, 229, 356, 
363-64 



716 



Index 



General Administration of Customs, 230, 
350, 351 

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), 348, 502 

geography, xxi, 62-71; boundaries, 64- 
65; size, xxi, 64; terrain and drainage, 
65-71; territorial waters, 69, 71 

Germany, war with, 32 {see also West 
Germany) 

Gongren Ribao (Workers' Daily), 184, 185 

Gorbachev, Mikhail S., xl, 491; on 
border disputes, 64-65 

government {see also cadre system; Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP); local adminis- 
tration; National People's Congress 
(NPC); State Council), xxvi, 39- 41, 
409-10, 421-34; administrative struc- 
ture, xxvi, 81, 88, 100-1; agricultural 
role, 127-28, 271-81; Central Military 
Commission, 424-25, 485, 553, 556; 
and Confucianism, 17; decentralization 
of authority, 411; economic role, 228- 
31; elections, 410; establishment of the 
People's Republic, xxxii, 39-40; estab- 
lishment of the republic, xxxii; interna- 
tional recognition, 40; judicial system, 
427-28; Legalism doctrine, 8, 10; under 
Mao, 39-53; and minority nationalities, 
86-88; under the Nationalists, 34-39; 
post-Mao, 53-54 

grain {see also agriculture): consumption 
rates, 251; corn, 288-89; hybrid rice, 
285; imports, 273, 288; pricing policy, 
246, 248-49, 277; production, 251, 
272, 286-90; rice, 268, 288; soybeans, 
289; wheat, 269, 270, 288, 295 

Grand Canal, 14, 17, 18, 68 

Great Britain, 21, 501; and Burma, 26; 
and Hong Kong, 26, 434, 477-78; mili- 
tary ties with, 581; trade with, 22-23; 
and Xizang, 31 

Great Leap Forward, xxxii-xxxiii, 43-46, 
99, 216-18, 240; and agriculture, 44; 
economic management, 216-18, 239; 
economic repercussions, 44-45, 272- 
73, 465; education policies, 153; effects 
on science and technology, 373, 380; 
industry, 44, 302-3, 312; and judicial 
system, 514-15; literary restrictions, 
188-89; political consequences, xxxii- 
xxxiii, 45; Soviet reactions to, 489 

Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. 
See Cultural Revolution 



Great Wall, 11, 14, 36, 68 
Great Wall Card, 245 
Great Wall Industrial Corporation, 350, 
573 

Greater Hinggan Range, xxii, 66, 68 
Group of 77, 502 

Guangdong Province, xxxix, 71, 226, 
234, 269, 355, 433; agricultural crops, 
290; economic growth, 128, 149; for- 
estry products, 292; import-export 
companies, 349; standard of living, 
119; textile production, 320 

Guangming Ribao (Enlightenment Daily), 
199, 438 

Guangxi-Zhuang Autonomous Region, 
355; agricultural crops, 290; economic 
subsidies, 86; population, 84, 85; tex- 
tiles, 320 

Guangxu, 28 

Guangzhou, 228, 245, 348; industry, 318; 
military region, 561; as seat of govern- 
ment, 32, 33, 34; textiles, 321; trade, 
21, 22 

Guizhou Province, 24; agricultural crops, 
290; economic subsidies, 86; population 
settlement, 84, 85; textile production, 
320 

Gulf of Tonkin (Beibu Wan), 327 
Guo Moruo, 188 

Guomindang, xxxii, 30, 31, 32-33, 34- 
35; and Chiang Kai-shek, 33-34; and 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 
37, 38-39; and intellectuals, 180; legal 
system, 509; public policing, 526; Red 
Army support, 545; Revolutionary 
Committee, 419; scientific policy, 376- 
77; suppression of warlords, 509 

Guowuyuan Gongbao (State Council Bulle- 
tin), 439 



Hai He, 69 

Hainan Island, xxi, 71, 81, 84, 328, 579; 
change in status of, xxxix; PLA seizure 
of, 546 

Han Chinese {see also minority nationali- 
ties), 12, 24, 84; attitudes towards 
minorities, 87, 99-100; diversity and 
unity of, 101-3 

Han Dynasty, xxxi, 10, 11-13, 14, 525; 
cultural developments, 186-87, 197; 
legal system, 508 

Han Fei, 8, 10 



717 



China: A Country Study 



Han Yu, 187 
Hangzhou, 198 
Hao, 6 

Hao Jianxiu, 420 

Harbin, 61; industry, 314, 315, 316, 319 
health care, xxii, 62, 90-96; AIDS pro- 
grams, 92; barefoot doctor system, 91, 

94- 95; facilities, 94; personnel, 92, 238; 
preventive measures, 91; rural areas, 
91, 94-95, 259; traditional medicine, 

95- 96; urban areas, 259 
Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace {see 

also Taiping Rebellion), 24 

Hebei Province, 52; industry, 324; tex- 
tiles, 320 

Hefei, 388 

Heilong Jiang, xxi, 21, 26, 64, 71, 576 

Heilongjiang Province, xxi, 11, 64, 71, 
81, 234; agricultural crops, 290; min- 
ing industry, 324 

Henan Province, 5, 7, 69, 343, 396; 
agricultural crops, 290 

Himalayas, 65, 66, 67 

historiography, 12; Marxist model, 4; 
post-Mao Zedong, 4-5 

Honduras, 498 

Hong Kong, 23, 418, 500; arrangements 
for return of, 477-78; Joint Declaration 
on, 434; joint ventures with, 33 1 , 348; 
migration to, 83; trade relationship, 
xxiv, 353 

Hong Lou Meng (Dream of the Red Cham- 
ber), 187-88 
Hong Xiuquan, 23-24 
Hongqi (Red Flag), 439 
Hongshui He, 330 

household production responsibility. See 
baogan 

housing: construction, 254; egalitarian 
standards, 136; income subsidies, 256; 
investments in, 276-77, 322-23; living 
space, 254-255, 322; private owner- 
ship, 255; shortage, 136; urban society, 
135, 136-38; and work units, 122 

Hu Qiaomu, 183, 462 

Hu Qili, xxxvii, 184 

Hu Shi, 188 

Hu Yaobang, xxxvii, 53, 54, 56, 185, 

192, 409, 413, 415, 438, 449, 453, 454; 

as chairman, 57; political reforms, 461; 

resignation of, xxxv, 228, 262, 446, 462 
Hua Guofeng, 52, 53, 55, 240, 447, 551, 

590; economic policies, 222; judicial 



reforms, 516; removal of, 449, 450; 

resignation as chairman, 57; science 

policy, 384 
Huabei, 327 
Huai He, 69, 362 
Huai He Plain, 362 
Huaihai Economic Zone, 343 
Huang Hai, 68, 71 

Huang He, xxii, 3, 64, 68, 330; embank- 
ment concerns, 68 
Huang He Valley, 5 
Huang Xing, 29 

Huangpu, xxv; military academy {see also 
Whampoa), 33 

Hubei Province, 30; industry, 306, 325; 
textiles, 320 

Hunan Province, 24, 34, 35, 545 

Hundred Days' Reform, 28-29 

Hundred Flowers Campaign, 42-43, 181, 
513-14; cultural developments, 190; 
and scientists, 379 

Hundred Schools of Thought, 7-10; con- 
tributions to literature, 186 

Huolinhe, 575 



immigration, 83-84 

Imperial China, 11-13; civil bureaucracy, 
106-8; civil rights, 508-9; dynastic gov- 
ernments, 11-30; foreign policy, 476, 
479; legal system, 508-9, 525-26; 
mutual aid groups, 526; tributary sys- 
tem, 13 

Import-Export Control Commission, 349 
imports, xxiv; aircraft, 316; barley, 295; 
chemical fertilizer, 282; chemicals, 318; 
18th century, 22-23; food, 352; grains, 
210, 218, 288, 295; iron and steel, 312, 
313, 352; machinery and equipment, 
219, 221, 222, 352, 403; metals, 309; 
minerals, 326; opium, 22-23; pulp and 
paper, 320; raw cotton, 289; sugar, 
290, 295; textiles, 352 
income, 255-59; agricultural, 226, 257- 
58; benefits and subsidies, 235, 255-56; 
bonus system, 224; collectively owned 
industries, 236; disparities, 119, 207, 
228, 257-58, 262; equalization goals, 
115, 213; and family size, 130-31; 
growth rate, 216; minority areas, 86; 
nonagricultural rural enterprises, 
258-59; private sector, 256-57; rural 
areas, 126, 277; state-owned industries, 



718 



Index 



235, 255; urban society, 135, 256; work 
units, 121-22 

India, 14; border dispute, 45-46; foreign 
relations, 496, 498; People's Liberation 
Army activities in, 549; as security 
threat, 578; Tibetan refugees in, 45 

Indonesia, 498, 580; alleged subversive 
activities in, 480, 496 

industry {see also defense industry), xxiii, 
301-33; chemical fertilizer plants, 282; 
collective ownership, 235-36, 305; con- 
struction, 322-23; economic reforms, 
119, 224, 226, 301; energy, 326-31; 
energy shortages, 302, 310; geographi- 
cal distribution, 234-35, 305-6, 307; 
government policies, 215, 304, 306; 
and gross national income, 234; handi- 
crafts, 215; heavy, deemphasis of, 223- 
24, 225, 301; historical trends, 302-4; 
internal trade, 340-42; investments in, 
118, 135, 216-17, 226, 303, 304, 308- 
9; "iron rice bowl" system, 302; labor 
force, 234-36, 309; manufacturing, 
310-22; market forces, 301, 304; min- 
ing, 324-26; nationalization, 42, 112, 
114, 214; organization of, 305; owner- 
ship of, 235, 305; post- World War II, 
302; pricing policies, 248; production 
rates, 216, 219, 221, 222-23, 302-4; 
raw materials, 309-10; research and 
development, 306-8; resource alloca- 
tion system, 229-30; rural, 331-32; 
"rural economic unions," 236; service, 
304; small-scale, 219; sources of capi- 
tal, 308-9; Soviet influence, 41; state 
ownership, 235, 305; taxation, 242; 
technology level, 208, 261, 306-8 

inflation, 207, 214, 228, 249-50 

Inner Mongolia {see also Nei Monggol 
Autonomous Region), 32 

Institute of Criminal Police, 533 

intellectuals; "antibourgeois liberaliza- 
tion," 182-83; campaigns against, 4, 
41, 182-83; and the Chinese Com- 
munist Party, 42, 116; Confucian in- 
fluences, xxxi, 376; and the Cultural 
Revolution, 181; exodus of, 180; under 
Four Modernizations, 181, 409, 447; 
government policy towards, 180-85; 
and the Hundred Flowers Campaign, 
181; limits on free expression, 184; 
manual labor, 47-48, 115; post-Mao 
encouragement of, 154, 182-85, 383; 



"spiritual pollution" campaign, 183- 
84, 457 
Intelsat, 367 

internal migration, xxxiii, 78-81, 117-18, 
271; frontier regions, 81; limitations, 
80; political expulsions, 79 

internal security, 47, 525-37; citizen's 
involvement in, 527, 534-37; counter- 
intelligence operations, 533-34; grass- 
roots organizations, 534-37; mediation 
committees, 536-37; militia units, 527, 
528; mutual surveillance, 534; revolu- 
tionary committees, 527; security sys- 
tem, 529-33 

internal trade, 209, 337-44; agricultural 
goods, 337-40; commercial depart- 
ments, 214, 338; economic zones, 342- 
43; free-market activities, 228, 338, 
340; industrial goods, 340-42; lateral 
economic cooperation, 342-43; nation- 
alization, 42; pricing policies, 338, 340, 
342; rationing, 338; retail sales, 343- 
44; state distribution system, 340, 342 

International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), 502 

International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
497; membership, 347-48, 502 

International Olympic Committee, 502 

Iran, military exports to, xli, 332, 573 

Iraq; arms sales to, 573; labor force 
requests, 83 

iron and steel industry, 310-13; reserves, 
309 

"iron rice bowl," xxxiii, 392; system, 302 
irrigation, 216, 270, 274, 284; origins, 7 
Israel, xli, 498 
Italy, military ties with, 581 

Jammu, 65 

Japan, 3, 16, 18, 26; Chinese students in, 
375; foreign relations, xxvii, 474, 498; 
influences of, 29; invasion of China, 
499; joint ventures with, 348; and 
Manchuria, 36; peace treaty with, 499- 
500; scientific cooperation, 396; and 
Taiwan, 499, 500; technology exports 
from, 308, 330; trade with, 219, 295, 
313, 326, 353, 500; unequal trade 
treaties, 345; wars with, xxxii, 31-32, 
-36-38, 180, 448 

Ji Dengkui, 55 

Jiamusi Airport, 364 



719 



China: A Country Study 



Jiang Jieshi. See Chiang Kai-shek 
Jiang Qing, 48, 50, 53, 56, 57, 189, 190, 
528 

Jiangnan, 308, 376 

Jiangsu Province, 343; economic growth, 
128, 149; industry, 308, 327; textiles, 
320, 321 

Jiangxi Province, 35, 36, 45, 234, 417, 
545 

Jianyang, 198 

Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily), 
182, 183, 199, 438 

Jiefangjun Wenyi (Liberation Army Liter- 
ature and Art), 182 

Jieziyuan Huazhuan (Manual of the 
Mustard Seed Garden), 195 

Jilin Province, 81, 234; agricultural crops, 
290; industry, 318 

Jin dynasty, 13 

Jinan, 561 

Jinggang Mountains, 545 
Jinmen, 45 
Jinxi, 318 

Jiulong. See Kowloon 

Jiusan (September Third) Society, 419-20 

Journal of Radio and Television ( Wuxian- 

dian Yu Dianshi), 196 
judicial system, xxvi-xxvii, 427-28, 
507-40; Civil Code, 427-28; civil 
rights, 513, 516, 518; Common Pro- 
gram, 511; courts, 427, 522-25; crimi- 
nal code, 508, 513; ideological basis, 
509-11; law enforcement, 525-37; legal 
profession, 510-1 1 , 521-22; legal stat- 
utes, 518-21, 537-38; legal training, 
507, 513, 539; local level, 507; Organic 
Law, 427, 431; penal system, 537-40; 
procuratorates, xxvii, 507, 511, 518, 
519-20, 529; public education, 511; 
reforms, xxxvi, 507-8, 512, 516-17; 
Soviet model, 510, 512; under the State 
Constitution, 515-22 
Junggar Basin, 67, 327 
junzi (ruler's son, gentleman), 8 



Kaifeng, 198 

Kailas Range, 66 

Kailuan, 312, 324 

Kalayaan (Freedom Land), 65 

Kang Sheng, 50, 56 

Kang Youwei, 28 

Kashi Airport, 364 



Kashmir, 65 

Kazaks, 84, 86, 88 

Kexue (Science), 376 

Khmer Rouge, support for, 580 

Khrushchev, Nikita, 45, 489 

Kinmen. See Jinmen 

Kissinger, Henry A., 493 

Kong Zi. See Confucius 

Korea, 3, 13, 14, 16; and Japan, 26; 
Koreans in China, 86 

Korean War, 499, 502, 584; Chinese 
involvement in, 40, 489; PLA deficien- 
cies in, 547; trade repercussions, 501; 
Unites States stance on, 492 

Kosygin, Aleksey, 490 

Kowloon, 26 

Kublai Khan, 16 

Kunlun Mountains, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69 
Kuomintang (KMT). See Guomindang 
Kuwait, 330 

labor force {see also cadre system; income; 
"iron rice bowl"; scientific and tech- 
nical personnel), 88-90; age break- 
down, 90; agriculture, xxiii, 90, 208, 
231, 268, 270-71; building materials 
industry, 319; and the Chinese Com- 
munist Party, 116-17, 148; contract 
system, 458-59; educational level, 90; 
electronics industry, 317; hereditary job 
transmission, 142-43; industrial sector, 
xxiii, 234-36, 309; job assignments, 
140-42, 172-75, 398; job mobility, 
148; lawyers, 508; nonagricultural rural 
enterprises, 234, 259, 271; private sec- 
tor, 256; productivity, 210; rural unem- 
ployment, 80, 81; service sector, 135, 
136, 138, 238; shortage of skilled work- 
ers, 209, 221, 261-62, 309; state farms, 
234; state vs. collective employment, 
115-16; trade and transportation sec- 
tors, 337; trade unions, 420; urban 
unemployment, 309; women, 74, 135, 
144-45; work units (danwei), 114-16 

lakes, salt, 68 

land reform, 41, 55, 112, 214, 267; 
administrative structure, 127-28; 
Agrarian Reform Law of 1950, 41, 
271-72; collectivization, 124-25, 272; 
and corruption, 128; decollectivization, 
125-26, 127-28, 134; establishment of 
state farms, 272; goals of, 124-25, 



720 



Index 



271-72; mutual aid system, 214, 272; 
social consequences of, 112, 133-34 

language, 35; Han Chinese, 101; minor- 
ity, 87; pinyin, 179; putonghua (common 
spoken language), 161, 179; reform 
plan, 179; spoken, 102; telegraph trans- 
mission of, 367; written, 102, 179 

Lanzhou, 561; industry, 314 

Lao Zi (Old Master), 10 

Laos, military ties with, 580 

leadership, 413, 415; ancient kings, 6; col- 
lective, 411, 450-52, 463; constitutional 
framework, 423; cult of personality, 
451; need for central control, 462-63; 
prohibition of cults, 411; succession 
issue, 465; tianming doctrine, 6 

Leading Group for Science and Technol- 
ogy, 394 

League of Left- Wing Writers, 188 

League of Nations, 36 

Legal Affairs Commission, 519 

legal statutes: civil cases, 521; counter- 
revolutionary activities, 537; criminal, 
518, 520-21, 537; Electoral Law, 519; 
of limitation, 520; Organic Law, 519 

Legalism. See School of Law (fa) 

Legation Quarter, 29 

Lhasa: airport, 364; riots, xxxix 

li (propriety), 508 

Li Bai, 187 

Li Guixian, xxxix 

Li Hongzhang, 25 

Li Peng, xxxvii, xxxix 

Li Si, 10 

Li Teng-hui, xl 

Li Xiannian, xxxvii, xxxviii, 53, 413, 

462; visit to United States, 495 
Liang Qichao, 28 
Liaohe, 327 
Liaohe Basin, 326 

Liaoning Province, 81, 234, 245, 309, 
392; industry, xxiii, 308, 310, 324; tex- 
tiles, 320 

Liberation Army Daily. See Jiefangjun Bao 
Liberation Army Literature and Art. See 

Jiefangjun Wenyi 
libraries and archives, 200-2; foreign 

access to, 202 
Liji (Record of Rites), 186 
Lin Biao, 45, 47, 48, 50, 57, 181, 213, 

586, 590; death of, 51; "Long Live the 

Victory of People's War," 480, 496; 

military coup by, 448; military policies, 



51, 548; political involvement of, 549, 
550; trial of associates, 56; "war prepa- 
rations" campaign, 550 

Lin Zexu, 22 

Linyi, 328 

literacy, 110; adult classes, 178; rate, 179; 
rural areas, 159, 270 

Literary Gazette. See Wenyibao 

Liu Shaoqi, 42, 46, 57, 448; chairman, 
45; and the Cultural Revolution, 48, 
49; economic policies, 213; Mao's 
ideology and, 47; reinstatement of, 56 

livestock, xxiv; dairy and poultry sector, 
291; draft animals, 291; feed mills, 
291-92; hogs, 291 

local administration (see also government), 
428-34; constitutional provisions, 428, 
432; decision-making authority of, 429, 
430-31; elections, 431; mass organiza- 
tions, 432; people's congresses, 429-30; 
reforms, 431-34, 436-37; special eco- 
nomic zones, 433; staffing reorganiza- 
tion, 435; standing committees, 429, 
430; xiang (administrative towns), 429, 
432 

Long March, 416, 448, 545 
Lu Xun, 188 

Liida, 328; industry, 318; Soviet Union 

naval base at, 489 
Lunyu (Analects), 186 
Luo Ruiqing, 527 

Luoyang, 7, 13, 396; industry, 314, 319 
Lushan, 45 



Ma Ding. See Song Longxian 
Ma-tsu. See Mazu 

Macao, 21, 418, 500; arrangements for 
return of, 477-78; Joint Declaration on, 
434 

machine-building industry, 313-17; elec- 
tric power equipment, 315; electronics 
equipment, 317; machine tools, 314- 
15; metallurgical equipment, 316; mod- 
ernization efforts, 314-15; plants, 314; 
technological limitations, 313; transpor- 
tation equipment, 315-16 

Malaysia: military cooperation, 580; 
sovereignty claims, 65 

Manchukuo, 36 

Manchuria, 21; and Japan, 32; secession 

of, 26; Soviet troops in, 26, 38 
Manchurian Plain, 68 



721 



China: A Country Study 



Manchus. 18-20, 29: and Hundred Days' 
Reform opposition. 28: invasion of 
China. 4: and Russia. 21 

"mandate of heaven." See tianming 

Manual of the Mustard Seed Garden 
{Jieziyuan Huazhuan), 195 

manufacturing industry: building materi- 
als. 318-19; chemicals. 317-18: con- 
sumer goods. 322: food processing. 
321-22: iron and steel. 310-13: 
machine building. 313-17; pulp and 
paper. 319-20: textiles. 320-21 

Mao Dun. 188 

Mao Zedong, xxxii. 4. 5. 34. 167. 213. 
215. 304. 445: agricultural policies. 
277; as chairman, 42; and the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP). 37. 39. 47; 
condemnation for Cultural Revolution. 
57: death of. xxxiii, 52-53: earthquake 
prediction interest. 382: and the econ- 
omy. 216: education policies. 47-48, 
141-42: foreign policv. 477. 480. 481. 
497; Great Leap Forward program. 44, 
45: ideology, 446-47, 465-66; military 
strategy. 545-46, 548; mobilization of 
peasantry. 35-36: "On the Correct 
Handling of Contradictions among the 
People." 181 . 514; opposition to legal 
system. 510. 514; personal security 
force. 528: political style, 466: popula- 
tion growth policies. 75-76: Quotations 
from Chairman Mao. 49: reassessment of. 
56. 409. 422. 447. 466; science and 
technology policies. 378: self reliance 
policies. 455: and the Socialist Educa- 
tion Movement. 47: and Soviet rela- 
tions. 488-89: "Yan'an Talks on 
Literature and Art." 188 

Mao Zedong Thought, xxvi. 37. 54. 410: 
and constitutional developments. 515; 
and foreign policy. 478-81: reassess- 
ment of, 446-47. 465-69: social values. 
468 

maritime shipping. See ports and shipping 

Marshall, George C 39 

Marxism-Leninism, xxvi. 410, 456: and 
foreign policv. 478-81: under Mao 
Zedong. 37: reassessment of, 446-47, 
465-69 

mass organizations (see also under names 
of organizations). 418-21; constitu- 
tional framework. 422; local level, 432; 
mobilization of, 43; origins of. 114; 



support for modernization program. 

420, 421 
Master Kong. See Confucius 
May Fourth Movement. 32. 35. 198 
Mazu. 45 

media. See communications 

Meishan. 198 

Mencius. 8. 186 

Meng Zi. See Mencius 

metallurgical industry. See mining industry 

Miao people. 85 

Middle East. 14. 16 

Middle Kingdom, xxxi, 4. 475, 476 

migration. See emigration; immigration: 

internal migration 
military technology. See defense industry 
minerals. See mining industry- 
Ming dynasty. 18. 476; cultural develop- 
ments. 195: science and technology. 
374-75 

mining industry, 6. 324-26: coal, 260, 
324; equipment production. 316: ex- 
ports. 309: iron and iron ore. 7. 260. 
324-25: mechanization level, 324; 
resources, xxiii, 67. 325-26: technologi- 
cal innovations, 308; transportation, 
324; uranium. 326 

ministerial portfolios, xxxviii-xxxix; 
agriculture, animal husbandry, and 
fishery, 229, 278. 592; astronautics, 
570. 574: coal industry, 390; commu- 
nications. 356. 433: culture. 183. 198. 
484; education. 157. 539: electronics 
industry, 390. 570: finance. 229. 243. 
390. 483: foreign affairs. 483-84. 486; 
foreign economic relations, xxiv, 224, 
230. 349. 350. 351. 483. 484. 488; for- 
eign trade. 224. 349: justice, 523: 
machine-building industry, 313; metal- 
lurgical industry. 313: national defense. 
483. 484-85. 524, 547, 555, 559: 
nuclear industry-, 570: ordnance indus- 
try. 350. 570. 574: posts and telecom- 
munications, 364, 366; public health. 
75. 90-91: public security, xxviii, 525, 
529, 531, 592; radio, cinema, and tele- 
vision. 178. 196. 366: 440: railways, 
316. 356: state security, 525, 533-34; 
supervision. 410. 427: water resources 
and electric power. 229. 284. 330 

minority nationalities (see also Han 
Chinese), xxii; armed forces involve- 
ment. 566: assimilationist policies, 



722 



Index 



87-88, 99-100; and border security, 
86; economic assistance to, 86; educa- 
tion system, 159; government policy 
towards, 87-88, 100-1, 430; and Han 
dominance, 101; Kazaks, 84, 86, 88; 
Korean, 86; Miao, 85; Mongol, 86; 
radio services, 368; settlement patterns, 
61, 84-86; Shan, 86; Tibetans, xxii, 
xxxix, 84, 85, 88; Uygurs, 84, 86; Yao, 
86; Yi, 85; Zhuang, 85 

Mo Zi (Mo Di), 10, 186 

modernization movements (see also Four 
Modernizations; Great Leap Forward); 
effect of traditional attitudes, 105-6; 
Hundred Days' Reform, 28-29; role of 
education, 155-56; Self-Strengthening 
Movement, 24-26 

Moism, 10 

monetary system. See currency 
Mongolian People's Republic, xl, 20; 
autonomy of, 31; boundary issues, 477; 
Chinese control of, 477; Chinese recog- 
nition of, 477 
Mongols, 18, 86; invasion of China, 3-4, 
16-17 

Multi-Fiber Agreement, 348 
Muslim Rebellion, 24 
mythology, 3 

Nan Ling, 69 

Nanchang, 34; uprising, 545, 568 

Nanjing, 13, 18, 24, 30, 34, 328; chemi- 
cal industry, 318; military region, 561; 
research laboratory, 376; treaty of, 23; 
university, 184 

Nanjing Regional Economic Cooperation 
Association, 343 

Nanning, 319 

Nansha Islands, xl, 65, 576, 579 
National Book Coordination Act of 1957, 
200 

National Conference of Party Delegates 
(1985), 413, 415 

national defense (see also armed forces), 
xxvii-xxviii, xxxvi-xxxvii, 543-93; for- 
eign cooperation, 579-82; foreign port 
calls, 581-82; India and, 578; security 
threats, 575-76; Soviet Union and, 
576-77; Taiwan and, 579; Vietnam 
and, 577-78 

National Defense Council, 547 

National Defense Industries Office, 391 



National Defense Science, Technology, 
and Industry Commission (NDSTIC), 
305, 400; responsibilities, 390-91, 559, 
569-70 

National Defense University, 564 
National Library of China, 201 
National Natural Science Foundation, 
399, 400 

National Party Congress, xxvi, 50, 51-52, 
53, 57, 412-13; eleventh, 409, 412; 
twelfth, 412, 452, 465; thirteenth, 
xxxiv, xxxvii 
National People's Congress (NPC), 42, 
45, 421, 424-26; committees, 410, 425; 
economic planning, 229, 239; elections, 
410; Foreign Affairs Committee, 482; 
foreign policy role, 482, 482-83; fourth, 
52, 221; fifth, 54, 56, 57-58, 222; func- 
tions, 424; judicial role, 512-13, 518; 
local-level congresses, 429-30; mem- 
bership, 425; minority representation, 
88; Organic Law of, 519; reduction of 
power, 515; sixth, 159; seventh, 
xxxviii; Standing Committee, 425, 482 
National People's Party. See Guomindang 
National Revolutionary Army, 33 
National Science Conference, 383-84, 
384 

nationalism (see also Guomindang), 33, 
108, 180; and foreign policy, 476-78 

natural disasters, 68 

natural resources, xxxiii, 260, 309-10, 
325-26 

navy (see also armed forces), 544, 560; 
blue-water capabilities, 587; defense 
expenditures, 569; force structure and 
equipment, xxvii, 585-87; manpower, 
546, 562; Naval Academy, 586; rank 
system, 568; South China Sea activi- 
ties, 579; Soviet assistance, 586; terms 
of service, 566; uniforms, 568 

NDSTIC. See National Defense Science, 
Technology, and Industry Commission 

Nehru, Jawaharlal, 496 

Nei Monggol Autonomous Region (see 
also Inner Mongolia), xxiv, 64, 71, 213, 
234, 269, 270, 429; agricultural crops, 
270, 290; economic subsidies, 86; hous- 
ing conditions, 255; industry, 306, 318, 
325; population, 78, 84, 85; supported 
migration to, 81 

Nei Monggol Plateau, 68 

Nepal, 477 



723 



China: A Country Study 



Netherlands, 501 

New China Booksellers (Xinhua Shu- 

dian), 198 
New China (Xinhua) News Agency, 199, 

439 

New Culture Movement, 32, 188; influ- 
ence of Western music, 193; Western 
painting techniques, 195 

"New Long March," 384 

New Territories (see Kowloon) 

New Zealand, 498 

newspapers, 199-200 

Nian Rebellion, 24 

Ningxia-Hui Autonomous Region, 68, 86 

Nixon, Richard M., 499; visit to China, 
51, 367, 493 

Nonaligned Movement, 502 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 501 

North China Plain, 66, 68, 69, 283; 
agricultural crops, 270, 288, 289; irri- 
gation needs, 284; population, 78 

North Korea. See Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea 

Northeastern Economic Zone, 342 

Northern Song dynasty, 15 

Norway, 330 

NPC. See National People's Congress 
(NPC) 

nuclear science, 330, 391; industry appli- 
cations, 330-31; Soviet weapons agree- 
ment, 46; weapons production, 301, 
306, 587-88 

Office of the Science, Technology, and 
Armaments Commission, 391 

oil and natural gas: exports, 326; foreign 
explorations, 327; offshore exploration, 
327, 328; pipelines, 328; refineries, 
328; reserves, 310, 326, 327, 328; 
South China Sea, 579 

Opium War, 22-23, 345 

Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries, 502 

Outer Mongolia. See Mongolian People's 
Republic 

overseas Chinese, 419; radio broadcasts to, 
368; support for 1911 revolution, 29-30; 
United Front Work Department, 482 

Pakistan, 64; boundary issues, 477; for- 
eign relations, 498; military ties with, 
573, 580, 582 



Palestine Liberation Organization, sup- 
port for, 480 
Pamir Mountains, xxi, 64, 67 
Pangu, 5 

paper industry, 319-20 
PAPF. See People's Armed Police Force 
(PAPF) 

Paracel Islands. See Xisha Islands 

Paraguay, 498 

Pearl River. See Zhu Jiang 

peasants (see also rural areas), xxxiii, 108-9; 

and the Chinese Communist Party, 42; 

community structure, 133- 34; family 

life, 130-32, 139; mobilization of, 

35-36, 43-44; settlement patterns, 61; 

"spiritual pollution" campaign, 183-84, 

457; stratification, 109 
penal system. See crime and punishment 
Peng Dehuai, 45, 54, 57, 548, 590 
PengZhen, 46, 425, 429, 460, 462, 520; 

judicial reforms, 519 
Penghu Islands, 26 

People's Armed Police Force (PAPF), 
533, 544, 561, 562, 592-93 

People's Bank of China, xxxix, 214, 243, 
351, 483; economic planning role, 229, 
240, 244 

People's Communes. See communes 
People's Construction Bank, 243, 244, 
351 

People's Daily (Renmin Ribao), 199, 431, 
438 

People's Insurance Company of China, 
243, 352 

People's Liberation Army (PL A) (see also 
armed forces), xxvii, 39, 220, 415; cam- 
paigns, 549, 551; and the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP), 543; Chinese 
People's Volunteers, 40; civilian atti- 
tudes towards, 557; Cultural Revolu- 
tion and, 48, 49, 549-51; discord in, 
50-51; 8341 Unit, 528; General Logis- 
tics Department, 556, 559, 561; Gen- 
eral Political Department, 555, 559, 
560-61; General Staff Department, 
555, 559, 560; law enforcement respon- 
sibilities, 516-17, 527; manpower, 544, 
562; newspaper, 199, 438, 560; origins, 
545; promotion of professionalism, 51; 
rank system, 567-68; revolutionary 
committees, 550; role in politics and 
government, 464, 550-51, 555-56; 
Sino-Indian border deployments, 578; 



724 



Index 



Sino-Soviet border deployments, 577; 
uniforms and insignia, 568; weapons 
production, 571 
People's Literature Publishing House, 
199 

People's Publishing House, 199 
petroleum, 260 

Philippines: imports from, 295; military 
cooperation, 580; sovereignty claims, 
65 

philosophical developments {see also Con- 
fucianism): Hundred Schools of 
Thought, 7-10; Neo-Confucianism, 
16, 20 

PLA. See People's Liberation Army (PLA) 
police, xxviii, 507; Anti-Rightist Cam- 
paign mandate, 515; auxiliary units, 
528; People's Armed Police Force, 533, 
544, 561, 562, 592-93; powers and 
responsibilities, 511, 515, 527, 529-32; 
recruitment, 532-33; residential con- 
trol, 530-31; secret police, 531; Soviet 
model, 527; training, 533; use of 
weapons and force, 532 
Political Bureau, xxxvii-xxxviii; foreign 
policy role, 482; membership, xxxvii, 
413, 556; Standing Committee, 413, 
451 

political developments {see also Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP); govern- 
ment), xxvi, 445-69; cadre system, 
434-37, 463-64; campaign against 
"bourgeois liberalization," 461-62; 
centralization, 42; collective leadership, 
450-52, 463; decentralization of power, 

445, 459-60; democratic centralism 
principle, 411, 426, 454, 461, 520; di- 
rect elections, 461 ; economic emphasis, 
54, 447; imperialism, 11-30; Marxism- 
Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, 410, 

446, 447, 456, 465-66; militarization 
of, 463, 464, 543; opening up policy, 
454-55; political consciousness, 213; 
political parties, 419- 20, 422; public 
participation, 418-21, 461, 463; re- 
forms, 450-52, 453-55, 460-62; repub- 
licanism, 29-31, 39-40, 509; role of 
ideology, 466-69; "spiritual pollution" 
campaign, 457; stability vs. revolution, 
447; transition to socialism, 41-43 

Polo, Marco, 17 

population, xxii, xxxiii, 61-62, 72-88; 
birth control programs, 75-78, 131; 



birth rates, 74-75; density and distri- 
bution, 78-84, 231; growth rates, 261; 
infant mortality rates, 209; life expec- 
tancy, xxii, 90, 209, 240; minority 
groups, 61; mortality rates, 74, 94; 
1982 census, 61-62, 72-74; 1953 cen- 
sus, 41; urbanization, 81-83 
ports and shipping, xxv, 21; construction 
projects, 357; container ship fleet, 362; 
inadequacies, 356, 362-63 
Portugal, 21; and Macao, 434, 477-78 
postal services, 364-65; labor force, 236 
procuratorates {see also judicial system), 
xxvii, 518; elections, 520; functions, 
511, 529; Organic Law of, 519-20 
Production and Construction Corps, 575 
Propaganda Department, 482 
Protect the Emperor Society. See Bao- 

huang Hui 
Protocol of 1901, 29 
public order. See internal security 
publishing industry, 198-99; nationaliza- 
tion, 198; restrictions, 198 
Puyi, 30, 36 



Qaidam Basin, 67, 327 
Qiao Shi, xxxvii 
Qilian Shan, 67 

Qin dynasty, 11, 13, 508, 525; cultural 

developments, 193 
Qin Jianxian, 185 
Qin Ling, 69, 268 

Qing dynasty, xxxi, xxxii, 18-30, 365, 
475, 509; cultural developments, 190; 
legal system, 525-26; science and tech- 
nology, 374-75 

Qing Zang Plateau, xxii, 65, 66, 68, 69, 
71 

Qingdao, xxv; industry, 305; textiles, 321 
Qinghai Province, 65, 328; chemical 

industry, 318; economic subsidies, 86; 

minority riots, xxxix; population, 78, 

85; supported migration to, 81 
Qinghai-Tibet Plateau. See Qing Zang 

Plateau 

Qinghua University, xxii, 172 
Qinhuangdao, xxv, 319, 328 
Qinshan, 331 
Qu Yuan, 186 
Quemoy. See Jinmen 



725 



China: A Country Study 



radio and television. See communications 

Radio Beijing, 366, 368; foreign language 
broadcasting, 368 

railroads, xxv, 236, 357-58; imported 
technology, 316; investments in, 315- 
16, 358; passengers, 357 

Railway Engineering Corps, 561, 575 

rainfall, 71, 268 

Rao Shushi, 42 

Reagan, Ronald, 495 

Record of Rites (Liji), 186 

Red Army (see also People's Liberation 
Army (PLA)), 37; Long March, 36, 
545; political alignments, 545; theatri- 
cal productions, 192 

Red Flag. See Hongqi 

Red Guards, 166, 220, 527. 550; Mao 
Zedong and, 48-49; origins, 48 

Reference Information. See Cankao Ziliao 

Reference News. See Cankao Xiaoxi 

reform movements. See modernization 
movements 

religion, 145-46; anti-Christian cam- 
paigns, 28-29, 40-41; Buddhism, 
xxxii, 13, 14. 16. 145, 146: Christi- 
anity, 146; and Confucianism, 104; and 
the Cultural Revolution. 101; Islam, 
17; Jesuits in China, 22: Lamaism 
(Tibetan Buddhism), 17; Nestorians, 
17; political organizations, 421; Protes- 
tants, 145; rituals, 146; Roman 
Catholicism, 17, 22, 145; Taoism. 145. 
146 

Renmin Ribao (People's Daily). 199. 431. 
438 

Republic of Korea. 498 

Republic of Vietnam (see also Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam; Vietnam); and 
France, 26; PLA actions, 551 

research (see also scientific and technologi- 
cal developments): agriculture, 285-86; 
Chinese Communist Party role, 308, 
382; colleges and universities, 391-92; 
duplication of, 387; emphasis on applied 
work, 382, 384; funding. 392; industry, 
306-8; institutes, 387, 387-92; military 
sector, 390-91; peasants mobilization 
for, 382; planning, 392-93; in produc- 
tive enterprises, 392 

roads, xxv, 237, 357, 360 

Roman Empire, 13 

Romania, 501, 580 

ru (School of Literati). 8 



Ruijin, 36 

rulers. See leadership 

rural areas (see also agriculture; peasants): 
cadres, 127-28; class labelling, 125: 
community structure, 133-34; con- 
sumer services, 344; corruption, 128; 
education, 160, 162, 164; family orga- 
nization. 126-27, 130-32; household 
investments, 276-77; incomes, 257-59; 
industrial enterprises, 331-32; market- 
ing system, 277; marriage, 132; non- 
agricultural concerns, 232, 234, 278, 
292, 294; regional inequalities, 455; 
and religion. 146; township govern- 
ments. 279 

Russia (see also Soviet Union): imperialist 
actions, 26; and Outer Mongolia. 31: 
trade with, 21; unequal treaties with. 
490 

san fan ("three anti") movement, 41. 512 
san min zhuyi (Three Principles of the Peo- 
ple). 29-30 
satellites, 301. 306. 332. 366. 367. 390: 

ground stations, 367 
Saudi Arabia. 498; military exports to. xli 
School of Law (fa). 8, 10, 508 
School of Literati (ru), xxxi. 8 
Science Society of China. 376 
scientific and technical personnel, 386-87. 
401-3; consulting work, 402; emigra- 
tion of, 377; employment rewards, 398. 
399; exchanges with Soviet Union. 378: 
job assignment system, 398, 402; job 
mobility. 401-3: lowering of profes- 
sional standards, 380; misemployment 
of, 398; overseas training and research. 
395. 396: professional bodies. 394-95: 
"reds" versus "experts," xxxiii-xxxiv. 
379-82: shortages, 386, 404 
scientific and technological developments 
(see also research), xxvi, 373-404; 
achievements, 373; in agriculture, 211, 
231; ancient period, 12, 13, 14: applica- 
tions to industry, 377-78, 398; commer- 
cialization of, 398-99, 400; coordinating 
bodies, 393-95; emphasis on practical 
benefits, 385; exchange agreements and 
joint projects. 384. 396-97. 400-1. 
403-4; funding. 398-99. 400: historical 
developments. 374-86: in industry. 211. 
306-8: institutions, 376-77. 387-92: 



726 



Index 



international ties, 384, 395-97; Joint 
Commissions, 378, 396; under Mon- 
gol rule, 17; organization/administra- 
tion of, 379, 387-95; planning, 378, 
384-85, 392-93; popularization of, 
376, 395; pre-1949, 374-77; reforms, 
xxxvi, 382-86, 397-403, 447; role of 
politics, 383; 1950's, 377-79; separa- 
tion of research from production, 378; 
Soviet influences, 377-79, 385, 491; 
technology markets, 400^1; technology 
transfer, xxiii, 378, 403-4; Western 
influences, 24-25 
Second Artillery Corps. See Strategic Mis- 
sile Force 

"second revolution." See Four Moderni- 
zations 

Secretariat, 409; foreign policy, 482; func- 
tions, 451; International Liaison De- 
partment, 482; membership, 415; 
reestablishment of, 415, 451, 463 

Self-Strengthening Movement, 24-26; 
scientific developments, 375 

Sha Yexin, 192 

Shaanxi Province, 6, 36, 68, 213, 274, 

357, 417; industry, 325 
Shan people, 86 

Shandong Province, 146, 270, 328, 343; 
agricultural crops, 277, 290; industry, 
325; and Japan, 31-32; textiles, 320 

Shang dynasty, 5-6 

Shanghai, 33, 52, 61, 81, 195, 199, 228, 
237, 245, 348; aircraft production 
plants, 316; education system, 159; 
import-export companies, 349; in- 
comes, 258; industry, xxiii, 235, 305, 
314, 315, 318; population, 82; textiles, 
320, 321 

Shanghai Communique, 493 

Shanghai Economic Zone, 342 

Shanghai Municipal Library, 201 

Shanghai People's Art Theater, 192 

Shangwu Yinshuguan (Commercial 
Press), 198, 199 

Shantou, 34, 226, 348, 433 

Shekou, 433 

Shengli, 326, 327, 575 

Shenyang, 159, 199, 245; industry, 305, 
314, 316, 318; military region, 561; 
population, 78, 82 

Shenzhen, 159, 226, 348, 433 

Shijie Jingji Daobao (World Economic Jour- 
nal), 185 



Shijing (Classic of Poetry), 186 
shipbuilding, 316 

Shuihu Zhuan (Water Margin), 546 
Shujing (Classic of Documents), 186 
Siberia, 21 

Sichuan Basin, 69, 269; population, 78 

Sichuan Province: agricultural crops, 290; 
industry, 306, 315, 318, 324; natural 
gas reserves, 327; textiles, 320 

Signal Corps, 575 

Sima Qian, 12 

Sino-Burmese Boundary Treaty, 65 
sinocentrism, 4, 6, 13, 475; and foreign 

policy, 475-76 
socialism. See political developments 
Socialist Education Movement, 47, 153 
society {see also cultural developments; 
family life; Han Chinese; income; mi- 
nority nationalities; religion; standard of 
living), xxii, 99-150; attitudes towards 
government, 105-6; class structure, 15, 
39; and communist party membership, 
11*6-17; and Confucianism, 104-6; elite 
groups, 106, 107; ethnic tension, 101; 
government control, 112-14; guanxi (per- 
sonal connections) system, 122-24; in- 
equalities, 147, 149; language, 101; 
moral deterioration, 228; 1950's trans- 
formation of, 112-14; organizational 
units, 114-16; partible inheritance sys- 
tem, 106; political life, 121; reeducation 
of, post-Mao, 445; role of women, 143; 
rural, 124-34; social stratification, xxxi- 
xxxii, 108-10; "spiritual pollution" 
campaign, 183-84, 457; traditional cul- 
ture, 103-12; upward mobility, 109, 
110, 112, 117, 120, 125; urban, 134-43; 
urban-rural distinctions, 117-19, 212, 
231; welfare programs, 115, 122; and 
work units, 120-24 
Society of Righteousness and Harmony, 

28-29 
Somalia, 573, 580 
Song Defu, 420 

Song dynasty, xxxi, 14-16, 525; cultural 

developments, 187, 194 
Song Jiaoren, 30 
Song Longxian, 184-85 
Song Yu, 186 
Songs of Chu (Chuci), 186 
Songhua Jiang, 326 
South Africa, 498 



727 



China: A Country Study 



South China Sea, 71, 544, 551, 576; oil 
reserves, 327; strategic importance of, 
579 

Southern Song dynasty, 15 
Southwestern Economic Zone, 342 
Soviet Union {see also Russia), 64; border 
disputes, 21-22, 49, 64-65, 477, 
489-90, 491, 492, 576; and Chinese 
warlords, 32-33; economic assistance, 
215; foreign relations, xxvii, 46, 474, 
488-91; ideological differences, 489-90; 
industrial assistance, 215, 302; invasion 
of Czechoslovakia, 49; labor force 
requests, 83; and Manchuria, 38; mili- 
tary cooperation, 547, 580; normaliza- 
tion of relations, 491; nuclear energy 
assistance, 330; political support, 
32-33; scientific and technical assis- 
tance, 306, 377-79, 396; as security 
threat, 490, 544, 575-77; and Sino- 
Indian border dispute, 46; suspension 
of aid from, 46; and Taiwan, 46; trade 
with, 44, 295, 346, 353, 491; war repa- 
rations, 214 
Spain, 21, 498 

Special Economic Zones Office, 351 
"spiritual pollution" campaign, 183-84, 
457 

Spratly Islands. See Nansha Islands 
Spring and Autumn {Chun Qiu), 186 
Spring and Autumn Period, 7-10 
Sri Lanka, military ties with, 580, 582 
standard of living, 209, 250-59; clothing, 
252, 254; cost of living, 257; food con- 
sumption, 251-52; government ser- 
vices, 136; and increased expectations, 
147; minority areas, 86; regional vari- 
ations, 117-18, 119, 259; rural society, 
126-27; urban society, 117-18, 259 
State Administration of Exchange Con- 
trol, 351 

State Administrative Council {see also State 

Council), 39 
State Capital Construction Commission, 

240 

State Constitution of 1982 {see also consti- 
tutional developments), 421-24; articles 
of, 422-24; civil rights, 521; economic 
provisions, 228-29; foreign policy pro- 
visions, 434; legal reforms, 521-22; 
local administration provisions, 428 

State Council, xxvi, 42, 426; birth con- 
trol activities, 75; economic role, 229, 



239; Foreign Affairs Coordination 
Point, 486, 488; foreign policy role, 482, 
483; foreign trade organizations, 349, 
351; Hong Kong and Macao Affairs 
Office, 426, 434; and industry organi- 
zation, 305; job contract system, 148; 
membership, 426, 427, 452; restructur- 
ing of, xxxviii; role in decision making, 
451-52; science and technology respon- 
sibilities, 388; Special Economic Zones 
Office, 426; task forces, 426-27 
State Council Bulletin. See Guowuyuan 
Gongbao 

State Economic Commission, 229, 240, 
278, 392; foreign trade role, 351; 
science policy role, 390 

State Education Commission, 153, 155, 
157, 166, 176, 178, 484; research fund- 
ing, 392 

state farms, 234, 272, 278 

State Import and Export Commodities 
Inspection Administration, 351 

State Machine-Building Industry Com- 
mission, 229, 305, 570 

state-owned enterprises: farms, 234, 272, 
278; income, 235, 255; industry, 235, 
305; labor force, 309 

State Planning Commission, 350, 392; 
agriculture and, 278; economy and, 
229, 240; foreign trade planning, 351; 
science policy role, 390 

State Science and Technology Commis- 
sion, 385, 388, 402; responsibilities, 388, 
390, 392; science policy role, 303, 390 

State Statistical Bureau, 209; agriculture 
and, 278; economy and, 229, 240; labor 
force statistics, 90, 386 

stock exchanges, 245, 458 

Strategic Missile Force (Second Artillery 
Corps), 544; equipment, xxvii; expen- 
ditures, 569; manpower, 562; nuclear 
forces, 587-90 

subway system, 358, 360 

Sudan, military ties with, 573, 580 

Suez Canal Authority, 362 

Sui dynasty, 13-14 

Sun Yat-sen, 29, 30, 32-33 

Sun Yixian. See Sun Yat-sen 

Sun Zi, 545 

Sungari River. See Songhua Jiang 
Supreme People's Court, xxvi, 513, 
515-16, 517, 523; military trial respon- 
sibilities, 524-25 



728 



Index 



Taihang Shan, 66 
Taipei, 39 

Taiping Rebellion, 23-24, 25, 546 

Taiwan, xxxii, 39, 45, 416, 418, 498, 544; 
and Chinese national defense, 579; and 
Japan, 26, 499, 500; reunification goal, 
xl, 478; as security threat, 576; sover- 
eignty claims, 65; Soviet stance on, 
489; United States assistance to, 492 

Taiwan Democratic Self-Government 
League, 420 

Taiyuan, 305, 314, 318 

Talas, 14 

Tanaka, Kakuei, 367 

Tang dynasty, 14, 476; cultural develop- 
ments, 187, 194 

Tangshan, 52, 68; earthquake, 222, 304, 
312, 324; industry, 235, 312 

Tanzania, 580 

Taoism, 10; cultural influences, 187; 
Mongol persecution, 17 

Tarim Basin, 12, 67, 327 

taxation, xxxvi, 242; revenue sharing, 243 

technological developments. See research; 
scientific and technological develop- 
ments 

technology transfer. See scientific and tech- 
nological developments 

telecommunications. See communications 

Television University, 369 

televisions. See communications; con- 
sumer goods and services 

textiles, 301, 304; cotton, 320-21; produc- 
tion, 320, 321; silk, 320, 321 

Thailand, 295, 580 

Third World (see also under names of 
individual countries): arms sales to, 
573; Bandung conference, 495, 496; 
China/Soviet Union competition in, 
490; Chinese militancy in, 496; cultural 
ties with, 497; foreign relations, 495- 
98; military ties with, 332, 544, 580; 
trade with, 354, 498 
"three anti" san fan movement, 41, 512 
Three Kingdoms (Wei, Shu, and Wu), 13 
Three Principles of the People (san min 

zhuyi), 29-30 
Tian Jiyun, xxxix 
Tian Shan, 67 

Tiananmen Square, 53, 54; demonstra- 
tions, 52, 516, 528 

Tianjin, xxv, 24, 29, 38, 81, 228, 348; 
education system, 159; import-export 



companies, 349; industry, 235, 305, 
314, 318; population, 82; textiles, 321 

tianming ("mandate of heaven"), 6, 8, 52 

Tibet. See Xizang Autonomous Region 

Tibetan people, 84, 85, 88 

tithing. See bao jia 

Tongmeng Hui (United League), 29-30 
Tongzhi Restoration, 25 
topography, xxii 

tourism, xxiv, 17, 354; travel restrictions, 
xxxix 

trade. See foreign trade; internal trade 

trade unions, 420; strike rights, 422-23 

transportation, xxv, 209, 212, 236-37, 
354-64; aircraft production, 316; auto- 
motive industry, 315; bridges, 361; civil 
aviation, 363-64; development proj- 
ects, 304, 356-57; disruptions during 
Cultural Revolution, 220; freight traf- 
fic, 355-56; inadequacies, 119, 354; 
inland waterways, 355, 361-62; invest- 
ments in, 356; labor force, 236; mari- 
time shipping, 316, 356, 362-63; 
non-motorized vehicles, 361; ownership 
and control, 356; passenger traffic, 356; 
post-World War II, 214; railroads, 
315-16, 355, 357-58; roads, 355-56, 
360-61; subways, 355, 358, 360 

Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and 
Mutual Assistance, 40, 50, 489, 547; 
termination of, 55, 576 

Treaty of Kiakhta, 21 

Treaty of Nanjing, 23 

Treaty of Nerchinsk, 21, 26 

Treaty of Shimonoseki, 26 

Triad Society, 21 

tributary system, 13 

Twenty-One Demands, 31-32 

Ulanhu, 88 

unemployment. See labor force 
United Front Work Department, 482 
United Kingdom. See Great Britain 
United League (Tongmeng Hui), 29-30 
United Nations (UN): economic and tech- 
nical assistance from, 502; and the 
Korean War, 40; membership of, 481, 
497, 502; scientific activities, 396 
United States: aid to Nationalist govern- 
ment, 38-39; Chinese students in, 83, 
173, 375, 386; diplomatic recognition 
by, 55; emigration policies, 83; foreign 



729 



China: A Country Study 



relations with, xxvii, xli, 492-95; joint 
ventures with, 348; military ties with, 
544, 581; normalization of relations, 
51, 474, 490, 492, 493; nuclear energy 
agreement, 494; "open door" Chinese 
policy, 26, 28; scientific and technologi- 
cal cooperation, 308, 330, 396; security 
ties, 494; technology transfer limita- 
tions, 495; Three Mile Island incident, 
330; trade with, xxiv, 295, 353-54, 
494, 495; troops in China, 38 
universities and colleges (see also educa- 
tion), 166-67, 376; administration of, 
168; admission rates, 170; adult stu- 
dents, 171; during Cultural Revolu- 
tion, 221, 380; enrollment plans and 
policies, 167, 169-73; funding of, 
168-69; institutions, 171; minority 
groups, 170, 171; political criteria for 
admission, 167; prestige, 169, 174; 
radio and television services, 440; 
research, 391-92; scholarship and loan 
system, 173; staffing, 172; student 
exchanges, 222; study abroad, 173-74 
University of Police Officers, 533 
University of Public Security, 533 
urban areas: administrative barriers, 118; 
ancient period, 15; cost of living, 257; 
decentralization of power, 459-60; 
economic subsidies, 136; education sys- 
tem, 162; family life, 138-40; house- 
hold registers, 134-35; housing, 135, 
136-38; reforms, 458-59; service sec- 
tor shortages, 136, 138 
Uruguay, 498; diplomatic relations with, 
xli 

Ussuri River. See Wusuli Jiang 
Uygurs, 84, 86 

Vavilov, Sergei I., 378 

Vietnam (see also Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam; Republic of Vietnam), xl, 3, 
13, 16, 18; border wars with, 55, 
552-53; as security threat, 577-78; 
sovereignty claims, 65; War, 492 

Wan Li, xxxix 
wan xi shao campaign, 74 
Wang Dongxing, 53, 55 
Wang Hongwen, 50, 56 
Wang Mang, 13 



Wang Meng, 185 
Wang Zhen, 449 

warlords, xxxii, 13, 31, 509; opposition 
to, 32-34 

Warring States Period, 7, 186, 508; philo- 
sophical developments, 7-10 

Water Margin (Shuihu Zhuan), 546 

waterways, xxv, 69, 236-37; freight traf- 
fic, 361-62 

Way (dao), 10 

Wei Valley, 6 

welfare programs. See society 
Wenyibao (Literary Gazette), 183 
the West (see also under names of individ- 
ual countries), 20; adoption of Western 
technology, 24-25; attitudes towards, 
4, 51; cultural contamination, 455, 456; 
cultural influences, 207; trade relation- 
ship, 21, 22; travel in China, 17 
West Germany: foreign relations, 498; 
labor force requests, 83; technology 
imports from, 308; trade relationship, 
xxiv, 354 

Western Europe (see also under names of 
individual countries): Chinese students 
in, 375; foreign relations, 500-1; mili- 
tary ties with, 544, 581; scientific 
cooperation, 396; trade relationship, 
219, 354 

Western Han dynasty, 344-45 

Western Zhou dynasty, 7 

Whampoa Military Academy, 33 

White Lotus, 21 

wildlife, 71-72 

women, 143-45; armed forces, 565, 566; 

discrimination, 144-45; education, 

143, 144; labor force, 74, 135, 144-45; 

status, 143-44, 513 
work units. See danwei (work units) 
World Bank, 160, 209, 314, 351, 373, 

497; membership, 347, 502; research 

assistance, 392 
World Economic Journal. See Shijie Jingji 

Daobao 

World Intellectual Property Organiza- 
tion, 502 
World War I, 31-32 
writing system, 3, 6 
Wu De, 55 
Wu Di, 12, 193 

wu fan ("five anti") movement, 41, 512 

Wu Han, 48 

Wu Xueqian, xxxix, xli 



730 



Index 



Wuchang, 30 

Wuhan, 34, 199, 245; industry, xxiii, 
305, 306, 313, 314, 319; revolt, 586 
Wusuli Jiang, 26, 49, 64, 576 
Wuxi, 308 

Wuxiandian Yu Dianshi (Journal of Radio 
and Television), 196 

xenophobia, effects of, 221 
Xia dynasty, 5 

xiafang (down to the countryside), 43-44; 

and school reform, 47-48 
Xiamen, 159, 226, 348, 433 
Xiamen Construction and Development 

Corporation, 433 
Xi'an {see also Chang'an), 6, 37, 199, 245; 

industry, 314, 316 
Xianggang. See Hong Kong 
Xie Fuzhi, 50, 56 

Xinhua (New China) News Agency, 199, 
439 

Xinhua Shudian (New China Booksel- 
lers), 198 

Xinjiang Military District, 592 

Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region, 
xxii, 12, 26, 71, 234, 270, 328, 592; 
agricultural crops, 290; economic sub- 
sidies, 86; ethnic tensions, 88, 101; 
housing conditions, 255; population, 
78, 84; strategic importance of, 578; 
supported migration to, 81 

Xisha Islands, 65, 576, 579; PLA actions, 
551 

Xizang Autonomous Region, xxii, 20, 40, 
45, 65, 270; alleged human rights vio- 
lations, xli; autonomy of, 31; control 
of, 477; economic subsidies, 86; ethnic 
tensions, 101; housing conditions, 255; 
minority discontent, xxxix, 88; PLA 
activities, 546, 549; population, 78, 84; 
strategic importance of, 578 

Xun Zi, 8 



Yalii Jiang River, 40 
Yalta Conference, 38 
Yan'an, 36, 37 

Yan'an Forum on Literature and Art, 193 

Yang Dezhi, 552 

Yang Shangkun, xxxviii 

Yangtze River. See Chang Jiang 

Yangzhou, 69 



Yanshan, 392 
Yao people, 86 
Yao Wenyuan, 48, 50, 56 
Yao Yilin, xxxvii, xxxix 
Yarlung Zangbo Jiang. See Brahmaputra 
River 

Ye Jianying, 53, 55, 413, 551, 557 
Yellow River. See Huang He 
Yellow Sea. See Huang Hai 
Yi people, 85 

Yihetuan (Society of Righteousness and 
Harmony), 28-29 

Yijing (Book of Changes), 185-86 

Yin dynasty. See Shang dynasty 

Yin Shan, 68 

yin-yang philosophy, 10 

Ying He, 362 

Yining Airport, 364 

young people: armed forces involvement, 
531, 561 ; and crime, 539; and the Cul- 
tural Revolution, 48-49; mass organi- 
zations, 161, 418, 420-21; support for 
Deng Xiaoping, 54 

Young Pioneers, 161, 421 

Yuan dynasty, 16-17, 475; cultural devel- 
opments, 190 

Yuan Shikai, 28, 30-31 

Yugoslavia, 501, 580 

Yunnan-Guizhou Plateau, 66, 69; stan- 
dard of living, 119 

Yunnan Province: agricultural crops, 
290; economic subsidies, 86; industry, 
325; population settlement, 84, 85 

Zaire, 580 

Zambia, 580 

Zeng Guofan, 24 

Zengmu Shoal, xxi 

Zhang Chunqiao, 50, 56, 551 

Zhanjiang, 575 

Zhao Ziyang, xxxv, xxxvii, xxxviii, 56, 
409, 413, 450, 451; background, 450; 
and Chinese Communist Party, 461; 
civil bureaucracy reforms, 434-35; eco- 
nomic policies, 450; foreign policy, 503; 
premier, 56, 450; science policy, 394, 
397; "spiritual pollution" campaign, 
457; visit to United States, 495 

Zhejiang Province, 332; industry, 327; 
textiles, 320, 321 

Zhenbao Island, 49, 490 

Zhongguo. See Middle Kingdom 



731 



China: A Country Study 



Zhongguo Xinwenshe (China News Ser- 
vice), 199, 440 

Zhonghua Shuju (China Publishing 
House), 198, 199 

Zhonghua Xinwenshe. See China News 
Service 

Zhongyuan Basin, 328 

Zhou dynasty, 6-7, 10; cultural develop- 
ments, 193 

Zhou Enlai, xxxi, 39, 50, 57, 181, 215, 
221, 304, 448, 545, 551; and the Cul- 
tural Revolution, 48; death of, 52, 222, 
445; economic policies, 51, 213, 221, 
222; foreign policy, 481, 483-84, 490, 
496; Four Modernizations program, 



52; nuclear energy policy, 330; and the 
People's Liberation Army, 50-51; pre- 
mier, 42; scientific policy, 382-83; 
trade policy, 346 

Zhou Weizhi, 182 

Zhu De, 35, 57, 545; death of, 52 

Zhu Houze, 185 

Zhu Jiang, xxv, 69, 355 

Zhu Jiang Basin, 330 

Zhu Jiang Delta, 327, 343; population, 78 

Zhu Xi, 16 

Zhuang people, 85 

Zhuang Zi, 10, 186 

Zhuhai, 226, 348, 433 

Zuo Zongtang, 25 



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